(Still) Awaiting Launch: Space Export Control Reform

On August 20, 2026, the White House published a new National Space Transportation Policy (NSTP), the first such revision in almost 13 years. The new policy provides welcome ambition, including its goal of supporting 1,000 launches and reentries every year by 2030, and it addresses a number of challenges and opportunities that have emerged in recent years. However, implementation will be crucial to ensure continued U.S. leadership in the face of rapidly rising foreign launch competition, which could have negative impacts on U.S. commercial and national security space interests.

The space industry should also pay careful attention to the new policy’s directive on space exports:

Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall update, as appropriate and consistent with United States economic, foreign relations, nonproliferation, and national security interests:

(a) export policies and programs, in coordination with the Administrator of NASA, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Transportation, to promote United States space transportation capabilities and standards abroad; protect United States intellectual property; and include industry advocacy, foreign sales, co-investment, co-development, market access, regulatory alignment, and technology protections; and

(b) export controls, in coordination with the Secretary of War, to enable United States export opportunities for space transportation-related capabilities to allies and partners.

This official shift toward export promotion of technologies covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) continues the bipartisan trend running from Trump 1.0, through the Biden administration, and now into Trump 2.0. Cumulatively, these administrations have overhauled the previous idiosyncratic interpretation of U.S. commitments under the MTCR. For decades, this interpretation limited U.S. international partnerships by, among other things, turning the MTCR’s presumption of denial for some exports—which can be overcome when in the U.S. interest—into a policy of denial of U.S. transfers to even close allies and partners, and also adopting a position of not encouraging “new” space transportation programs even in other MTCR countries.

Unfortunately, the spirit of such top-level policy shifts has to date remained largely unimplemented in the lower-level space export control regulations that govern daily life for U.S. space entities, nor do current regulations account for foreign availability and competition in a range of space technologies beyond launch.

In 2023, the Chair of the National Space Council announced an initiative in which the U.S. government would conduct a review of space export controls to enable a globally competitive U.S. industrial base, reviving an effort to update U.S. space export controls that had stalled following its initiation in 2019. In response, draft regulations were issued for comment in 2024 by the Departments of State and Commerce. However, the draft Department of State rule at that time was criticized by industry for setting seemingly arbitrary limits that demonstrated a lack of awareness of, or interest in, the foreign commercial availability and competition present across a range of space technologies. The proposed rule’s constraints imposed unilateral limits on U.S. firms for both launch-related technologies and a range of non-launch technologies, including synthetic aperture radar, radiofrequency, and infrared data.

Competition from foreign firms in the global space economy has only grown fiercer in the two years since the draft rules were released, driven in particular by the ambitions and investments of a number of countries pursuing “sovereign” capability (however defined) and trying to take market share by offering “ITAR-free” products (i.e., products purportedly not subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations administered by the Department of State).

While the 120-day deadline contemplated in the new NSTP for updated space export controls indicates that this protracted round of review could soon come to an end, whether the new rules are worth the wait remains to be seen. Space policymakers, operating companies, and investors will need to carefully monitor whether the aforementioned initiatives on export promotion and global competitiveness are thoroughly reflected in the actual regulatory treatment.

Another misfire (similar to the 2024 draft regulations) that fails to take seriously the need to promote U.S. competitiveness in the global space market would carry real-world negative effects, not only for U.S. space operating companies and investors, but also for the Trump administration’s broader priorities of maintaining a dynamic defense industrial base, promoting exports, encouraging allied and partner burden sharing, stimulating investment, and cutting excessive regulations.

International competitors are moving faster than ever. The U.S. bureaucracy needs to keep up and get out of the way. Absent a compelling rationale for an exception, the default policy setting for space exports should be the same as it is in many other industries: a level playing field for U.S. space firms competing abroad.

Sean Wilson is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also the founder and CEO of the Mirai Group and the former director of international space policy at the White House.