Can Washington Counter Beijing Without Repeating Cold War Mistakes?

At the height of the Cold War, U.S. partners could reliably count on U.S. military or intelligence support for any number of actions if they were sold as vital to counter communism. This included coup d’états and extreme human rights violations up to and including death squads. While U.S. military and intelligence support for unsavory regimes and actors is somewhat well known, historical examples of human rights concerns taking a back seat to geopolitics are not limited to the Pentagon or Langley.

Take, for example, the annual Human Rights Reports (HRRs). These reports are a legally required Department of State exercise that reports on human rights violations in every country around the globe. They are generally regarded as factual, objective, and a vital source for journalists, analysts, government adjudicators, and policymakers. However, analysis from the Cold War period shows consistent gaps between the analysis of human rights organizations and the Department of State’s HRRs in their reporting on U.S. allies versus countries seen as competitors or Soviet allies. According to the authors, this indicates “that the [United States] shows significant favoritism towards countries that it values strategically.”

This approach is unsurprising, as it is not uncommon for the United States or other sovereign states to stand by allies in international arenas, even in the midst of unpopular, problematic, or morally abhorrent decisions. It does, however, demonstrate the breadth of support for problematic regimes in efforts to counter geopolitical foes and the insistence on such support from all elements of the U.S. foreign policymaking process. Put differently, at times, all U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community, have seen value in glossing over human rights concerns.

The Soviet Union, since its collapse in 1991, has no longer been the pacing threat for the United States. This role has been assumed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past several years, leading to concerns that human rights and democracy, which were once dismissed in international efforts to counter Moscow, may now be dismissed in efforts to counter Beijing.

COUNTER Act

It is within this context that a bipartisan group of Senators, led by Senator Chris Coons, introduced the Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025, also called the COUNTER Act. This bill would “require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People’s Republic of China.”

The COUNTER Act puts forth the findings that “the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the [People’s Liberation Army] to project and sustain military power at greater distances” and “a global PLA logistics network could disrupt United States military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve.” In addition to efforts to establish new military bases, Beijing is expanding its influence in much of the Global South, including significant efforts in Africa, through ever greater security cooperation. Taken together, the facts demonstrate the importance of a coordinated, strategic policy to combat Beijing’s military adventurism.

The bill would further require the executive branch to “proceed with the urgency required to address the strategic implications of the PRC’s actions” as well as “reflect sufficient interagency coordination with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government approach” and “identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be influential in shaping a partner’s decision making regarding giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory.”

It is this “menu” that implicates the history of U.S. efforts in countering a pacing threat’s expansionist aims. While Cold War history demonstrates the lengths to which the U.S. government went to counter perceived influence from a geopolitical rival, these excesses should not be repeated. Endeavors to influence a partner country’s decisionmaking should not be limited to accommodating the worst impulses of governments. They must also involve civil society and individuals whose partnership is far more robust and long term but may be at odds with the interests of governments, particularly those that are not responsive to the demands of their people.

Countries Implicated

The concern about a strategic approach to influence that prioritizes the needs and wants of governments over the needs and wants of the people is not a hypothetical one. In addition to the Cold War history laid out above, the majority of countries noted as targets for potential PRC basing in the COUNTER Act do not have representative or accountable governments. Of the 22 countries specified as having ongoing basing, port access, or where “the PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection,” V-Dem categorizes 16 as either electoral authoritarian or closed authoritarian. Only one, the Seychelles, is categorized as a liberal democracy.

This provides ample incentive for the U.S. government to work closely with partner governments to decline Beijing’s advances without considering the people within those countries. After all, the logic goes, if people are not able to hold governments accountable for their actions, their inputs have limited impact on such basing decisions.

The Fickle Nature of Dictatorships

This approach, favoring dictatorial governments over relationships with civilians through civil society, rehashes a long-running debate over stability versus human rights and democracy. Throughout the history of the United States, there has been a significant willingness to work with dictators on shared foreign policy goals. This is an inevitable element of operating on the world stage, but it does not have to be a conscious choice. Further, when the goals are long term, prioritizing the demands of authoritarians neglects to understand the fickle nature of dictatorships or the robust, sustainable nature of partnerships with broader populations. In the instance of countering the PRC’s military basing aspirations, a long-term and sustainable approach that considers the interests of populations rather than governments is vital.

Democracies are subject to constantly changing policy preferences. These can be in response to a change in administration, changes in social mores, or newfound places in the world order, among countless other factors. Dictatorships are similarly ever-changing, but their fully elite-driven nature can mean that policy preferences are altered by an elite few, meaning the ship of foreign policy can change considerably quicker. This can also be driven by personalist elements such as perceived individual slights, corruption, or individual relationships.

In the basing example, while civil society may be concerned about Beijing expanding its military operations deeper into a country for potential corruption, a concern about ever-greater PRC influence in a country’s elite decisionmaking, or general preferences against playing host to military bases, these concerns may be features, not bugs, to authoritarian governments. Corrupt actors may be interested in what benefits they and their inner circles will accrue when a base is built. They may see an opportunity to exploit great power competition for greater benefits with a Chinese military base in-country. Finally, they may see the presence of the Chinese military as another protection for their dictatorial regime, moving the country further from any semblance of democratic accountability.

Robust relationships with a country’s population are far more sustainable and less subject to the whims of an elite. This is true in both the positive and negative. A civil society that was consulted and included in efforts to deter broad partnerships with Beijing will remember those efforts. As will populations where the public was left out of the process, and the United States acceded solely to a dictator’s whims. The Soviet Union had success nurturing such resentment in partner countries through an “anti-colonial” narrative, which has largely been supplanted by Beijing’s efforts to bill itself as a “powerful voice of the Global South.” U.S. decisionmaking that sidelines civilians in favor of dictators will only further that narrative.

Recommendations

Mandate Consultation with Civil Society Alongside Government Stakeholders

As the bill recognizes, ultimately, it is governments that make decisions on whether to host foreign bases. It is impossible for consultations to avoid the interests of a government in attempting to dissuade partner countries from hosting Chinese military bases. However, efforts should be conducted in tandem to understand the “comprehensive menu of actions that would be influential in shaping a partner’s decision making regarding giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory,” as it is seen from both government and civil society partners. These broad-based consultations should be mandated in the bill.

Embassies are well equipped to have conversations with civil society partners, including those working in a wide array of sectors, to find out what actions would be most influential to convince populations that hosting a PRC military base is not a viable path forward. The classified nature of information sharing envisioned in the bill goes a long way to protect these opinions from potential retribution, but such consultations should be conducted with strict adherence to do-no-harm principles.

Potential actions proposed by civil society should be aggregated with potential actions proposed by government stakeholders to determine possible overlap and areas where both governments and populations would be adequately convinced, setting up both an immediate defense against potential PRC basing and a sustainable defense against future partnerships with Beijing should the nature of the regime change.

Include Foreign Assistance for Civil Society Advocacy in the “Whole-of-Government Approach”

As the bill recognizes the necessity of a “whole-of-government approach,” foreign assistance to civil society should be included alongside other efforts to discourage PRC basing in partner countries. While dictatorships may be elite-driven enterprises, they are susceptible to public opinion. Given a structure that requires consultation with civil society, support should be proffered to civil society organizations to improve their ability to advocate for their position, thus moving the needle on even authoritarian regimes in the long term.

This support for civil society also serves to improve relations between partner country civilians and the United States, utilizing the greatest historical advantage the United States holds over authoritarian competitors, the perception that it stands with its ideals of democracy and human rights.

Recent polling demonstrates a growth in how much of the Global South sees Beijing as a more positive influence than Washington. That trend will not be reversed by continuing to work with authoritarian regimes at the expense of civilian populations. Broad-based consultation and support to civil society, demonstrating true partnership with the people of a country alongside work with elite decisionmakers, will create long-term and sustainable relationships rather than short-term deals that can be reversed on the whims of an authoritarian.

Andrew Friedman is a senior fellow with the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.