Beyond Venezuela and Cuba: The U.S. Military’s Future Operations in the Western Hemisphere

After Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the extraction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the White House is increasing pressure on Cuba for some type of political change. Whether the U.S. military will also be deployed in some capacity to the Caribbean island remains to be seen; much will depend on a potential renewed conflict with Iran.

While these three hotspots continue to make headlines, the U.S. military is also expanding its presence across Latin America and the Caribbean. Combating drug-trafficking will continue to be a priority for Washington, and the U.S. military will be heavily involved in this mission.

The Strategy in Focus

Recent high-profile documents support this argument. The recently released 2026 Annual Threat Assessment does not list China, Russia, or Iran at the top. The first place in the list of threats is reserved for “foreign illicit border actors,” namely transnational criminal organizations like the Mexican Cartels, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang, the Tren de Aragua cartel, narco-insurgents in Colombia, and gangs in Haiti. Similarly, the 2026 posture statement of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the combatant command that oversees most of Latin America and the Caribbean, begins by stating that “thirteen Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are conducting campaigns of terror, violence, and corruption” within SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility.

Moreover, the recent, first-ever Americas Counter Cartel Conference in Miami aims to create a unified bloc among U.S. allies to counter criminal entities. The conference concluded with a (brief) declaration signed by 17 ministers of defense and high-level officials, which calls for expanding multilateral and bilateral cooperation, including in border security and countering narco-terrorism and drug-trafficking, and for creating a joint “coalition to combat narco-terrorism and other shared threats in the Western Hemisphere.” The declaration does not create a new multilateral defense agency or mechanism but rather reinforces the U.S. military’s strategy of working alongside Latin American and Caribbean militaries to fight narco-terrorism and drug-trafficking.

Anecdotally, when SOUTHCOM’s General Francis Donovan testified at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in February, he explained “We’ve seen changes in the narco-traffickers’ patterns, and in a closed setting I’d like to provide some more details specifically on that, but I will, looking forward, senator—the boat strikes aren’t the answer,” in response to a question by Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ) about the consequences of the kinetic strikes against suspected narco-vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific and if they were “degrading” the operations of the drug cartels. The general added, “What we’re moving for right now might be an extension of Southern Spear, but really a countercartel campaign process that puts total systemic friction across this network.”

Ongoing Developments

These high-level documents, meetings, and statements are transformed into operations on the ground. As recently as April 19, the U.S. military conducted another kinetic strike against a “vessel operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations,” in the Caribbean. The strike took place under the banner of Joint Task Force Southern Spear. While most U.S. ships deployed last year at the height of tensions with Venezuela have left the area—most notably the Ford carrier—other U.S. assets remain.

Recent developments also suggest that future U.S. operations will be tailored to each mission. In Ecuador on March 3, troops from Ecuador and the United States carried out a joint military operation against a “Designated Terrorist Organization” in Ecuadorian territory. It is unclear what role U.S. troops had during the operation. Meanwhile, the Mexican government confirmed that the United States provided intelligence information that led up to the February operation that eliminated Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho, the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa is particularly eager to strengthen relations with the United States, in general, and with the U.S. military in particular. In 2025, Noboa called for a referendum to modify the Constitution and allow for foreign military bases to operate again in the country—the population voted against it. So while a U.S. base in Ecuador is out of the question—for now—Noboa is looking for other ways to increase defense cooperation via joint operations, joint training, and regular military meetings. The Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense has praised in recent weeks the bilateral cooperation between Ecuador and the United States to combat maritime drug-trafficking.

Moreover, in what Ecuador’s Ministry of Defense labeled a historical operation, for the first time, three of the army’s AMX-13 tanks were used to destroy an illegal mining site in the north of the country. Using tanks against a stationary, empty target was probably overkill, but the operation was a clear message to Washington and SOUTHCOM about the Noboa administration’s commitment to use all available military resources in its internal security operations.

Paraguay is another country to monitor, as the Paraguayan Congress recently ratified a State of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Paraguayan Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez Lezcano in December. The SOFA will allow U.S. troops to be temporarily deployed to the country for training operations, though critics of the agreement are skeptical. Additionally, the U.S. bases in Panama and even Puerto Rico, which were reopened last year, and the U.S. military has a growing presence in various forms across the region.

Venezuela is the final unknown in this equation: Interim President Delcy Rodríguez is improving relations with the United States to the point that SOUTHCOM’s General Donovan carried out an unprecedented visit to Caracas in February. It is unclear if the Venezuelan armed forces, now with a new president and minister of defense in charge, will increase counter–drug-trafficking operations and if they will be willing to receive U.S. military support, in one shape or another.

The recent operations in Ecuador, the ratification of SOFA in Paraguay, and the ongoing training operations for jungle warfare in Panama suggest that Washington is also preparing to engage in more on-the-ground operations in the coming months. Will U.S. troops be deployed to the front lines across Latin America to search and eliminate drug-traffickers, gangs, narco-insurgents, and terrorists? Or will U.S. troops play a more secondary role, providing training and intelligence? Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced every conceivable shape of U.S. military operations in the past two centuries, so any option for Washington today is likely on the table.

Will Anything Change?

Ultimately, the question is whether this growing U.S. military presence across Latin America and the Caribbean region will succeed in significantly reducing the amount of drugs like cocaine that are produced and smuggled to the U.S. and global markets for consumption.

The aforementioned statements and also the joint operation with Ecuador, in Ecuadorian territory, suggest that the U.S. military will seek to neutralize not only the platforms that transport drugs, but also the cocaine manufacturing facilities in South America, and areas where marijuana and coca are grown. This goal in itself is not new; the United States has historically focused on destroying the production and transportation of narcotics, assuming that will eliminate demand. Plan Colombia, a U.S.-Colombia initiative aimed at reducing cocaine production in the late 1990s and early 2000s, exemplifies that the region has experienced this type of operation before. Ultimately, drug-traffickers and narco-insurgents adapted to this joint strategy, and a quarter of a century later, drug production continues as the global demand for narcotics continues as well.

Final Thoughts

A final word about history is important. U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are complex, to put things mildly. Similarly, U.S. military operations across the region are deeply linked to the history of the Inter-American system, dating back to the U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848), the Spanish-American War (1898), and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Haiti (1915–1934). During the Cold War, the United States carried out military operations in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989), not to mention more covert operations to support anti-communist movements in Cuba and Nicaragua, among others. U.S. troops supported Bolivian troops to eliminate the famous Argentine revolutionary, Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

In the post–Cold War era, military interventions decreased, apart from the U.S. operation in Haiti in the early 1990s. The U.S. military’s presence in the region also diminished, as the Rafael Correa administration closed the U.S. base in Manta, Ecuador, around 2009. Until a year ago, the United States operated bases in El Salvador, Honduras, and, of course, in Guantanamo, Cuba. However, while the number of U.S. military facilities across the Americas has been more limited, the U.S. military has continued to actively engage militaries across the Western Hemisphere through military exercises (e.g., Unitas, Tradewinds, Panamax, and CENTAM Guardian); bilateral training; military education programs (e.g., via the Inter-American Defense College and the Perry Center at the National Defense University); intelligence sharing; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions; the U.S. National Guard’s state partnership program; and sales of U.S.-made military technology.

Hence, from a historical perspective, the new wave of U.S. military operations across Latin America and the Caribbean—this time to combat drug-trafficking and narco-terrorism—is not new. The region has experienced U.S. military operations in the past and will likely experience them again.

Because of the legacy of U.S. military operations across Latin America and the Caribbean, new deployments will be met with caution and skepticism by some sectors of local populations. Similarly, respect for human rights and national sovereignty will continue to be concerns as U.S. military operations continue, both at sea and potentially, on Latin American and Caribbean soil. The impact of these military operations may also influence future elections across the region.

Broadly speaking, the Inter-American system appears paralyzed. There is a new secretary-general in the Organization of American States, and the Mercosur–European Union trade agreement is (slowly) moving forward. However, Latin American and Caribbean integration mechanisms and goals appear to have slowed in recent years as newly elected leaders have focused on domestic issues rather than regional integration. Internal political turmoil in some countries (e.g., Peru) prevents the development of long-term foreign policy strategies.

One positive piece of news is that the overwhelming majority of Latin American and Caribbean governments continue to want positive relations with Washington, including strong military ties. However, history shows that Latin American politics are like the pendulum of an old-style clock, and they can easily move toward another ideology. The new wave of U.S. military operations must be accompanied by win-win initiatives in other areas to engage regional governments, industries and businesses, and the general population.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.