Trump-Xi Summit in Beijing: Managing the World’s Most Important Relationship

President Donald Trump’s May 14–15, 2026, visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will likely represent a relatively modest step toward greater stability and predictability in the world’s most important bilateral relationship. Like every president who goes to Beijing, Trump faces outsized expectations against the backdrop of a much more complex and challenging relationship. China feels confident enough to be able to stand up to Trump on many key issues, including sanctions, technology controls, critical minerals, and Iran. However, the PRC’s eagerness to hold a summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signals that it is much less confident than many observers believe, and the recent Beijing visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi shows China positioning itself as having already weighed in with Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump and Chairman Xi share a common goal of highlighting their skill in managing the other. Both countries expect to announce a return visit to the United States by Xi in the fall. Additionally, it is likely that Trump will attend the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shenzhen, China, and Xi will likely attend the G-20 in Miami at the end of the year.

Q1: What does the United States want to get out of the summit?

A1: President Trump wants to show that his relationship with Chairman Xi can deliver tangible economic and security benefits to the United States. The president will be seeking PRC support for his efforts to secure an acceptable agreement from Iran to end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration wants to show that it has brought fairness and reciprocity to the economic relationship, which the president has long argued favors China. This will include securing Chinese commitments for significant purchases of U.S. goods and services, with a particular emphasis on purchases that will ripple through the economy in key U.S. sectors, including agriculture, by the November midterm elections. Recognizing China’s failure to follow through on previous purchase commitments from his 2020 Phase One trade deal, the president will announce the creation of a “Board of Trade” comprising senior officials from both countries to oversee implementation, aiming to show that this time will be different.

The United States will also be seeking to expand China’s supply of rare earth elements, as agreed to at the first Trump-Xi meeting in Busan last year, as well as further Chinese cooperation to block exports of fentanyl precursors. Other topics for consideration may include developing a framework for further bilateral discussions on AI, particularly regarding risk and safety. Discussions may work to secure PRC support for a viable agreement between Russia and Ukraine, though, for its part, the PRC will almost certainly continue to provide systematic support for the Russian war machine. Finally, Trump may ask for Xi’s help in brokering renewed engagement with North Korea.

Q2: What does China want from the summit?

A2: China’s top priority is greater stability in its relationship with the United States, especially greater predictability on tariffs. Beijing also hopes that successful leader-level engagement will sideline those within the Trump administration who would like a more competitive approach. China relishes that Trump is coming to Beijing for the first U.S. presidential visit in almost nine years, which the PRC will portray as recognition of Beijing’s enhanced global stature and success in standing firm against the Trump administration’s initial efforts to pressure China.

On the economic front, the PRC seeks to signal the success of its tit-for-tat approach to managing the Trump administration’s escalation on tariffs, its use of rare earth exports to retaliate against U.S. export controls, and its willingness to match U.S. de-escalation. Beijing has pushed for the establishment of a “Board of Investment” to match the “Board of Trade” and would like agreement on the need to reduce barriers to investment in the United States, though it recognizes that this is probably more than is feasible at present.

On Iran, China will try to avoid appearing to pressure Iran in a way that would seem to support the United States, though it will encourage President Trump to reach an agreement that reopens the Strait of Hormuz. While Beijing’s extensive petroleum stockpiles, massive coal baseload, and leadership in renewable energy technologies have shielded it from the initial impact of the closure, higher energy costs will hurt the PRC directly in the long run and will likely also reduce demand in many of the export markets around the world that underpinned the Chinese economy in 2025. 

Chairman Xi will once again emphasize PRC concern about Taiwan and seek explicit U.S. agreement to restrict arms sales as a quid pro quo for a more stable relationship—or even push for a change in long-standing U.S. language that it can portray as a win. Even if unable to make such clear gains during this visit, China is more likely to believe that a steady cadence of leader-level meetings will give the United States incentives to avoid action on Taiwan that would antagonize Beijing.

Q3: What are Indo-Pacific countries looking for?

A3: Indo-Pacific countries will be watching the overall tone of the visit as well as whether there are specific agreements on trade, technology, export controls, and Iran. Across the region, governments all hope for a Goldilocks U.S.-China relationship—good enough to avoid conflict and pressure to take sides, but not so good so as to suggest a G2 partnership in which decisions critical to their interests are made only in Washington and Beijing. In every country, the hope will be for a modus vivendi that lowers tension and uncertainty, particularly on tariffs and critical mineral supply chains. Most players in the Indo-Pacific are hoping for signals of resolution of the Iran crisis, though Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will be particularly worried about the possibility that President Trump, seeking to secure PRC support on Iran, may make concessions on issues they consider vital. 

Despite the deep concern about being pressured to take sides by either China or the United States, countries in the region (particularly in Southeast Asia) fully appreciate that they have benefited significantly from U.S.-China economic competition, as shown by significant investments and the large increase in exports to the United States since 2018. Across the region, there will be close attention to mentions of key regional issues in the respective readouts from the United States and the PRC (a joint statement is very unlikely), with particular focus on any mentions of the South China Sea, East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and ASEAN—which Trump appears to have not yet raised in his exchanges with Xi over the course of his second term—as well as cooperation in other regions.

Q4: What is Taiwan watching for?

A4: Always nervous before U.S.-China summits that its interests will be traded away to make progress on the issue of the day, Taiwan will be watching for any changes in how the United States describes the cross-strait relationship. Taipei is particularly worried that Beijing will successfully persuade Trump to express “support” for peaceful unification or state that the United States “opposes” rather than “does not support” Taiwan independence. After President Trump said he discussed arms sales to Taiwan in a February 2026 phone call between U.S. and PRC leaders, Taipei is also worried that Trump will negotiate with Xi on arms sales to Taiwan, thereby undermining one of President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances. More broadly, Taiwan worries that President Trump’s confidence in his own relationship with Chairman Xi will lead to a lessening of U.S. support for Taiwan in areas such as security, trade, and support for Taiwan’s efforts to preserve its web of official and unofficial international relationships.

Edgard Kagan is senior adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.