In October 2023, U.S. president Joe Biden and the late Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong elevated the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to new heights with a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In a joint statement, the two leaders agreed on further cooperation to protect human rights in both countries. Although the United States and Vietnam have championed achievements in economics and security, human rights remain a point of contention. The United States and Vietnam share fundamentally different viewpoints on the issue. In the 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the U.S. Department of State assessed that the Vietnamese government systematically represses the basic civil and political rights of its people. Meanwhile, Vietnam rejected criticism by the U.S. government, saying that the country has witnessed significant progress in human rights in recent years.
The United States and Vietnam have two communication channels on human rights, the U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue since 1996 and the U.S.-Vietnam Labor Dialogue since 2000. While the former mostly addresses political and civil rights, the latter discusses specific issues in Vietnam’s labor rights practices. Although these conversations have taken place for more than 20 years, they have been ineffective. Washington remains unhappy about Vietnam’s unresponsiveness in improving its human rights record and Hanoi grows more suspicious toward what it views as external powers attempting to dictate its domestic affairs. With advancing human rights abroad a priority in U.S. foreign policy, the United States must find a way to discuss human rights with Vietnam without undermining the two countries’ strengthened partnership. By understanding Vietnam’s institutional constraints, enhancing knowledge sharing, and leveraging multilateral frameworks, the United States can foster a more productive human rights dialogue with Vietnam—and in turn, a more holistic Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Why U.S. Human Rights Conversations with Vietnam Do Not Work
Flawed dialogue mechanisms and deepening distrust from the Vietnamese government toward any perceived external influence have prevented fruitful discussions on human rights between Vietnam and the United States.
First, existing bilateral communication platforms are not effective in improving human rights practices in Vietnam. For the U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, Vietnam sends representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet with the United States. However, as diplomats, the representatives cannot make decisions regarding human rights cases as they are neither executors nor legislators of human rights policy. For the U.S.-Vietnam Labor Dialogue, the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) leads the Vietnamese delegation. Although MOLISA can propose and revise labor laws, any legal changes require approval from the National Assembly. Government agencies also need to seek the Politburo’s green light, so new regulations cannot be passed without political will from the Politburo. The Ministry of Public Security also lacks a say in these conversations despite being the department behind many of the controversial arrests of political activists. Moreover, the U.S.-Vietnam human rights discussions have led neither to concrete action plans nor enforcement mechanisms. Without any legally binding agreements, there is no promise that Vietnam will take any U.S. recommendations on human rights practices.
Second, historical and institutional distrust toward the United States regarding human rights issues persists in Vietnam. Public support for the United States’ endeavors to strengthen human rights abroad are undermined by the U.S. war legacy in Vietnam. As such, Hanoi views Washington’s criticism on Vietnam’s human rights as a double standard due to atrocities related to U.S. bombing and killings during the Vietnam War. During a meeting with then-speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in 2007, Vietnam’s then-president Nguyen Minh Triet emphasized that the United States did not “have the authority to discuss human rights with Vietnam.”
The CPV also worries that U.S. condemnations of Vietnam’s human rights practices may challenge the party’s leadership. Like many single-party regimes, the CPV’s foremost objective is to maintain its legitimacy. The Vietnamese government recognizes that external influence could endanger its domestic reputation. The United States’ call for stronger human rights standards in Vietnam raises the party’s concerns about a “color revolution,” a process in which hostile forces use violence to abolish the party’s leadership and establish a new regime backed by Western countries. Many legal documents echo the party’s efforts to criminalize anti-party activism, framing protests, demonstrations, and critical social media content as “abuse of democratic freedoms.” Notably, the CPV Politburo adopted Directive 24 to tighten control over domestic political discourse two months ahead of Vietnam's historic partnership upgrade with the United States. The directive aims to limit outside influence and protect the party’s leadership in the face of Vietnam’s growing exposure to the world.
Arrests of political dissidents and liberal government officials have increased in recent years. Issues that were formerly considered safe for advocacy are now dangerous grounds, especially following the arrests of prominent environmental activist Hoang Thi Minh Hong in 2023 and labor reformer Nguyen Van Binh in 2024. In this context, government officials with liberal values are less likely to advocate for reforms as they worry about being purged by the party. As an external power, Washington’s support for pro-democracy dissidents may cause misunderstandings among Vietnamese leaders, who could be led to believe that the United States is attempting to interfere with Vietnam’s domestic affairs. Therefore, criticizing Vietnam’s human rights situation publicly may do more harm than good.
Forging a Constructive Human Rights Dialogue: An Action Plan
To promote human rights without souring U.S.-Vietnam relations, the United States must show its respect for the differences in their respective political systems. By consistently providing reassurance during bilateral visits and public communiques, Washington can ease Hanoi’s suspicions about a U.S.-backed “color revolution.” However, frank conversations remain crucial. As such, Washington should still raise any alleged malpractices in annual human rights dialogues and other meetings with Hanoi. The United States should also suggest Vietnam to include officials from the Ministry of Public Security and the Party into these conversations.
At the same time, the United States can help Vietnam improve its human rights legal framework without creating distrust from the Vietnamese government. U.S. government agencies can establish working groups to provide technical assistance for Vietnam’s National Assembly, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Public Security. For instance, the American Bar Association, with funding from the U.S. Department of State, has partnered with Vietnamese government institutions, law schools, and lawyers’ associations to improve legal education and institutional development in Vietnam since 2009. This program has trained government officials in anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, as well as fighting wildlife trafficking.
Similar projects can be conducted to advance rule of law in human rights, notably in areas that pose little risk to the party, such as LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and economic rights. Legal training can also limit gray areas in laws on anti-state crimes. For example, Article 331 of Vietnam’s Criminal Code considers “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State” a crime. However, it is unclear what actions constitute “abuses.” By leveraging knowledge-sharing initiatives, the United States can still offer genuine help to improve Vietnam’s human rights laws while considering the Vietnamese government’s concerns.
Beyond bilateral human rights dialogues between Washington and Hanoi, the United States can exert pressure on Vietnam to better its human rights standards through multilateral platforms. This approach has proven successful as some multilateral arrangements require its members to adopt laws that match international standards. In some cases, notably during the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Vietnam expressed willingness to reform its labor laws to conform with international labor rights standards. Vietnam also ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture and released some political prisoners as part of the negotiation. However, concrete action plans for legal reforms were not seen because then-president Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement, annulling Vietnam’s commitments. Nevertheless, this multilateral approach can still be helpful. As Vietnam’s Decree 53 on Cybersecurity Law requires technology firms to remove “toxic content” on social media when requested by the government, many companies are concerned that the law can be used to curb freedom of speech. The United States can cooperate with the European Union to ease Vietnam’s restrictive cybersecurity law by expressing mutual concern in their annual business delegations to Vietnam. The United States can also pressure Vietnam to revise its labor laws as a statutory requirement the U.S. approval of Vietnam’s market economy status.
From the U.S. perspective, encouraging improved human rights practices from Vietnam will help advance Washington’s foreign policy goals. By improving its human rights practices to match international standards, Vietnam can attract more foreign investment, boosting its economy and improving its international status. As the country aims to seek another term as member of the United Nations Human Rights Council, bettering human rights practices will also help advance Vietnam’s international reputation and secure its position on the Council. Therefore, candid conversations and detailed action plans to improve human rights in Vietnam will be of great benefit for both sides, forging a more holistic U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Giang Pham is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
