The NATO Ankara Summit: “NATO 3.0” in Practice

Introduction 

When NATO was founded, its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, famously remarked that the alliance existed “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” That statement reflected early Cold War realities, but that world no longer exists. The need for a clear political bargain at NATO’s core, however, remains.  

Allies will gather in Ankara, Turkey, this July at a critical moment. NATO faces a war in Europe, renewed instability in the Middle East, and growing internal tension over priorities, burdens, and risk. NATO has endured disputes before, but a lack of unity—if left unmanaged—can weaken deterrence as effectively as military shortfalls. As Wallace Thies suggests, crisis begins when members become indifferent to sustaining the alliance. By that definition, NATO is under strain—but not yet in crisis—despite reporting that the United States will reassess the value of NATO after its war with Iran.  

In a more contested international order, the benefits to the United States of remaining in NATO continue to outweigh the costs, particularly as Europe is stepping up to deliver what U.S. officials have termed “NATO 3.0”—a more European NATO in which allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense. The question, therefore, is not whether NATO should endure, but how it should adapt. A modern update to Ismay’s dictum would be for NATO to keep the Americans committed, the Europeans capable, and the Russians contained.  

External Crisis and Alliance Friction 

The U.S.–Israel military campaign against Iran and Tehran's retaliatory closure of the Strait of Hormuz have produced global economic and security consequences. Global shipping and energy markets have come under pressure, with spillovers into already strained European economies. President Trump called on European allies to deploy naval assets to reopen the strait, framing the crisis as a test of alliance solidarity. The United States has also expressed frustration at the perception that European governments have constrained U.S. operations. 

From Washington’s perspective, the argument is familiar: Europe benefits from global stability underwritten by U.S. power and should shoulder more of the burden when that stability is threatened. President Trump has criticized Europe by suggesting the continent was absent when it mattered, and that it does not truly share the sacrifice. Europeans will push back: Tens of thousands of European troops served in Afghanistan over two decades, hundreds died, and the commitment was sustained long after public support had eroded at home. This complicates the free‑rider narrative and risks undermining cooperation.  

From Europe, the picture looks different. The Iran campaign was launched without allied consultation, rests on contested legal and strategic grounds, and risks diverting attention and resources away from Ukraine. For European leaders already engaged in a difficult domestic debate over sustained defense spending, another major Middle Eastern war is a significant political complication—not a rallying point. 

Internal Strain and Alliance Norms 

These tensions are compounded by a broader strain created by U.S. rhetoric and political pressure concerning Greenland. However serious or tactical such statements may be, this rhetoric heightens sensitivities around sovereignty, consultation, and the boundaries of acceptable behavior within the alliance. 

This context helps explain European reactions. NATO is a defensive pact structured to provide collective protection against specific agreed-upon risks. Article 5 covers the defense of allies against armed attack in Europe and North America; it does not serve as a blanket guarantee for support in wars initiated by individual members, especially beyond the Euro‑Atlantic area. Treating such actions as NATO responsibilities misrepresents both the alliance's purpose and its obligations. 

Expecting automatic access to bases or alliance support for operations beyond the remit of Article 5 is akin to filing an insurance claim for an excluded event and then blaming the insurer when the claim is denied. While the conflict in Iran has global implications, it does not constitute a NATO operation and should not be framed as a test of the alliance. 

That said, the absence of obligation does not imply an absence of cooperation. European allies have provided basing access, overflight permissions, logistical support, defense against drone and missile attacks, and rescue operations. The United Kingdom and France have taken a leading role in organizing a maritime coalition to help secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Such cooperation, however, rests on sovereign consent and political choice, not alliance entitlement. 

With friction now evident, Ankara must serve as a moment of strategic refocusing, returning NATO to deterrence and restoring discipline around how that mission is sustained. 

Americans Committed 

From a U.S. perspective, disengagement from NATO would be a strategic mistake. Washington’s central long‑term challenge lies with China. Managing that challenge depends increasingly on cooperation with capable allies and on Europe doing more in its own region. Russia’s growing military, economic, and technological alignment with China means European and Indo‑Pacific security are no longer separable theaters. A Europe unable to deter Russia would absorb disproportionate U.S. attention, diverting effort away from the Indo‑Pacific. NATO remains a net strategic enabler for the United States. It anchors stability in Europe, pushes deterrence forward, and allows the United States to shape—rather than simply respond to—Eurasian security dynamics. 

A sustained perception of U.S. unreliability in managing the transatlantic relationship would carry its own costs. It could accelerate European efforts to reduce dependence on the U.S. defense industry, increase support for more protectionist procurement frameworks at the EU level, and encourage a gradual strategic decoupling from Washington. Over time, this would weaken interoperability, erode economies of scale in U.S. defense production, and diminish U.S. influence. 

At the same time, the United States retains a central role in shaping any eventual settlement in Ukraine through its escalation management, global leverage, and diplomatic reach. To date, however, U.S.-led efforts have stalled without producing a breakthrough. If such talks resume, the aim should not be to force premature negotiations or trade territory for temporary quiet, but to ensure diplomacy proceeds from a position of strength that only sustained U.S. engagement can underpin. 

In this context, U.S. interests lie in exertion rather than exit: repairing alliance frictions, pressing Europe to assume credible first responder responsibilities, and modernizing NATO. Withdrawal from the alliance would not reduce U.S. burdens; it would multiply them—weakening deterrence in Europe, eroding U.S. strategic leverage globally, and shifting the defense perimeter westward, exposing North Atlantic sea lanes and the Western Hemisphere to greater Russian and allied probing. 

This points to NATO’s central requirement: a Europe capable of acting as a credible first responder. 

Europe Capable  

Ensuring that Europe is capable is not about deference to the United States, but about delivering the forces and readiness NATO requires. Europe’s defense posture is increasingly shaped by the recognition that U.S. commitment cannot be taken for granted, prompting some allies to consider whether Europe could credibly defend itself within NATO if required. The credibility of deterrence will rest on whether European allies can translate ambition and expenditure into usable combat power. 

Prioritization is essential. Europe’s focus must be to sustain Ukraine and deter Russia. Europe has stepped up to show what sustaining Ukraine looks like in practice. In 2025, U.S. aid fell sharply, with Europe providing the majority of military, financial, and economic assistance to Ukraine—reflecting a shift toward first‑responder responsibility for continental security and reducing pressure on U.S. forces. 

Record increases in defense spending are meaningful, but money alone will not close capability gaps. Commitments—including movement toward spending 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035—will only matter if they produce deployable forces aligned with NATO’s defense plans. Readiness must therefore displace inputs as the primary metric, measured in the ability to deploy at speed, sustain under pressure, and regenerate forces under contested conditions—without relying on U.S. reinforcement as the default backstop. 

Capabilities, industry, and resilience are central. Fragmented procurement and short production runs limit Europe’s ability to convert spending into combat power. Industrial capacity—munitions, maintenance, repair, and skilled labor—is now a strategic variable. In this context, Europe is now the primary market for U.S. defense exports, sustaining production lines, strengthening the industrial base, and reinforcing interoperability at scale. This strengthens, rather than dilutes, U.S. readiness. 

The war in Ukraine has also reshaped conflict, with drones, precision strike, and networked intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance driving demand for scalable, attritable mass. NATO modernization must therefore reflect not just more capability, but different capability. 

Cyber defense, protection of critical infrastructure, and civil preparedness are equally essential. Hybrid threats target societies as much as militaries, making civil resilience and continuity of government integral to deterrence. 

European capability also underpins NATO 3.0. A Europe able to act as a first responder enables adaptation in posture and force generation. This is already visible in NATO’s adaptation: new regional defense plans, a higher-readiness force model, and expanded forward presence. European allies are also assuming greater operational roles. These steps mark a shift from burden-sharing in principle to burden delivery in practice. 

Ultimately, while increased defense spending matters, capability will be measured in outcomes: usable combat power, resilient societies, and sustained readiness. If Europe delivers, NATO’s strategic bargain can hold—providing the foundation for effective containment of Russia. 

Russians Contained 

Containing Russia remains NATO’s central strategic task. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine removed any ambiguity about Russia’s willingness to use force to revise the European security order. Today, containment means denying Russia the ability to achieve its objectives by force or coercion. Support to Ukraine remains the most direct and cost‑effective means of achieving this goal. As long as Russia is tied down in Ukraine and paying high costs for limited gains, its ability to threaten NATO territory is reduced—though prolonged conflict carries escalation risks that must be managed. 

A credible containment strategy requires a shared threat assessment, including how adversaries work together. Russia’s (and China’s) support to Iran—including intelligence sharing to target U.S. forces—demonstrates Moscow’s willingness to challenge U.S. interests across regions. These dynamics blur geographic boundaries and raise escalation risks. 

Beyond the conventional domain, Russia relies heavily on hybrid tactics. Cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, energy coercion, and sabotage remain central tools of its strategy. Recent UK warnings about Russian submarine activity near critical undersea infrastructure highlight a key vulnerability. Undersea cables and pipelines underpin economic stability, military communications, and energy security; threats to them represent a direct challenge to NATO resilience.  

Containing Russia is therefore not solely about force posture. It requires protecting infrastructure, improving intelligence sharing, and responding coherently to gray‑zone aggression. Failure risks normalizing coercion and eroding deterrence. In this sense, Europe’s growing defense role is foundational and depends on alignment between U.S. commitment and European capability. Sustaining this balance must be Ankara’s central task. 

Conclusion 

The Ankara Summit is not a referendum on NATO’s relevance, but a test of its discipline. In an era of overlapping crises, deterrence depends on unity, clarity, and capability. The challenge for Ankara is not to redefine NATO’s mission, but to operationalize its modern bargain. 

Priorities for the Ankara Summit should include: 

1. Reaffirm a clear division of labor. Europe should be the first responder for European security, with the United States providing extended deterrence and reinforcement. 
2. Shift from inputs to outcomes. Ensuring higher spending produces deployable forces and sustained readiness aligned to NATO’s defense plans. 
3. Institutionalize lessons from Ukraine and Iran. NATO must apply what it has learned about industrial production, modernization, and resilience, ensuring scalable output and infrastructure protection. 
4. Signal sustained support for Ukraine. Europe is carrying more of the war’s financial burden, but success depends on continued U.S. industrial support.  
    

Ankara must also reinforce that cohesion does not require agreement on every operation. The Iran crisis and the Greenland episode have strained trust; restoring it requires renewed commitment to consultation, transparency, and respect for sovereignty within the alliance. 

If Ankara succeeds in operationalizing this bargain—keeping the Americans committed, the Europeans capable, and the Russians contained—NATO will remain not only relevant, but resilient. Unity is not an aspiration; it is the precondition for deterrence. 

Jonathan Burchell is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.