Being a Good Neighbor? Charting Malaysia’s Evolving Views on Thailand’s “Deep South” Conflict

On March 22, a wave of coordinated bombings hit Thailand’s “Deep South,” drawing attention to the secessionist-sectarian conflict that has for decades persisted in the region. Primarily comprised of the three southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, the so-called “Patani region” has specifically been the site of conflict between Thai government forces, its resident Thai-Malays, and insurgency groups claiming to represent the ethnic minority. The conflict has persisted despite negotiations between the two sides since 2013 and, more recently, attempts to broker a ceasefire during the Islamic month of Ramadan and the Buddhist new year celebration, Songkran.

Malaysia has been a key player in peace negotiations from the very beginning. Most recently, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has characterized the conflict as a humanitarian concern and tactfully urged the two sides to reconcile. Yet, these statements stand in stark contrast to Malaysia’s past positions on the Patani, which vacillated from “covertly” supporting separatist rebels, to readily deferring to Thai security forces, to even openly criticizing the Thai government.

Understanding the various factors impelling Malaysia to act––or not act––over the past half century is crucial to understanding Malaysia’s motivations today, and thus the trajectory of Thailand’s Patani conflict more broadly. Indeed, as the United States seeks to build closer economic and security ties with Southeast Asia––in ways that transcend U.S.-China geopolitical competition––Washington would do well to understand and help ameliorate one of the region’s most deadly and tenacious conflicts.

Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Deep South Conflict

The long-running conflict in the Patani region has seen a notable resurgence since 2022. Analysts have attributed this to a variety of reasons: increased anti-state sentiments stemming from the continual “second-class” treatment of Malay-Muslims, a growing global Islamist movement, the development gap between the Southern provinces and the rest of the country, and the rebels’ distrust in the Thai government’s commitment to the peace process. Moreover, violence has been exacerbated by the response of the Thai government, which declared martial law in January 2004. Since then, the conflict has claimed the lives of over 7,000 civilians, soldiers, public servants, and rebels.

Peace negotiations have proceeded in fits and starts since the beginning of the conflict. Malaysia, a Muslim-majority state with a track record of mediating in secessionist conflicts, has been at the forefront of these efforts since 2013. Then, Prime Minister Najib Razak initiated talks with Thai prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra––but this fell to the wayside following regime change and political instability in Thailand. Negotiations were also hindered by a perceived lack of seriousness from both rebel and government groups––both of which doubted Malaysia’s “partiality” in the conflict.

Progress has ramped up since 2022, with the resumption of onsite negotiations in Kuala Lumpur in 2023. In his first official state visit to Thailand in 2023, then-newly appointed Anwar said that Malaysia will “express [their] … legitimate concerns, whilst acknowledging that south Thailand is purely an internal issue within Thailand.” He also said that it is Malaysia’s “duty as a good neighbor and family to do whatever is required and necessary to facilitate the process.” In February 2024, the two opposing sides agreed “in principle” to a peace plan.

However, the amicable stance of the Malaysian government today, one that is sensitive to the priorities of the Thai government as well as Patani’s Thai-Malays, is not an inevitability. In fact, the history of Malaysia’s role in the Patani region indicates that their willingness, and ability, to facilitate peace has been largely inconsistent over the years.

Digging Deeper into Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s “Deep South”

Malaysian attempts to frame a policy toward Southern Thailand can be traced to the 1940s, when nationalist movements in British Malaya saw the four southern provinces of Thailand as part of a Greater Malay-Indonesian state (Malayu-Indonesia Raya). Malay nationalist movements that came to dominate the Malaysian independence struggle, including the eventual ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO), initially supported such a concept. But UMNO did not provide an official endorsement, in exchange for Thai support to the Malaysian independence struggle.

Malaysia’s attitude and policies toward the Patani region changed in 1959, when the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) emerged as an electoral competitor to UMNO in the northeastern states of Malaysia. PAS inherited the aforementioned Melayu Raya doctrines––as reflected in public speeches, party platforms, and campaign materials. Through the 1960s and 1970s, PAS leaders called for Patani autonomy, independence, or even a merger with Malaysia. UMNO’s response was to covertly support Islamic resistance movements in the region, providing military aid, covert armaments, and refuge to militants. Until the late 1980s, Malaysian authorities even allowed Thai resistance groups to establish operational headquarters in their country.

Conflict slowly turned into cooperation, as the Thai-Malay relationship evolved to encompass economic development projects. For example, in 1990, a “Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development” body was set up, which primarily served as a vehicle for cooperation on offshore petroleum projects. In 1993, Malaysia and Thailand, along with Indonesia, established a “growth triangle” covering the southern region. And in December 2002, a joint cabinet meeting was held, during which both parties agreed to boost economic, tourism, and trade linkages. Security cooperation soon followed, particularly as the post-9/11 Global War on Terror escalated dramatically. In May 2003, the two parties engaged in joint security patrols and standardized military operational procedures to enhance economic activity.

Yet, in 2004, Malaysian officials were greatly alarmed by consecutive violent incidents in the region. On April 28, 2004, five Thai security officials and 107 insurgents were killed. Soon after, on October 25, seven demonstrators and seventy-five prison transportees died during the Tak Bai incident. The public blowback was severe. Critics––including then-imprisoned Anwar––pushed the current government to deal with the Patani conflict. In an unusual step, the Malaysian parliament even debated the Tak Bai incident in November 2004, and unanimously condemned Thai security actions.

A Pragmatic Approach After All?

The ups and downs of the Thai-Malaysian relationship, and hence Malaysia’s vacillating attitudes toward the Patani region, suggest that various factors are working together to shape Malaysia’s policies and rhetoric today––shaping overall prospects for peace. Over the long term, Malaysia’s policy toward Thailand’s southern border crisis can only be described as pragmatic. The United States’ approach and potential response to the regional conflict must thus reflect and respond to this pragmatism.

On the one hand, economic and security cooperation has driven Malaysia to pursue peace: it has created opportunities for coordination and consultation, and has given each party a greater stake in stability. Recently, Anwar and Thai prime minister Srettha Thavisin agreed to “expedite” cooperation to develop Thai-Malaysian border areas and to strengthen cooperation between their chambers of commerce, building on both leaders’ efforts to secure investments and economic opportunities. A growing illicit economy––endangering Thai-Malays as well as Malaysians––has made close security cooperation an even greater priority.

On the other hand, joint development projects––and associated security concerns–– did not stop Malay-Muslim nationalists from mobilizing against Thai authorities during the Tak Bai incident and adversely affecting Thailand-Malaysia relations. Amid the contemporary rise of Malaysia’s Malay ultranationalists and Islamic activists, combined with an increasingly vocal assertion of a Malay identity by the Patani’s Thai-Malays, might perceived shared Malay-Muslim grievances push Anwar to be more vocal––and critical––again? Politicians in Malaysia, particularly during tumultuous election seasons, have not shied from populist rhetoric valorizing Thai-Malays and highlighting the oppression of Muslims near and far.

Still, Malaysia’s policies and rhetoric cannot be seen solely as outcomes of the salience of religious and ethnic identity. Examining Malaysia’s longer history in the Patani region, it remains unclear as to when Malay-Muslim grievances would lead to hostilities—as in 2004 and from the 1960s to 1980s—or cooperation—as in the 1950s and presently. Particular attention should thus be paid to how Islam is politicized and mobilized, how Malay-Muslim grievances are weaponized, and how the structures of domestic politics can channel these grievances.

In the end, the complexities of this conflict offer us a stark reminder: should Washington (and Washington-based analysts) choose to involve itself in or provide support to the ongoing peace negotiations around the Thai southern border––as it has in other parts of Southeast Asia––it needs to understand the contingent nature of Malaysia’s attitude toward the region, and nuanced functions of money, security, and identity.

Angus Lam is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.