Expect A More Dangerous Asia If Maritime Issues Don’t Make the Trump-Xi Agenda

Things are not working the way they are supposed to in the Strait of Hormuz—and, increasingly, neither are they in the waters of Asia.

Traffic has been throttled in the Strait of Hormuz since the beginning of the Iran conflict in March, sending energy prices sky-high and creating rippling economic uncertainty that has threatened the health of the global economy. Fears of a similar situation emerging in Asia have never felt as real: In the last year, amid U.S. preoccupation in the Western Hemisphere and Iran, China has made unprecedented strides in eroding the navigational and economic rights of neighboring states in pursuit of maximal control of its near seas. Its latest move, interfering with commercial traffic east of Taiwan with a new, persistent coast guard presence, has sharply raised fears of a maritime blockage in Asia that would have even more massive impacts than the closure of Hormuz.

Capabilities…

Neither of these problems have easy—or purely military—answers. U.S. forces have tried to secure the Strait of Hormuz through mine-clearing operations and strikes on Iranian capabilities threatening commercial traffic. But despite these efforts, the United States’ overwhelming military superiority has not translated into an ability to restore traffic through the strait. Even a minimum Iranian capability to strike transiting ships has been enough to deter most commercial ships or convince them to proceed on Iran’s terms—along new routes and paying tolls.

In Asia, the U.S. tool kit for addressing China’s maritime expansionism has also relied heavily on its military. The U.S. Navy has long conducted freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s (and others’) excessive maritime claims. These have succeeded in maintaining the U.S. military’s ability to navigate in contested areas, but have done little to deter Chinese efforts to interfere with the navigation and economic activity of its neighbors. The Philippines remains an illustrative case: Despite being a U.S. treaty ally, its ships face constant harassment from larger and more numerous Chinese counterparts in the South China Sea, and it has paused development on known offshore oil and gas reserves, a potentially critical resource for a nation with the highest electricity prices in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for 12 years under pressure from Beijing.

Recognizing the importance of a wider range of tools, especially when the primary actors in China’s gray zone operations are white-hulled coast guard and maritime militia ships, the United States recently deployed six U.S. Coast Guard fast response cutters to the Western Pacific as the Expeditionary Cutter Squadron, homeported in Guam but operating temporarily out of Singapore and the Philippines. This type of creative deployment is a welcome development and has the potential to support more nuanced U.S. operations in Asia’s maritime spaces, particularly in combination with counterparts from allies and partners in the region. But while this capacity is important, one of the many lessons from Hormuz has been that U.S. ships alone cannot easily fix a broken waterway.

…Without Conviction

The United States needs not just regional capabilities but also clear signaling to China that it would use them in the event of a maritime crisis. However, while the State Department continues to issue press releases in response to individual maritime incidents, at senior levels the administration has adopted the practice of deliberately speaking out less on security issues with Beijing. This point of policy was repeated in August by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby as he spoke in Manila on U.S. security strategy in Asia—without once mentioning China or the South China Sea.

As the Trump administration has been speaking softly and carrying a big stick (at least, the sticks that have not yet been spent in the Iran conflict), China has looked anything but deterred, instead accelerating efforts to bend and break the rules in the waters of Asia. In the last year, Beijing has gone far beyond the concerning but consistent patterns of behavior it had exhibited for the past 10 years:

• in the Paracel Islands, it has restarted large-scale dredging for the first time in a decade to construct one of the largest island bases in the South China Sea;
• at Scarborough Shoal, it has deployed multiple floating platforms while quadrupling the number of militia and China Coast Guard ships that deny Philippine government and fishing vessels access in contravention of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration ruling;
• in the Yellow Sea, it has established permanent coast guard patrols that shadow Korean law enforcement activity around Chinese-installed platforms in the Provisional Measures Zone;
• it has sharply increased China Coast Guard activity at Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island; and,
• perhaps most concerningly of all, it has established semipermanent coast guard patrols east of Taiwan that have illegally interfered with hundreds of transiting commercial vessels.

Under Secretary Colby himself stated in his August remarks that it takes two things to deter coercion: “fielded hard power and the demonstrated political will to use it.” While arguments can be had about the administration’s success in fielding hard power, it is clearly taking steps to try to achieve this goal. But its messaging on maritime issues in Asia needs a shot in the arm if it wants to demonstrate the U.S. political will necessary to deter a maritime crisis in Asia.

Making the Connection

With Xi set to visit Washington next week, now would be the right time for Washington to course correct and send a clear signal to Beijing that it cares about what happens in the seas and straits of Asia. The message itself need not, and probably should not, be anything new: The United States expects the waters of Asia to function according to international law as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and where Chinese behavior exceeds that, it should expect to incur direct or indirect costs.

Under past administrations, this position would be the bare minimum and could probably go without saying. But the Trump administration has shown little regard for traditional U.S. positions and has itself challenged maritime norms with its own excesses, including posts from the president floating up to 20 percent fees on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. And while Trump has been accused of many things, remaining quiet about things he cares about is not one of them. Amid policy upheaval and radio silence from top leadership, it would only be logical for Beijing to test, as it clearly already is, whether Washington cares anymore about freedom of navigation or the stability of maritime spaces in Asia.

It is possible that the administration thinks it does not need to care about Chinese bad behavior at sea in the same way that it clearly cares about Chinese trade and technology policies. But its focus in Iran was also entirely on the regime and its nuclear program until traffic through the strait was shut down. Just like in Hormuz, if things go south in maritime Asia, the United States will have no choice but to prioritize it. And whatever amount of relationship capital it takes to address maritime issues now, it will be far less costly than waiting until Beijing has pushed its positions even further or triggered a crisis with a U.S. ally.

An effort to signal resolve in the leader-to-leader channel need not be an about-face from the administration’s current “quiet” approach. In fact, it can help enable it. A single strong message from the top can be left to reverberate, accomplishing the job of connecting U.S. capabilities to desired outcomes while avoiding the churn of repeated back-and-forth exchanges.

By the same token, a firm message on maritime issues need not delve into the details of individual scenarios, threaten specific responses, or bind the United States to any particular course of action, which the administration is clearly loathe to do: Washington is always free to choose whether, and how, to respond to individual incidents. Traditionally, naming and shaming has been one of the easiest ways for U.S. leadership to impose costs on Beijing. If the administration sees value in toning down the public rhetoric, it can also push back with additional U.S. operations, deployments, and financing to support regional capabilities and capacity. But if public messaging is not going to be a go-to tool of this administration, it needs to do the signaling work up front to clearly draw the connection between China’s maritime behavior and subsequent U.S. actions.

With the energy of the Trump administration so clearly focused on economic relations with China, it would be a surprise if maritime issues figure largely in the public press from the summit. But whether public or private, it will take signaling from the top if this administration wants its security posture to steer Chinese behavior in the right direction. If maritime issues fall off the summit agenda completely, the world should only expect worse behavior from Beijing in the waterways of Asia.

Harrison Prétat is deputy director and fellow at the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.