Is the United States Abandoning Saudi Arabia at Its Moment of Need?

The Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia that began on July 13—and are still ongoing—recall nothing so much as the strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure of September 2019. But this time it is worse, and the stakes are much higher.

In 2019, drones struck a major crude oil stabilization facility in Abqaiq and a huge oil field in Khurais, both in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. The impact, not only on Saudi Arabia but potentially on global energy markets, could have been grave. The Houthis at first claimed responsibility, but the attacks were more likely the work of Iran or its Iraqi proxies. At the time, President Trump condemned the attack and famously claimed that the United States was “locked and loaded” to launch a reprisal. But in the end, the United States imposed additional sanctions on Iran and did not respond militarily. The reason, Trump implied, was that the United States is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The tepid U.S. response left Saudi Arabia with an enduring grievance: Its principal defense partner sat by while the kingdom was brazenly attacked by its principal adversary.

By 2022, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had negotiated a ceasefire. It held imperfectly until July 2026, when Saudi Arabia was attacked again—this time most definitely by the Houthis. The attacks plunged Saudi Arabia into a conflict it had hoped to avoid.

Houthi missiles, mostly intercepted, began targeting Saudi Arabia on July 13. The Houthis announced a naval blockade on July 22 and began targeting oil tankers carrying Saudi crude in the Red Sea. They then began attacking Saudi energy infrastructure, culminating in a strike on an oil refinery in Jazan on August 9. On September 10, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq—plausibly coordinating with the Houthis—struck the critical East-West Pipeline that had allowed the country to reroute its oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea. And on September 18, a Houthi ballistic missile targeting Riyadh was intercepted by Saudi air defenses.

These attacks come as global oil inventories are at historically low levels, a product of the continued blockades—U.S. and Iranian—on the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices are edging higher, and gas and diesel prices in the United States are the highest since 2022. And although the Houthis are thus far limiting their strikes to Saudi targets, it is worth recalling that between 20 and 30 percent of global container traffic goes through the Bab al-Mandab at the mouth of the Red Sea.

U.S. support for Saudi Arabia could take various forms beyond air strikes, including intelligence sharing and targeting recommendations. But credible reports suggest that direct U.S. military engagement is what Saudi Arabia really wants, and what President Trump has reportedly declined to provide. There are several possible explanations for Trump’s disinclination:

• Although the White House and the Pentagon tend to downplay the issue, it seems clear that the war thus far has taken its toll on U.S. forces. The U.S. military is reportedly facing serious challenges, including shortages of some sophisticated interceptors, according to the Pentagon’s own inspector general. There are also reports that U.S. naval vessels deployed to the Gulf badly need maintenance. This comes as U.S. military installations in the region, including the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, suffered extensive damage in the early days of the war.
• President Trump may be disinclined to break the U.S. ceasefire with the Houthis that was implemented, with Omani mediation, in May 2025. Or, President Trump may not want to open a new front in the Iran war, which would effectively rebut his narrative that the war is all but over.
• Meanwhile, as a political matter, President Trump has seemed anxious to declare the war over, to move on, and to stop talking about it as the November midterm elections grow nearer. If Trump agreed to launch military operations against the Houthis, effectively opening a new front in the U.S. war, it would put the lie to the notion that this war is all but over.

U.S. reluctance to get involved stokes the perception that the United States has abandoned a partner at its moment of greatest need. While the United States’ Saudi ally is under attack, the U.S. president is telling the world that he is not helping the ally. Rather, he is talking to that ally’s enemy—mostly to convince it not to attack the United States.

This puts the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, in a difficult spot. Prince Mohammed’s nearly exclusive focus for much of the past decade has been inward-looking, investing heavily in transforming Saudi society, diversifying its economy, and creating opportunities for young Saudis, particularly women. The last thing the Saudi leadership wanted was rockets, missiles, and drones launched toward the kingdom from Iran or Iraq or Yemen.

After the 2019 attacks, the Saudi leadership may have felt aggrieved, though its approach was not to walk away from the United States, but to seek greater clarity in the relationship. Arguably, the experience led directly to the effort that began in 2022 to negotiate a mutual defense treaty with the United States, an arrangement that would have brought maximum clarity about Saudi and U.S. expectations in the event of a major conflict (and would have led to Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel).

A treaty and normalization deal never got over the finish line. But Saudi Arabia continued to seek a closer security partnership with the United States, and during his November 2025 visit to Washington, Prince Mohammed seemed to attain just that. The United States designated Saudi Arabia a major non-NATO ally, agreed to sell the kingdom the F-35 fighter jet, and inked a new strategic defense agreement with the kingdom. And yet, less than a year later, at this moment of need, the “upgraded” relationship seems to count for little.

This doesn’t bring the U.S.-Saudi relationship to a point of rupture. Saudi Arabia and the United States have invested decades in their military partnership, including training, exercises, integration into U.S. Central Command planning, and, of course, arms sales. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to walk away from that partnership, but going forward it will likely continue to seek greater clarity, even guarantees. If the kingdom is attacked again by its mortal enemy, what will the United States do? What precisely is the import of a major non-NATO ally designation? To what degree should Saudi Arabia expect to be part of major decisions on U.S. military operations in the region that implicated Saudi Arabia and its neighbors directly? And the United States should also expect Saudi Arabia to look for other defense partners—not as replacements, but to supplement and bolster its defenses. The recent Mecca Pact that brought Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey together in what is described as a mutual defense pact is a good example.

In the immediate term, Saudi Arabia is faced with the same two options it has always had: military operations and diplomacy. The kingdom is currently pursuing military operations against the Houthis and, in a sense, it cannot afford not to. The kingdom is under attack, and as a political matter, it has to retaliate. But ultimately, we should expect a return to diplomacy—imperfect, unsatisfying diplomacy that nonetheless deescalates the conflict. That diplomacy may actually have to start with Iran, and there have been reports that the Arab Gulf states had plans to meet with Iranian negotiators in Oman. That seems to be postponed, but it is the direction this conflict is likely headed: a diplomatic process that doesn’t necessarily involve the United States, one that reaches an uncomfortable and incomplete modus vivendi with Iran and sets the stage for deescalating the conflict with the Houthis.

Michael Ratney is a senior adviser (non-resident) in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.