Reengaging the Solomon Islands: A Strategic Opportunity for the United States

Introduction

Following a vote of no confidence that ousted Jeremiah Manele, Matthew Wale was sworn in as prime minister of the Solomon Islands on May 15. Wale, a member of parliament since 2008, is the most pro-Western leader the country has seen in recent years. In his opening press conference as leader, he stated, “Change is coming.” Wale’s election presents a significant opportunity for the United States to reset and strengthen engagement with the Solomon Islands after years of strained relations and growing geopolitical uncertainty, particularly following the 2022 Solomon Islands-China security agreement. However, whether this moment leads to meaningful change will depend on the extent to which Washington recognizes the strategic opening and commits to sustained attention and engagement with this critical partner.

Historical Foundations of U.S.-Solomon Islands Relations

For many Americans, the Solomon Islands—and the broader Pacific—is most relevant in the context of World War II, although U.S. vessels regularly stopped in the Solomon Islands in the late nineteenth century, when it was a British protectorate. During the Pacific campaign of World War II, the Solomon Islands emerged as a strategic location for both U.S. and Japanese forces. The Japanese occupation of the Solomon Islands kicked off in April 1942 under Operation Mo, and Japan successfully seized control of Tulagi, Solomon Islands, shortly thereafter. In response, the United States launched its Solomon Islands campaign, with U.S. Marines landing on the island of Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, marking U.S. forces’ first major allied land offensive against Japan. The Guadalcanal campaign ended in a victory for Allied forces on February 9, 1943.

Following the Solomon Islands’ independence in 1978, the United States quickly established diplomatic relations with the new nation. The U.S. consulate in Honiara was upgraded to an embassy in 1988; however, it closed in 1993. From that point forward, the U.S. ambassador to Papua New Guinea was also accredited to both the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. In 2023, the United States again opened its embassy in Honiara, but as of mid-2026, the ambassadorial post remains vacant.

Over the last half century, U.S. engagement with the Solomon Islands has struggled to find a narrative beyond the legacy of World War II, which, while significant, does not alone define the unique challenges and opportunities of the modern U.S.-Solomon Islands relationship. With limited diplomatic engagement, the bilateral relationship has mostly centered on the delivery of development assistance. From 2008 to 2023, the United States committed $69.7 million in official development assistance across 64 projects, although as of 2026 only $46.9 million has been spent. With the United States primarily focused on its defense relationships with Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia in the northern Pacific, U.S. policymakers for the most part have been happy to defer to Australia as the primary development and security partner in the Solomons.

Shifting Alignments and Rising Regional Concerns

This rough division of labor, whereby the United States maintained a relatively modest level of engagement with the Solomon Islands, began to shift in 2019, when the Solomon Islands, under then–Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing after 36 years of close relations with Taiwan. That same year, China also succeeded in maneuvering another diplomatic switch in the Pacific—when Kiribati decided to recognize Beijing rather than Taipei—further demonstrating China’s growing reach and influence in the region.

While U.S. unease over China’s growing Pacific ambitions continued to grow after 2019, it was the signing of a Solomon Islands-China security agreement in 2022 that set off alarm bells in Washington and Canberra. The opaque nature of the agreement—which has still not been publicly released—added to the concern that the arrangement could provide an entry point for China to build out a dual-use facility in the Pacific. For Australia, the security agreement was particularly shocking and prompted renewed engagement with the United States and other traditional partners to collaborate more closely across the Pacific region.

The United States responded in kind, ramping up its own engagement with the Solomon Islands alongside an overall increase in attention to the broader Pacific region. In an attempt to thwart Chinese inroads into the Solomon Islands security structure, the United States sent senior officials to the country, reopened the embassy in Honiara, and pushed initiatives such as a shiprider agreement and the restoration of Peace Corps programming. Many of these proposals remained unsigned or pending, however, as bilateral relations continued to suffer as Prime Minister Sogavare—and his successor, Prime Minister Manele—further embraced a multidimensional relationship with China, often to the extent of appearing to act as a proxy state for China within the Pacific Islands Forum.

In 2023, Sogavare was one of only two leaders to skip the second U.S.-Pacific Island Forum Leader’s Summit hosted at the White House by then-President Joe Biden in what was taken as a deliberate snub, despite being in the United States just days prior (Vanuatu’s prime minister also missed the summit, but was needed in country for a no-confidence motion in parliament).

There was initial hope that Jeremiah Manele, elected as prime minister in 2024, would be somewhat more welcoming of Western engagement. It soon became clear, however, that despite Manele’s more diplomatic tone, he would maintain the same close relationship with China as his predecessor. In 2025, as host of the annual Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting (PIFLM), the Solomon Islands attempted to prevent Taiwan, a longtime development partner, from attending. In what was viewed as a compromise after other Pacific countries objected to Taiwan’s exclusion, all 21 dialogue partners, including the United States and China, as well as development partner Taiwan, were blocked from attending the summit. By early 2026, the geopolitical state of play in the Solomon Islands remained tenuous, with Australia, the United States, and others viewing China’s close relationship with the country as a growing strategic threat.

Political Instability and the Fall of the Manele Government

Following a series of cabinet resignations that fractured his governing coalition in mid-March of this year, Manele fought to hold onto power by refusing to convene parliament. Despite these efforts, the Court of Appeal ordered Manele to convene parliament, which ended in his removal from office on May 7.

In the ashes of this upheaval, two top contenders emerged for the position of prime minister: Peter Shanel Agovaka and opposition leader Matthew Wale. Agovaka, who served as the minister for foreign affairs and trade relations in the Manele government, received support from Manele’s coalition. Agovaka has praised China’s economic development and voiced his party’s support of the one China principle. Wale, in contrast, is a longtime critic of the Solomon Islands security agreement with China and advocate for closer relations with the West. On May 15, Wale was elected prime minister with 26 votes in favor.

A Strategic Opening for the United States

Outsiders tend to view Solomon Islands’ political movements only in the context of great power competition; however, members of parliament are primarily focused on responding to domestic and economic pressures within the Solomon Islands. Their ability to stay in power ultimately hinges on whether they can follow through on promises and deliver solutions for the country’s very real challenges. For Wale, the most pro-Western leader the nation has had in recent years, it will be imperative to demonstrate that partnering with Australia and the United States is in the best interest of the Solomon Islands.

Australia, the region’s largest aid donor, has stepped up its engagement with the Solomon Islands in recent years. In December 2024, Australia announced $100 million in funding to expand the Solomon Islands’ police force, and it has supported communities through the delivery of humanitarian assistance following Tropical Cyclone Maila in April 2026. Following Wale’s appointment, Canberra has been quick to capitalize on the shift in leadership. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese congratulated Wale in a post on X immediately after the election, and on June 3 Wale traveled to Canberra, where he met with Albanese and the two leaders agreed to start discussions on a new treaty. Wale also committed to signing a delayed MOU enabling the Solomon Islands’ participation in the regional Pacific Policing Initiative and advancing the existing policing agreement between the two countries. Australia also pledged around $35 million to help the Solomon Islands respond to the impacts of Tropical Cyclone Maila and increasing global oil prices. Most notably, Wale informed journalists that his government would be reviewing its security agreements, including its deal with China.

The U.S. government has also been quick to recognize this important shift in power. On May 19, the resident U.S. chargé d’affaires in Honiara, Dan O’Hara, met with Wale to congratulate him on his election as the new prime minister, followed by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio releasing a statement of congratulations. The subsequent week was speckled with a series of announcements, including a bilateral partnership on earthquake monitoring and the signing of an investment incentive agreement. The rapid rollout of these initiatives is in clear contrast to the friction that existed between the United States and the previous two governments, which often delayed or indefinitely sidelined similar U.S. proposals.

Despite these positive indicators, it is unlikely that the Wale government will completely distance itself from China, potentially including with respect to the 2022 security agreement, as the partnership is deeply entrenched and has delivered meaningful local development and other benefits. It is also critical that the United States and other partners not oversimplify what are inevitably complex domestic politics for Wale, who holds together a coalition spanning a broad spectrum of members of parliament.

That said, this is a rare opportunity for the United States to not only revitalize a struggling relationship but also to stem China’s momentum in what was previously the most pro-Beijing capital in the Pacific. Initial congratulations and announcements are a good start, but to truly capitalize on this opportunity, the United States will need to demonstrate real commitment by increasing official diplomatic engagement through the appointment of an ambassador and expanded embassy staffing. It should leverage this initial momentum to push through pending issues such as the redeployment of the Peace Corps to the Solomon Islands and the signing of a shiprider agreement with Honiara, the latter of which would allow closer collaboration on the nation’s maritime domain awareness challenges. The United States should also not miss the opportunity to work with the new government to address particularly pressing needs, including the country’s strained medical facilities. As Australia and other partners surge their engagement, it will also be critical to work with regional allies to identify gaps in assistance and avoid redundancies.

Conclusion

As the United States looks ahead to the PIFLM in Palau this September, bolstering U.S.-Solomon Islands bilateral relations should be a top priority for enhancing overall U.S. engagement with this critical Pacific region. In his congratulatory statement, Secretary Rubio said that the United States looks forward to working with the Wale government to “grow . . . [U.S.] cooperation with [the] Solomon Islands.” The election of Matthew Wale offers an opportunity to reverse course in one of the most strategically significant countries in the Pacific. Whether the United States is able to successfully leverage this moment will hinge on its ability to follow through with meaningful action.

John Augé is the program manager for the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kathryn Paik is a deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at CSIS.