Improving Cooperation with Allies and Partners in Asia

The Issue

The rise of China and its growing assertiveness present both a challenge and an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its alliances and partnerships across Asia. While countries like Japan, South Korea, India, and the Philippines are increasingly alarmed by Chinese actions, U.S. efforts to coordinate with these allies are hindered by misaligned interests, weak institutions, occasionally overbearing American leadership, and China’s countercoercive strategies. Problems such as poor intelligence sharing, burdensome arms sales procedures, and limited multinational strategic planning hinder overall cooperation. The United States should institute a White House–led prioritization of China coordination, implement reforms to better respect allied political and economic needs, expand regional institutions like AUKUS and the Quad, and strengthen personal ties among defense and intelligence officials. Implementing these steps is essential to enhancing deterrence and warfighting capability in a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific security environment.

Introduction

The rise of China and Beijing’s aggressiveness have alarmed countries across Asia.¹ This growing fear—seen in Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and other states—represents an opportunity for the United States to solidify, and build on, its partnerships in the region.

China’s advancements in its military capabilities, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, demand a coordinated response; no single nation can effectively manage this challenge alone. Indeed, close ties to allies and partners are a notable U.S. competitive advantage compared with China.² These nations provide basing and access for U.S. forces, help deter aggressors, and ensure there is strong support in the face of Chinese economic coercion. They are often at the cutting edge of a range of defense-related innovations, such as directed energy weapons that use concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic energy, to destroy targets, and advanced semiconductors.³ Should war break out, they would do much of the fighting—and the dying. Most U.S. operational plans include a major role for allies and partners, providing for basing, access, pre-positioning, logistics, and coalition operations. Protecting allied territory and populations would also be an important U.S. mission in many scenarios.

In its competition with China, the United States needs to share intelligence, plan jointly, sell arms, and otherwise cooperate with a range of countries. Some of these, like Australia and Japan, are long-standing partners, but many other regional countries have not worked closely with the United States in the past. But even the United States’ closest allies face barriers that inhibit effective cooperation.

And even when allies are rhetorically embraced, they are often treated as afterthoughts. Allies are not given timely and detailed intelligence against shared threats because of security concerns and cumbersome procedures. They are excluded from strategic planning even though their own roles are often central to U.S. plans. Allies are often encouraged to buy U.S. arms, but face barriers receiving advanced technologies and military equipment because of the cumbersome Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policy and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).⁴

The results are potentially catastrophic. Allies may be less aware of threats because they lack access to U.S. intelligence, contribute less to military operations when excluded from planning processes, and face delays acquiring vital weapons systems and integrating U.S. technologies into their armed forces. They may question U.S. willingness to support them in a crisis and thus be more receptive to overtures from China. These problems may lead to redundancies—or worse, gaps—as allies pursue their own intelligence and military capabilities, and perhaps even seek their own nuclear capacity, separate from those of the United States. Some allies may even question whether they should risk standing up to Chinese aggression.

Poor cooperation may also result in allies being surprised by or unprepared for a conflict, leading to higher casualties. They could be quickly overwhelmed because the United States did not help them prepare properly for various contingencies. The United States may need to deploy more of its own forces in response or otherwise step up its direct involvement even when allies would otherwise be willing and able to play a greater role. 

Solving coordination and bureaucratic problems is necessary, though rarely glamorous. However, any effort to contain or otherwise counter China requires using all available resources, including those of allies and partners, efficiently and cost effectively. Relatively small changes in the U.S. approach can unlock tremendous benefits in the contributions of allies.

This brief addresses three areas where the United States can strengthen its alliances and partnerships across Asia in peacetime in order to enhance deterrence against China and be better prepared for conflict: strategic planning, intelligence sharing, and arms sales.⁵ It draws heavily on (and at times takes text directly from) three other CSIS reports in this series on cooperation with allies and partners that examine ways to improve U.S. intelligence sharing, transform the Department of Defense’s multilateral strategic planning, and streamline U.S. arms sales.⁶ These earlier reports and thus this brief rely on interviews, discussions, and workshops with officials and experts; a literature review on the practice and theory of alliances; survey work of key partner states; and historical case studies.

The paper identifies four categories of challenges that hinder effective cooperation in any confrontation with China: competing interests and unclear priorities; weak institutions and cumbersome procedures; concerns about U.S. dominance; and potential Chinese countercoercion.

The United States, however, is well positioned to manage these challenges. This can be achieved by prioritizing a White House–led effort focused on Asia, supporting Asian states in developing their own industrial bases and otherwise respecting their own political needs, improving regional institutions and expanding resources dedicated to cooperation with Asian allies, and bolstering personal ties whenever possible. Taken together, such steps will help solidify U.S. alliances and partnerships and, in so doing, enhance both deterrence and warfighting capabilities.

This paper first briefly lays out some of the challenges China poses to the United States and its allies. Second, it describes a range of problems and fears that inhibit strong partnerships in Asia. Third, it assesses how these problems might manifest in a confrontation with China. The paper concludes by offering recommendations for strengthening U.S. partnerships.
 

The China Challenge: A Brief Overview

China poses an array of threats to the United States and its allies. Beijing is making aggressive claims in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea, infringing on the sovereignty of Japan, the Philippines, and other countries. China has made the assimilation of Taiwan a top priority, building up its conventional military and nuclear forces and turning them into a potentially formidable foe. More broadly, Beijing is seeking to challenge U.S. global dominance and create a new international order centered on China.

As part of its effort to build military and economic power, China is methodically developing its defense industry. China’s arsenal grew by over 400 modern fighter aircraft and 20 major warships between 2021 and early 2024. China also more than doubled its ballistic and cruise missiles arsenal, developed a stealth bomber, and doubled the number of nuclear weapons it possesses.⁷ China is the world’s largest shipbuilder, with a military and commercial shipbuilding capacity that is roughly 230 times larger than that of the United States.⁸ In addition, China has become notably faster than the United States in acquiring weapons systems. 

In addition to a strong industrial base, China is moving increasingly close to Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Although these relationships are not institutionalized like NATO, they have already proven formidable. Russia has sustained its war in Ukraine with massive economic assistance from China, Iranian drone systems, and North Korean troops. It is plausible, and indeed likely, that these countries might assist China in any confrontation it has with the United States and its allies.⁹

China is engaged in a massive espionage campaign, seeking to penetrate the United States and allied governments.¹⁰ In 2023, the director-general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) warned that Australia faced “unprecedented” threats from Chinese intelligence.¹¹ This danger requires U.S. allies to have robust security protocols, which many of them lack. Chinese intelligence penetration of the Philippines and Taiwan, for example, is considerable.¹²

China is thus seeking to advance on multiple fronts. In addition to using its growing military prowess to bolster its aggressive regional foreign policy, Beijing is also using alliances with other anti-U.S. countries and its intelligence services to advance its agenda.

Fears and Problems of Allies and Partners

Despite the shared threat from China, U.S. cooperation with actual and potential allies and partners is uneven and fitful. Some reasons for this are inherent to any alliances, while others are due to U.S. policies and attitudes. The reasons can be grouped into four categories: competing interests and priorities; lack of institutionalization and cumbersome procedures; concerns about U.S. dominance and a lack of autonomy; and Beijing’s countercoercion. These issues are discussed in the context of intelligence sharing, multinational strategic planning, and arms sales.

1. Competing Interests and Priorities

The United States and its allies often have competing interests, hindering military planning and other forms of cooperation. One South Korean official noted fears in his country that Europe and the Middle East would distract the United States from threats in Asia.¹³ Allies, for their part, often have different priorities: North Korea, not China, is Seoul’s top concern.¹⁴ Even when there is agreement on the threat, there may be disagreement on the response. Some regional states that fear China believe that accommodation is necessary, while others favor a more confrontational approach. One official pointed out that many in South Korea, while not sympathetic to China, do not share the U.S. view that China is an adversary that must be confronted, preferring a more stable relationship.¹⁵ The Philippines, which seeks U.S. support in its own maritime disputes with China, at the same time is hesitant to back Taiwan in a crisis.¹⁶ Making this more difficult, many U.S. partners in Asia do not trust each other: U.S. efforts to bring South Korea and Japan together have had multiple setbacks due to their bitter history.

So-called “chain gangs,” where allies drag their partners into a conflict, are another problem where different interests lead to inadvertent conflict. U.S. leaders have feared that a Taiwanese declaration of formal independence would generate a backlash in China, which would in turn lead Beijing to go to war and force the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense. Thus U.S. officials have tried to assure Taiwan of U.S. support in a conflict with China while trying to prevent it from acting unilaterally, claiming that in such a scenario the United States would not back Taiwan.¹⁷ If U.S. support is too unconditional, Taipei may believe it has a shield against Chinese aggression even in scenarios where it, rather than Beijing, is changing the status quo.

Just as the United States worries about chain-gangs, so too do U.S. allies. NATO leaders have declared that they oppose any Chinese military efforts to control Taiwan, but European states have less concern about a China-Taiwan dispute than does the United States; as a result, they lack the extensive security relationships that the United States enjoys in Asia.¹⁸ Even a basic step such as NATO opening a liaison office in Japan was met with opposition within the alliance after Chinese concerns became clear.¹⁹ However, through NATO and other relationships, European states are tied to the United States, and it would be difficult for them to remain neutral in a U.S.-China conflict.

Mixed messages and unclear prioritization on the U.S. side have worsened these problems. Although the United States has emphasized Asia as its top area of security interest since the Obama administration, Europe, the Middle East, and (under the second Trump administration) Latin America have all competed for resources and senior-level attention. Part of this is due to the nature of the U.S. system, where multiple voices speak simultaneously on security and other issues. However, even within smaller communities there can be confusion, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, and other entities within the U.S. defense establishment sending different signals.

The United States, however, faces a dilemma: Increasing trust can, at times, lead allies and partners to do less, particularly when they have other priorities, such as emphasizing domestic spending over national security. A historic problem has been “buck-passing,” wherein allies free ride off their alliance with the United States or another power, not spending enough on their own militaries or otherwise not contributing their fair share.²⁰ Although measures like military spending as a percentage of GDP are at best rough, it is clear that many at-risk Asian states are spending relatively little (often short of 2 percent) on their militaries.²¹ Many allies have failed to invest in basic capabilities, such as fuel storage and transport, as well as high-end systems.²²

2. Weak Institutions and Cumbersome Procedures

Strong institutions can build trust, facilitate planning, reduce barriers to arms sales, promote interoperability, ease information sharing, and play many other important roles. Institutions create their own momentum, reinforcing habits of cooperation that in turn feed back into the sense of shared purpose and strategic alignment that birthed the institutions in the first place.²³

There is, however, no Asian NATO.²⁴ The institutions that do exist are valuable, but they are more limited in their size, scope, and integration. Four existing arrangements merit discussion: the Five Eyes, the Quad, AUKUS, and the Military Framework.²⁵

• The Five Eyes intelligence alliance, which grew out of the U.S.-UK World War II partnership, is often held up as the gold standard for intelligence sharing. The Five Eyes consists of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As scholars have noted, the Five Eyes “is unique in the combination of its longevity, its resilience to changing global circumstances, and its ability to survive periodic tensions as well as maintain an ongoing similarity in the worldviews of its membership.”²⁶ The countries involved share extensive intelligence related to foreign communications and methods of collection, as well as finished intelligence products.²⁷ There is also some division of labor, with Australia monitoring South and East Asian communication while New Zealand covers the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. In recent years, cooperation has increased with regard to intelligence collection on China, with different members trying to expand their overall collection and coordinate regularly with others.²⁸
• The Quad, composed of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, focuses on high-level coordination on issues like maritime security and natural disasters, with little day-to-day integration. Although all members worry about an assertive China, India has been reluctant to go beyond general joint statements. In 2022, however, the Quad launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, which provides an opportunity for expanding institutionalization and organizational structures in maritime areas related to law enforcement.²⁹
• A small but powerful alliance structure is AUKUS, a 2021 trilateral agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to equip Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack submarine and enhance cooperation on advanced capabilities, including arms sales.³⁰ This has included limited trilateral planning through the rotational presence of U.S. and UK submarines in Australia.³¹ The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have also established the International Joint Requirements Oversight Council (I-JROC) as a forum for the vice chiefs of defense in the three countries to review joint and combined warfighting concepts as they develop.³²
• The Military Framework is a U.S.-led forum of 14 countries that began with a focus on the Islamic State militant group. In recent years, however, it has expanded its scope to address strategic competition in both Europe and in Asia, with an eye toward improving planning and intelligence sharing. The Military Framework and the Five Eyes have members from Asia, but key countries such as South Korea are not included.³³

All of these institutions are valuable, but none include all of the key countries in the region that the United States would work with in a confrontation with China. Others do not involve detailed integration and planning or efforts to facilitate arms sales. The strongest—AUKUS and the Five Eyes—are particularly narrow in both their composition and function.

Many of the U.S. efforts with allies and partners in the region are bilateral. These include the U.S.-Philippines Salaknib exercises or the U.S.-Republic of Korea Freedom Shield exercises; bilateral wargaming such as the U.S.-Japan Integrated Air and Missile Defense Wargame; and various dialogues and working groups.³⁴ There are also formal joint commands, such as that with South Korea. The United States has extensive, but uneven, bilateral intelligence sharing relationships with key countries in Asia beyond the Five Eyes, such as Japan and South Korea.

The United States sets its own intelligence collection requirements, as do most allies; this can make resource issues more pronounced. Because collection is not coordinated, the United States often does not know what information allies—even Five Eyes countries—already have, thus reducing the economy of efforts.³⁵

In addition to insufficient military spending, allies and partners often have weaker counterintelligence capabilities than the United States, which inhibits sharing. Allies often lack Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) access and similar systems designed for sharing highly classified information.

Because institutions are weak, cooperation depends more on personal relationships. These types of relationships allow a margin for error: When things, inevitably, do not go as expected, interpersonal relationships allow for creative solutions and workarounds that the standard institutional processes cannot generate in a timely way. Relationships formed when sharing intelligence or making joint plans can pay off in numerous ways during a crisis and help overcome bureaucratic complexities. In many cases, however, U.S. officials deployed to non-English speaking countries do not know the local language and at times have limited background on the country’s history and strategic situation.³⁶

In addition to weak institutions for coordination with partners, the U.S. system is bureaucratically complex and technically difficult to access, which inhibits bilateral cooperation. The United States also often defaults to NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) classifications, hindering planning, intelligence sharing, and information about arms sales.

Even when institutionalization works, information sharing and coordination are often confined to military, intelligence, or other technocratic problems, with a lack of commensurate dialogue at the political level. This hinders broader strategic planning, as key actors are often not present. In addition, allies may receive different signals from military officers versus political leaders, making it harder for them to understand U.S. objectives and priorities. Indeed, the non-military side may be going in the wrong direction. A U.S. official responsible for security cooperation noted that the military is the front end working with partners, but civilians are the back end, and the latter do not have enough capacity to keep up with constant demands in Asia. The official pointed out that personnel cuts to the civilian workforce will harm military efforts at security cooperation.³⁷

3. Concerns About U.S. Dominance

Cooperation with the United States creates autonomy issues for allies and partners. U.S. budgets and capabilities dwarf those of even wealthy allies like Japan, and thus partners can benefit tremendously from U.S. assistance. At the same time, however, specialization of partners to avoid duplication or reliance on U.S. intelligence, logistics, or other capabilities leaves partners vulnerable if the United States sees its interests differently during a crisis.

The United States at times worsens this problem with its tendency toward unilateralism. During Desert Shield, an important U.S. operational plan (OPLAN 1002-90) did not account for Saudi logistics capacity, which led to the overallocation of U.S. logistics assets to Saudi Arabia and the ad hoc incorporation of Saudi logistics capacities by local-level leaders. In the end, this error meant little due to the enormous coalition military advantage over Iraq, but a war with China would depend heavily on effective logistics, and similar errors could be disastrous. In Afghanistan, the United States took greater control over planning as the insurgency worsened in order to improve overall speed. Plans, however, were often implemented before NATO validation, and the contributions of U.S. allies were often more limited as a result.³⁸

Allies see multinational planning as initiated, led, and dominated by the United States, and this is difficult when allies have their own interests and views of how to fight a conflict. One former U.S. official noted that the United States often believes it understands the interests of allies better than they themselves do—even as U.S. policies and priorities regularly flip-flop. U.S. stances are, or can be perceived as, arrogant and uninformed at times: A “daddy knows best” approach, as the official described it.³⁹ In arms sales, U.S. procedures are designed to reduce U.S. purchases from allies and partners, leading to resentment when the United States pushes allies to purchase U.S. systems. In general, building domestic industry capacity is a top goal of allies, which they see as vital economically and also a way to bolster deterrence.

Nationalism and local politics often complicate other countries’ relationships with the United States, making open coalition planning and formal alliances more difficult. In general, states do not like to openly rely on other states for their security, as it implies government weakness. In addition, world opinion of the United States varies considerably by country and historical period, often creating pressure on governments to publicly distance themselves from Washington. In some important countries relevant to potential China-related contingencies, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, the United States has a history of conflict, generating additional suspicions. When the United States acts without consulting allies, the political consequences can be considerable.

4. Countercoercion

Because allies are often weaker and closer to potential aggressors, the cost of betting on the wrong horse is higher. As one foreign official noted, “Allies have less room to say ‘oops’."⁴⁰ This is a problem for allies in Asia, where China is near and the United States is far away. Thus, they are highly vulnerable to Chinese military and gray zone pressure, particularly if the United States is not there to back them up. Sam Roggeveen, a former Australian intelligence analyst, notes that greater U.S. military ties to Australia—including the construction of air bases in the country that host U.S. forces—“conflates America’s strategic objectives in Asia with ours, and it makes those bases a target.”⁴¹ Similarly, a South Korean official noted, “Being on the side of the United States is not cost free,” adding that “South Korea cannot wish away geography.”⁴²

China is also an important trading partner for allies in Asia, and it weaponizes these economic relations when its political positions are challenged, imposing selective boycotts on imports from the offending country or otherwise imposing restrictions.⁴³ This threat has shaped the behavior of even close U.S. allies. New Zealand, for example, has feared alienating China, and thus its intelligence partners have at times been reluctant to cooperate with it. As one expert put it, “the Kiwis are reluctant to say ‘boo’ to China.”⁴⁴

U.S. allies and partners worry that the United States will not honor its promises to them, making them more sensitive to the risks involved in crossing China. This concern has grown in the Trump administration, as the United States has criticized many long-standing allies.⁴⁵
 

How These Problems Inhibit Cooperation Against China

In a confrontation with China, problems related to intelligence sharing, strategic planning, and arms sales could prove catastrophic. These would hinder deterrence, making a conflict more likely; undermine responses to Chinese coercion before and during a crisis; and hinder the U.S. and partner response should a shooting war with China break out.

Problems may begin with different threat perceptions. Some valuable information may fail to reach allies. One Japanese intelligence official noted that they rarely see U.S. information in their day-to-day work.⁴⁶ This, in turn, affects threat perceptions and attitudes toward the United States. Allies may prove slower to recognize aggression from Beijing in the absence of salient U.S. intelligence.

A lack of trust occurring due to different interests and a limited and slow supply of critical weapons systems may inhibit allied confidence in U.S. security guarantees. This in turn may weaken deterrence and create incentives for nuclear proliferation. Allies may be more willing to bandwagon with a potential aggressor if they are unsure that the United States will back them or if they believe close ties to the United States will “chain gang” them into an unwanted war. Some partners and allies might turn to China or other providers for weapons.

In such circumstances, it is far easier for Chinese countercoercion to function. Allies and partners will fear that they are too weak or that the United States will not back them—or both—and they will not have a coordinated response to Beijing’s military and economic pressure.

Beijing may believe that poorly armed and trained U.S. allies create an offense-dominant environment in which a fast strike would succeed while a more prolonged conflict would fail, as the United States would then step up its support.⁴⁷ China may also believe that allies with poorly armed militaries and weak defense industrial bases will be easy pickings. This perception is especially likely if they believe that the victim state has weak intelligence and could be caught by surprise. Chinese leaders may also reason that differing U.S. and allied interests will allow them to find cracks in any alliance, posing challenges in areas where one party has less of an interest, such as China staking a claim to tiny, unpopulated islands in the Pacific.

Cooperation is likely to suffer both before and during a crisis. Military operations depend on a wide range of tactical information, and, as one allied official put it, “Bad intelligence means bad plans.”⁴⁸ Allied military forces may have suboptimal postures, fail to be prepared for a confrontation, or lack personal relations that can facilitate cooperation during a crisis. As one official put it, key figures may be exchanging business cards as they meet for the first time rather than rolling up their sleeves to work.⁴⁹ Interoperability at all levels would pose tremendous challenges. This would include allies and partners having weapons systems from non-U.S., perhaps even Chinese, manufacturers, but also unfamiliarity due to insufficient preparedness, limited training, and coalition-wide military exercises.

During a conflict, a lack of effective coalition planning may lead the United States to wrongly assume that allies will take on roles for which they are unprepared or unwilling, while conversely allies may wrongly assume that the United States will manage difficult aspects of a conflict, such as air supremacy or strategic lift, without fully understanding U.S. limits. Allies that are poorly trained and lack access to high-end military systems will be less able to counter air supremacy, deny sea lanes to adversary shipping, prevent cyberattacks, or otherwise act on their own. This increases the risk that the United States would enter a shooting war from a position of weakness and that, during a conflict, it would not be able to take full advantage of allied and partner capabilities and vice versa.

Recommendations

To improve cooperation with allies against China, the United States should consider four steps: improving prioritization; respecting allied politics; strengthening Asia-focused institutions; and bolstering personal ties.

1. Prioritize Coordination on Challenges Related to China

The U.S. government, in the best of times, involves a welter of competing bureaucracies with different missions and concerns, which in turn make different and competing demands on allies and partners. When the United States prioritizes a concern, as the Biden administration did after the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the resulting chaos can be overcome, but this is the exception, not the rule.

A high-level working group on China, run out of the White House, should coordinate planning, arms sales, intelligence sharing, and other requests from China-facing allies to ensure they are given top priority. Examples would include ensuring that intelligence-sharing procedures are streamlined for key countries in Asia and that ITAR; Technology, Security, and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD); and FMS processes do not hinder arms sales. Coordination would also ensure that U.S. guidance to allies and partners is clear and does not conflict at different bureaucratic levels. Working with Congress to reduce the number of Congressional authorizations for sales that are not strategically sensitive and do not involve the most sophisticated systems could speed up the process.

Prioritization should then occur when U.S. officials engage allies in bilateral and multilateral forums in Asia. This will be a back-and-forth, with the United States adjusting its priorities in response to allied concerns as well as encouraging allies to embrace U.S. priorities. In the end, U.S. priorities will not be achieved without allied assistance, so accommodating their concerns is vital for ultimate U.S. success. Ideally, this would be bipartisan, as allied and partner cooperation will span administrations and suffers when U.S. priorities oscillate. Intelligence sharing also plays a role here. One former allied official noted that U.S. assessments shaped their own country’s worldview in dozens of small ways that, over time, brought the two countries into greater alignment.⁵⁰

2. Respect Allied Politics and Economics

Just as arms sales and other forms of cooperation bolster the U.S. economy, so too can military cooperation help allies’ economies and their willingness to work with the United States. In particular, a “build allied” approach allows the United States to better achieve important goals, such as more rapid shipbuilding, while benefiting allied economies, making cooperation much easier for them politically and giving them a vested interest that will transcend various administrations.⁵¹ Collaborative ventures can be particularly valuable, increasing economies of scale and enabling the United States to profit from allied arms sales and vice versa. However, the U.S. bureaucratic incentives all go in the other direction. As one interviewee noted, “no one gets fired for buying American.”⁵²

In general, Washington must recognize that the unpopularity of the United States and allied concerns for autonomy may at times make cooperation difficult. Improving cooperation often requires behind-the-scenes engagement rather than open pressure, accepting that allies will differ with the United States, at times publicly, and letting allies take the lead in visible ways.

3. Strengthen Institutional Ties and Expand the Circle

U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia may never mirror those in Europe, but they can be strengthened. Expanded, AUKUS-like arrangements with Japan and South Korea would be highly valuable, and the Philippines should also receive extra attention. Outside AUKUS, the United States could consider coordinating arms sales and FMS cases for countries like Japan and South Korea to speed up the process so both can advance together.

Although the Quad is among the weaker of the existing institutions in Asia, there is hope for invigorating it. President Donald Trump’s good relations with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the recent commitment to deepen the U.S.-India defense relationship, could be used to address India’s concerns and improve alignment over the Quad’s role and purpose.⁵³

The United States should also begin the long process of expanding and institutionalizing intelligence cooperation with key Asian allies outside the Five Eyes. This will involve technological upgrades on the allies and partner side and procedural changes on the U.S. side to reduce the automatic default to NOFORN. In addition, the United States will need to start with more limited sharing and build from there as allies and partners improve their counterintelligence and, over time, harmonize their collection efforts with the United States.

U.S. systems are complex for partners and allies to navigate, and they are made worse when the United States lacks the personnel to ensure prompt responses. More liaison officers for joint planning and intelligence sharing are necessary, as is more training for both U.S. and allied officials on the complexities of U.S. procedures, so their requests can avoid common pitfalls.

4. Build Stronger Personal Connections

Multinational efforts can also improve personal connections and, in so doing, build trust that is invaluable during a crisis. In addition, these connections are vital for work-arounds when institutional cooperation is slow or otherwise insufficient. As the Military Framework’s official history notes, “The most precious ‘product’ of the framework is neither tangible nor measurable. It is instead something elusive and sublime: trust.”⁵⁴ Expanding the circle for institutions will strengthen personal connections, as will increasing personnel. A particular effort should be made to increase the number of speakers of Asian languages who work with allies and to ensure that rotations and assignments to Asia help build long-term expertise and personal connections.
 

The Benefits of Greater Cooperation

These recommendations, taken together, can improve planning, make partner militaries stronger, and bolster sharing in general. With common or compatible systems, procedures, and communication protocols, allied forces can coordinate actions more efficiently, respond faster to emerging threats, and achieve objectives with greater precision. Intelligence relationships can also bolster overall diplomacy and alliance strength. By sharing capabilities, resources, and information, interoperability leads to more efficient use of military assets and more coordinated responses.⁵⁵ Demonstrating military interoperability also sends a clear message about the solidity of alliances and the collective commitment to maintaining international security and order.⁵⁶ Integrated command and control systems enable allied forces to deploy and operate together effectively on short notice, helping allies to leverage each other’s strengths and compensate for individual limitations.

Working with allies and partners can be frustrating and is always time-consuming. The results are invariably incomplete, and the benefits difficult to measure in peacetime. Strong alliances, however, are the bedrock of deterrence and warfighting: They can help the United States avoid a war with China through effective deterrence and, should deterrence fail, enable the United States to triumph.

Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

This research was made possible by the support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.

Please consult the PDF for references.