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Over the next two years, several leadership positions in multilateral organizations will be up for election, warranting the attention of the United States. A necessity for maintaining global peace and security, these multilateral institutions serve as channels to project U.S. soft power and promote U.S. interests. While these organizations have diverse levels of notoriety, ranging from the relatively unknown International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) to the more ubiquitous World Bank and Interpol, securing leadership positions within these organizations remains critical for the United States and its like-minded allies to achieve their foreign policy goals. Leaders set the directions and agendas of these organizations and have significant decisionmaking power, particularly over institutional priorities, budget allocations, and staff composition. Supporting U.S. or U.S.-friendly candidates to lead influential multilateral organizations can help advance policy decisions that are in the interests of a world order the United States supports.
A glance at the state of international affairs today sees world order and norms in a state of flux, as the collision of economic, geopolitical, and demographic shifts result in new alliances and the shifting power profile of various countries such as India. Multilateral institutions are key in such scenarios, serving as places where nations come together to shape their desired futures and agree to new terms of engagement. The United States, as a superpower and a nation with significant interests in the economic, trade, security, political, and human development outcomes of global rebalancing, should be at the multilateral table leading and shaping discussions. The importance of U.S. involvement in multilaterals is also crucial for another reason: a failure to help lead and shape these institutions risks ceding influence to China, Russia, or other competitors that espouse undemocratic values. However, while alarmists may warn that multilaterals provide a platform for undemocratic actors to gain power and influence, it is essential to recognize that multilateral institutions are expert bodies that select experts, not countries, to lead them. It is farfetched to think that the United States can wield absolute power in multilateral institutions. For example, per the responsible stakeholder thesis of engaging China, a two-part strategy of seeking increased leadership positions while also looking to engage the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in ongoing multilateral efforts is essential.
The upcoming secretary general (SG) election at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the perfect example of what is at stake in multilateral leadership contests. The election will occur at the ITU’s Plenipotentiary Conference between September 26 and October 14, 2022. The ITU is responsible for the future of the internet, including critical standard-setting and 5G regulatory activities. The two candidates for SG are Doreen Bogdan-Martin of the United States and Rashid Ismailov of Russia. Bogdan-Martin has had three decades of experience as an ITU bureaucrat while Ismailov is a former Russian deputy telecommunications minister and former Huawei executive. The State Department rightly came out early in its support of Bogdan-Martin. Secretary of State Antony Blinken released a press statement in support of Bogdan-Martin's candidacy on March 31, 2021. Additionally, USAID administrator Samantha Power issued a statement of support on July 27, 2021. While the election has not yet occurred, the State Department’s efforts to back a qualified U.S. candidate early on is a prime example of a forward-looking, strategic policy that will hopefully reap the intended outcome.
Beyond the ITU, which should be the priority of the Biden administration, 10 other leadership races between 2022 and 2024 demand attention. Of these ten, the two most significant races are the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
The other eight relevant races are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and World Bank. Given the norm of successful reelection for leaders of these organizations, the Biden administration would be wise to focus on elections where leaders have already served two terms and, among these, target institutions that hold great strategic interest to the United States.
PAHO is both the hemispheric health organization established in 1947 as the successor to the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the Americas regional office of the World Health Organization (WHO). U.S. support and leadership could be critical given the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and the need to demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional development. PAHO is significant to Latin America given the sizable toll of Covid-19, which caused 1.7 million deaths as of May 2022. Moreover, as of July 2022, the World Bank reported that 8 in 20 Caribbean countries still had not reached a 50 percent vaccination rate. The United States, as host to PAHO headquarters and its largest budget contributor, traditionally has recognized its potential to help strengthen regional and national health systems, deliver critical health outcomes, and reduce social inequality exacerbated by the pandemic. Progress in these areas would advance overall well-being in the region, making countries more resilient, while also serving U.S. health security interests. The election of the next director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PAHO’s executive arm) will occur during the 30th Pan American Sanitary Conference (September 26–30, 2022). Members will vote by secret ballot to select the director for a five-year term from the nominated candidates at the conference. PAHO’s director must be both a national of and nominee of a member country of the Americas. The current director, Carissa F. Etienne, is from Dominica and is completing her second and final term. Despite increasing Chinese investment and interest in Latin America, China’s non-membership in PAHO significantly limits any influence over the election. It is likely that member countries will continue the tradition of electing a technically qualified public health specialist. The past four directors prior to Etienne were medical professionals from Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, and Mexico.
The IMO and the FAO are both UN specialized agencies, which hold more sway due to their size and power. There are 15 total specialized agencies at the United Nations. The United States is a key FAO partner, collaborating with the organization across the food and agriculture sector, from global crop forecasting and food safety to disaster assistance, economic sustainability of agriculture, and resilience building. The IMO is the global standard-setting authority for the safety, security, and environmental performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted, and universally implemented. The next IMO SG will be elected at the 129th session of the IMO Council from July 17 to 21, 2023 (subject to confirmation at the 128th session in November/December 2022). Both the United States and China are members, and the current SG, Kitack Lim, is from the Republic of Korea. The next director general (DG) of the FAO will be elected at the 43rd FAO Conference from July 1 to 7, 2023. The United States and China are both members and the current leader, Qu Dongyu, is a Chinese national. However, despite China’s leadership of the FAO, it is important that the Biden administration not fall victim to alarmist cries that China is positioning itself to become the dominant authority in the UN system—both to bolster its challenge to a U.S.-led neoliberal international order and to distract from human rights violations within China. Civil servants, like all those who lead multilaterals and UN agencies, are required to take an oath:
International civil servants must remain independent of any authority outside their organization; their conduct must reflect that independence. In keeping with their oath of office, they should not seek nor should they accept instructions from any Government, person or entity external to the organization. It cannot be too strongly stressed that international civil servants are not, in any sense, representatives of Governments or other entities, nor are they proponents of their policies.
This oath should quiet fears that the leaders of multilateral institutions are serving alternative, nationalistic aims.
The current DG of the IMSO, Captain Moin Ahmed, is from Bangladesh, and a new DG will be appointed in 2023 at the 28th IMSO Assembly from September 26 to 30. This agency is an important standard-setting body that has “oversight of certain public satellite safety and security communication services provided by mobile satellite communication systems.” It is also the coordinator of the Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships (LRIT) system, which helps track and identify ships around the world, ensuring shipping security and protection of the marine environment. Both China and the United States are members of the IMSO. Given China’s continual expansion and maritime claims in the South China Sea, maintaining U.S. allies in leadership positions at the IMSO could help to push back on China.
In the strain of environmentally focused organizations are the GEF and UNEP. The next CEO/chairperson of the GEF will be appointed at the 64th GEF Council meeting in June 2024. Both the United States and China are members. The current GEF CEO/chairperson, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, is from Costa Rica. The next executive director of the UNEP will be elected during the 78th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2023. Much like the GEF, both the United States and China are members of the UNEP. The current UNEP executive director, Inger Andersen, is from Denmark. The GEF and UNEP have different mandates but are both critical organizations for the preservation of biodiversity and fighting climate change and its effects. Supporting an American, or a candidate from a like-minded country, to occupy the position of CEO/chairperson at the GEF could bolster climate change mitigation efforts and clamp down on China, which remains the largest global emitter of CO2 and continues to expand its mines and increase coal production.
The IOM is a UN agency that promotes orderly and humane migration and good migration governance by providing guidance to governments and migrants. The leadership of the IOM had been dominated by the United States since the organization’s founding in 1951, a track record that ended in 2018 with the election of António Vitorino of Portugal as DG. This stinging loss makes the 2023 election even more important for the United States to reestablish its tradition of leadership within the organization. Both the United States and China are members of the IOM. The new DG will be selected in 2023 by the 171 voting member states, which select candidates from those nominated by their home governments. Voting is conducted by secret ballot and the winning candidate must receive one-third or more of the total votes.
Interpol has faced a fair amount of criticism in the past decade. It helps connect different country police organizations around the world, functioning as a “network of police from different nations.” It does not have the authority to carry out investigations or arrests but is critical in helping local police units carry out their duties more efficiently. There has been mounting concern regarding the usage of Interpol’s Red Notices—a notification for arrest and possible extradition—by authoritarian leaders to persecute political dissidents. The current SG, Jürgen Stock, is German. The next SG will be elected at the 93rd General Assembly meeting in the final quarter of 2024, which will be hosted in the United Kingdom. Given that undemocratic countries like Russia and China have the potential to abuse Interpol systems, like Red Notices, it is important to support the election of a U.S. ally to the SG position to ensure greater oversight.
The EBRD is a multilateral development bank, differing from the other organizations mentioned, many of which are technically part of the UN system. The next president will be elected by the board of governors in October 2024. The current president, Odile Renaud-Basso, is French. While the war in Ukraine is far from over, there have been conversations within the EBRD about economic and infrastructure-related reconstruction efforts already. So long as the EBRD, under Renaud-Basso’s watch, continues to allocate a significant amount of the institution’s financial envelope to Ukraine and frontline states impacted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States should support Renaud-Basso’s reelection. The EBRD was originally created to help steer reconstruction efforts in Europe post–World War II and will likely need to play a similar role after the close of the Ukraine war. The future president of the EBRD will need to play a key role in overseeing not only these efforts but also energy diversification from Russia for many of its member states. The Biden administration has displayed increased interest and cooperation with European countries, including notable progress on policy and politics. Thus, a positive, constructive relationship with the EBRD is essential to continue advancing European-U.S. cooperation, which is of increased relevance to combat Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The next president of the World Bank will be elected by the Executive Board during the annual meeting from April 19 to 21, 2024. The current president, David Malpass, is American. The presidency of the World Bank has traditionally been held by an American, and there is no indication that anything will change in 2024. However, it is possible that the Biden administration will put forth a candidate other than President Malpass, even if President Malpass is seen to be fulfilling his duties effectively.
As global competitors continue to directly and indirectly exploit the multilateral system for their own gains and agenda, the United States should proactively support the election of U.S. or like-minded candidates for leadership roles across multilateral institutions. Such leadership in the multilateral system can help keep malign actors accountable and ensure that progress on global imperatives, from climate change to economic and gender equity, remain overarching goals in these institutions.
As increasingly authoritarian countries and actors continue to challenge global economic stability and international norms—the Russian invasion of Ukraine being a glaring example—the United States cannot afford to cede influence in multilateral organizations, given the rule-making and standard-setting abilities of these institutions on a suite of global issues. The United States, working with allies and like-minded partners, can help discourage future contentious actions by China and Russia. While a U.S. candidate does not have to lead every single organization, having a significant number of leaders be U.S. allies ensures a democratic, transparent, equitable agenda will prevail.
Veronica Rice is a program coordinator with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president, William A. Schreyer Chair, and director of the Project on Prosperity and Development and Americas Program at CSIS.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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