Photo: Pierre Crom/Getty Images
Many have noted that 2024 will go down as the year of elections, with a record number of citizens around the world having voted by the year’s end. In eastern Europe, Moldova will join this list with their election on October 20, 2024. But this year’s Moldovan election is unique for several reasons, including that the country’s citizens will be voting not only for their next president but also on changing the Moldovan constitution to enshrine EU membership as a goal for Moldova. While recent polling suggests strong voter enthusiasm, high levels of trust in the current president, Maia Sandu, and majority support for joining the European Union, the outcome of these elections is far from certain and of crucial importance to the future of the country. Understanding the nuances of the Moldovan election landscape, including the significant risks of disruption, is important to understanding both the results and the broader implications for the country’s direction.
Q1: Who is running in the Moldovan presidential elections, and how are they polling?
A1: As of September 1, 2024, a total of 27 individuals have submitted paperwork to run for the president of Moldova. The president, who is the head of state in Moldova, is elected for a four-year term. Given the number of candidates in the field, it is likely that no absolute majority will be reached in the first round of the elections, with candidates polling at 1–2 percent taking votes away from the leading candidates. This will likely result in a runoff between leading candidates, which would occur two weeks later, on November 3.
President Sandu, who is representing the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), is polling the highest of all candidates, with more than 30 percent of the vote. Former president Igor Dodon, who was representing the Socialist Party, was previously polling the second highest, with around 20 percent of the vote. Of note, Transnistria and members of the Moldovan diaspora are not included in either of these polls. The importance of these groups in the context of the election is discussed in the last question.
Recently, however, Dodon announced that he would not be seeking election and instead backed the former prosecutor general Alexandru Stoianoglo. Stoianoglo was appointed by Dodon and removed by Sandu over allegations of having accepted a bribe for dropping charges against a Moldovan oligarch. The former prosecutor general is currently on trial for corruption. It is notable that Stoianoglo, as the leading socialist candidate, has said he will support EU integration. This is particularly significant since the Socialist Party in Moldova has long been linked to Moscow, and Moscow does not support EU integration for Moldova. Perhaps this represents Moscow’s attempt to diversify its candidates in Moldova by having a centrist in the mix.
During the last presidential election, PAS and the Socialist Party eventually took, between the two of them, 80 percent of the vote. There is also a likely voting block being organized by fugitive oligarch Illan Shor, who has been convicted by the Moldovan government for his role in the theft of a billion dollars from Moldovan banks. Given the violations of some of the parties Shor has supported, it is unlikely these parties will appear on October’s ballot.
Q2: What is the controversy surrounding political parties and candidates in the October elections?
A2: The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) of Moldova is a national government body tasked with overseeing the electoral process. In the lead-up to the October presidential elections, the CEC has suspended political parties or candidates for reasons including, but not limited to, having greater expenses than income reported, using the resources of a banned party to support their candidacy, and other violations of Moldovan election law. CEC decisions can be appealed in Moldovan courts. But, depending on the findings of the CEC, appeals may not be necessary. For example, the issue may be resolved if candidates can reregister under another political party or if parties submit updated income disclosures.
Much of the activity and controversy surrounding the CEC over the past couple of years has centered around sanctioned oligarch Illan Shor. In 2023, his political party, called the “Sor” party, was declared unconstitutional by the highest Moldovan court, given its repeated violations and refusal to comply with elections law. This was the first time in Moldova’s history that a political party had been banned by the government. While the parliament attempted to ban the leadership of this party from participating as candidates in elections for five years, this individual ban was later overturned.
Shor has continued to fund other political parties, operating in a hydra-like manner. During the current election cycle, the CEC has removed two parties associated with Shor. The decision regarding these two parties’ suspensions, Victorie and Chance, has been upheld in subsequent appeals. It currently remains to be seen which candidates Shor will be backing with public support and funding in the upcoming elections, and what impact his continued disruption efforts will have not only in the October elections but in the 2025 parliamentary elections as well.
Q3: What exactly are citizens voting for or against in the EU referendum?
A3: The ballot in October’s election will include the following language to be voted on by Moldovan citizens: “Do you support Moldova’s accession to the European Union?” This language, which is referred to publicly as the EU referendum, is in support of a bill that would add the following language to the Moldovan constitution: “Reconfirming the European identity of the people of the Republic of Moldova and the irreversibility of the European course; Declaring integration into the European Union as a strategic objective of the Republic of Moldova.” If the phrase above passes the popular vote, the bill as a whole will take effect.
The inclusion of this referendum on the ballot alongside the presidential decision was controversial, as was the specific language that will be seen on the ballot. This change occurred quickly at the end of last year, leading to accusations against the party in power, PAS. Of note, a 2010 referendum in Moldova failed because of a lack of voter participation. After this, there were other attempts to link referendums to national elections prior to the most recent code change.
The controversy and accusations generally centered around the change allegedly occurring improperly and for politically motivated reasons—for example, to use the popularity of EU accession in Moldova to bolster PAS’s own support. Of note, EU accession has consistently polled above 50 percent, whereas President Sandu, PAS’s candidate, has consistently polled around 35 percent. Opposition parties have stated that they oppose the referendum but do not necessarily oppose Moldova joining the European Union, although some also oppose the EU referendum.
The inclusion of the referendum on the ballot required a change to the electoral code to allow for this to occur in tandem with or near the presidential election. Before this change, a referendum was not allowed 60 days before or after a presidential or parliamentary election. The Constitutional Court of Moldova ultimately upheld the change to the law to allow the votes to occur simultaneously; the court also upheld that the language at the ballot box, previously stated above, was sufficient for the implementation of the broader bill.
Q4: What does the diaspora and Transnistrian participation mean for the upcoming election?
A4: Over the past 30 years, the Moldovan population has decreased by almost 25 percent due to emigration, with over one million Moldovan citizens now living abroad. During the 2020 elections, members of the diaspora made up 15 percent of the voters. The diaspora is a notable voting bloc and is expected to strongly support the EU referendum and pro-Western political parties. During the last presidential election, over 90 percent of the diaspora voted for President Sandu in the second round. There have long been efforts to limit the diaspora’s voting ability and scope, with accusations that they are out of touch with Moldova. Some of these Moldovan citizens living abroad will be able to vote by mail, while others will need to go to Moldovan missions, consular offices, or other physical polling stations abroad, which are limited. In the lead-up to the October 2024 elections, there have been an unexpectedly high number of Moldovan diaspora registrations from Russia, leading to questions of potential undue influence on these voters.
Conversely, the almost 300,000 Moldovan citizens in Transnistria will need to travel to Moldova to vote in the October 2024 election. There have been accusations of efforts to leverage the population of Transnistria via the large-scale bussing of voters into Moldova and the perception that they are being paid to dilute pro-Western voting in Moldova. The largely Russian-speaking population there has a significantly more favorable view of the Russian government compared to people residing in the Romanian-speaking areas of Moldova. Of note, in the past Transnistrian turnout has generally been low.
Another Russian-speaking area of Moldova, Gagauzia, has also been at the center of some of the election controversy. This has been heightened by Gagauzia’s governor, Yevgenia Gutsul, who has been publicly critical of President Sandu and EU integration while supportive of Russia, meeting with President Vladimir Putin and supporting Gagauzian citizens receiving payments from the Russian government. Gagauzia has continually been exposed to higher levels of Russian propaganda than elsewhere in Moldova. While both these pro-Russian voting blocs are more likely to affect the presidential elections, rather than the EU referendum, there is concern from EU supporters that they might also derail these efforts.
Q5: What is the likelihood of the elections being disrupted, and how is this likely to occur?
A5: Earlier this year the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada issued a statement about Russian efforts to undermine the upcoming Moldovan elections. This statement follows the local Moldovan elections in the fall of 2023, during which election observers noticed a doubling in election violations as compared to 2019. Russian documents uncovered in 2022 detailing influence operations in Moldova include specifics on funds from the Federal Security Service, a Moscow intelligence agency, earmarked for Moldovan election interference.
There will likely be cyber incidents leading up to the election designed not only to disrupt the election itself but also to undermine voters’ trust in the results. During the 2023 local Moldovan elections, the CEC repelled a significant cyberattack. While this attack did not affect vote totals and occurred after voting had stopped, it did take the elections website offline for a period on the evening of the election. Attacks like these can undermine voters’ faith in election integrity.
There is also likely to be money flowing into Moldova to directly bribe voters, as has occurred in the past. To help stem this tide, the Moldovan Parliament recently passed a law that would fine voters who accept financial incentives to sway their vote. This is not to mention the role of disinformation, such as deepfakes targeting the leading candidate, President Sandu, and EU integration. These disruption attempts leading up to the October elections are a part of the ongoing hybrid war that Russia has been waging in Moldova. It is in Moscow’s interest to undermine faith in Moldova’s democratic process and disrupt its pathway toward EU integration. Regardless of the results of the October elections, it is likely that this disruption will continue into the parliamentary elections and beyond.
Q6: What role does online disinformation play in the Moldovan elections, and what is being done to combat it?
A6: In 2023, it was estimated that Russia spent $50 million on its hybrid war in Moldova, including on efforts related to disinformation. This number is expected to rise to $100 million in 2024. Not all of this spending will support disinformation campaigns; it will also likely be used to fund direct voter bribery, among other methods of illegal influence. Disinformation, however, is rampant in Moldova, where Kremlin-backed narratives fill spaces even outside of elections.
At the center of the online disinformation space is Illan Shor, who has been sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for election interference on behalf of Russia. The majority of Shor’s disinformation-fueled advertising has occurred on platforms owned by Meta, even after Facebook banned Shor from purchasing ads on its site. In July of this year, for example, Shor spent well over 10,000 euros on ads on Facebook. While Shor is not the only sanctioned Moldovan oligarch who has continued to purchase ads on Meta platforms, he is the largest spender.
The Moldovan government, civil society organizations, and independent media all work to combat disinformation in the country. The Moldovan government has taken steps to combat information warfare with the support of Western partners and allies. Combating disinformation while supporting freedoms of speech, press, and expression is always a challenging balance to achieve. Those working to achieve this balance are generally at a disadvantage to those looking to disrupt it for their own malign gains. Moldova will continue to face this struggle as the Kremlin continues to use all means and modes available to continue to disrupt the information space in Moldova for its own gains.
Leah Kieff is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
