As geopolitical flashpoints proliferate and great power competition spills into every corner of the Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is at risk of subverting its center of gravity. Malaysian prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, speaking as the current ASEAN chair, reminded his fellow leaders that “ASEAN centrality must be our North Star.” Yet, his call comes at a time of increasing uncertainty.
ASEAN centrality has grounded the bloc as an important anchor in the region, fashioning it into a pillar of the global rules-based order. However, even as ASEAN centrality becomes more important than ever, its relevance is becoming endangered as the tides shift.
ASEAN centrality hinges on the bloc serving as the premier platform for both internal and external actors in the region to convene upon and cooperate on various issues. This foundational principle, first codified in the 2008 ASEAN Charter, was born not for ASEAN to act as a cohesive entity like the European Union, but as a forum through which Southeast Asia could amplify its collective voice in a region dominated by great power rivalries.
In the past few years, however, ASEAN centrality has been continually drowned out by waves of both internal fractures and external subversions. In an increasingly contested and multi-polar Indo-Pacific, disruption of ASEAN centrality may hold severe consequences for not only Southeast Asia, but also for the United States.
Realignments Reveal Fractures
ASEAN’s first major setback came in 2012 when the bloc failed to issue a joint communique at its annual summit over objections raised by Cambodia on language regarding the South China Sea. Another similar deadlock occurred in 2016 when ASEAN foreign ministers fell short of taking a unified stance on actions in the South China Sea, again due to Cambodia blocking consensus.
In 2023, the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism observed that “overreliance on decisions by consensus” has become an obstacle to effective multilateralism, and “enabled a minority to obstruct meaningful action…” This observation is particularly apt for ASEAN, where consensus-based decision making has paralyzed the bloc.
Today, ASEAN faces both internal and external fractures, and the ongoing Cambodia-Thailand border crisis has only deepened these cracks. Cambodia, along with Laos, have also become increasingly dependent on Chinese infrastructure loans, raising questions about their strategic autonomy.
Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto, similar to his predecessor, Joko Widodo, is pivoting away from ASEAN. Instead, Prabowo is focused on enhancing ties with countries outside of the region like China, Russia, and Turkey—a partial reflection of ongoing frustrations over fellow members not “fully committing” to ASEAN. Writing in 2015, Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, laid out that “If other ASEAN countries do not share Indonesia’s passion for and commitment to ASEAN, then it is indeed time for us to start another round of debate on the merits of a post-ASEAN foreign policy.” A decade later, this sentiment remains as Indonesia increasingly looks beyond the bloc.
The Philippines has grown similarly disillusioned with ASEAN’s lack of support in its disputes with China in the South China Sea. Manila has turned toward pursuing stronger defense ties with Washington and Tokyo as the ASEAN-led Code of Conduct negotiations stall. As Philippine defense secretary Gilberto Teodoro puts it, “ASEAN should not allow other parties to define what ASEAN centrality means. And not (allow others) to use ASEAN’s perceived action or inaction as a wedge to drive divisions among us.”
This sentiment is reflective of a broader trend among Southeast Asian policymakers. According to the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2025 State of Southeast Asia Survey, only 6.2 percent of respondents supported the idea of “not joining any grouping and focusing simply on ASEAN multilateralism.” While ASEAN centrality remains a rhetorical commitment, in practice, most countries are hedging their bets by pursuing outside minilateral and bilateral arrangements.
Malaysia, as the current ASEAN chair, has struggled to maintain the appearance of unity. In response to U.S. liberation day tariffs, Prime Minister Anwar rallied his fellow leaders to put up a united front and face Washington together. But in reality, member states including Malaysia rushed to secure their own bilateral negotiations. Most notably, Vietnam was the second country after the United Kingdom that announced a deal with Washington on tariffs, leaving others more exposed to economic pressure and strategic leverage.
External powers are also increasingly turning to minilateral groupings that bypass ASEAN on issues the bloc has historically handled. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which brings together the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, and the emerging “Squad” grouping between the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines have both taken on roles in areas such as maritime security, joint development, and digital governance. These are all domains in which ASEAN has positioned itself to be a regional leader. By offering more agile cooperation and clearer alignment between members, these groupings represent external powers’ increasing preference in circumnavigating ASEAN’s traditional multilateral platforms. This convergence of both external and internal issues is chipping away at ASEAN centrality in real time.
Risks in a Fragmented Indo-Pacific
The emerging state of play in the Indo-Pacific is defined not just by rivalry between the United States and China, but also by a broader multipolarity involving middle powers like India, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea. ASEAN’s role in facilitating regional and international cooperation is integral, yet it is being upended by the erosion of its centrality.
Without a credible and united ASEAN, the bloc may lose relevance in the Indo-Pacific. Member states may begin to pursue “post-ASEAN” strategies, accelerating the fragmentation of Southeast Asia's regional bond. Moreover, without ASEAN serving as a connective strand, minilateral security groupings could multiply, contributing to the risk of a regional arms race and heightened military competition.
For the United States, this would mean the loss of a vital diplomatic and strategic partner in the region that has historically helped mediate tensions and uphold a rules-based order. Without ASEAN, realignments in the global order may hasten as the Indo-Pacific loses an important platform for multilateralism.
In a world with deepening crises, the absence of a cohesive ASEAN would remove a critical buffer against broader conflict and risk the Indo-Pacific becoming more volatile and susceptible to unilateral assertiveness from great powers.
The Path Forward
ASEAN centrality has been effective in the past and can continue to work. In 2019, ASEAN led the negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement that includes all ten ASEAN members alongside China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The successful establishment of the RCEP highlights ASEAN’s ability to serve as a beacon for multilateralism, even amid rising protectionism and challenges to globalization.
ASEAN must display bold, decisive actions to realign its member states. Most importantly, ASEAN needs to reassure the world that it still possesses the acumen to navigate regional crises as it did in the past. ASEAN is facing turbulent waters. The tides may be rising but ASEAN need not be swept away. By drawing on its past successes and reorienting itself for the future, ASEAN can still maintain its center.
Hpone Thit Htoo is a research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.