Photo: SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images
As discussed in the previous commentary, deteriorating relations between the United States and South Africa have been a culmination of policy missteps by the latter’s government in a manner that has been deemed incongruent—if not threatening—to a hawkish Trump administration. At risk is the severance of diplomatic goodwill, two-trade trade of around $20 billion, and critical financial commitments to South Africa’s broader economic agenda. At this juncture, the critical question is whether U.S.–South Africa relations are beyond repair or whether there are any policy mechanisms Pretoria could evoke to appease the Trump administration without compromising its own sovereignty.
The ascension of Trump to the U.S. presidency has directed the geopolitical spotlight directly on the South African government and the policy that instructs its internal and external engagements. In doing so, the Trump administration has found several facets of South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy to be inconsistent, discriminatory, and at odds with the southern African state’s self-proclaimed position of geopolitical neutrality. While the problems flagged are myriad, three specific policy positionings have drawn the attention of Washington:
While these policies are currently contentious and divisive, they equally present South Africa with an opportunity to demonstrate both proactive and reactive governance which conform to the prevailing zeitgeist of international politics which is more rooted in real than ideal politick.
The issue of farm murders has become among the most divisive aspects of South Africa’s national security discourse. On the one hand, there are civic groups such as AfriForum and Solidarity that believe that this form of criminality is more pervasive than delineated in South African Police Service (SAPS) crime data and that racial prejudice is as much a motivating factor as financial gain among the perpetrators. On the other, there is the South African government that articulates farm murders as forming part of South Africa’s wider violent crime phenomenon and an issue that has no ethno-political component in its planning and ultimate execution. Notably, the Trump administration has found itself more inclined to believe the narrative presented by Afrikaner-based civic organizations than that presented by the South African government itself.
While crime statistics conducted by both SAPS and independent organizations vindicate the South African government’s position on the matter, the issue nonetheless remains influential on the future of U.S.–South Africa relations. Highlighting the fact, that the Trump administration has gone as far as providing the White Afrikaner community—who claimed to be disproportionately impacted by farm attacks—the opportunity to seek asylum and even fast-track their citizenship in the United States. Given its prevailing centrality, addressing the issue of farm attacks could be a low-hanging fruit for the South African government to gain Washington’s favor, while also improving domestic insecurity. Here, the focus can be directed toward addressing security resource shortages and undercapacity in rural settings and allow for engagement between the state and associated stakeholders, which may include—but not be limited to—farm owners, farm workers, and traditional and customary leaders. This will undermine perceived non-activity and perhaps even state complicity in farm attacks, while also ensuring enhanced security and resource availability in communities which disproportionately affected by urbanization.
In the socioeconomic realm, affirmative action and South Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment policy program, have proven to be equally divisive. Attempts by the South African government to provide redress for economic inequality induced by the apartheid governance system, have attempted to facilitate economic conditions that are more inclusive and representative of the country’s racial dynamics. These mechanisms, however, have been cited by its detractors to be both discriminatory and as a major impediment to the country’s business operating environment.
To counter such claims, a more constructive narrative must be advanced by the South African government. To this effect, emphasis should be placed on the engagement of the more than 600 U.S. companies operating in South Africa that can provide an honest and transparent account of labor conditions and business practices in the country. This could be with respect to both challenges that they face but may also reflect on the many positive attributes associated with South Africa’s business operating environment. Other mechanisms that could be introduced are increased and more public engagement between the U.S.–South Africa Business Council—and their respective chambers of commerce—to deepen bilateral economic ties and find ways to better synergize commercial engagements.
Emphasis should also be placed on how bilateral trade between South Africa and the United States is mutually beneficial and that a breakdown in such relations will have a negative blowback for several U.S. companies—especially in automotive, finance, technology, healthcare, and energy industries—and open the door for increased penetration by rival economies such as China. Again, the purpose of such an initiative will be to regain the narrative around the domestic business environment, while strengthening relations between South African and U.S. private sectors, with the latter being demonstratable evidence that the former is a market that presents more opportunities than risks.
As the previous commentary highlighted, deteriorating relations between South Africa and Washington is not a phenomenon that emerged at the advent of Trump’s second term in office but rather is the culmination of a foreign policy disposition that is antithetic to the country’s self-proclaimed geopolitical neutrality and which in many cases threatens U.S. domestic and international security. Again, however, the theme in question presents an opportunity for synergy rather than further disunity among the two states.
While the United States military and political footprint in Africa is lessening, Washington continues to look for strategic partners to protect its political and economic interests on the continent. In this regard, South Africa can seek to build off relationships forged off existing bilateral defense and security initiatives such as the U.S.–South Africa Defense Committee and find greater opportunities for cooperation in the region. A standout example would be Mozambique, where the U.S. Export-Import Bank is a primary financier of the liquified sector in the insurgent-impacted Cabo Delgado province and where American companies are key investors and engineering contractors. Here, South Africa and the United States—with the assent of Mozambique—can synergize efforts in securing these interests from extremist attacks and related acts of insecurity.
A similar model could also be adopted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the government of Felix Tshisekedi has offered unfettered mineral rights to the Trump administration in exchange for material support against the Rwanda-backed M23 insurgency. Should such a deal arise, the existing South African National Defense Force could emerge as a trusted partner for the United States government, thereby mutually stabilizing the eastern DRC and allowing for commercial activities to proceed without risk. Any arrangement in the DRC could be linked with agreements on minerals transportation that leverage the existing North-South corridor connecting the DRC with ports in South Africa.
Mending this relationship requires acknowledging an uncomfortable truth: South Africa needs the United States more than the United States needs South Africa. While Pretoria must defend its sovereignty, it must also recognize that diplomatic recalibration—not confrontation—is the surest path to preserving economic and strategic ties. By addressing misconceptions, amplifying its economic strengths, and offering tangible security cooperation, South Africa can rebuild bridges without sacrificing its principles.
The alternative, a protracted standoff, serves no one’s interests—least of all South Africa’s.
Ryan Cummings is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
