Will the "Strengthening the Quad Act" Work?
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States exists to promote shared interests in strategic technological cooperation and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, having begun as a coordinated humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Reflecting the need to engage more closely with each other on shared interests, the forum was revived and elevated in 2017 to feature regular leadership summits and ministerial meetings. The last Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023 in Hiroshima, Japan, showcased the growing importance of this alliance. As of early 2024, India has been proposed as the host for the next leaders’ summit later this year, perhaps after the U.S. presidential election in November.
The Quad countries have a shared interest in securing semiconductor manufacturing value chains as well as developing and investing in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), next-generation communications technologies (including 5G and 6G), and Open RAN mobile standards and technologies that promote interoperability and innovation in wireless networks. They have also launched several research fellowships and joint initiatives for sharing technological standards and lowering regulatory barriers for advanced technology developments. These Quad platforms highlight the importance of sharing AI standards and codeveloping advanced AI models.
On February 15, 2024, the House of Representatives passed the Strengthening the Quad Act, seeking to elevate and institutionalize the status of the Quad as a growing innovation and security platform within a delicate balance of interests. The act was well received, with 379 members in favor and 39 opposed.
After passing the House last February, the Strengthening the Quad Act was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Now, for it to potentially reach the full Senate floor for a vote, the committee must first take up and vote on the bill. Whatever the outcome of this initiative, a major shift is already underway as the United States and key Indo-Pacific allies come together around the technological and security domains that have defined the twenty-first century thus far.
The Quad Nations’ Perspectives
Plans to formalize the status of the Quad is a key development, especially as leaders of the four participating countries have described the Quad relationship as a diplomatic or strategic partnership rather than a rigid, formal alliance. This flexibility has so far allowed the Quad countries to avoid portraying the partnership as an overtly anti-China bloc or as an Indo-Pacific NATO. Indeed, they have been promoting the Quad as fostering a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on shared values and principles, rather than an outright coalition against China.
To this end, the Quad has introduced numerous initiatives, including the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership, the Quad Investors Network, and the International Standards Cooperation Network. Advancing mutual advantages in technology and innovation is central to the Quad’s agenda, but each member nation also has unique contributions and interests that mutually complement one another.
Australia: Australian minister of foreign affairs Penny Wong has highlighted the critical importance of the Indo-Pacific partnership in ensuring regional sovereignty and territorial integrity. She emphasized how the Quad aims to “ensure a free and open order” and prevent the Indo-Pacific from being “dominated by any power” amid China’s military modernization. The critical importance of the Indo-Pacific partnership is ensuring regional sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The Quad presents an opportunity for Australia and the United States to build their existing technological cooperation in concert with India and Japan. Australia’s leadership of the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership is expected to further existing cooperation in protecting critical infrastructure and telecommunications networks.
India: India’s minister of external affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has described the Quad as an example of the growth of a multipolar global order and a collaborative, rather than unilateral, approach to global dynamics. He has expressed confidence that the Quad’s relevance will continue to grow, becoming a more significant factor in regional and global politics and policymaking.
Drawing on India’s strengths, the Quad members can accelerate the speed of technological progress, drawing on Indian scientific and engineering talent to emerging technology industries. India also provides a large and growing market for applications and products derived from advances in AI, cybersecurity, biotech, and quantum computing.
Japan: Japanese minister of foreign affairs Yōko Kamikawa has stated that she views the Quad as a critical bridge among the four countries to further develop a free and open Indo-Pacific. She has stressed how the initiatives implemented by the Quad have steadily benefited the region in a wide range of areas.
For Japan, the Quad provides a more in-depth framework to align efforts on critical and emerging technologies. Notably, the joint statement following the Hiroshima Quad summit emphasized collaborative work on securing the digital economy, 5G and Open RAN, cybersecurity, and civil space as well as enhancing supply chain resilience for semiconductors and critical minerals.
The United States: According to U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken, the Quad serves as a key coalition to elevate cooperation in the region, not only in economic and humanitarian areas but also in strategic realms. For example, the Malabar exercise, originally between the U.S. and Indian navies, now includes all four Quad nations’ militaries, reinforcing their shared commitment to an open, inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order.
The Quad’s Future and Challenges Ahead
While Australia, Japan, and the United States are already long-standing treaty allies, the current formulation of the Quad accommodates India’s reluctance to join in a strong military alliance. As a rising economic power and a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean, India’s participation in the group is both essential and welcomed by the other Quad partners.
Squaring the circle, Minister of External Affairs Jaishankar has noted that “[the Quad] is there for global good and it is there for the global commons. It is facilitated by the emergence of the Indo-Pacific. And it is propelled by a change in the global order that requires more, not less, collaboration among the like-minded.”
To adapt to these circumstances, Quad members have stressed that their partnership is not a formal, institutionalized alliance but rather a flexible and informal coalition that aims to foster technology collaboration and a free and open Indo-Pacific region. They emphasize that the absence of institutionalized methods creates a structure with greater agility and responsiveness that is free of the bureaucracy and institutional sclerosis often identified with alliance structures. Further, they emphasize that the Quad is not an anti-China setup, but rather a partnership focused on mutual advantages. The lack of a formal alliance organization preserves both this agility and the plausibility of this narrative of purpose.
Even in its current form, many Southeast Asian countries view the Quad with skepticism, perceiving it as a thinly veiled strategy to contain China’s rise. They are concerned that the Quad and its military cooperation might lead to further destabilization of the region, especially if the Quad members react as China’s assertiveness continues to grow in the South China Sea.
Although realizing that the Quad could be a potential source of public goods, like the new vaccine-focused Quad Health Security Partnership formalized in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the emergence of a new Indo-Pacific coalition in the region is also seen by some as an obstacle to the ongoing efforts of countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote stability through deeper regional integration, although the terms of that integration are, of course, what is at issue. In addition, some see the potential for coordination challenges between ASEAN nations and the activities of the Quad, despite the broadly shared economic and security goals between the two coalitions. Others see these efforts as complementary. The reality of Australia, Japan, India, and the United States seeking greater cooperation on a broad range of issues is a powerful message.
The Strengthening the Quad Act
It is in this vast geopolitical backdrop that the Strengthening the Quad Act is designed to reinforce cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with regards to (1) preparing for the next pandemic, (2) codeveloping new innovative technologies, and (3) deepening economic engagement and integration. It requires the U.S. Department of State to develop a strategy to increase engagement and cooperation with the Quad within 180 days of the bill’s enactment. Within 60 days of its enactment, the bill would also require the Department of State to enter negotiations with Australia, India, and Japan to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group that would include up to 24 members of the U.S. Congress. It would also draft guidelines for annual meetings of the leadership of the Quad countries and submit an annual report on the Quad’s activities to the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees.
When the act was introduced in September 2023, U.S. representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and other proponents argued that the bill would create more robust cooperation among like-minded nations to foster an open and resilient Indo-Pacific. Advocates of the legislation have underscored that the Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group would also deepen engagement among legislators of the four member countries and enhance more active dialogue on agendas, particularly those related to technology and innovation. Whether this effort enhances the careful diplomatic progress on military cooperation on which the broader effort of the Quad rests remains to be seen, but it clearly represents a desire to deepen and expand cooperation.
Alexander Kersten is deputy director and a fellow with the Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Julia Yoon is a research intern with the Renewing American Innovation Project at CSIS.