China’s Intelligence Footprint in Cuba: New Evidence and Implications for U.S. Security

The Issue

China has long been rumored to operate spy facilities in Cuba, but few details about its footprint there have been made public. Research by CSIS reveals four sites within Cuba that are most likely to be supporting China’s efforts to collect intelligence on the United States and its neighbors. Satellite imagery and open-source analysis offer an unprecedented look into these facilities and provide clues as to how they could be used to spy on sensitive communications and activities in the region. These sites have undergone observable upgrades in recent years, even as Cuba has faced increasingly dire economic prospects that have drawn it closer to China. In light of these developments, the United States and its regional partners should carefully monitor China’s growing role in Cuba, harden sensitive communications, and push for transparency to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation.

Introduction

China’s ambitions to expand its global intelligence-gathering capabilities have drawn it to the doorstep of the United States. In a striking revelation in June 2023, Biden administration officials confirmed reports that China has access to spy facilities in Cuba. Later divulgences by the Wall Street Journal suggested that officials had identified as many as four facilities of concern and tracked Chinese technicians entering and exiting several.

Rumors of a Chinese intelligence presence in Cuba have been simmering for decades. Yet the latest revelations fed new speculation about the extent and depth of Beijing’s footprint there. Coming just months after a Chinese spy balloon crossed much of the continental United States, these reports contributed to renewed concerns over China’s expanding efforts to collect intelligence on the U.S. homeland.

Cuba’s proximity to the southern United States and the Caribbean makes it a prime location for collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT) on the region. Sitting less than 100 miles south of Florida, Cuba is well-positioned to keep watch on sensitive communications and activities, including those of the U.S. military. The southeastern seaboard of the United States brims with military bases, combatant command headquarters, space launch centers, and military testing sites. For Beijing, having access to SIGINT capabilities in Cuba would open a significant intelligence window inaccessible from within Chinese territory.

Satellite imagery and other unclassified information analyzed by CSIS provides an unprecedented look at four facilities across Cuba that have equipment capable of collecting SIGINT. Some are decades old but appear to have undergone upgrades in recent years; others have materialized only within the past few years. These four facilities—selected from nearly a dozen Cuban sites of interest analyzed by CSIS—are the most likely to be supporting China’s intelligence efforts in the region.

SIGINT in Practice

SIGINT is a core element of modern spy craft. Intercepting signals transmitted by both civilian and military actors can provide countries with valuable information about their adversaries, competitors, and allies alike. Modern technologies such as undersea fiber-optic cables, satellite networks, and cyber tools have opened new avenues for SIGINT collection, but traditional methods of collecting and deciphering signals transmitted over the radio frequency (RF) spectrum remain a critical part of espionage.

Gleaning useful intelligence from RF signals is a complex task that requires specialized equipment— namely antennas that are optimized for the signal characteristics of their targets. The size, number, orientation, and layout of these antennas determine their capabilities and function.

Geography impacts the effectiveness of SIGINT. Over long distances, radio signals can become difficult to isolate from surrounding traffic. Signals transmitted via satellite—the primary means of military and national security communications—are sent in bursts as the satellite passes over a target area. Monitoring or intercepting this data requires a physical downlink facility directly within the satellite footprint.¹

Other SIGINT methods, such as radar systems that track missiles and satellites, are similarly constrained by range. Radar transmissions generally require a direct “line of sight” to the target, which can be blocked by the curvature of the Earth and other physical obstacles.

Analyzing Possible Cuban SIGINT Sites

Using satellite imagery and other open-source tools, CSIS assessed nearly a dozen facilities across Cuba that were rumored by various sources to be connected to Chinese espionage. Of these, four had observable SIGINT instrumentation, clear physical security infrastructure (guard posts, perimeter fencing, military insignia, etc.), and other characteristics that suggested intelligence collection.

Bejucal

Nestled in the hills overlooking the capital city of Havana is the largest active Cuban SIGINT site reviewed by CSIS. Located near Bejucal, the complex gained notoriety during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis for housing Soviet nuclear weapons.

For decades, Bejucal has been subject to suspicion for possible ties to Chinese intelligence, including in English and Spanish-language media, U.S. congressional testimony, and unclassified government documents. It even featured in the 2016 U.S. presidential primary debates when Florida senator Marco Rubio called on Havana to “[kick] out this Chinese listening station in Bejucal.”

Satellite imagery from March 2024 indicates that the facility is active and has been for some time. South of the base are at least five entrances to underground facilities, built between 2010 and 2019. What these facilities house is difficult to determine from satellite imagery, but unconfirmed sources from Cuban defectors suggest they may be the headquarters of the radio-electronic brigade of Cuban military intelligence.

A variety of antennas dot the grounds, and several have been moved as recently as January 2024. These include dish antennas, used mainly to intercept satellite communications.

The location and characteristics of these instruments could enable the base to track satellites and intercept their downlink communications. It could also potentially collect data on U.S. rocket launches from Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida. Such information would give privileged insight into the flight paths and telemetry data of two of the primary sites where U.S. satellites are delivered into space. Studying these launches—particularly those of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy reusable first-stage booster rocket systems—is likely of keen interest to China as it attempts to catch up to U.S. space launch technology.

Some SpaceX launch trajectories, including those that deliver polar-orbit satellites into space, travel south from Cape Canaveral over the Caribbean Sea. Environmental assessment documents submitted by the company show potential splashdown areas for their reusable first-stage systems located off the coast of Cuba (see Figure 1). Bejucal offers a prime vantage point to collect valuable data on these launches.

El Salao

On the opposite side of the island is a new SIGINT site that has previously gone unreported. Satellite imagery from March 2024 reveals that just east of the city of Santiago de Cuba, near a neighborhood called El Salao, a large CDAA has been under construction since 2021.² With a projected diameter of 130 to 200 meters, the facility could be capable of detecting signals anywhere from 3,000 to 8,000 nautical miles away once operational.

The array is just two miles northeast of the Moncada Cement Plant, a project inaugurated in 2018 amid the Cuban government’s push to revitalize its decaying cement industry. According to local reports, the plant was part of the China-financed expansion of the port at Santiago de Cuba, both supplying materials for its construction and allowing easy export through the port. Photos posted to social media suggest that workers at the Moncada plant are also involved with work on the El Salao site, indicating at least a possible link between a known Chinese-funded project and the emerging CDAA facility.

CDAAs like this one are used primarily for high-frequency direction finding (HFDF), which involves pinpointing the origin of incoming radio signals. Originally developed to help military and intelligence services track the location and movements of their targets, CDAAs are now also used for a variety of civilian applications, including law enforcement, search and rescue, and atmospheric research. 

Sites like these were a staple of SIGINT during the Cold War, when the United States and Russia operated expansive CDAA networks overseas.³ They are less common today due to changes in military communications and the development of new HFDF technologies. Most sensitive military communications are now transmitted via secure fiber-optic cable or satellite, making the interception of high-frequency radio communications less valuable. Civilian agencies like the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) continue to use CDAAs to monitor radio traffic.

Still, CDAAs can provide insight into the location and movements of military forces at a relatively low cost. They are low-maintenance and weather-resistant. China has invested in new CDAA facilities on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, two of its militarized islands in the South China Sea, showing that the technology remains relevant even for a high-end military force like the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Paired with other forms of SIGINT, CDAAs like these can help provide China with early warning about naval activity near its contested islands.

The El Salao site in Cuba remains under construction, and its final configuration—including its full diameter and its numbers of antennas and rings—remains unknown. However, once complete, the site will likely be capable of monitoring the U.S. Navy and its international partners operating in the Caribbean and even the South Atlantic Ocean. The facility’s proximity to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay means it could collect even seemingly mundane data from high-frequency radio transmissions that would help paint a detailed picture of U.S. and other military activity in the Caribbean. While modern military communications are highly encrypted, information on the frequency, origin, direction, and pace of communications traffic could provide significant intelligence value.

Wajay

Less than 10 kilometers north of Bejucal lies a smaller facility known as Wajay. The presence of security fencing and two guard posts strongly suggests that the site is intended for military or other sensitive activities.

The compound has gradually expanded over the past 20 years, growing from just one antenna and several small buildings in 2002 to a robust complex today. It now hosts 12 antennas of various sizes and orientations, significant operations and support facilities, and even a small solar farm, which would potentially offer insurance against Cuba’s increasingly unreliable power grid.

The presence of trees and agricultural activity indicates some mixed-use functionality, a feature seen at other SIGINT sites where builders have aimed to disguise their true purpose. While less prominent than Bejucal or El Salao, Wajay has appeared in a handful of documents that claim China played a role in either its construction or modernization.

No dish antennas are visible here, suggesting Wajay’s purpose is primarily terrestrial signal interception and transmission. However, the variety of antennas present is a clear indication that Wajay is responsible for a reasonably complex and evolving SIGINT mission set.

Calabazar

Alongside Bejucal and Wajay, the Calabazar facility represents the third major active SIGINT site on the outskirts of Havana. Its presence and history are less discernible in the open-source literature than those of Bejucal and Wajay. Declassified CIA documents suggest it most likely served as a communications facility in the 1960s; however, its present incarnation shows significant upgrades. Perhaps most notable is the new solar farm, significantly larger than Wajay’s and installed beginning in 2012.

Calabazar boasts dish, vertical, and horizontal antennas, likely collecting variegated intelligence. As at Bejucal, the dish antennas appear to be largely oriented southwards, potentially aimed at picking up transmissions from satellites in geosynchronous orbit over the equator. Changes in the number and orientation of the antennas, however, show that Calabazar is diversifying the intelligence it collects.

Unlike the previous three sites, Calabazar was not identified in any publicly available records as having ties with China. Nevertheless, reports obtained by CSIS from Cuban defectors situate this base squarely within the island’s broader intelligence-collection efforts.

The growth of space-monitoring equipment at Calabazar (as well as at Bejucal) is notable given that Cuba lacks its own satellites and space program. While the country could operate downlink capabilities to access satellite data for a range of applications, the types of space-tracking equipment observed are likely intended to monitor the activities of nations like the United States with a presence in orbit.

Even limited access to this equipment would provide China a far greater ability to monitor and communicate with its own space assets passing over the other side of the globe. Like the United States, Russia, and Europe, China operates a global network of ground stations from which it can conduct telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) on its satellites and spacecraft. China has historically lacked access to ground stations in North America. These installations in Cuba could help close that gap.

China’s Cuban Embrace

Post-Soviet Pivot

Cuba has a long history of hosting foreign adversaries’ intelligence agencies seeking to snoop on communications flowing in and out of the United States. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union operated its largest overseas SIGINT facility at the Lourdes Signals Intelligence Complex near Havana, which was used to monitor U.S. satellites and intercept sensitive military and commercial telecommunications. At its peak, the facility was said to provide the Soviet Union as much as 75 percent of its military intelligence.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow’s presence in Cuba began to wane. Lourdes was officially shuttered in 2002, and its campus was converted into the University of Informatic Sciences (UCI), now Cuba’s leading institute for computer science and engineering.

The Soviet Union’s collapse provided an opening for competitors, especially China, which quickly filled the void. The 1990s saw several high-level exchanges between Chinese and Cuban leaders, including a military delegation led by China’s minister of national defense, Chi Haotian, in 1999.

Rumors of China’s intelligence presence on the island appear to have begun with Chi’s visit. Media reports from the time suggest that the minister inked a deal giving China access to several former Soviet electronic eavesdropping facilities on the island. A 1999 article in the Nuevo Herald cited a leaked report from the FCC suggesting that China had provided the Cuban government with upgraded signal-jamming equipment to interfere with U.S. broadcasts like Radio Martí, which aims to stir political dissent.

Since those early days of engagement, China’s ties in Cuba have only strengthened. Cuban and Chinese military officials have engaged in routine high-level meetings across state, party, and military leadership. Cuba was among the first Latin American and Caribbean countries to receive Chinese leader Xi Jinping following his 2013 inauguration, and Cuban leaders have visited China at least four times since then. This includes a recent meeting in April 2024 between He Weidong, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, and Cuban general Víctor Rojos Ramos, where the two avowed their “unbreakable friendship.”

China’s financial support for Cuba has seen continuous growth. Despite Cuba’s notoriously difficult investment environment, China has provided roughly $7.8 billion in development financing to the island since 2000, according to AidData. This includes major projects like the modernization of the Port of Santiago de Cuba, a $120 million project formally launched in 2015 following Xi’s visit the previous year.

The China National Petroleum Corporation has also entered into partnerships with Cuba’s state-owned oil company to develop onshore and offshore oil wells. While Cuba’s proven reserves are meager, boosting domestic oil production has been a priority for the Cuban government, as the collapse of Venezuela’s oil sector has led to a shortage of cheap fuel. At the same time, China has played a major role in helping Cuba diversify its heavily fossil fuel–dependent power grid, pledging to help construct 92 solar farms on the island.

Beijing-tied firms are also deeply embedded in Cuba’s technology sector. Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE—both blacklisted by the U.S. government over espionage risks—now form the backbone of Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure. Frequent technical exchanges between Cuban and Chinese state-backed universities and technology firms likewise facilitate technology transfer.

Crisis and Opportunity

Cuba is currently embroiled in its worst economic crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union—a crisis worse, even, than the notorious “special period” that followed the loss of the island’s Cold War patronage. The Covid-19 pandemic decimated the island’s tourism industry, blocking one of its key sources of revenue and foreign currency. The other source, remittances from Cubans living abroad, was severely curtailed by Trump-era policies that limited money transfers. While the Biden administration has walked back some of these policies and has rhetorically committed to a rapprochement with Havana, the Cuban government’s heavy-handed crackdown on mass protests since 2022 has put further efforts on hold.

Taken together, these shocks have triggered an acute and far-reaching economic downturn. In 2023, Cuba's economy shrank by 2 percent while inflation surpassed 30 percent. Government cuts to fuel subsidies have caused the price of gas to rise more than 400 percent. Cubans are fleeing in record numbers: more than a million people—about 10 percent of the population—left between 2021 and 2023. Then, in late October 2024, island-wide blackouts left the island in the dark for days on end. Even now, Cuba's power grid shows no signs of improvement, owing to collapsing infrastructure and a complete lack of funds to pay for improvements.

Across the Atlantic, reports have surfaced of Cuban citizens enlisting in the Russian armed forces to fight in Ukraine for salaries higher than any they could obtain back home. While the Cuban government claimed to have broken up one ring involved in this plan, according to these reports Cuban mercenaries appear to have legally entered Russia before heading to the front lines, suggesting that Havana was complicit at least at some level by authorizing the emigration of these workers-cum-soldiers.

Havana is in desperate need of external assistance to help it weather this crisis. Yet with few close international partners and few meaningful economic benefits to offer, its options are limited. For outside powers, Cuba likely appears attractive more for its proximity to the United States than for promising markets or abundant natural resources.

Taken together, China’s growing economic and political leverage in Cuba may be opening doors for its military and intelligence services there. Beijing has clear strategic interests in establishing a footprint on the island, given its proximity to the United States and strategic position in the heart of the Caribbean. Cuba’s dire need for support is an ideal opportunity for China to establish a presence there. Even without a substantial presence of PRC forces on the island, Cuban intelligence could easily share information they collect with Beijing. Such cooperation could occur without a sizable deployment of Chinese personnel, making detection difficult.

Beyond SIGINT

SIGINT collection and cooperation may represent only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to China-Cuba cooperation. China has strong political and ideological motivations to preserve one of the world’s few remaining communist states. Its growing influence over the country’s gradually emerging digital economy has already enabled the Cuban government to more effectively repress dissent and maintain social control. During the July 2021 protests, for instance, the Cuban government was known to selectively draw down bandwidth at protest sites, preventing organizers from communicating with one another and sharing footage of security force abuses.

Yet Beijing’s greatest interests on the island are clearly strategic. China’s ambitions to expand its overseas military presence are well documented, and Cuba provides an attractive foothold for the PLA in the Caribbean. A declassified assessment by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released in early 2024 lists Cuba as one of several countries where China is looking to establish military facilities.

Additionally, Cuba-China intelligence sharing could extend well beyond the domain of SIGINT. Cuba’s spy services have built up a sophisticated network of human intelligence (HUMINT) focused overwhelmingly on the United States. In December 2023, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia and career foreign service officer Manuel Rocha was arrested and charged with espionage. Rocha allegedly served for 15 years as a Cuban intelligence asset within the United States, where he played a major role in shaping Washington’s foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere, including Cuba. According to Attorney General Merrick Garland, the case represented one of the “highest-reaching and longest-lasting infiltrations of the U.S. government by a foreign agent.”

Rocha’s arrest adds to a long history of Cuban exploits cultivating HUMINT assets, including the former leading Cuba analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Ana Montes, who was arrested in 2001. Former CIA and FBI counterintelligence officers have long held that the island trades insights gathered from HUMINT for favors from other powers, especially Russia and China. Any intelligence-sharing arrangement with China could also include a treasure trove of HUMINT. Cuba has also been an avid exporter of intelligence-gathering know-how to other authoritarian regimes in the hemisphere, helping Venezuela build its own military intelligence apparatus to watch for signs of disloyalty among its security forces. Known as the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, or DGCIM, the Cuban-backed institution is currently being employed to quash signs of disloyalty as Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro seeks to cling to power following a blatantly stolen election.

China is not the only extra-hemispheric power probing for opportunity in the Americas. In 2017, Russia inaugurated a GLONASS (Russian GPS equivalent) station in Nicaragua. The facility has since come under scrutiny as a potential vantage point from which Moscow could gather information on the United States and other Latin American countries. More recently, the newspaper Confidencial published an investigation into the Mokorón military base in Managua, alleging that the facility had been handed over to Russia for use as a SIGINT facility. General Glen VanHerck, former commander of U.S. Northern Command, testified in 2022 that the Kremlin had its highest concentration of spies located in Mexico, where the number of Russian diplomatic personnel has jumped 60 percent since the invasion of Ukraine (even as Mexico has reduced its diplomatic personnel in Moscow).

Moscow could be looking to revitalize its own intel-gathering capacity in the hemisphere, with Cuba standing out as an especially appealing springboard. Reporting from The Insider in June 2023 suggested that the University of Informatic Sciences, located on the site of the former Lourdes SIGINT complex, has once again become a hub for Russian intelligence personnel.

Perhaps most troubling is the potential for U.S. adversaries to move beyond intelligence cooperation toward a more overt military and defense partnership with Havana. Russia has already demonstrated a willingness to use Cuba to project power into the Western Hemisphere when it dispatched a naval flotilla—including a guided-missile frigate and a nuclear-powered submarine equipped with Zircon hypersonic missiles—to the island in June 2024.

Policy Recommendations

Cuba’s revival as a beachhead for U.S. rivals in great power competition should raise concerns in Washington and beyond. The island was famously the site of the world’s closest brush with nuclear war, the Cuban Missile Crisis. While China is unlikely to establish major offensive capabilities on the island in the short term, the gradual expansion of its intelligence presence there will remain an enduring concern for policymakers in the United States and its regional partners.

Intelligence work tends to be shrouded in secrecy, as evidenced not only by Chinese and Cuban denials of SIGINT cooperation, but also U.S. reticence to share details on the situation. Nevertheless, the following lines of effort represent important first steps to help harden U.S. and partner infrastructure and deter further escalation by adversary powers on the island.

1. Push for transparency and open communication channels to reduce misperceptions.

The history of Cuba’s outsized role in U.S. strategic competition offers instructive lessons on the dangers of miscommunication between rival powers. Soviet miscalculation of the U.S. reaction to its decision to station nuclear weapons on the island set the Cuban Missile Crisis in motion. While there are few indications that a similar crisis is on the horizon, failure to manage communications may result in a dangerous spike in tensions between Washington, Beijing, and Havana.

In particular, the United States should be clear that the permanent installation of offensive military capabilities in Cuba or the basing of PLA combat assets would be seen as a significant escalation. Continuing to expose developments at Cuban intelligence and military facilities can also be an effective means of signaling to China that it will be unable to grow its footprint in secret.

2. Harden civilian infrastructure against SIGINT interception.

While most modern U.S. military communications are encrypted to prevent highly sensitive intelligence from being gleaned through SIGINT, civilian enterprises are often more vulnerable. Firms such as SpaceX are nevertheless engaged in highly strategic technology sectors that China has demonstrated an interest in targeting.

The United States, through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, should look to identify and build awareness and competency among private companies that may be targeted. The State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy can take similar steps with U.S. allies and partners in the region to secure their potentially vulnerable systems.

3. Work to counter Chinese and Cuban digital authoritarianism.

China’s technical and financial support has become invaluable for the Cuban government as it seeks to resist popular pressure and clamp down on dissent. As U.S. officials have disclosed, Huawei and ZTE technicians may have played a role in enabling signals intelligence collection on the island’s inhabitants and of its neighbors. Cooperation between China and Cuba on SIGINT can provide Havana with new methods for digital repression.

U.S. officials can support efforts to provide the Cuban public with greater access to the internet and telecommunications technologies beyond the reach of state control. Providing Cuban civil society with reliable and secure virtual private networks to communicate and organize through, for example, can be an important step toward internet freedom and transparency while helping at-risk groups protect themselves from repression.

About the Authors

Matthew P. Funaiole is vice president of iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow of China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in using data-driven research to address complex policy issues, with a focus on Chinese foreign policy, dual-use technology, and maritime trade. In 2022, he launched the “Hidden Reach” initiative, which leverages open-source intelligence to uncover poorly understood sources of Chinese influence and examine how China advances its strategic interests through commercial and scientific ventures. From late 2015 through mid-2020, he was the principal researcher for the ChinaPower website. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr. Funaiole taught international relations and foreign policy analysis at the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland, where he also completed his doctoral research. Dr. Funaiole is also engaged in several creative writing projects, and he is an avid photography enthusiast.

Aidan Powers-Riggs is an associate fellow with the iDeas Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he primarily supports the Hidden Reach special initiative. Previously, he researched China’s foreign and security policies and U.S.-China tech competition at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), the Asia Society Policy Institute, the China Power Project at CSIS, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Aidan earned an MA in Asian studies with an emphasis in politics and security at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) at Georgetown University. He earned his BA from the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he graduated Phi Beta Kappa with a degree in political science and a minor in professional writing.

Brian Hart is deputy director and fellow of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He also helps to lead Hidden Reach, a CSIS special initiative that shines light on underappreciated sources of China’s influence through open-source data and satellite imagery. Brian’s research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy, China’s military and defense industrial base, Taiwan security issues, U.S.-China relations, and Chinese technology policy. Prior to joining the CSIS China Power Project, he conducted research at the Project 2049 Institute, the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, Trivium China, and Wake Forest University. Brian earned his MA with honors in China studies and international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a graduate certificate in China studies from the SAIS Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He received a BA with honors in politics and international affairs from Wake Forest University.

Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he supports the program’s research agenda and coordinates event planning and outreach. He previously served as an intern for the Americas Program. His research interests include transnational organized crime and human rights and security in Central America. Mr. Ziemer holds a BA in global affairs and history from Yale University.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); author for IHS Markit (formerly the Jane’s Information Group); and publisher and editor of KPA Journal. Formerly, he has served as founder and chief analytics officer of KPA Associates, LLC, senior imagery analyst for 38 North at Johns Hopkins SAIS, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center. He has authored four books and more than 300 articles, reports, and monographs on numerous defense-related subjects. Mr. Bermudez has consulted and lectured extensively in academic and government environments both in the United States (e.g., National Defense University, Columbia University, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Alamos National Laboratories, Stanford University, U.S. Marine Corps University, U.S. Army Intelligence, U.S. Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy Postgraduate School) and internationally (e.g., United Nations, Israel Defense Forces, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Republic of Korea National Defense College). He has also testified before the United Nations and U.S. Congress as a subject matter expert concerning North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear, chemical and biological warfare programs, satellite imagery of North Korean political prisoner camps, and ballistic missile development in the developing countries.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America and a course coordinator at the United States Foreign Service Institute. His research focuses on U.S.-Latin America relations, strategic competition and defense policy, authoritarian regimes, armed conflict and transnational organized crime, and trade and development issues. Previously, Dr. Berg was a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he helped lead its Latin America Studies Program, as well as visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. Dr. Berg was a Fulbright scholar in Brazil and is a Council on Foreign Relations Term Member. He has been published in a variety of peer-reviewed academic and policy-oriented journals, including The Lancet, Migration and Development, the SAIS Review of International Affairs, and the Georgetown Security Studies Review. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, CNN.com, Los Angeles Times, and World Politics Review, among other outlets. He routinely testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Dr. Berg obtained a PhD and an MPhil in political science and an MSc in global governance and diplomacy from the University of Oxford, where he was a Senior Hulme Fellow. Earlier, he obtained a BA in government and theology from Georgetown University. He is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese and is conversational in Slovenian.

Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Throughout his more than 25-year career, Mr. Hernandez-Roy has worked extensively to advance democratic governance, prevent and resolve conflict, strengthen the rule of law, respect human rights, ensure citizen security, and promote integral development across Latin America and the Caribbean. He has held various senior leadership positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), having served as a senior political adviser to two secretaries general. In this capacity, he most recently documented the abuses of authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Cuba and co-led the organization’s efforts to hold the Venezuelan regime accountable for possible crimes against humanity. He was previously the director of two OAS departments focused on advancing and defending democracy and building the hemispheric security agenda. He managed several donor-funded projects focused on security sector reform across the Americas, oversaw the organization’s political analysis system, supervised the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, and negotiated the establishment of the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras. He also coordinated the Fund for Peace and was intimately involved in the peaceful resolution of border disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua, Belize and Guatemala, and Honduras and El Salvador. More recently, Mr. Hernandez-Roy served as a citizen security and international development consultant for Creative Associates International. He also worked for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Ottawa, Canada, early in his career. He is a native English speaker and is fluent in Spanish and French. He holds a BA honors degree in history from Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada) and an MPhil degree in international relations from the University of Cambridge, England.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following people for their research and technical support: Thomas G. Roberts, Laura Delgado López, Maria Werlau, Jennifer Jun, Michael Kohler, William Taylor, and Katherine Stark.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.

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