Photo: DANIEL SLIM/AFP via Getty Images
A host of issues confront President Claudia Sheinbaum as she settles into Mexico’s highest office. From the future of security policy to nearshoring questions and tariff threats—not to mention the fallout from the judicial reforms by her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly known as AMLO)—the Sheinbaum administration will not want for demands on its attention. One often overlooked but crucial area for the new president to address is the future of Mexico’s information communications technology (ICT) sector. ICT policy is simultaneously one of Mexico’s greatest strengths and a continued impediment to the country’s economic and development goals. About 97 percent of Mexico’s 130 million inhabitants have access to at least 3G mobile internet coverage, according to the International Telecommunications Union, and urban hubs have given rise to a vibrant digital economy. Indeed, Mexico’s tech industry has birthed eight “unicorns,” or technology startups valued at over $1 billion. Countless other small- and medium-sized enterprises have their roots in the drastically lowered barriers to digital connectivity.
Yet Mexico is also a land of contrasts when it comes to ICT competitiveness. The country boasts some of the highest spectrum fees in the Western Hemisphere, which disincentivizes broadband deployment. The Mexican telecommunications market remains heavily concentrated in the hands of a single actor, América Móvil, preventing new entrants to the market and impeding service provision to historically underserved communities. Indeed, millions of Mexican citizens remain stranded on the wrong side of the digital divide, with a more than 30 percentage point difference in internet access between rural and urban households. Finally, the growing presence of Huawei in Mexico’s ICT infrastructure, including in the country’s first forays into 5G deployment and solar energy projects, creates mounting geopolitical risk at a time when alignment between the three United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) member countries is of vital importance for furthering economic dynamism in the North American bloc.
Amid this panorama, Sheinbaum promises both change and continuity for Mexico. While she has thus far largely stayed the course with AMLO’s signature policy initiatives, promising to move forward with the so-called Fourth Transformation and some of its major infrastructure investments and constitutional reforms, there may be greater flexibility in other areas. On telecommunications in particular, Sheinbaum’s record as head of government for Mexico City points to a modern, technocratic, and fulsome understanding of the potential for ICT to have a transformative economic impact. Notably, Sheinbaum oversaw a dramatic expansion of digital public infrastructure, including the Digital Agency for Public Innovation, which is responsible for increasing access to government services online and letting citizens make appointments with government offices, apply for licenses and permits, and access social benefits—all through their phones. To further support this expansion of digital government, Sheinbaum oversaw the completion of one of the largest public Wi-Fi networks in the world, with Mexico City setting a world record for the greatest number of free Wi-Fi hotspots.
Increasing competitiveness will be essential for Mexico to realize the full potential of its digital sector. Furthermore, such changes would be highly welcome, as the Sheinbaum administration begins amid an atmosphere of shaky investor confidence and a major budget deficit that is likely to require cuts or adjustments to expensive (and popular) social programs. Unfortunately, another cost-saving measure adopted by the new administration involved eliminating the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), the independent agency involved in setting ICT policy, along with a raft of other independent and watchdog agencies.
This white paper outlines the state of competition in Mexico’s ICT space at present, before turning to the government’s own foray into telecommunications infrastructure and the market distortions this has created. It concludes by outlining a series of policy recommendations for the Sheinbaum administration to bolster competitiveness within the constitutional and budgetary constraints it inherited from AMLO.
Mexico today is at a crossroads when it comes to the ICT policy it has pursued for more than a decade. Since 2013, when Mexico passed its landmark telecommunications reform, regulation of the ICT space has been led by the IFT, an independent regulatory body charged with setting the sector’s rules of operation. These protections were further strengthened by the entry into force of the USMCA, which includes chapters with provisions for both telecommunications and digital trade competitiveness (thereby addressing a key weakness of its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was signed before the boom in digital activity). In particular, Chapter 18 of the USMCA, which pertains to telecommunications, requires that all signatories maintain independent regulatory bodies “separate from, and not accountable to, a supplier of public telecommunications services.”
Furthermore, the USMCA directs countries to empower their respective regulators to require major telecoms providers to offer other market actors access to elements of their networks. Known as “unbundling,” this provision is key to ensuring competition in the ICT space, since the high up-front costs of building telecommunications infrastructure allow established players to quickly consolidate a monopoly by preventing newer actors from using key parts of their networks. In Mexico’s case, the provision has ensured that the IFT can penalize América Móvil for anticompetitive practices and create a more dynamic environment for new investment to occur. Indeed, since 2013, Mexico’s telecommunications space has witnessed the entry of new actors, including AT&T and the Spanish firm Telefónica.
Another development intended to expand internet access has been the so-called Red Compartida, or shared network, a public-private partnership spearheaded by the firm Altán Redes and intended to act as a wholesale network that lowers costs for new entrants in the telecoms market by enabling them to buy services from it rather than undertake the capital-intensive work of building their own networks from scratch. Altán Redes was also initially mandated to cover 92.2 percent of Mexico’s population by 2024, with an emphasis on bringing coverage to underserved and rural areas.
Taken together, these reforms have helped expand internet access in Mexico, growing it from 43.5 percent of the population in 2013 to 56.7 percent in 2018. After his election in 2018, however, AMLO sought to systematically defang independent regulators like the IFT. The former president slashed the agency’s budget by 25 percent from 2018 to 2019 and neglected to name replacements for the three of the seven commissioners who serve on the IFT’s board. Without enough members to meet a quorum and obtain the five-vote majority needed for major organizational decisions, the institute struggled to move quickly in response to new developments on the ground. Finally, during the 2024 election, AMLO proposed eliminating the IFT as an independent body and bringing it under the control of the presidency, a policy that eventually made its way to the floor of Mexico’s congress under Sheinbaum as part of a series of constitutional reforms.
The crux of AMLO’s critique of the IFT is that it has failed to sufficiently level the playing field for competition in the telecommunications space, with América Móvil still enjoying a market share of approximately 70 percent. Ironically, AMLO’s own efforts to hobble the IFT have helped turn this allegation into a self-fulfilling prophecy, while the former president’s closeness to billionaire mogul and América Móvil owner Carlos Slim throws into question his true dedication to democratizing the ICT space. Stripping the IFT of its independence represents a sea change in the way Mexico’s telecoms space is managed, introducing the potential for ICT policy to become a political football, or otherwise allowing presidents undue influence to pick winners and losers in this vital sector by putting their fingers on the scale of key regulatory decisions.
In November 2024, Mexico’s congress voted to approve a constitutional reform dissolving the IFT and six other independent regulatory agencies. The IFT’s functions will be subsumed by the new Agency of Digital Transformation and Telecommunications (ATDT), directly under the control of the president. While this change offers the possibility of retaining some of the human capital and expertise the IFT cultivated over its 12-year history, the reform has exacerbated uncertainty around the future of Mexico’s ICT sector and the potential for political interference in digital service provision. The elimination of the IFT as an independent entity also puts Mexico further at odds with the provisions in Chapter 18 of the USMCA at a time when tensions around the agreement have come into sharp focus with the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. More immediately, the elimination of the IFT has put important telecommunications decisions on hold in Mexico—perhaps most importantly the country’s second 5G spectrum auction, which was canceled amid concerns over the IFT’s capacity to administer the process while simultaneously transitioning into the ATDT.
In contrast to the IFT, the Red Compartida enjoyed a far more favorable reception from AMLO, whose signature digital program, “Internet Para Todos” (“Internet For All”), positions Altán Redes’ efforts as critical to increase coverage in underserved regions. This partnership was solidified after Altán Redes filed for bankruptcy in 2021. The firm exited bankruptcy proceedings the following year as the Mexican government agreed to lend its financial backing in exchange for becoming a majority shareholder in the company. Shortly thereafter, in January 2024, the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) assumed control over Altán Redes’ daily operations, incorporating it into the CFE Telecommunications and Internet For All (CFE-TEIT) project. With this sequence of moves, what was originally intended as a partnership between a private firm and the public sector became a de facto state-driven initiative. Given AMLO’s predilection for nationalism and preference for state-owned enterprises, such an outcome was likely a welcome development for his administration; however, it also risks adding to Mexico’s precarious fiscal situation.
In 2022, CFE-TEIT turned a net profit for the government of nearly 5 billion pesos (about $260 million). The next year, however, it reported a loss of almost 9 billion pesos (about $460 million), equivalent to roughly six times the operating budget of the IFT. These losses were driven in part by ballooning operating costs, which rose some 68 percent between those two years. Meanwhile the promise of Internet For All has yet to be realized, with the newspaper Expansión reporting that in 2023, 18.8 percent of Mexicans still did not have adequate access to the internet, with the most significant gulf in coverage persisting between urban and rural communities. Altán Redes, for its part, was mandated to have covered 92.2 percent of the population by 2024, a goal it failed to achieve as it grappled with bankruptcy proceedings and acquisition by CFE-TEIT. The government’s assumption of management over Altán Redes’ finances and operations also risks adding yet another mission that outstrips its capabilities. Furthermore, this comes at a time when the Sheinbaum administration is facing one of the most severe budgetary deficits in recent history, representing approximately 6 percent of GDP. Pressure to cut this deficit will press up against the need to respect some of AMLO’s signature policy achievements, especially when it comes to social spending on initiatives like Sembrando Vida (focused on reforestation and poverty alleviation) and Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro (focused on employing young people). In this context, the CFE-TEIT may be a convenient program to draw out needed savings by reducing state support. Doing so will not only help the Sheinbaum administration get a better handle on its fiscal situation but also offer a golden opportunity to revisit and undo a policy that has had a significant anticompetitive effect on Mexico’s ICT sector.
Altán Redes and the Red Compartida hold significant promise in theory, but the Mexican government’s near-total control over both is further distorting the country’s already lopsided telecommunications market. In practice—and especially since the CFE assumed control over day-to-day operations— Altán Redes has received three different subsidies from the federal government.
First, the company was able to bid for wireless spectrum at bargain-bin rates. According to reports, Altán Redes received as much as a 90 percent discount on spectrum in the 700 MHz band. Spectrum auctions are the primary means through which telecommunications providers acquire the necessary radiofrequency bands to provide service. Historically, Mexico’s sky-high spectrum prices, among the steepest in Latin America, left many usable blocks unclaimed, as bidding on them was simply not economical. The steep cost of spectrum caused Telefónica, which entered Mexico’s ICT market after the 2013 reforms, to return all of its bands to the government between 2019 and 2022, striking a deal to use AT&T’s infrastructure instead.
Supporters of the Red Compartida project argue that some level of government subsidy is to be expected, and that the benefits of having a wholesale supplier outweigh the potential harms to the small number of established players in the ICT infrastructure space. However, the lack of transparency around the bidding process for Altán Redes should raise serious questions as to whether the blocks of spectrum awarded to the company would not have been put to better use through a more competitive auction. Furthermore, to build a genuinely competitive ICT industry, Mexico should seek to encourage competition at every level of the telecommunications sector, from wholesale infrastructure providers to mobile virtual network (MVNO) operators alike.
Second, the financial risk of operating a new wholesale network, and the heavy up-front costs incurred, have been mitigated since the CFE took over management of Altán’s debt. To be sure, government support is almost certainly necessary given the Red Compartida’s objective of bringing coverage to communities located in regions that likely did not attract significant private sector investment for building infrastructure. In the United States, public-private partnerships have been employed for similar purposes to boost internet and cellular access in remote or low-density areas through grant programs, technical assistance, and other funding support. However, the extent of Mexico’s government intervention in Altán Redes means that today the company resembles a state-owned enterprise more than a public-private partnership.
Finally, while Altán Redes initially intended to build its own infrastructure, since the government took over management of its debt the CFE and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA) have been reportedly building cell towers and related infrastructure at the president’s behest and on Altán’s behalf. Since 2022, the CFE has agreed to invest $1.76 billion in cell towers and fiber-optic cables for use as part of the Red Compartida. Also of note has been the use of the military in ICT infrastructure deployment, with army engineers working alongside the CFE to identify locations for erecting new cell towers. In this way, the Red Compartida was subsumed into AMLO’s Morena Party’s broader pattern of militarism, which sought to incorporate a growing number of civilian functions and infrastructure projects under the umbrella of Mexico’s SEDENA. For Altán Redes itself, however, the cumulative effect of these various subsidies, bargain-priced spectrum, defrayed financial risk, and state assistance in building the most capital-intensive elements of its network has been the formation of a telecoms juggernaut with which few (if any) private firms can hope to compete.
While the above factors mean that Altán Redes is distorting Mexico’s wholesale telecommunications market, even more troubling are the signs that under the CFE’s management, the company may be moving into the retail telecommunications market as well. As part of its mandate to provide service to underserved areas, CFE-TEIT is empowered to sell SIM cards. In February 2024, this mandate was expanded to authorize the agency to supply mobile services not only to unconnected areas, but also to recipients of AMLO’s social program expansion, regardless of their location. The IFT approved this change, provided that the total number of beneficiaries of CFE-TEIT’s services do not exceed 4.24 million people. This has created a circular trade wherein Altán Redes provides wholesale services to CFE-TEIT at bargain-bin prices while the CFE, in turn, subsidizes Altán’s operations by deploying telecommunications infrastructure on its behalf.
In addition to CFE-TEIT, the cumulative impact of Altán Redes’ government subsidies means it can provide wholesale services to MVNOs that are far below the rate of its closest competitor. Bait, one of the fastest-growing MVNOs in Mexico, has been able to dramatically expand its market share in a mere two years— going from four million to over 15 million subscribers in that period—by relying heavily on Altán Redes for steeply discounted wholesale services. While Bait’s use of Altán Redes may make good financial sense, excessive focus on state-run enterprises may hold Mexico’s overall telecommunications sector back in the next decade. Indeed, Bait has already signaled its desire to partner with private sector providers in order to offer a higher degree of service.
While Altán Redes has been able to roll out its network on the cheap, its mobile infrastructure has not necessarily been preferable to that of other carriers. Indeed, mobile network operators (MNOs) that control both infrastructure and wireless spectrum, like AT&T and Telcel, are the leading actors in the deployment of 5G in Mexico, whereas Altán Redes is only now beginning to consider expanding into 5G. On the whole, this has meant a lower quality of service for consumers. Mexico lags behind its peers in 5G deployment, with just 37 percent of its population covered. This is below the global average of 38.4 percent, and well behind countries like Brazil and Chile, which boast 52.7 percent and 86 percent coverage, respectively. Nevertheless, as MVNOs continue to rely on Altán’s prices to stay competitive, they will find it hard to justify purchasing wholesale services from higher quality but more expensive competitors, leaving Mexican consumers with fewer options in the long run—especially fewer high-speed options.
Moving away from market dynamics may further damage Mexico’s nearshoring prospects. Companies looking to relocate to Mexico and remain competitive will require ICT infrastructure capable of delivering mobile broadband quickly, at low latency and affordable prices—something Altán Redes in its present form is unprepared to deliver. One especially noteworthy case for further study will be the proposed Isthmus of Tehuantepec Interoceanic Corridor, championed by AMLO to link Mexico’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts through a series of railways and industrial parks. SEDENA has been particularly active in this project, building (and in some cases expropriating land for) the rail infrastructure, as well as helping to set up cell towers and lay fiber-optic cabling. However, the quality of ICT infrastructure available may not rise to the level needed by companies whose investment the government hopes to attract in the corridor. Without private sector enthusiasm, the promised gains of this initiative will fail to materialize, and ICT will play an important role in determining success or failure.
Additionally, the presence of Huawei in Altán Redes’ infrastructure exposes the Red Compartida to elevated geopolitical risk. Altán selected both Huawei and Nokia to aid in its 4.5G infrastructure rollout in 2017, with the intention of using Nokia equipment along the U.S.-Mexico border while restricting the deployment of Huawei technology to locations further south. However, reporting by Reuters later found Huawei equipment to be present in at least three northern cities originally intended to be covered by Nokia. Even if Altán Redes had managed to perfectly limit Huawei infrastructure to southern Mexico, the nature of modern telecommunications means that businesses and individuals relying on the company’s infrastructure could still find themselves at risk of having their data siphoned off by China.
Elevated geopolitical risk in the ICT sector comes at a time when the North American economic block appears to be fracturing in terms of its approach. Whereas the United States and Canada have roughly aligned to impose high tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and strip companies like Huawei and ZTE from their digital infrastructure, Mexico appears to have left the door ajar. Much of this concern has revolved around the automotive sector, but the digital space represents an area of growing concern as well, especially if U.S. companies operating in Mexico feel pressured to rely on Altán Redes, or on MVNOs that use the company’s infrastructure for affordable internet access. Elimination of the IFT as an independent agency has further added to growing investor uncertainty regarding Mexico and to the potential for new investments in the ICT sector to become subject to political horse trading. History shows that in the era before the IFT, when telecommunications policy was set by the Federal Commission of Telecommunications—an entity within the Secretariat of Communications and Transport—Mexico’s ICT landscape was marked by the monopolization of the space by América Móvil, higher average prices, and laggard internet deployment across the country. The elimination of the IFT may further advantage Altán Redes by giving the federal government increased control over spectrum pricing and, in the process, allowing for further discounts on projects related to the Red Compartida.
At a time when Mexico is seeking to juggle an increasingly contentious relationship with the United States, characterized by anxieties around tariffs, migration policy, drug trafficking, and Chinese investment, tensions over ICT policy will only further entangle the bilateral relationship. For Sheinbaum to make good on her pledge to intensify Mexico’s engagement with North America, taking a hard look at geopolitical risks across the board, including in ICT, will be necessary. By hitching its wagon to Altán Redes, Mexico risks handicapping its own chances of emerging as a digital sprinter.
This being said, Mexico will likely be reluctant to reform so long as it remains under the shadow of 25 percent tariffs from the United States. As the North American economic bloc seeks to chart a way forward, increasing digital competitiveness represents one area where policymakers can achieve quick wins for their citizens and bolster ICT sector integration.
To fully capitalize on its potential in the ICT sector, Mexico should pursue policies aimed at increasing competition between companies on the basis of service, not expanding a single government network. The Sheinbaum administration faces countervailing pressures to both stay the course on AMLO’s policies and forge new answers to increasingly salient policy challenges around Mexico’s security, competitiveness, and economic future. Telecommunications can and should be a priority for the new administration, as it is an area where there may be sufficient daylight between Sheinbaum and her predecessor and where relatively small gains can yield major wins for Mexican consumers.
1. Right-Size Altán Redes
The Sheinbaum administration would do well to take a close look at the current shape and mandate for Altán Redes, which—as detailed above—has grown significantly from its initial concept. Rather than acting as the backbone for a country-wide internet project under the banner of CFE-TEIT, Altán Redes and the Red Compartida should be reverted to a public-private partnership focused more narrowly on expanding access in remote and underserved communities. In doing so, Mexico should strive to disentangle the company’s financials and management from the CFE, which would allow Altán Redes to act as a true wholesale network. Such a move would benefit consumers across the board. A right-sized Altán Redes would allow companies like Bait to contract with it for access in hard-to-reach areas while still pulling from a variety of suppliers to give users the best-possible coverage in areas with more established ICT infrastructure.
Beyond aiding Mexico’s ICT competitiveness, a more restrained vision of Altan Redes would also make sound financial sense. Rather than saddling CFE-TEIT with responsibility for managing a nationwide telecoms infrastructure rollout, the Mexican government could reduce its liability and debt burden by restoring the original public-private partnership structure. While this may cut against the outgoing administration’s inclination toward state-owned enterprises, the Sheinbaum administration will have less room to maneuver when it comes to such enterprises that are management-expensive and heavily indebted. In contrast to titans like PEMEX, Altán Redes’ relationship with the federal government is less mature and less politicized, presenting more leeway for the new president.
2. Preserve Regulatory Independence and Integrity
The elimination of the IFT and its planned transformation into the ATDT gives the Sheinbaum administration newfound authority to intervene in Mexico’s ICT sector. While the urge to exercise this ability is tempting, the government should resist it and instead focus on making credible commitments to preserving the culture of expertise and impartiality which have characterized the IFT since its founding. Staffing the agency with nonpartisan experts and avoiding making it a target of political discussion are necessary to ensure Mexico can chart a course for digital competitiveness even under less-than-desirable conditions.
Particularly as Mexico heads towards the USMCA joint review process (which may take place on an accelerated timeline), it would behoove the government to signal a commitment to impartiality in regulatory affairs. As telecommunications policy is relatively low-profile compared to more prominent areas of divergence—such as Mexico’s judicial reform—it is one area where Mexican, U.S., and Canadian negotiators could find common ground before sitting down for formal talks. But the Sheinbaum government must come prepared to make serious and enforceable commitments to preserving regulatory independence within the ATDT that satisfy USMCA provisions. Other related steps could include implementing past IFT recommendations to lower spectrum prices (see below), which would signal that the new digital sector body has the means and commitment to advance ICT sector competitiveness.
3. Lower Spectrum Fees
The success of Altán Redes, which got a head start out of the gate thanks to the hefty discount it received on spectrum, is in fact a testament to the even greater gains Mexico could achieve by lowering spectrum costs across the board. These fees present one of the most significant impediments to ICT competition in Mexico, advantaging powerful and highly consolidated incumbents and pricing out potential new entrants. Mexico’s 2025 5G spectrum auction was announced by the IFT to limited interest, with the main players likely to remain market-dominant América Móvil or perhaps Altán Redes, if it secures another discount on 5G spectrum bands.
Lowering spectrum fees represents one of the single greatest steps Mexico could take toward improving its competitiveness in the ICT space. This would also pay dividends for the Mexican government, which could reap higher returns from an increase in the purchase of spectrum bands, even at lower individual cost. Mexico should also consider applying discounts on spectrum for rural and underserved areas—a model experimented with by Brazil in its own 5G auctions—thereby enlisting more private companies in the effort to expand internet coverage.
4. Recognize the Links between Physical and Digital Economic Competitiveness
The upcoming 2026 review of the USMCA has provoked consternation from some corners, but it could also be an opportunity to emphasize the crucial importance of a competitive and well-regulated ICT sector for Mexico’s broader economic competitiveness. Trade and industry associations in Mexico, the United States, and Canada can play a role by communicating with the Sheinbaum administration about their concerns regarding the potential elimination of the IFT as an independent regulator and the potential for knock-on effects in foreign investment and nearshoring attractiveness in Mexico. To be successful, a campaign to preserve the IFT’s independence and advance a competitive agenda for the ICT sector must consist of both “carrots” to incentivize pro-competitive behavior and “sticks” that the United States can deploy as needed in response to bad behavior.
In particular, the United States should seek to work with Mexico to resolve the concerns raised by China’s presence in the latter country’s ICT sector. The United States should seek to outline the clear geopolitical risks of allowing China to penetrate the data and communications networks of Mexican businesses, as well as uplift alternative vendors like Nokia and Eriksson to compete with Huawei in support of Mexico’s 5G development. There are encouraging signs that Mexico is willing to cooperate on this front when it recognizes the risks of PRC influence: for instance, the United States and Mexico cooperated in July 2024 on a set of tariffs intended to stop China’s dumping of steel and aluminum on the Mexican market. Effective diplomacy and communication between Washington and Mexico City could provide the impetus for renewed dialogue on the digital front.
5. Develop Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) to Enhance Connectivity
An alternative means of solving the need to provide more and better internet coverage throughout Mexico comes in the form of Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN). By encouraging interoperability across the telecommunications technology stack, O-RAN can mitigate the tendency of the ICT sector to become clustered between a handful of large companies who are able to pay the up-front costs of infrastructure development. In contrast to infrastructure deployed by Altán Redes, which is generally incompatible with that of companies like AT&T or Telcel, an O-RAN system would allow different network pieces deployed by different companies to interface seamlessly with one another. O-RAN has advantages for both ICT competitiveness and security. Since companies would not need to be responsible for building the entire ICT architecture from scratch, new and smaller entrants with comparative advantages in, say, radio antenna could more easily enter the market. Similarly, O-RAN systems could easily replace compromised equipment provided by Huawei, while conventional Radio Access Networks built on Huawei infrastructure will struggle to mitigate the potential intelligence collection and cyber vulnerabilities even with future updates.
However, O-RAN remains a relatively nascent technology with a shortfall of qualified workers and engineers to help it truly gain competitive scale. The United States can encourage the deployment of O-RAN in Mexico by supporting technical education and exchange. Domestically, the United States has allocated $1.5 billion through the CHIPS and Science Act to support the development of O-RAN. A similar initiative, potentially branching off from existing technical and educational collaboration between the United States and Mexico on semiconductors, could be focused on training and upskilling Mexican engineers and technicians to help the country build its knowledge base around this technology. Such a move would not only help expand coverage by allowing more efficient deployment of ICT infrastructure but also position Mexico to compete for the next generation of ICT development.
Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.
This white paper is made possible through general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.
