The Nonproliferation Implications of Japan's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Decisions
Japan has been a leader within the nuclear nonproliferation regime for decades, but is also the only non-nuclear-weapon state with both uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing -- two sensitive capabilities that can make fuel for nuclear reactors or fissile material for bombs. With dependence on foreign energy resources hovering at 95%, Japan made closing the nuclear fuel cycle a key element of its energy security policy many decades ago. After the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, however, the future of nuclear power in Japan seems uncertain, raising questions also about the future of Japan's fuel cycle activities.
Please join us for a panel discussion on Friday, November 21 that will explore the domestic constraints on Japan's policies, technical challenges and opportunities, and implications for the nonproliferation regime. The panel will address the challenges and opportunities facing Japan as it continues to attempt to reconcile domestic and international pressures on its fuel cycle decisions and release the results of a recent workshop sponsored by CSIS and Hitotsubashi University.
Featuring:
Dr. Nobumasa Akiyama
Professor, School of International and Public Policy, Hitotsubashi University
Ms. Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service
Dr. Steve Fetter
Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland
Ms. Sharon Squassoni
Director and Senior Fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, CSIS
Featuring
