As the Group of Seven (G7) prepares to hold its 51st Summit in June 2025 in Kananaskis, Canada, critical mineral security is poised to be a major topic of discussion. All G7 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have emphasized securing critical minerals as a strategic priority. In the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers’ 2023 Communiqué, the group stressed “the growing importance of critical minerals for the clean energy transition and the need to prevent economic and security risks caused by vulnerable supply chains, monopolization, and lack of diversification of existing suppliers of critical minerals.” Since then, individual countries have released executive orders and national strategies for developing critical mineral resources. However, there is significant scope to strengthen coordination between these seven countries to mobilize collective resources, diversify, and de-risk supply chains.
China’s dominance in critical mineral supply chains—where it processes between 60 and 90 percent of key minerals—has been cultivated over decades through strategic investments in resource-rich regions across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested $16 billion in overseas mining projects, excluding minority stakes—up sharply from under $5 billion a decade earlier. Over the 10-year span from 2013 to 2022, China poured $679 billion into infrastructure across 150 countries, much of it directed toward energy and transport networks essential for supporting mining operations in countries such as Chile, Bolivia, and Indonesia. Concurrently, China expanded its domestic refining capacity through targeted industrial policy. This comprehensive strategy has allowed China to secure control over cobalt production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and lithium in Latin America’s Lithium Triangle, with raw materials shipped back to China for processing. China then leverages its market power to manipulate commodity prices and restrict exports, making it increasingly difficult for Western companies to compete and attract private capital.
Cooperation with allies will be required to solve today’s critical mineral security issues. Critical minerals investments in the Global South are often high-risk, long-term ventures that require large amounts of upfront capital. These projects often extend beyond mine development to include infrastructure, power transmission, and processing facilities. The mix of commodity price fluctuations, political instability, and extended timelines to profitability deters many private investors—a hurdle that Chinese state-owned enterprises are largely insulated from. Without collective, multilateral action, China will continue to secure strategic projects around the world and lock in long-term offtake agreements—blocking the United States and its allies out of the sector and further expanding its control of supply chains.
The scale of capital required to create resilient supply chains is insurmountable by a single country. Figures for the cost of mineral investments needed for energy alone range from $590 billion to upwards of $2 trillion by 2040. Yet in 2023, G7 countries collectively committed just $13 billion to domestic and international critical mineral initiatives—an amount that falls drastically short.
A well-structured G7 Critical Minerals Investment Fund that pools capital from all seven nations towards high-priority projects can help de-risk projects, provide much-needed capital, incentivize private investment, and ensure guaranteed offtake of materials to G7 countries can counter the dominance of adversaries in the global minerals industry. There are some examples of how government co-capitalization can advance minerals security. In 2024, the Qatar Investment Authority committed $180 million to TechMet, while the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) holds a $105 million equity stake in the company. These investments are fueling the development of nickel, rare earths, lithium, and vanadium projects worldwide, accelerating TechMet’s growth into new ventures that provide offtake opportunities for the United States and Qatar.
Current G7 Minerals Investment Initiatives
There are two initiatives, started under the Biden administration, that seek to support Western mining investments with government financing. The first is the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), launched in June 2022 at the G7 Summit. PGI aims to invest $600 billion from G7+ partners over the course of five years in global infrastructure projects.
One key PGI initiative with significant implications for the mining sector is the Lobito Corridor. The United States has committed $4 billion of the $6 billion total investment. Once completed, the corridor will connect Angola, Zambia, and the DRC to regional and global markets through the Port of Lobito, enabling faster and more cost-effective transport of copper, cobalt, rare earths, lithium, and other minerals to the United States and Europe. The project includes upgrading and expanding a 1,289-kilometer railway, construction of an estimated 350 miles of new rail line in Zambia, and the construction and maintenance of supporting infrastructure along the rail line and at the mining terminal located at the Port of Lobito in Angola. The Lobito Corridor will reduce the risk of transportation disruptions and the cost of doing business for mining companies operating in the region. The project is expected to break ground in 2026, but the Trump administration’s funding pauses and the Department of State’s organizational overhaul could delay the project.
The second Biden administration initiative is the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a joint effort among G7 nations and additional partners like India, South Korea, and Estonia aimed at backing strategic mineral projects to strengthen supply chain security and catalyze private investment. However, the diverse membership brings a range of national interests, resulting in roughly 30 projects that are modest in scale and dispersed globally—for example, $20 million for cobalt sulfate refining in Canada, $40 million toward a graphite mine in Tanzania, $3.4 million for rare earths feasibility studies in Angola, and $8 million for nickel and cobalt efforts in Australia. While the MSP marks progress, these fragmented, small-scale investments fall short of mobilizing the level of private capital required to build the large-scale, vertically integrated supply chains necessary for the West to rival China.
The Serra Verde project in Brazil, which receives support through the MSP, illustrates how investments may fall short strategically if vertical integration is overlooked. While Serra Verde is Brazil’s first rare earth element (REE) mine and the only at-scale producer outside Asia of four key REEs used in magnet production, most of its output is already contracted to China. According to the company’s CEO, this was due to China being the only country with the capacity to refine two of the mine’s heavy rare earths at the time the deal was made. Such supply chain realities must be factored into project selection decisions—otherwise, G7-backed investments risk supplying China with even more critical mineral feedstock.
Existing G7 efforts to strengthen mineral supply chains have not generated the scale of capital required to truly diversify global sourcing. To advance minerals security, the G7 must shift from handshake diplomacy to delivering substantial investments that can propel strategic projects from the development phase into full-scale production.
A New Model: Joint G7 Investment to Advance Strategic Minerals Projects with Guaranteed Offtake
A new and improved model for G7 financing for critical minerals projects in the developing world should include the following to be the most effective and attract private capital at scale:
- Pooled capital from as many G7 members as possible to generate a substantial investment fund while spreading risk across participating nations.
- Strategic project selection guided by private sector input and evaluated through a vertically integrated lens—ensuring mining projects are aligned with allied refining capacity, and vice versa. Without such alignment, increased extraction may simply flow to Chinese refineries.
- Secured offtake agreements to guarantee that G7 nations gain reliable access to resources their investments help unlock.
Japan’s strategy of investing in African mineral resources to support its battery and electronics sectors illustrates how targeted investment, paired with effective minerals diplomacy, can be used to secure long-term offtake agreements. Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security’s (JOGMEC) financing comes with offtake requirements that are designed to ensure stable access to energy and mineral resources for Japan—including oil, natural gas, and critical minerals. When Japanese state funding is provided, a portion of the project’s production must be allocated to Japanese companies; in the case of equity investments, it is typically proportionate to their equity stake in the project. JOGMEC owns a 51 percent equity stake in Lofdal, an advanced-stage rare earths exploration project in Namibia that has large reserves of heavy rare earths—75 percent of the total rare earth oxide content at Lofdal consists of heavy rare earth oxides. Additionally, in 2023, Japan signed an agreement with Namibia for rare earth exploration in which JOGMEC will collaborate with Namibian state-owned mining firms and government officials. According to the signed Scope of Work, JOGMEC will conduct research into the possibility of Namibia becoming a hub for rare earth concentration and separation, in exchange for access to rare earth ore. This same model has been used by Japan in Tanzania, where JOGMEC signed an MOU regarding Lifezone’s Kabanga nickel mine, one of the world’s largest and highest-grade undeveloped nickel sulfide deposits, to facilitate the supply of nickel materials for its battery industry in exchange for the potential investment.
Which Minerals and Projects to Prioritize First?
There are significant opportunities for G7 financing collaboration to make a significant difference in supply chain security for many mineral supply chains. Here are some priorities based on national and energy security priorities for G7 countries:
1. Rare Earth Elements in Vietnam
China’s recent rare earth export restrictions have accelerated efforts to source an alternate supply. Vietnam’s rare earths sector holds substantial untapped potential. Despite possessing the world’s second-largest reserves—accounting for 18.9 percent globally—it contributed less than 0.1 percent of global rare earth production in 2024. Vietnam’s REE resources have the potential to challenge China’s monopoly on the industry. In 2023, President Biden visited Hanoi and signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Vietnam to “[strengthen] technical cooperation to support Vietnam’s efforts to quantify its [REE] resources and economic potential and attract quality investment for integrated REE sector development.” However, despite talks, the investments have failed to materialize.
Dong Pao is one of the largest REE deposits in the world, and many foreign investors have proposed plans to develop it over the years. In 2009, Japanese companies Toyota Tsusho and Sojitz entered a joint venture to develop the mine to supply Japan with 5,000 metric tons of rare earths per year. However, by 2013 China was ramping up REE supply and prices plummeted, leading the Japanese investors to abandon the project.
Japan and the United States both have significant rare earth capabilities and downstream demand that can be leveraged to create a G7-controlled mine-to-magnet supply chain. A multibillion-dollar pooled investment from G7 partners into Vietnam’s underdeveloped REE industry could then signal to private industry that these strategic projects will have the government support necessary to see them through.
2. Uranium in Namibia
In 2023, a group of over 20 countries—including five G7 countries—committed to tripling nuclear energy. The goal of increasing nuclear power capabilities is bipartisan—the Biden administration pledged to increase nuclear power capabilities at COP28 while the Make America Great Again 2024 platform from the Republican National Convention promised that “Republicans will unleash Energy Production from all sources, including nuclear, to immediately slash Inflation and power American homes, cars, and factories with reliable, abundant, and affordable Energy.” However, securing a stable uranium supply remains one of the most significant obstacles to reaching that target. In 2022, the United States produced only 75 metric tons of uranium—an insignificant figure that accounted for just 0.02 percent of global output.
Investments in uranium mining and enrichment are essential for expanding nuclear power capacity across G7 nations. Namibia stands out as a key uranium source, as the third-largest uranium producer in the world. Despite this, Namibia has only three operational uranium mines, all of which are owned by Chinese entities, with 77 percent of the country’s uranium exports sent to China for enrichment. While Australian company Bannerman Energy and Canadian firm Forsys Metals Corporation each control preproduction projects in Namibia, junior mining companies often struggle to secure financing—particularly during market downturns or sharp drops in commodity prices. Advancing a project from exploration to full-scale production requires substantial capital, with the cost of mining and processing equipment alone ranging from $100 million to several billion dollars. G7 financing support can ensure that projects make it from pre-production to production, regardless of volatile market conditions.
Additionally, G7 partners are well-positioned to support the uranium supply chain. At present, two adversaries—China and Russia—control 62.7 percent of the world’s uranium enrichment capacity. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have significant uranium enrichment capabilities, with ownership of two of the world’s four dominant uranium enrichment companies, Orano and Urenco. The United States is also building its enrichment capabilities. On the production side, Canada is a major player, home to the two largest-producing uranium mines globally. By leveraging Canadian mining expertise alongside European enrichment capacity, strategic G7 investments in Namibia could secure critical uranium feedstock for Western supply chains and reduce dependence on Chinese and Russian imports.
3. Copper and Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Finally, G7 financing could be leveraged to de-risk jurisdictions such as the DRC, which is home to some of the world's highest-grade copper deposits and largest cobalt reserves. Given that the DRC’s mines produce both copper and cobalt, they hold strategic importance across a broad spectrum of security interests. However, the country poses considerable challenges, including corruption, recent export restrictions, and ongoing conflict. Chinese companies have saturated the Congolese mining sector—following the 2016 acquisition of one of the DRC’s most valuable mines, Chinese firms now own or have stakes in 15 of its largest copper and cobalt operations. If G7 nations are serious about securing stable access to cobalt—a resource heavily concentrated in the DRC—they must invest in both upstream production and midstream processing in the DRC and allied countries. In 2022 alone, the DRC exported $5.99 billion worth of cobalt, with 95.8 percent sent to China for processing. China’s dominance in the midstream segment is evidenced by the fact that it refined 76.4 percent of the world’s cobalt supply. Any export restrictions imposed by China on this critical material could seriously disrupt future battery manufacturing.
The DRC has indicated interest in partnering with the United States and the West to further develop its minerals sector. A deal is currently being negotiated with the DRC and the U.S. Department of State, exchanging minerals access for security assistance, which will reportedly involve private partners as well. A G7 investment could incentivize non-PRC investment and reduce the cost of capital in a challenging mining jurisdiction.
Conclusion
A G7 critical minerals investment fund can strengthen efforts to build allied mineral supply chains and counter adversaries’ dominance in the industry. Targeted investments in resource-rich countries like Vietnam, Namibia, and the DRC offer a clear pathway to secure materials in strategic jurisdictions. The upcoming G7 summit offers member nations an opportunity to pursue a minerals security strategy rooted not only in diplomacy but in concrete, capital-backed action.
Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Meredith Schwartz is a research associate for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.
This commentary was made possible through generous support from the Cobalt Institute to the CSIS Critical Minerals Security Program.
