The Hormuz Implications for Energy Policymaking: Japan and South Korea
August 18, 2026 • 8:00 – 9:00 am EDT
The Hormuz Energy Crisis Generates a Tailwind for Nuclear Energy in Northeast Asia
Photo: Buddhika Weerasinghe/Bloomberg via Getty Images
The Iran conflict has multiple implications for the future of energy policymaking in Asia. One energy source that is underexamined as the region navigates the continued uncertainty over the Strait of Hormuz is nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is a key supplement to natural gas for electric power supply in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, all of which are highly import reliant while also entirely dependent on maritime shipping to secure natural gas supply. The supply and price dynamics in liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets since March have challenged the security of electricity supply in these three economies. As such, how the energy crisis shapes the role of nuclear energy in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is one key policy question that could illuminate the long-term energy security and transition implications of the Hormuz energy crisis.
Nuclear power is a key nonhydrocarbon source of electricity in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (see Table 1). The dearth of domestic gas resources has led these economies to become some of the largest global LNG importers. By reducing globally traded LNG supply and driving up prices, the Hormuz energy crisis has made dependence on LNG imports more costly. For example, Asian energy prices since March have been roughly 50–100 percent higher than in February 2026. Additionally, because they are wholly dependent on maritime trade, the three economies are highly exposed to rising shipping costs driven by higher fuel prices and maritime insurance risk premiums, even when importing LNG from suppliers outside the Middle East.
The Hormuz energy crisis is generating a tailwind for nuclear energy use in these three economies, albeit to unknown and varying degrees of long-term political durability.
In Japan, the energy-related economic costs of the Iran conflict are elevating the role of nuclear energy as a pillar of its energy security. On June 29, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi instructed her economic minister to put together, by August, a comprehensive policy package to strengthen the resiliency of the nation’s energy system, reflecting key lessons from the Hormuz energy crisis. More proactive construction of new nuclear reactor units will likely be a top recommendation.
The greater political support for nuclear energy use mirrors growing public acceptance, as shown in several major public opinion surveys. While the public remains concerned about nuclear safety, strong interest in addressing climate change and reducing energy costs—also highlighted in the survey results—may explain the growing openness to nuclear energy use. In one major survey held annually since 2006, the support for nuclear energy in the 2023 edition reached the highest level since the Fukushima accident (the 2026 edition has not yet been published). The same survey shows that the public interest in the energy security implications of the Russian war remains high, as the war-induced gas market tightness and price hikes created energy security and economic challenges for Japanese customers.
More broadly, the steady increase in public acceptance has enabled Japan’s latest triennial strategic energy plan to propose maximum use of nuclear energy. Adopted in February 2025, the Seventh Strategic Energy Plan reversed the approach taken in previous editions since 2011, which had sought to minimize nuclear energy use. Accordingly, the plan targets nuclear power accounting for 20 percent of Japan’s electricity supply by 2040, when the nation’s electric power demand is forecast to be 10-20 percent higher than the current level.
If Japan is to meet this target, the country’s nuclear energy fleet needs rapid modernization. As of early July, 15 nuclear reactor units are in operation across a fleet of 33 units that are technically operable. However, as many as five new units—equivalent to 5.5 gigawatts (GW)—are needed to replace those reaching the end of a 60-year operational license by the 2040s; by the 2050s, as many as 14 units—equivalent to 16 GW—could be lost without replacement. The Japanese government is reportedly close to formally proposing the construction of two to five new reactor units in the coming months.
In South Korea and Taiwan, the high dependence on hydrocarbon imports and growing electric power demand similarly underpin increasingly favorable public attitudes toward nuclear energy. It is particularly notable that the chief executives of South Korea and Taiwan, respectively, have become more accepting of nuclear energy use since taking office.
In light of the Hormuz energy crisis, the South Korean government announced in mid-March its intent to raise nuclear power plant utilization to 80 percent, from the current level in the high 60 percent range, while also expediting regular maintenance to bring six nuclear reactors back online ahead of schedule.
These steps are aligned with the ongoing commitment to nuclear energy use in South Korea, where a 26-reactor fleet supplies about 30 percent of its power needs. Under the 11th Basic Plan on Electricity Supply and Demand, finalized in February 2025, South Korea aims for nuclear energy to account for nearly 32 percent of electricity supply in 2030, and 35 percent in 2038. In January 2026, President Lee Jae Myung confirmed that the nation would proceed with the construction of two new large reactors in accordance with the 11th Basic Plan—a 15-year plan which is published every two years—despite the latest edition, covering 2024 to 2038, having been issued under his predecessor from the other opposing, traditionally pro-nuclear political party.
South Korea anticipates robust growth in its electric power demand in the coming years, particularly to support advanced manufacturing industries such as semiconductors. In 2025, semiconductors accounted for more than 20 percent of the nation’s total exports, making the sector highly valuable to South Korea’s industrial competitiveness. According to the South Korean government, the nation’s electric power demand will grow at 1.8 percent annually, to reach 129.3 GW in 2038.
While the underlying drivers of South Korean support for nuclear energy are similar to those in Japan, what sets South Korea apart from its two fellow Northeast Asian economies is its strong public support for nuclear energy. In a January 2026 poll conducted by the government, 70 percent expressed support for the construction of two new nuclear power plants. It is against this backdrop that nuclear new-builds are under way, most recently with site selection by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) in late June, to build two large-scale reactors. The high public acceptance has likely enabled KHNP’s selection of Yeongdeok County in North Gyeongsang Province, which is a region that has not previously hosted nuclear power generation.
In contrast, nuclear energy use has traditionally been a source of political division in Taiwan. As its final nuclear reactor reached its 40-year operating license limit in May 2025, Taiwan became “nuclear free,” as envisioned by its Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leadership since 2011.
Yet, Taiwan is unlikely to remain nuclear free for long. In a public opinion survey in late March, over 60 percent expressed support for nuclear energy use. Notably, among those polled, over 47 percent of those who identified themselves to be pro-DPP responded that the advantage of operating nuclear power plants outweighs the disadvantages for Taiwan; this marked an increase of nearly 14 percentage points from March 2021.
To be clear, Taiwanese public sentiment was already shifting away from nuclear phase-out before the Hormuz energy crisis. Following the Taiwanese legislature’s passage in May 2025 of the amendments to the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act, the Maanshan nuclear power plant—whose two units most recently came offline, in 2024 and 2025—has been under regulatory review for restart since March.
This pragmatic shift by President William Lai, whose party initiated the nuclear-zero vision over a decade ago, reflects his desire to meet growing energy needs while mitigating emissions increase and greater import dependence. Taiwan’s electric power demand is forecast to grow twice as fast in the next 5 years as it did in the past 10 years, as its semiconductor manufacturing flourishes and AI use expands. Moreover, President Lai reportedly noted “energy resilience” as a key consideration behind his softening attitude toward nuclear energy use, even if nuclear restarts may not serve as an immediate solution to the current energy supply challenge given the need to secure nuclear fuel and personnel, let alone regulatory approval.
The Hormuz energy crisis has clearly strengthened the role of nuclear energy in the energy policymaking of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as each of these economies strives to balance their economic, security, and climate policy agendas. The pace and scope of nuclear energy use will continue to be subject to the dynamic democratic political landscapes of all three economies. In particular, it is important not to conflate support for license extension with support for new reactor construction in the case of Taiwan. Nonetheless, the current geopolitical turmoil has likely transformed nuclear energy from a politically contentious source of electricity into a pragmatic energy policy choice across these three economies.
Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.