Photo: Leon Neal/Getty Images
Most of the oxygen in the trade room has been taken up recently by the debate over the various section-numbered tariffs—122, 301, and 338. Amid all that, three other things have happened, not exactly under the radar but certainly without as much public notice as the tariffs. All of them suggest growing restlessness with Trump’s tariff policy.
The first was the introduction of legislation by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) to curb the president’s tariff authorities. The bill would require congressional approval for tariffs imposed under Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In addition, it would repeal outright Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which was the basis for the just-expired 10 percent tariffs, as well as Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which is the basis for the just-announced 50 percent tariffs on Canada. To implement the first part, the bill would create a Joint Committee on Tariffs and Trade, composed of five members each from the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. The joint committee would have 30 days to evaluate any administration tariff proposal and decide whether it should be sent to the full Congress for a vote. Finally, the bill would take the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative out of the Executive Office of the President and make it a separate agency. It would also establish an inspector general for the agency.
This bill is not likely to go anywhere anytime soon, particularly as the current Congress nears the end of its lifespan. But Senator Wyden’s position as ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee gives the bill some added heft, particularly if the Democrats take over the Senate in the November midterm elections. It is also a sign that members of Congress are moving beyond simple gestures of protest against the tariffs and are beginning to look for substantive changes that would clearly restore tariff authority to the Congress as the Constitution intended, in this case by simply repealing authorities that Trump has used.
The second is the controversy over one part of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026. While there is broad support for tougher Russia sanctions—the Senate voted 86 to 12 to take up the bill—Senator Wyden and Congressman Richard Neal (D-MA), ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee, have expressed concern about the provision that authorizes the president to impose 500 percent tariffs on Russia and up to 100 percent tariffs on the five biggest purchasers of Russian oil and gas. From a practical point of view, not all of these tariffs are likely to be imposed. The little trade the United States has with Russia currently is mostly fertilizer components and minerals. Additional tariffs on those items would be equivalent to shooting ourselves in the foot. The big oil and gas buyers are China, India, Turkey, and several countries in the European Union, notably France and Hungary. Three of those are NATO allies. As for the others, Trump lately has gone out of his way to avoid additional provocations with China, and the United States is amid negotiating a trade agreement with India, which ostensibly includes its commitment to reduce its Russian oil purchases.
The objection to the provision, however, is not based on its practical effect but on the wisdom, or lack thereof, of granting the president additional tariff authority in the face of substantial evidence he has misused the authority he already has. As with the Wyden legislation, the issue here is reining in the president’s tariff authority.
The third development is a letter sent to Trump by the leaders of two labor unions—the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and the United Steelworkers—expressing concern about the Section 338 tariffs imposed on Canada. The two leaders, whose unions have members on both sides of the border, expressed their support for the long-term constructive relationship the United States and Canada have had but noted that “the U.S. trade relationship with Canada over the last year and a half has been marked more by division than cooperation. On behalf of our members on both sides of the border, we call for renewed engagement and negotiations to return our relationship to a more stable, balanced footing.”
This letter is significant because organized labor, particularly the United Steelworkers, has strongly supported Trump’s trade policy. Their expression of concern suggests some erosion in labor’s support for tariffs, at least with respect to Canada. The letter is carefully phrased, but the message is clear: These tariffs are not good for either Canadian or U.S. workers, and the administration would be wise to try something else. The letter also notes Section 338 requires a 30-day waiting period before tariffs can be imposed, and the two leaders offer to work with the administration during that period to “find a better path forward.”
These three events suggest the people are restless. In truth, they have been privately restless for some time, but now they are coming out of the shadows and staking out positions contrary to Trump’s. This will not lead to immediate change. Trump always resists any opposition and is famously attached to tariffs. But we may be seeing the start of a movement that could grow. Time will tell.
Author’s note: I retired from CSIS on March 29, 2026. I plan to continue writing this column and participating in The Trade Guys podcast, so please continue to read and listen. However, my CSIS email address will no longer be working, so if readers or podcast listeners want to contact me directly, they should do so at [email protected].
William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
