Tim Lenderking: Hope in Yemen?

Jon Alterman: Tim Lenderking is a career diplomat serving as the US special envoy of Yemen. He's had senior diplomatic roles in the Gulf and in Iraq. And we first met 20 years ago when he was the Middle East advisor to then undersecretary of state for political affairs, Marc Grossman. Tim, welcome to Babel.

Tim Lenderking: Thank you, Jon. Good to be with you.

Jon Alterman: The Saudis have been battling the Houthis for seven years, but about a month ago, the sides announced that they'd reached a two-month ceasefire. What happened?

Tim Lenderking: I think this is a very significant development, and I think a number of factors are at play. The Saudis have frankly struggled with this conflict. They have seen their influence diminish in Yemen. They've seen that the Houthis have gained strength on the battlefield. The Houthis are a very determined foe. The Iranians have given support to the Houthis—which is a very unfortunate development for U.S. interests, and ultimately, for Yemenis. So, I think a number of factors have come into play, where the Saudis have really seen the benefit of ending the conflict. Yemen is a contiguous neighbor of Saudi Arabia, so whatever happens in Yemen is always going to matter to Saudi Arabia. We’ve also tried to encourage the Saudis end the conflict, and I think that the international pressure on all sides—including from within the region—is an important factor in why we've gotten to a relatively positive place today.

Jon Alterman: Were you surprised? Because in February it seemed much less optimistic, you seemed much less optimistic in February that we were close to a breakthrough, and yet this happened.

Tim Lenderking: I think that the Houthis have not been able to impose their will on the ground in Yemen—which is something that they’ve had success in over the last year, particularly their offensive on the city of Marib, about 100km east of Sana`a. There are energy platforms there that the Houthis would like to control. The city is controlled by the Yemeni government, and the Houthis have thrown a lot of fight at Marib over the last year. But they haven’t succeeded in taking the town. It's been ridge top to ridge top, valley to valley, with losses and gains made on a regular basis, but the Houthis have not been able to prevail. Strong Saudi air support has been a key factor here, and the Emiratis have played a role by joining forces with the Saudis to try to blunt the Houthi offensive. The international community has been very united about the Houthi offensive on Marib being the major obstacle to peace over the last year. And I think those messages have actually gotten through to the Houthis—combined with the fact that they have not been able to take the town.

Jon Alterman: And the Emiratis sent in this giants’ brigade that they support, which has helped tip the balance in Marib, right?

Tim Lenderking: Yes—I think that was a major factor. The Emiratis care about what happens in Yemen as well. They used to have a larger military presence there, and they drew that down. They still have groups that they support and strong interests in Yemen—as do the other Gulf countries. Nobody among the Gulf countries wants this conflict to continue, and I think that there's been a more united front on that side—the primary point of that is that there is no military solution to this conflict. That’s basically what the world has been saying. I think that's what the parties themselves have realized over the course of the last year. That has been beneficial in leading toward the truce and the de-escalation of hostilities.

Jon Alterman: Who are the parties? There's the Saudis, the Emiratis, other Gulf countries. There's the United Nations and the United States. Who are all the parties, and what leverage does the United States have over all of them—or arguably over any of them?

Tim Lenderking: You have to start with the different rungs. In the innermost circle, this is a conflict between Yemenis. It's a conflict between the Yemen government, which is internationally recognized and the Houthis, who are one sector of Yemeni society and the Yemeni political landscape. This is also a conflict that has drawn in outside actors. I mentioned the Iranians, but of course the Saudis play a role. The Omanis don't have a military presence inside Yemen, but as a neighboring country, they obviously have very strong interest in what happens. At its heart, this is a civil war—this is a conflict among Yemenis—which has involved outside actors in increasing scope Our goal has been to try to turn the military conflict into a political track—to continue to emphasize that there is no military solution. And as we've seen play out on the ground in the last two years, no party has been able to completely impose its will over Yemen, and that is an important and sobering realization for the Houthis in particular. But it’s also a sobering realization for the Saudi-led coalition. I think American leverage comes out of our very strong relations with the Gulf countries—the fact that Saudi Arabia is a partner of the United States, and we share a strong commitment to ending the conflict. I think that the Houthis have been open to a U.S. role, and I think they recognize that the United States can do things—in terms of positioning the Saudis and the coalition—that other countries can't do. Finally, of course there is a UN-led peace process here. We've had success by way of the UN envoy for Yemen. There's a particularly talented envoy now, Hans Grundberg, who has played an instrumental role in achieving this truce. We partner with United Nations. They take the lead in terms of a lot of the shuttle diplomacy, but the United States is very much there to provide support.

Jon Alterman: You've been a diplomat for 29 years. You've been in a lot of difficult negotiations, including in Iraq. What's different about these negotiations?

Tim Lenderking: These negotiations are different in a couple of ways. The first is that I think there's a certain amount of exhaustion that is setting in, and that's helping to galvanize the parties to deescalate. And number tow, as I mentioned, there is no military solution, so any ability by any of the parties to continue to try and push for military gains is an uncertain prospect. Related to that point, number three is that there is a huge toll on Yemen civilians. This war—as it’s continuing to slug out in a place like Marib—brings huge humanitarian toll in terms of destroyed infrastructure, inability of humanitarians to move supplies throughout the country, internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are fleeing one part of Yemen into other parts of the Yemen—and often having to flee from there as well. Finally, I think that the international community has really sensed that there is a moment of opportunity here and that taking advantage of these different strands could lead to things like a truce, de-escalation, prisoner releases, or opening the humanitarian space further so that the much-needed assistance that goes into Yemen can be most effective.

Jon Alterman: Let me ask you about the humanitarian issue. You worked in humanitarian relief before you became a diplomat. The United Nations now estimates that two thirds of Yemenis are in need of humanitarian assistance. There has long been a perception the Houthis are sort of indifferent to the humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people. How has the humanitarian situation shaped both what the Saudi/Emirati coalition is doing, what the United States and the United Nations are doing, and what the Houthis are doing as we try to move toward something that looks like a resolution?

Tim Lenderking: You're absolutely right that the humanitarian crisis is an urgent one. Yemen is frequently called the world's worst humanitarian crisis—looking at all the metrics, whether it's food, insecurity, the impact of Covid-19 and a lack of vaccines, despite a very strong level of support from the United States. If you look at health factors, access issues, and the ongoing destruction of civilian infrastructure, these are all factors that lead to the humanitarian crisis. I'm very pleased that the United States is a leading donor. We have provided more than $4.5 billion of assistance since the conflict began, so U.S. dollars are really having impact and going to feed people and provide healthcare for Yemen's neediest people. The Houthis also have a responsibility to provide humanitarian services for the people who live under their control, and 80 percent of Yemen's population lives under Houthi control. So they have an incentive that Yemenis don't starve or get displaced. In that sense, the Houthis do cooperate to a certain degree with international institutions like the World Food Program and other UN agencies which have offices in Sana'a. The United Nations is regularly engaging with the Houthi leadership to make sure that the Houthis are providing access and ability for NGOs working in Yemen to follow up with their affected populations and implement the projects they've been funded to do.

Jon Alterman: Although one of the criticisms is that the Houthis insist on bribes or taxes to get assistance to Yemenis— that the Houthis are trying to profit from the international community's efforts to assist Yemen's most vulnerable people. And the argument is that Houthis are indifferent to it. And when we saw this with discussions about access to the port of Hodeida—that the Houthis are willing to hold out for benefit, regardless of the humanitarian impact on Yemenis.

Tim Lenderking: Humanitarians have really bonded together in the last two years to go to the Houthis leadership with united approaches, so the Houthis can't play one aid organization off against the other. Those common messages are very important for the Houthis to understand that it's not just enough to have a hospital built. There need to be doctors. There need to be supplies. There needs to be access. Patients need to move, and families need to visit. So, there has been some improvement in the impact of international organizations to change Houthi perceptions and to open up more access.

Jon Alterman: We've heard a lot about the, the perilous conditions of the deteriorating oil tanker off the coast of Hodeida. Is there any movement on that issue?

Tim Lenderking: There is movement on that issue. In March the United Nations signed a memorandum of understanding with the Houthis to allow the 1.1 million barrels of oil that is on this decaying tanker to be offloaded onto a separate and safer vessel. The concern here is that the Safer will explode or leak—with that heavy load—and that'll create an environmental catastrophe and an economic catastrophe in a major shipping area and a major and fragile maritime habitat here. That could completely ravage Yemen's fishing industry, impact shipping into the Suez Canal, and tourism throughout the Gulf.

Tim Lenderking: So we're very glad that there will be a pledging event on May 11, which will give an opportunity for countries and the private sector to come together and support a donor effort here to pull funds together—to help us offload the oil onto a safer ship. We've been working in very close partnership with David Grossly, the humanitarian coordinator to implement this memorandum of understanding (MOU). The Houthis will have to follow through on their responsibilities, but we will get this ecological disaster off the table and not have that added to Yemen’s woes.

Jon Alterman: You suggested before, and it's been widely reported that Iran has significant influence over the Houthis. Do you think it's likely that Iran sought to play a constructive role supporting this recent ceasefire so as to help the nuclear negotiations? Do you see an implicit link?

Tim Lenderking: I don't see an implicit link, but we're always looking for ways that we can coax Iran to play a more positive role in Yemen. I think the fact that they welcomed the truce on April 2 was well received here. That was a positive step. We had Saudi Arabia and Iran both welcoming a truce in Yemen. Now, what we need to see from the Iranians is whether their behavior on the ground will change. Are they going to continue to smuggle weapons into Yemen in violation of security council resolutions? Are they going to continue to train and arm and equip the Houthis—in lethal production of missiles and UAVs? Are they going to continue to encourage the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE—or other Gulf countries? It really comes down to what the Iranians are actually doing on the field. There we must see better behavior from Iran.

Jon Alterman: You were one of the first special envoys that President Biden named after he came into office. You were named at the beginning of February 2021. What is at stake for the United States in Yemen?

Jon Alterman: Why do you think it was so important to name a special envoy? And what do you think you're going to be able to accomplish?

Tim Lenderking: I think that the United States under the new administration really sought to highlight the importance of diplomacy. What you have with the truce in Yemen is a diplomatic achievement. Between the United States, the United Nations, and other forces who have been working at this problem for so long, we finally achieved this breakthrough through painstaking, painstaking engagement. I had close to 20 trips to the region over the last 15 months, and trips to European countries as well. All of that marshalling of international determination to end the conflict and close ranks internationally so that we're all speaking with one voice on the conflict’s key points—no military solution, no one party has the ability to conquer the entirety of Yemen, there must be a political negotiation—was greatly assisted by U.S. diplomacy and our efforts. I think that, combined with the sense of determination in the Gulf that this conflict should end, gave some unity, purpose, and direction to international efforts. I think we’ve seen some benefit from that type of determination and engagement.

Jon Alterman: Your last trip was unusually long three weeks. What were you able to, to get done in that period of time?

Tim Lenderking: There was a real surge of diplomatic activity—by both us and by the United Nations—and this is what led to the truce on April 2. Coming out of the Yemeni-Yemeni talks in, in Riyadh was the formation of a new presidential leadership council. The secretary of state called week to congratulate them—but also to encourage them to reach out across party lines in Yemen and promote reconciliation and militate against the division that has racked the country. We’ve tried to ensure that this new leadership gets off to a good start and to continue to, in our other stops in the region, to highlight the importance of continued economic and humanitarian support for Yemen. All of this encapsulates the value of U.S. diplomacy and U.S. engagement in the Yemen conflict at this particular time.

Jon Alterman: You know, we were engaged in Yemeni politics. We helped create the Yemeni National Dialogue—which broke down and partly led to this civil war. Why should we be more optimistic now? What causes for optimism do we have now that this will head in different direction?

Tim Lenderking: For the first time in six years, there is a truce in Yemen. If you look at the levels of fighting up to April 2, they're quite significant. They drop off steeply on April 2, and the truce is largely holding in most parts of the country. There's reinvigorated Yemeni government leadership. There are many back channels working now between the different parties that I think are very important for promoting an overall solution. And you have a united international community, saying, “Let's get this done. It is time for the Yemen conflict to be finished.” Nobody wants this more than the Yemeni people, and in our engagements with, with them—in several trips to Yemen that we've had over the last couple of months—we hear their voices coming through very strongly in their appeals that this be brought to a close.

Jon Alterman: From the outside, it looks like the Gulf hasn't been especially grateful. In fact, what we've seen from the Emiratis is they seem enraged that the United States did not several Yemeni missiles launched against Abu Dhabi more seriously. They felt that the United States was not as aggressive as it should be. I assume you could argue that the Emirati push in Yemen, which helped elicit this diplomatic movement, was in response in part to the missile attacks. Is there a sense of gratitude in the Gulf? The general picture is that the Gulf feels that the United States is less engaged and not doing it needs to do there.

Tim Lenderking: It’s not necessarily gratitude, but I think that there's a real appreciation for U.S. engagement on Yemen. Just having come from a trip—10 days ago, Jon—with meetings with the Emiratis, the Saudis, the Qataris, the Kuwaitis, there's a strong sense of appreciation for U.S. diplomacy. I think there is a recognition that we probably wouldn't have gotten to this stage without U.S. diplomacy. As you said, there is a long way to go, and we haven't achieved peace in Yemen. There is a truce. There are elements of the truce which are in the process of being eliminated. This is a bright spot, but it's also a decisive moment when the international community—and most importantly the Yemeni parties themselves are going to have to make some tough decisions, continue to support the truce, extend it and build it into a more durable ceasefire, and have the kind of reconciliation and engagement that is necessary for Yemenis to determine the future of their country.

Jon Alterman: Tim, you said you've been on 20 trips in the last 15 months. Does the truce give you an opportunity to not have your next trip planned?

Tim Lenderking: Well, there's also important engagement in Washington. The role of Congress is extremely important, so the opportunity to brief Congress and to speak publicly when there are events in the world which will completely drown out this little ray of hope in Yemen is important. Obviously, there’s a huge amount of attention on Ukraine—as it should be—but the Ukraine crisis also impacts Yemen. I appreciate you taking the time because I think it’s important for people to know that there is a positive moment here. It's also important to know that it’s also fragile and that it is going to require continued international engagement to turn this moment into a larger peace dividend for Yemen and the Gulf region more broadly.

Jon Alterman: I certainly hope so. Tim, thank you for joining us on Babel.

Tim Lenderking: Thank you, Jon.