What Australia and Fiji’s New Treaty Means for the Pacific | State of Play

State of Play, a podcast and commentary series produced by the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, features timely analysis from CSIS’s leading regional experts on geopolitical developments and the future of the international order.

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On Friday, May 8, 2026, Fiji and Australia finalized the Vuvale Union, an historic treaty-level agreement between the two nations. This agreement was the successful culmination of a three-day visit by Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong and Defense Industry and Pacific Island Affairs Minister Pat Conroy to Suva. Although the text of the treaty has yet to be released, the Australian government has indicated that it will “strengthen Fiji’s capabilities across interdiction, policing, legislation, prosecution, and help to combat transnational crime,” in addition to elevating the relationship across the three pillars of economy, security, and people. An official announcement from the office of the prime minister of Fiji also notes enhanced cooperation in “traditional” security sectors such as illegal fishing and drug trafficking, as well as the inclusion of economic security, including work on critical infrastructure, health, trade, and labor mobility. Pointing to the broader significance of the agreement, the prime minister’s office also states that this “new chapter” in Fiji-Australian relations can provide a “blueprint” for the broader Pacific region.

Why Does It Matter?

This agreement is yet another signal of Australia’s significant push over the past few years to shore up security relationships across the Pacific, largely in response to China’s growing ambitions to gain influence and presence in this critical arena. In recent years, Australia conducted a whirlwind of diplomacy, signing bespoke agreements with Papua New Guinea in 2025, Nauru in 2024, and Tuvalu in 2023, all with specific security components obliquely limiting China’s reach. As the Pacific’s most dynamic economy, one of only three Pacific Islands with a standing military (the other two being Papua New Guinea and Tonga), and as the headquarters of the regional Pacific Islands Forum, Fiji holds significant sway across both Melanesia and the larger Pacific. The Vuvale Union’s particular focus on bolstering cooperation and capacity building in policing, interdiction, and prosecution points to an overarching security lens to the treaty, similar to what Australia has incorporated into other agreements in the Pacific.

What’s Next?

While it has not yet been fully published, many will be keen to see how and if the Vuvale Union limits China’s ability to engage with Fiji in the security sector, as Australian arrangements have done elsewhere. It is also not yet clear what specific funding and capacity building is nested within the treaty, although Australia will be eager to demonstrate tangible benefits to Fiji to prove the worth of such an agreement to other prospective Pacific partners. Across the Pacific, Australia will likely continue this trend of more clearly prioritizing its security priorities via bilateral agreements. Earlier in 2025, Australia was poised to sign a similar agreement with Vanuatu, only to have the deal indefinitely delayed over concerns within the Vanuatu government that it would limit the country’s engagement with other partners—at present, Beijing is Vanuatu’s largest external creditor. In a possible flanking move, other sources have reported that China is close to finalizing a similar deal with Vanuatu, although both China and Vanuatu refute those claims. Australia may also aim to build upon its September 2025 statement of intent with the Kingdom of Tonga, which articulated that the two sides would elevate ties by codifying this relationship in a security or defense agreement.

What’s Under the Radar?

To stay ahead of growing external interest in Pacific security sectors, there is momentum within the Pacific to create a regional security treaty which would broaden the mandate of the existing Pacific Response Group to also cover “stabilization operations” in addition to disaster response. This would reinforce a Pacific-led approach to tackling security needs, and prompt greater coordination when and if external partners (such as China, Japan, and the United States) offered assistance. While both Australia and New Zealand—as members of the Pacific Islands Forum—appear to support this trajectory, it remains unclear how such a move would affect existing U.S. security and defense relationships in the region. These include the U.S.-Papua New Guinea Defense Cooperation Agreement and long-standing defense ties—also governed by formal agreements—with the three Compacts of Free Association in Micronesia. To demonstrate support for Pacific-led architecture while maintaining its own position as a partner of choice—including in the security sector—the United States should ensure high-level participation in this year’s PIF Leaders’ Meeting. It will also be critical to curb the perception of the United States as retreating from the region by reinstating ambassadors (there are currently no U.S. ambassadors at post in the Pacific Islands) and continuing to engage on critical infrastructure and economic security.

Kathryn Paik is a deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.