Photo: Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images
This series—led by the Futures Lab and featuring scholars across CSIS—explores emerging challenges and opportunities likely to shape peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. All contributions in the series can be found by visiting Strategic Headwinds: Understanding the Forces Shaping Ukraine’s Path to Peace.
Incoming president Donald Trump has made achieving a rapid, negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine a cornerstone of his foreign policy agenda. In recent months, both Russia and Ukraine have indicated openness to a negotiated end to the hostilities. But it is unclear whether an end to the war is currently possible on any basis other than capitulation to Russia’s maximalist demands.
Reaching a deal that is acceptable to Ukraine and its Western supporters will require significant flexibility on the part of the Kremlin. Recent Russian statements, however, do not suggest the Kremlin sees a need to offer meaningful concessions, and Russia has a clear advantage on the battlefield.
By immediately raising Russia’s costs of continued conflict—and credibly signaling a willingness to keep these costs high for a prolonged period—the Trump administration can encourage the Kremlin to compromise and improve the prospects for a deal that is acceptable to the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. Specifically, the administration should signal a higher tolerance for escalation risks by significantly increasing the delivery of long-range missiles to Ukraine and lifting the restrictions on their use and should clarify the West’s willingness to escalate further if talks fail to produce an acceptable outcome.
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, the Biden administration has demonstrated that it prioritizes escalation control over imposing costs for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Biden’s team has carefully weighed the military benefits of aid against potential escalation risks in a slow, deliberative process that has repeatedly diminished the impact of U.S. support. The administration’s prolonged hesitation over providing tanks to Ukraine, for example, delayed the training of new Ukrainian units and thereby impeded Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Most recently, a similarly long (and public) deliberation about the use of Western long-range missiles on targets within Russia allowed the Kremlin to move 90 percent of its aircraft out of range before the administration reached a decision. While Biden ultimately granted Ukraine that permission, as of December 2024 it is unclear whether the administration maintains geographic restrictions on their use.
Beyond its approach to military aid, the Biden administration has demonstrated a low tolerance for escalation risks by carefully avoiding actions that could lead to direct conflict between the United States and Russia. In the leadup to Russia’s invasion, for instance, the Biden administration evacuated the U.S. embassy in Kyiv, which reduced the likelihood that Russian attacks would kill Americans and thereby removed this complicating factor for the Kremlin. After Russia’s invasion, President Biden repeatedly declared that the United States would not become directly involved in the conflict, warning of “World War III” if it did so. His administration subsequently delayed—and eventually canceled—a routine Intercontinental Ballistic Missile test for the same reason. These steps may have reduced the risks of horizontal escalation but also clearly demonstrated that the Biden administration prioritizes avoiding weapons of mass destruction use or a direct clash with Russia above support to Ukraine.
The Biden administration’s cautious approach to escalation management may have been warranted given the risks inherent in Biden’s open-ended commitment to Ukraine, but such an approach will present challenges in obtaining a settlement that protects the interests of the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. The incoming administration will need to convince Russia that the costs of continued fighting will far outweigh any potential benefits. This may be difficult: Russian forces are advancing on the battlefield more rapidly than at any point since 2022, and there is no reason to believe that the Kremlin doubts its ability to make further gains. Given the Biden administration’s demonstrated risk aversion, the Kremlin may doubt the United States would be willing to escalate to impose greater costs if peace negotiations fail.
President Trump’s stated goal of quickly bringing the conflict to an end requires a new escalation management approach to reset the Kremlin’s perceptions of U.S. risk tolerance. To induce the Kremlin to compromise, the Trump administration should rapidly expand aid to Ukraine and threaten to further expand aid if talks fail.
To raise the Kremlin’s costs in the immediate term and shift Putin’s perception of U.S. risk tolerance, the incoming administration should significantly increase the quantity of long-range missiles delivered to Ukraine and lift any remaining restrictions on their use. The Biden administration began to provide long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) ballistic missiles to Ukraine in March 2023, initially restricting their use to targets within Ukraine before later permitting strikes into Russian territory. The administration, however, has not publicly disclosed the number of missiles provided or the types of targets that Ukraine is authorized to strike. Thus far, Ukraine’s strikes have been few and limited to military targets, and reports suggest that the Biden administration may continue to restrict Ukrainian strikes to certain regions of Russia. The Trump administration should immediately deliver hundreds of ATCACMS and (if technically feasible) Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) for Ukraine’s use against a wider range of targets, including oil and gas infrastructure. While these missiles would be unlikely to significantly impact battlefield dynamics in the short term, they would allow Ukraine to increase Russia’s costs for its aggression. More importantly, these strikes would demonstrate a higher U.S. tolerance for escalation risks and build credibility for threats to further expand aid.
While rapidly expanding Ukraine’s ability to strike targets in Russia would increase the risk of an aggressive Russian response, there are at least two reasons to believe that Putin would refrain from nuclear use or attacks against NATO. First, while an influx of Western missiles would increase the costs of the war for Russia, it would not shift the trajectory of the conflict. Putin likely knows this and, given Russia’s current winning position, may be reluctant to escalate in a manner that would risk a direct clash with the United States. Second, the Kremlin’s warnings have focused on strikes against Russian territory in general, so it is unclear whether Putin would see a meaningful distinction between Ukraine’s current, infrequent strikes on Russian military infrastructure and more frequent strikes on both military and economic targets.
To convince the Kremlin that the costs of continued fighting would far outweigh the benefits over the longer term, the Trump administration should signal that it is willing to escalate further if talks fail to produce an acceptable outcome. While some draft peace deals from those affiliated with the incoming administration have identified threats to expand aid for Ukraine as a means to induce the Kremlin to negotiate, the incoming Trump administration should clarify precisely what that would entail. Accordingly, Trump should publish a five-year plan for Ukraine’s war effort that his administration will implement if talks fail. The plan should include a massive, unrestricted lend-lease arrangement for Ukraine from the United States and its NATO allies that would, at best, give Ukraine a battlefield advantage and, at least, halt Russia’s gains. Given Russia’s growing economic challenges, the prospect of a prolonged stalemate could serve as a strong incentive for compromise. To strengthen the plan’s credibility, the administration should coordinate with allies to quickly begin the process of securing legislative approval for further funding.
Reaching a peace settlement that is palatable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine will be difficult given Russia’s current battlefield advantages. Complicating a solution further is the fact that the necessary steps will raise the risks of dangerous escalation and may be unappealing from a U.S. domestic politics standpoint. Capitulation, however, poses its own political and escalation-related risks, including that of Russian aggression against other states in Eastern Europe and the potential for damage to U.S. credibility with allies. Counterintuitively, the incoming administration’s best path to peace is to signal a willingness to escalate.
Lachlan MacKenzie is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
