North Korea: Revisionist Ambitions and the Changing International Order

The emergence of an “Axis of Upheaval” consisting of revisionist states—which, to borrow language from former Secretary of State Antony Blinken, seek to “alter the foundational principles of the international system” while “entrenching autocratic rule” at home—has been embraced by Pyongyang, driven by tangible and intangible security needs, along with tactical and strategic shared interests. The structure, behaviors, and durability of this new geopolitical order continue to evolve as countries probe the risks and benefits of working within a structure designed to openly challenge the rules-based liberal order. Understanding North Korea’s needs and interests can help in assessing the future direction of its behavior and interaction with other revisionist states, and in considering possible diplomatic strategies to counter and deter potentially dangerous outcomes.

Discerning Between Defensive, Coercive, and Offensive Military Needs

The Korean Peninsula has been in a state of armistice for almost 72 years. It has been a period marked by long stretches of peace and stability that have allowed South Korea and other Northeast Asian countries to enjoy remarkable economic growth, stability, and prosperity. Occasional flare-ups resulting from North Korean provocations occur, but over the decades, Pyongyang’s confidence that it faces little military threat from South Korea or the United States has grown, particularly as its repeated lethal and kinetic provocations have gone relatively unpunished by South Korea or the United States in the name of de-escalation and maintenance of the armistice. This is why, in part, North Korea has exhibited no real interest in security guarantees, tension reduction, or confidence-building efforts during multiple rounds of denuclearization negotiations. That reality, coupled with North Korea’s incremental and gradual nuclear and missile development, confirms the National Intelligence Council’s assessment that North Korea’s security needs are not and have not been primarily defensive in nature.

Coercive and Offensive Needs

North Korea’s overarching security objective is to build well-rounded weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional capabilities to coerce and dominate South Korea and potentially, through larger-scale revisionist actions, redefine the balance of power on the peninsula in Pyongyang’s favor. Therefore, enhancing WMD and conventional capabilities is likely what North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seeks in his relations with Russia, highlighting the serious regional security implications in both the near and longer terms.

The 2023 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that, through 2030, “Kim Jong-un will most likely continue to pursue a strategy of coercion, potentially including non-nuclear lethal attacks, aimed at advancing the North's goals of intimidating its neighbors, extracting concessions, and bolstering the regime’s military credentials domestically.” Additionally, it dismissed as “very unlikely” the possibility that Pyongyang was developing nuclear weapons for purely defensive use over the coming decade.

Intangibles Kim Jong-un Likely Seeks in a New Alternative World Order

Over its 30-year nuclear pursuit, North Korea’s strategic ambition has been acceptance as a nuclear power, leading to diplomatic and economic “normalization” for longer-term survival with diminished sanctions and pressure. This was Kim’s goal after claiming in 2017 to have  a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could reach the United States. In 2018, Pyongyang pivoted to diplomacy to mitigate pressure and advance its “responsible nuclear power” status. At the 2018 Singapore Summit with President Trump, Kim aimed to project himself to both domestic and international audiences as the leader of a recognized nuclear power, treated as an equal by the United States. However, this effort ultimately fell short, as evidenced by the failed 2019 Hanoi Summit, where Kim was unable to secure de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status or obtain sanctions relief in exchange for limited and reversible denuclearization measures. Kim told his people to abandon hopes for sanctions relief and improvement of relations with the outside world in his read-out of a major plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea at the end of 2019.

As North Korea began to reengage the outside world in 2023, one question emerged: With whom could a non-denuclearizing North Korea engage? Clearly not South Korea, the United States, or Japan, which all demand denuclearization progress for reconciliation and normalization. Even China, despite its inconsistent sanctions enforcement, insists denuclearization must remain the end goal for the Korean Peninsula, limiting its support for North Korea to avoid straining China-U.S. relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, desperate for munitions to sustain his aggression against Ukraine, was willing to accommodate Kim’s conditions while ignoring the nuclear issue, increasing Kim’s confidence that the changing geopolitical environment would be conducive to his goal of enduring and prevailing through selective engagement without denuclearizing. This confidence has also been bolstered by the Trump administration’s early avoidance of references to denuclearization.

Tangibles Kim Likely Seeks

While there is no concrete evidence yet of the tangible benefits North Korea might ultimately obtain, the surge in cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has provided North Korea with its traditional survival needs and the networks to circumvent multiple UN Security Council sanctions, while becoming one of the most flagrant examples of revisionist countries within the axis.

Iran-DPRK Relations

Pyongyang and Tehran have a history of “significant and meaningful” missile cooperation, particularly North Korea’s support to Iran’s short- and medium-range missile programs. While quality and performance issues and Iran’s relationship with South Korea have, at times, militated against more robust cooperation with North Korea, Pyongyang might turn to Tehran for assistance in areas that could greatly enhance and complement its missile program, such as drone technology. If the new axis tolerates nuclear breakouts and Tehran pursues that path, North Korea could be one of several potential technology, material, and design providers.

China-DPRK Relations

Since the post-Mao era, Beijing has been cautious about empowering North Korea in ways that would bring “conflict and turmoil to the Korean Peninsula,” which Xi Jinping warned China would not allow during his November 2024 meeting with President Biden. Thus, China supports North Korea enough to “survive, but not thrive” as an emboldened Pyongyang strengthens both Seoul’s and Tokyo’s demands for a stronger U.S. military presence in the region, a concern heightened by Moscow’s reported WMD and conventional weapons support to Pyongyang.

Russia-DPRK Relations

Kim appears largely focused on securing WMD, missile, space, and conventional gains from Russia. Enhanced efficiency and quality control in North Korea’s munitions industry will benefit both countries’ munition needs. As Kim and Putin test each other’s reliability, the relationship could move significantly beyond mere transactional, one-off deals and agreements. 

The United States has released details of specific benefits North Korea is receiving from Russia, but of greatest concern is that Russia would help North Korea increase the performance, reliability, and lethality of its nuclear warheads, including reentry vehicle technologies it may not yet have perfected. While Russia may avoid openly supporting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it is less likely to be concerned about supporting its space program, the enhancement of which is necessary for targeting and battle damage assessment. North Korea’s successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite on November 21, 2023, strongly hinted that recent Russian technical support enabled success in an area where North Korea had previously failed. Secretary Blinken’s January 6, 2025, revelation that there is “reason to believe that Moscow intends to share advanced space and satellite technology with Pyongyang” suggests continued Russian support of North Korea’s space program.

Since assuming power in 2011, Kim has focused on modernizing North Korea’s large yet undertrained and underequipped military. Poorly maintained Soviet-era ground, air and air defense, and naval systems had not been modernized for years. While long-range artillery has served as a powerful tool of coercion and deterrence, threatening Seoul and its 25+ million citizens, it alone cannot win wars without “boots on the ground,” meaning a well-equipped and trained conventional force.

It is believed that Kim has been seeking help with ground, air and air defense, and naval systems, to include possible S-400 surface-to-air missile, MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, and even nuclear-powered submarine technology. In the ground domain, North Korea is reported to have provided both M-1978 Koksan 170 millimeter (mm) self-propelled howitzers and 240 mm multiple launch rocket systems to Russia, yielding lessons in tactics and weapons performance.

What might be concluded thus far is that when it comes to Russia’s potential support for North Korea’s WMD and conventional capabilities, Kim Jong-un will need to be practical, and Putin is likely to be conservative. While advanced aircraft are much needed by North Korea, options like MiG-29s and Su-27s—though upgrades—do not reflect an exponential leap beyond what North Korea already possesses, such as older MiG-29s and Su-25s. Perhaps Kim asked for more advanced aircraft and was rejected, settling for the lesser aircraft that is a more practical match for North Korea’s air force needs and life cycle infrastructure. Kim settling for the possible and affordable demonstrates that even the “Axis of Upheaval” is still hierarchical, with stronger powers like Russia and China limiting what they provide to “junior” partners such as North Korea and Iran.

What Kim Might Offer the Axis

Until now, it would have been a stretch to consider any grouping of nations’ interests to be advanced by North Korea’s inclusion. However, Putin perceives diplomatic and symbolic value in Kim Jong-un’s support for Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine. Furthermore, North Korea is serving as an early case study for countries intrigued by transformations in the global order, a perceived weakening of U.S. dominance, and the costs and benefits of aligning with leading revisionist states such as China and Russia. If Putin is serious about promoting this alternative order even beyond the Ukraine conflict, he is likely to see value in sustaining cooperation with North Korea and will not be easily convinced to sell out Kim Jong-un to please Trump. 

Though Pyongyang’s tangible contributions to Russia’s munitions needs may be limited, with reports of outdated and defective shells, its production capabilities and quality are steadily advancing. Foreign Policy has reported that North Korea has provided between 1.6 and 6 million shells to Russia. By being the “nuts and bolts munitions provider” to countries like Russia and Iran, North Korea could secure advanced technologies, materials, and machinery to enhance and modernize its munitions industry. 

North Korea could also be a force provider. It has a long history of sending workers abroad for hard cash, but sending troops to fight alongside Russian counterparts takes this to a new level. Currently, it is believed that 11,000–12,000 North Korean troops have been dispatched to Russia, with some estimates reaching as high as 100,000 troops. As the Korean People’s Army’s warfare experience improves, Kim Jong-un is likely to pursue more opportunities for its people to go abroad to acquire hard cash. Prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 2375 since 2017, expanding the number of North Koreans working abroad will also erode the current sanctions regime writ large, reflecting Kim’s hopes that this newly emerging illiberal order will render current standing UN Security Council resolutions meaningless.

Military Cooperation Going Forward

Based on the level of technologies involved, three broad areas of conventional military cooperation among these like-minded countries can be posited. Cutting-edge technologies are the least likely to be shared among the “Axis of Upheaval” countries, given the unique military advantages, investment, and future sales potential to the technology owner. Low-end exchanges such as basic munitions and spare parts for older legacy systems will continue to be important considering their fundamental role in ensuring success in any extended conflict, and because a distributed production architecture has proven indispensable for sustained military operations.

Between the high-end and low-end capabilities are less high-tech but still crucial capabilities such as drones, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), air defense systems, basic missile components, and other legacy ground, air, and naval systems that enhance conventional capabilities’ lethality. These are capabilities where countries such as Iran and North Korea can provide systems of sufficient reliability to help replenish arsenals depleted by current or recent conflict. Conversely, these are capabilities North Korea would burn through quite quickly in any protracted conflict on the peninsula, necessitating support from outside suppliers. When it comes to North Korea, conventional assistance obtained from Russia is as troublesome as WMD cooperation itself, since conventional weapons are more likely to be used in coercive or even revisionist actions than WMDs.

Worries Looking Forward: Enabled and Emboldened for Revisionist Actions? 

The 2023 NIE judged that North Korea will likely limit its nuclear use to supporting conventional coercive actions, but sees them as less likely than revisionist actions to redefine and dominate the Korean Peninsula’s security status quo. Although most experts assess that a classic unification of the peninsula, similar to the 1950 attempt, is well beyond the Korean People’s Army capabilities, other significant strategic objectives achievable through force could be pursued as North Korea’s nuclear and conventional capabilities expand.

Figure 1: Going Forward: U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Nuclear Use Scenarios 

In both the most likely scenario of coercive use and the much less likely scenario of outright offensive use of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang’s perception of support or tolerance from outside actors, especially Beijing and Moscow (whether as an economic lifeline against sanctions or isolation or through direct military support, including munitions, weapons systems, or even troops, as Pyongyang has done for Moscow over the last two years), serves as an important “driver” of whether Kim Jong-un might go down that path. Enhanced conventional capabilities were also seen as a potential driver in the 2023 NIE, providing Kim more options and greater confidence in maintaining escalation dominance compared to high-risk nuclear weapons. As the use of force for revisionist objectives becomes an accepted norm within the “Axis of Upheaval,” and as Kim grows confident in mutual defense guarantees, such as the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the possibility grows that Kim feels empowered by strengthened capabilities and emboldened to use them. As cooperation grows among axis members over time, even military support from Iran or from China might be perceived by Kim as a possibility during a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

This leads to the “why?” question. What is Kim Jong-un seeking in resorting to either lethal and kinetic coercive actions or more dangerous, larger-scale revisionist ones? Intended outcomes Kim may be pursuing fall along a continuum, as depicted in the chart below.

Figure 2: DPRK Strategic Objectives Through the Use of Force

While not an exhaustive listing of all possible coercive or revisionist actions and intended outcomes, the above graphic is useful in considering what actions short of an all-out war to reunify the Korean Peninsula Kim Jong-un might consider risking to achieve revisionist outcomes of significant strategic value, and that by nature would include either threats or actual use of nuclear weapons to compel capitulation by South Korea. 

Colliding Interests and Diplomatic Windows

Beijing’s response to Putin’s actions against Ukraine serves as a useful example for Kim to consider as he decides how Beijing, Moscow, and other axis members might respond to North Korean aggression targeting South Korea. Xi may have been surprised at Putin’s actions and even concerned about reputational risks of the emerging axis, but it would prove to be overly hypocritical for China to do anything but support Russia’s efforts as it lays the groundwork for its own future actions toward Taiwan. 

Kim Jong-un, meanwhile, likely hopes that the DPRK-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will secure Russia’s support or at least acquiescence in DPRK military actions against South Korea. However, China’s support remains uncertain, as previously mentioned in Xi and Biden’s meeting in November 2024. Doubtlessly, both Xi and Putin remember the Cold War, a system in which Beijing and Moscow felt free to act but sought to keep their satellite states under control to prevent becoming entrapped or entangled. Putin may have acted with confidence that U.S. support to Ukraine would be limited by the absence of a formal mutual defense treaty between Kyiv and Washington. Xi may believe that there are Taiwan scenarios where a lack of U.S. intervention could be confidently guaranteed. Both Xi and Putin likely would be concerned that North Korean revisionist military actions against South Korea would bring an overwhelming—and potentially nuclear—U.S. response that neither wants. Here is where Kim Jong-un’s confidence in an expanded set of options may meet its limits.

This is where there is diplomatic opportunity for the United States to make Beijing and Moscow stakeholders of Pyongyang and its actions, depending on how Trump engages Putin and Xi, and what impact that might have on revisionist bloc dynamics. If Beijing and Moscow are convinced that there would be a price to pay in failing to contain North Korea—a greater U.S. military presence in the region, the possibility of horizontal escalation, etc.—there is a possibility that they may be more inclined to act to contain and discourage Kim before the fact, or be tolerant of U.S. actions in response. Greater pressure will be needed to remind Kim Jong-un that any perceived newly emerging global order does not give him carte blanche to engage in dangerous military actions, and that actions against South Korea will inevitably have global implications beyond the peninsula. At the very least, reminding Beijing and Moscow that there is no scenario for conflict on the Korean Peninsula from which they would be immune to the ramifications requires firm and consistent messaging.

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

The views expressed in this submission are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.