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Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has been at the root of its accelerating collaboration with North Korea, Iran, and China. While Moscow leans on these three countries to prop up its war effort, these mutually beneficial relationships are simultaneously supporting the needs of its partners in the realm of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and is going beyond its initial purpose to fuel a global arms race. These mutually beneficial ties include diplomatic support and technological transfers from Russia to North Korea (DPRK) and Iran, as well as more concrete cooperation such as the supply of highly enriched uranium from Russia to China.
Russia’s nuclear partnerships undermine the nuclear order with impunity. As one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Russia has historically played a key role in preventing nuclear proliferation. Moscow supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and leveraged its diplomatic weight to bring Iran to join the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Since 2022, however, it has abandoned this role, instead fostering nuclear proliferation to further its military objectives.
President Donald Trump considers arms control deals a major goal for his second term, despite failed attempts during his first tenure. At the same time, Russia’s new partnerships provide President Vladimir Putin with increased leverage against the United States across theaters in Europe and the Indo-Pacific in the context of possible arms control deals. In this new context, for President Trump to be in a position of strength, countering adversaries that are increasingly working together against the United States in the sphere of proliferation needs to be at the forefront of global allied strategies. For this, the United States will have to strengthen existing alliances to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated approach, counter proliferation, and engage global partners.
Russia’s deepening relationship with North Korea—formalized in a mutual defense treaty since June 2024—is perhaps the most worrying from a nonproliferation perspective. In March 2024, Russia vetoed the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) renewal of the UN 1718 Committee, which monitors sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. That October, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called denuclearization of the Korean peninsula a “closed” issue, explicitly abandoning long-standing opposition to recognizing Pyongyang as a nuclear power. Russia is now likely facilitating North Korea’s dual-usespace program. It is also possible—though unproven—that Russia may be helping to advance North Korea’s missile programs. Notably, the success of a recent intercontinental ballistic missile test demonstrated significant advancements in reentry vehicle and fuel technology, which is key for the development of a credible nuclear-capable missile system.
Russia’s cooperation with Iran is also troubling. An original signatory to the JCPOA in 2015, Moscow notably assisted Western efforts to restore the deal prior to the 2022 invasion. These efforts have since dissipated, with Russia instead working to stymie negotiations. In parallel, Moscow has provided Tehran with missile and space technology and may have also provided assistance for its nuclear program, deepening the two countries’ extensive military-technological exchange.
While China has refrained from directly sending weapons to Russia, it is the main conduit for dual-use components and foreign weapon parts—as much as 60 percent of the latter according to Ukrainian sources—and as such cannot be ignored. In return, Russia has facilitated technology transfers to China in submarine and missile technologies according to the United States. Rosatom is providing highly enriched uranium for a Chinese fast breeder reactor program, the first of which started running mid-2023. These programs produce large amounts of plutonium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons after reprocessing. Moreover, both countries have been patrolling strategic bombers since 2019 over the Sea of Japan, and in November 2024, China included for the first time its new nuclear capable long-range bomber H-6N. Russia’s actions also lower the cost of China’s inaction in the UNSC. Beijing is weakening the sanctions regime on Pyongyang, failing to disrupt local networks facilitating ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods—including weapons—to and from North Korea. China has already directly supported North Korean nuclear modernization since 2017 by contributing missile parts and launchers.
This military-technological cooperation demonstrates a common effort to stymie the global nonproliferation architecture, defined since the 1970s by the NPT. The NPT remains the only universal and verifiable framework to ensure the five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) commit to their disarmament obligations while nonnuclear states commit to nonproliferation in exchange for security guarantees and access to peaceful uses of the atom for nonnuclear weapon states. In the past decade, the NPT has been challenged because of the lack of significant progress on the disarmament front, which gave traction to the movement in favor of unilateral disarmament. On the nonproliferation side, however, only “rogue states” were contesting the international order. The DPRK left the NPT in 2003 to pursue its nuclear program, and Iran, which was already on a pathway to a nuclear weapons program before this collaboration. What makes the situation much more dangerous now is the fact that recognized nuclear-weapon states like Russia, and to some extent China, may no longer play their role as guarantors of the international order against proliferation, or even contribute to it.
Moscow has drastically reduced its commitment to nonproliferation norms. This is clear in recent Russian actions such as blocking consensus at the NPT Review Conference in 2022 and withdrawing from the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2023. Meanwhile, China aims to maintain a facade of commitment to international norms yet remains deliberately opaque in its nuclear policy. Russia’s behavior further legitimizes China’s modernization and buildup of its nuclear arsenal, despite a lack of transparency regarding ongoing efforts as well as the discrepancies with its “no first use” policy unchanged from 1964.
In the long term, Russia’s material support for North Korea and Iran, combined with its permissive attitude toward their nuclear ambitions, could contribute to the normalization of both nations as nuclear states. North Korea’s goal to normalize its nuclear status has long been a cornerstone of its national policy, and this ambition is increasingly attainable. With North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities and its ability to test ballistic missiles in Ukraine, coupled with Russia’s endorsement, the regime is edging closer to de facto recognition as a nuclear-armed state. This shift would force a paradigm change in nuclear strategy, particularly for nuclear powers like the United States, who would need to move from a deterrence-by-denial strategy to one based on nuclear deterrence. For the Trump administration, this may necessitate a rethink of its strategy toward the DPRK, as the Iron Dome for America would put a heavier focus on missile defense.
Moscow’s abandonment of nonproliferation principles could signal to other countries that there are fewer consequences for pursuing nuclear weapons, encouraging proliferation around the globe. Iran’s nuclear ambitions would likely provoke a regional arms race, with neighboring Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt potentially pursuing their own nuclear programs. At a time when leaders such as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, former President Yoon Suk-Yeol of South Korea, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are publicly contemplating nuclear weapons as a means to secure their sovereignty, it may also prompt them to take further steps. These potential knock-on effects could force the United States to make a difficult choice. It may feel compelled to provide additional security guarantees to its allies and partners to prevent their development of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, if the United States allows these states to acquire nuclear weapons—which is sometimes coined “friendly proliferation”—Washington would contribute to the erosion of the nonproliferation norm alongside Russia. This would mark a radical turn in U.S. foreign policy and make it harder for Washington to distinguish itself from its adversaries, who would jump on the opportunity to dismantle the global nuclear order at their advantage.
The United States and its allies hold a significant advantage through well-established, credible alliances grounded in deterrence and reassurance. The most urgent task is preventing Russia from gaining the upper hand in Ukraine, as a scenario where Russia sets a precedent of gaining territory by using nuclear coercion would likely embolden the proliferating patterns between Russia and its supporters.
Combatting Russia’s proliferation potential will require reprioritization of nonproliferation among Western allies. Europe should take a firmer stance against China’s role in enabling Russia’s war effort, as well as the support it provides by facilitating Russian and Iranian sanctions evasion. While China has avoided direct military aid to Russia, it has facilitated critical technologies and goods essential to Russia’s military operations. Beyond targeted measures, European nations should continue to develop policies to protect critical infrastructure, hybrid threats, and defense supply chains, pursue innovative defensive economic tools and work to counter Chinese influence. It must resist any efforts to water down sanctions or punitive measures against China—especially those with significant industrial interests like Germany. Beijing—unlike Moscow, Tehran, or Pyongyang—has a strong desire to maintain its image as a responsible stakeholder. China may therefore be receptive to calls to pay greater heed to upholding the nonproliferation regime, emphasizing the potential knock-on effects of violation for its reputation and economic interests.
In addition, a coordinated response across theaters is essential to signal unity and resolve. At NATO, greater cooperation with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand could improve understanding of the implications of Russia’s collaborations. In parallel, the European Union’s new security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea enhance their ability to coordinate potential punitive measures. For Seoul, revising its defense doctrine to allow direct lethal aid to Ukraine would send a clear message to Russia and North Korea, challenging the normalization of North Korea’s nuclear status.
Alongside the United States, allies and partners must prioritize counter-proliferation efforts by investing in measures to prevent the flow of illicit technologies and materials fueling nuclear ambitions. Key actions include tracking and dismantling procurement networks supplying North Korea and Iran with dual-use technologies and defense materials. The European Union plays a crucial role in enforcing export controls with global partners and curbing sensitive technology transfers to sanctioned states. Reports indicating that Western components were found in North Korean missiles retrieved in Ukraine underscore the need for strong countermeasures.
To respond to Russia’s increasing disregard for the nonproliferation regime, the United States and its allies must raise the costs of violation. This should start with vocally emphasizing the inadmissibility of Russia’s diplomatic—and likely technological—support for the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. It might go as far as recalling publicly that the cooperation between Russia and proliferating actors such as Iran and DPRK may provoke a diplomatic, economic, or military backlash from the West. It will also require the West to engage nonnuclear-weapon states, particularly in the Global South, where concerns about double standards in the West’s approach to nuclear issues are prevalent. The West must emphasize that its commitment to nonproliferation applies universally, addressing perceived inconsistencies. By rebuilding trust and highlighting global security risks of nuclear proliferation, the West can foster a more unified stance against the spread of WMDs.
Russia’s cooperation with proliferating countries should inform the United States’ approach to nuclear arms control negotiations. As President Trump mentioned the possibility of “disarmament talks” with Russia, the current U.S. administration should consider adding nonproliferation commitments in its objectives when preparing for future deals. Whether it is for negotiating a potential following agreement to the bilateral New START treaty with Russia (due to expire in 2026) or crafting regional deals with Iran or the DPRK, it is in Washington’s interest to raise a high bar for nonproliferation. It would be the most efficient way to avoid nuclear proliferation to go out of hand, and to hold Moscow and Beijing accountable for their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.
Astrid Chevreuil is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow with the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council. Nicholas Lokker is a research associate for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
