The Implications of Poland’s Presidential Election

On June 1, Poles elected Karol Nawrocki to be the next president of the Republic of Poland. A hardline nationalist, Nawrocki won 50.9 percent of the vote against centrist candidate Rafał Trzaskowski, who garnered 49.1 percent of the vote. Turnout was 71.0 percent, a historic high.

Nawrocki is affiliated with the Law and Justice (PiS) party, the same party as the current president—and main opposition to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform—and had never held elected office before. He will take office on August 6 for a five-year term. His election is unlikely to alter the current state of Polish politics and governance, which means a steady state on U.S. relations but a lack of progress on the rule of law and European integration.

Q1: What does Nawrocki’s election mean for Poland?

A1: Poland’s electorate remains sharply divided, and its branches of government will be too. Nawrocki has vowed to oppose the rule of law, climate, and societal reforms that Prime Minister Tusk has tried to pass since coming to power in 2023. He will be able to do so thanks to the president’s veto power and Tusk’s lack of a veto-proof majority in the parliament.

Reforms aiming to undo PiS’s decade-long dismantling of judicial independence are critical to get Poland back on track to being a consolidated democracy. Between 2013 and 2023, the country experienced a severe drop in democratic standards primarily due to PiS’s politicization of the judiciary (e.g., unlawful appointment of thousands of judges and instrumentalization of a disciplinary chamber for judges). These reforms would also guarantee Poland’s long-term access to large pools of EU funds, which it needs to support its economic growth, and EUR 137 billion (USD 156 billion) of which were frozen until 2024 because of PiS’s policies (they have not been entirely disbursed).

Nawrocki campaigned on a conservative, nationalist platform that opposes delegating power to Brussels. He will likely oppose climate-related legislation, which Poland needs to transition out of its coal-dominated energy sector and to support the next wave of economic growth. His emphasis on Polish nationalism and PiS’s record of favoring allies in large state-owned companies may spook investors, which would affect this growth further—despite Poland’s remarkable economic trajectory.

Q2: What does it mean for the European Union?

A2: The fight over Poland’s rule of law and the primacy of EU law over member states will continue. While Tusk’s election ushered in better relations between Warsaw and Brussels, the lack of tangible progress on judicial independence will weigh on the relationship. The European Commission will face a choice: reinstate a funding freeze for the billions allocated to Poland through the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism or continue disbursing them to a friendly government that has not taken the necessary steps aside from promises to pass reforms—thus severely impacting the credibility of the European Commission’s commitment to the rule of law. Issues related to LGBTQ+ and abortion rights could also inflame tensions with Brussels, as Nawrocki will veto any legislation to expand these rights. A win for Trzaskowski would have erected Poland as a shining example of democratic renewal following years of backsliding, now a dim prospect at least until the 2027 parliamentary elections.

The picture is mixed for the other big files on Brussels’ desk: For competitiveness and defense investments, Poland will remain a positive force, and Nawrocki will likely align with Tusk and Brussels. He will be more vocal around negotiations of the next seven-year EU budget, given Poland’s reliance on cohesion and agricultural funds. Though he does not lead those negotiations, he may put pressure on Tusk to oppose any concession that would affect Polish interests or farmers—and can attack him for it on the political stage. Relationships with neighbors may also be impacted: Nawrocki has made statements about demanding World War II reparations from Germany, though he wants good economic relationships with the country. The extent of his rhetorical outbursts will drive the direction of those relationships.

Q3: What does it mean for Ukraine?

A3: Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Poland has been an ardent supporter of Ukraine, advocating for a strong response and rallying European allies to provide military support. It has also hosted millions of Ukrainian refugees, who still number close to a million today. However, Nawrocki campaigned for more conditional support for Ukraine as the mood in Poland has soured against refugees. He opposes Ukraine’s NATO accession and may refuse to ratify it if the time comes. Though he does not have the power to radically change Poland’s current policies toward Ukraine, his voice joins a chorus of unhelpful rhetoric that dampens support for Kyiv and cracks Europe’s united front against Russia at a critical time.

Q4: What does it mean for U.S.-Polish relations?

A4: Nawrocki has been complimentary of U.S. President Donald Trump’s politics and policies, a seemingly reciprocal sentiment. He visited the White House in May 2025 and received an endorsement from Trump. He will be a positive interlocutor for U.S.-Polish relations and, possibly, for NATO. Poland’s historical anti-Russian stance is unlikely to affect Nawrocki’s relationship with Trump; he benefits from the fact that Poland spends 4.2 percent of its GDP on defense—the highest percentage of all NATO allies—and from Russia’s lack of movement in the ceasefire negotiations, which has irked Trump.

Nawrocki also ushers in a new chapter in U.S.-Polish relations, one not centered on post-communist democracy-building or economic liberalization, but rather on the alignment of conservative forces and nationalist interests. Having advocated for traditional and Catholic values—and against immigration—during the campaign, Nawrocki’s stance will resonate with an important segment of Trump’s electorate and high-level administration officials. Notably, while the Polish diaspora as a whole voted 63.5 percent for Trzaskowski, the U.S.-based diaspora supported Nawrocki to the tune of 56.7 percent. These bonds will remain strong.

Donatienne Ruy is the director of the Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy and a fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.