This transcript is from a CSIS podcast published on January 9, 2024. Listen to the podcast here.
Jon Alterman: Rafat Al-Akhali is convener of the Council on State Fragility at Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government and an economic development consultant. He was leader of the youth movement that helped usher in Yemen's transitional government in 2012, and he was Yemen's minister of youth and sports from 2014 to 2015.
Rafat, welcome to Babel.
Rafat Al-Akhali: Thanks, Jon. A pleasure to be here with you.
Jon Alterman: So, for people who haven't really been following Yemen and are now suddenly realizing that there's something happening with the Houthis in the Red Sea, what's your snapshot very briefly of the context that people have to understand about what's happening in Yemen right now?
Rafat Al-Akhali: The important context to keep in mind is the multilayered nature of the conflict that is ongoing. There's a local dynamic with multiple groups which started in 2014, when the Houthi rebels took control of the capital, Sana'a. Since then, that local dynamic, that local civil war in essence, has evolved and multiple local groups have emerged with different lines of fighting or conflict on the ground now. That's one level.
The other level is a more regional level. Back in 2015 a coalition led by Saudi Arabia joined to support the internationally recognized government, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE play a key role there. Of course, there's support from Iran for the Houthi rebels, so that's the regional dynamic. Internationally, there is the United States, the UK, and others who either support the internationally recognized government or support Saudi and UAE in their efforts. Now, you just mentioned with the conflict moving into impacting international maritime, we see more and more internationalization of this conflict.
What is important to keep in mind is that this has been going on for a while. It didn’t start in 2014 or 2011 or even before that in 2002 when the initial wars with the Houthi rebels in Sana'a in the north country started. There were six wars that took place between 2002 and 2008. Before that in 1994, a civil war broke out between the North and the South, which now has its own reflections in this situation. It's a long history going back at least to the '60s and can be traced to these cycles of conflict to today.
Jon Alterman: So let me start by going back twenty years. As you said, the Houthi battle with the central government really began about 2002. About twenty years ago, you went to Canada on a scholarship. You were thinking that you were going to learn how to do technical things. What did you think you'd learn, and what did you learn that you didn't think you'd learn when you left Yemen twenty years ago?
Rafat Al-Akhali: You're right, 2002 was the same year that I started my university in Canada, and I went there to study IT, specifically computer engineering. That's what I thought I will learn, but as soon as I got to Canada, I got to be more involved with student life, student activism, student associations, and so I learned much more on that side than I expected when I first left Yemen.
And that got me to really think about how much Yemeni youth are missing in this kind of university life and also the learning that can happen when multiple people from different places come together. Since I was very interested in joining a lot of these regional conferences and international conferences, I learned a lot and I wanted to make sure that I also take that opportunity back to some of the Yemeni youth.
Jon Alterman: And then you went back to Yemen. You worked in Canada for a while, but you went back to Yemen. There was this student movement that was starting. You became a youth activist. What was that like?
Rafat Al-Akhali: I was lucky enough to be able to go back to Yemen every summer during my studies in Canada. In 2004, I went back to Yemen and started this big youth development conference. We tried to bring together young people from across the country and get them together for a week focusing on different team building skills and leadership skills.
But we still didn't have the political space. It was still very dominated by the political security forces. There wasn't as much freedom for such movements to take place.
Things evolved in Yemen, and we evolved with it. I was later involved at the end of 2009 in setting up another youth movement, Resonate Yemen, to try and get Yemeni youth voices into the discourse on terrorism. Back then we thought it would be a long-term effort to mobilize youth voices to convince public policy makers in Yemen that they should listen to youth.
We started that off in 2010 and then the Arab Spring started in 2011, and we suddenly moved from a point where there was a lot of disengagement from youth not feeling that they can contribute or influence or do anything related to public policy or politics to a point where everyone was interested.
So we fast-forwarded our initial plan, which was in a decade to get to that point, and now everything was happening right there. It was such a time of hope, and everyone was so engaged, so we continued that.
I then transitioned to the government side. There was so much to influence and so much to have impact working on the inside after having worked from the outside, trying to influence the system for very long. I felt that I would be in a good position to try and do that, so I went back to university again and did another master’s, this time in public policy. I transitioned and joined the government.
Jon Alterman: Was your experience serving in government very different from what you had expected?
Rafat Al-Akhali: It was. I think it was very shocking in a way to see two things. One, the inefficiencies in the system and the very basics were not even there. The civil service in Yemen is very weak, so what ends up happening is that the bureaucracy, or the machine, is not there. I always remember that when I did the public policy master’s, they taught us that the minister comes in and decides where the direction of a policy based on their political party, platform, or what they got elected on, and then the machine works and the ship sails in this new direction. But in Yemen, and countries like Yemen, you come in, and you say, "This is the new direction," and nothing happens. You know, there's no machine that works to steer the ship in the new direction. There's very little capacity, there's very little understanding of what the purpose is. So that was one area.
On the other side, I really saw what got me to join the government to begin with—the impact that could happen, the huge resources that the public sector has, and how with very little reforms or very little actions you can steer those resources to make a huge impact that I would have spent years and years trying to do from the civil society organizations or outside the public sector system.
Jon Alterman: Well, now you're working at an even higher level with the Council on State Fragility with a lot of people who've been in leadership positions in government from around the world. What is the paradigm that you're trying to shift through this Council on State Fragility?
Rafat Al-Akhali: The challenges that face Yemen but not only Yemen, but countries like Yemen, so fragile and conflict-affected states as they are called. And then to start seeing the similarities, the differences, and try to understand, what is the approach towards addressing fragility is and how can we make it better?
We had a big commission and worked for a couple years gathering evidence from academia but also from practitioners on the ground. Where we got to is the need to build these inclusive politics, as we call it, beyond elections or democracy defined as electoral democracy. We see it right now in Yemen, and we continue to see it in many countries. The traditional approach is for any country to quickly move out of any conflict into elections. This is always the push. This is what we had in Yemen, as well. We had a transitional period of two years. In those two years, we were supposed to have a national dialogue between all the Yemenis together and come up with a new form of state basically and put that into our constitution. Then, take that constitution into referendum, and then have elections all within two years.
However, we saw that not only in Yemen, but in different countries as well, there are different visions and plans that the UN and the international system comes up with. That's the main paradigm shift that we, on the political side, were trying to advocate for is that countries and societies need to take their time to evolve out of conflict. And what is important during that period is to have this inclusive politics where power-sharing is acceptable to all.
And we've seen again and again academic evidence showing how many countries went back to conflict as soon as there were elections on the horizon because where the checks and balances are not in place and the culture’s not in place, it's a one-time election, it's one man, one vote once. All the other parties know that if they're out, they're out for good, and they'll be destroyed by the other opponents.
Jon Alterman: You've written movingly about some of the economic consequences of this conflict, which has stretched on for years. As you think about the broader work you've done with the Council and State Fragility and the need for more inclusive economics, more inclusive politics, how do you align that with a need for getting the guys with the guns to lay down the guns? There is an instinct, and it's been criticized recently in some academic literature as we've talked about on Babel, of people who say, "Well, you shouldn't just be buying off the warlords, you have to be thinking longer term." But how do you think longer term if the warlords are still fighting and still getting people to fight on their behalf?
Rafat Al-Akhali: Absolutely. I think that's probably a big gap in the approach towards protracted conflicts like the one in Yemen because it feels like the international approach and specifically the UN system approach does not give enough priority to addressing the economic aspects of the conflict itself, and there's strong mobilization on humanitarian response.
And the UN knows how to do that, and the world knows how to kind of respond to that, but there's one aspect that is the economic-related issues of the conflict.
Conflict over the central bank, for example, which has been a major thing in Libya, in Yemen, and other countries, as well. Also conflict on the commanding heights of the economy, right, the telecom sector, the oil and gas, and all that. These are, of course, political conflicts, but they manifest themselves on economic issues, and so we always try to highlight that the conflict is about attempts to both get the power and get the wealth. So power is on one hand and wealth comes with it, and, subsequently, the resources of the wealth. That area is not always paid attention to. A lot of the resources deployed are people who can talk about security and military sector reforms like ceasefires and demobilization. They can also talk about the politics of how do we share power, and what do you get in the cabinet, and how can we get into a cease fire and uplift their process.
But there are not enough people who are able to talk about the economic dimensions of the political conflict, and that's what we are seeing. We address this on the Fragility Council and Commission, but also we've done a lot of work on this in Yemen. It starts with having that platform or that space for these issues within the process. What we have been asking for is to have that structure in place, having an economic track where these issues can be put on the table. Of course, it would start with some of the very urgent issues. The port needs to be open, we need to have road access so goods can flow and people can move, and we have to address the currency division that we have now with the Central Bank.
But then, eventually, having that structure in place, having the right people there, will allow us to address some of the medium and longer-term issues and think more widely about what Yemen needs to be sustainable economically and how can both create an efficient and self-sufficient economy but also integrate into the region and integrate internationally. I think that's the key area where a lot of work is still needed.
Jon Alterman: You've written a lot, and I think really persuasively, about some very micro local projects in Yemen. So, getting back to the micro level, what kinds of economic projects are also peace-building projects? How do you structure an economic project to be a peace-building project if you don't have this international aspect to muck things up?
Rafat Al-Akhali: Absolutely. I think that's probably what gives me a lot of hope and still gives me enough energy to push forward is seeing what is happening at the more local level, at the city, provincial, or governorate level within all the governorates in Yemen. When you see what's happening there, you realize there's a different story to what the big, international headlines would focus on. When you go on the ground to the different provinces, you see a very different reality from one governorate to another. Some governorates have achieved remarkable development during the conflict, such as Marib, for example. Marib is a big example of that because it has been a smaller province but a rich smaller province around 300,000 to 400,000 in population. We had the main electricity power station in Marib. It was powered by natural gas, and it was feeding all of Yemen, but Marib had no public electricity.
They were always seeing the cables and the electricity lines over their heads but had no electricity there. And it was also the source of oil. So, when the conflict started, what happened is that they benefited from the resources, and they were able to use much more of those resources that were initially going to the central government. You see a lot of development in Marib.
Jon Alterman: And a lot of immigration to Marib from other parts of Yemen.
Rafat Al-Akhali: Exactly. I was going to say that there's a big IDP (internally displaced person) community, both in the camps but in Marib as well. So now, the estimate is that there's around two million plus in Marib. There's huge growth that has taken place, like new roads, new hospitals, new clinics, new schools, big malls, and big restaurants opening up. You see a different dynamic there.
Similarly in Taiz, where, of course, the biggest headline has always been the Siege on Taiz, and the Houthis have been blocking all the main road access to Taiz, causing a significant humanitarian impact in Taiz. But still when you get to the city, the markets are buzzing. There are new hotels. There are new businesses coming up, and this mainly took place when the violent confrontations stopped. We have practically been in a ceasefire since April of last year, but even before that in many of the battlefronts, there have been an informal or unofficial ceasefire, and that allowed some normalcy to come back.
Now, that's what I try at least personally to focus more on: how can we help these local communities to just get back on their feet, get back to the cycle of productivity, of jobs, get out of the trap of humanitarian. It's this delicate balance of how to gradually transition from that into a more sustainable economic productivity in the country. And it's all going to happen at the local level.
Jon Alterman: How do you make it attractive for talented Yemenis to stay in Yemen? There has been a lot of talented Yemenis like yourself who are largely outside the country now. How do you transition from a place where the talented people feel they need to live overseas, the only place they have a chance for them and their kids to where people want to really invest their future in Yemen?
Rafat Al-Akhali: I think this is probably the biggest challenge that we have and will continue to be having. It is really felt, this brain drain, and you can see it in all sectors. Yemenis who are talented with some skills and some experience who were able to leave the country have already left the country. There's only very few who stayed, either because they could not get any chance to leave or because of family reasons and personal reasons. So now every time we try to find qualified people for any opportunity in any sector, it has become very, very difficult.
I remember I was having a conversation with the construction sector with a number of private sector companies there, and they were telling me how the sector was built over decades to get into the point that they were at in 2010. They had enough engineers and a labor force, and now maybe 80 percent or more have moved on. They have left the country. So now every time they try to work on any project, they have to really struggle to try and find the labor force. It's no longer there. Of course, in the government sector, it's a big challenge where very few people can be hired there.
So I'm not sure we have the answer, to be honest. It's a huge challenge. We know it will continue to be a challenge. We need to figure out how to work with the people that are still in the country, to upskill them to the level that is needed, especially if we get into a recovery/reconstruction phase. Also, how do we ensure that we still engage one way or another with the expat community that has left Yemen? Even if they're not going to come back to live and work in Yemen, at least they could be willing to go back a few times a year and contribute somehow or contribute from where they are in whichever field.
Jon Alterman: So let me close with another big question that I'm not sure there's a good answer to, but maybe you have a better answer than I do. And that is, when there are security problems in Yemen, the world starts really caring about Yemen. When there aren't security problems in Yemen, the world stops caring about Yemen. Then there's security problems in Yemen, and the world starts caring again. I certainly know American ambassadors who said, "The only way I could get anybody's attention was through counterterrorism," but counterterrorism distorts the prism through which people see Yemen. How do you think we can get out of that cycle?
Rafat Al-Akhali: Absolutely. If there's anything just from the purely, again geopolitical calculations, I don't think that Yemen will move to become high up on the strategic agenda of any of the major world powers. And so most likely, I think the possible way forward is to try and figure out how to better integrate regionally. This is an area where we can still do a lot of work on. Yemen has not been part of the Gulf Cooperation Council, for example, which has all the Gulf countries in it for various reasons. I've heard from many of my Gulf friends and analysts that they think if Yemen was part of it, maybe we wouldn't have got to this point.
And today again, these same points and same discussions are on the table. How can Yemen be better integrated with the region? How can we ensure a country, which is large compared to the rest of the regional countries, can not only be part but kind of integrate with Vision 2030 in Saudi or the other visions, so we can look at the region as a whole? I think that's where the challenges are.
Unless we can figure out how to do that, it's very difficult to think that Yemen will integrate with the EU, engage in trade, or receive aid. It will not be a major recipient or a major partner for the EU or the US or anyone else.
Jon Alterman: Well and certainly, one of the problems in the region is there's been a lot of engagement by Saudi Arabia, a lot of engagement by United Arab Emirates, and a lot of engagement by Iran. Rather than leading to Yemen's peaceful integration in the region, it's helped contribute to violence in Yemen that's driven exactly the same cycles we've been talking about.
Rafat Al-Akhali: Absolutely. Because I think, at least that's my own opinion, that the engagement was not based on what I just mentioned. It was not with that objective in mind or with that direction in mind. The engagement was more about how we deal with the threat out of Yemen? How do we try to contain things in Yemen? How do we try to manage the politics or buy the political elites or do any of that? And of course for Iran, how do we establish some power in the vicinity of Saudi.
We need to look at how do we actually get to win-win regional integrations where we can move Yemen away from the current situation, the demographic challenge, and the poverty that is in place, with very high levels of population density and also a very young population. Unless we can create jobs, unless we can get people to work, there will always be this instability in the country, which will spill over to the region.
Jon Alterman: So let me ask an unfair question and partly putting your Blavatnik School of Government hat on. Is the answer to this that the region has to think of a better way to deal with Yemen or is the answer you need a Yemeni leadership that has a better vision for how it engages in the region? Obviously, the two need to be related, but where would you put the emphasis? Is it on Yemeni leadership shaping its relationship to the region or the region figuring out how it's going to finally do something constructive instead of destructive with Yemen?
Rafat Al-Akhali: I would put the emphasis definitely on the Yemeni leadership. I always think that it all starts with the leadership in the country itself. There's really little that can be either imposed on any country but if it doesn't come from inside and from the political leadership and political elite that are there, it's very difficult to see a way out. And I think every country in the region will look for their own interests, will look for what they believe is best for their people, and only Yemenis and the Yemeni leadership can and should do that for their own people. And so, I would put the emphasis there.
Now I always say that the biggest challenge we have in Yemen is a leadership crisis, unfortunately, where we haven't had that type of leadership in the country for a very long time, and we hope that with time, maybe in the coming years, we can actually see better leadership in Yemen that can then work with the region and the world internationally to get Yemen to a better place.
Jon Alterman: Rafat Al-Akhali, thanks very much for joining us on Babel.
Rafat Al-Akhali: Thank you so much.
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