The Iran Conflict Illuminates Taiwan’s Unique Energy Security Challenge

How the Iran Conflict Changed Taiwan’s Energy Calculus

The Iran war has caused Taiwan to embrace significant measures to buttress its energy security. There is a particular concern on the island about Taiwan’s limited LNG reserve, and Taiwan’s media has warned of rapid and dire consequences if Taiwan were to face an LNG shortage. In 2024, Taiwan imported nearly 70 percent of its crude oil and 34 percent of its LNG from the Middle East (and mainly from Qatar).  

Nearly two months since the Iran war began, Taiwan has diversified its energy supplies away from the region. For example, Taiwan imports approximately 60 percent of its crude oil from the United States, a sharp contrast to its previous 70 percent dependence on the Middle East in 2024. While most of the remaining 40 percent come from the Middle East, many Taiwanese energy companies have adjusted their shipping routes to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, instead transiting through the Red Sea and other routes.

Taiwan is also purchasing more LNG from the United States. By 2029, Taiwan’s goal is to increase its LNG purchase from the United States to cover 25 percent of its LNG needs, from about 10 percent in 2025. Qatar and Australia were the largest LNG suppliers in 2025, each accounting for about one-third of the Taiwanese LNG imports. In addition to the above changes, Taiwan maintains a 40-day coal reserve, exceeding the statutory requirement to keep at least 30 days supply of coal. Coal could serve as an alternative, backup power source for Taiwan to generate electricity in the event of LNG shortfalls.

The Politics of Energy in Taiwan

However, Taipei has not called for demand-side measures to mitigate a major energy crisis stemming from the Iran conflict, unlike other Asian economies. Since the start of the conflict, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs has repeatedly reassured the public that there would be no gas shortage and has decided to curb electricity prices, at the additional expenditure of $620 million for spot LNG cargoes. Also, CPC has negotiated “mutual assistance” with Japanese and South Korean buyers. Taiwan’s public think-tank, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology, has reiterated its assessment that with the utilization of all energy stockpiles and renewables, Taiwan can sustain more than 40 days without imports.

Taipei is highly resolute to dispel shortage concerns and mitigate interruptions in daily lives and societal activities. This posture stems from a highly politicized nature of energy policymaking in Taiwan, where energy has been one of the most debated policy areas. For example, six of the 15 topics in public referenda since 2018 have been about energy. The Taiwanese attitudes toward energy policy are strongly polarized along party lines: Supporters of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) favor renewables and are traditionally antinuclear, while supporters of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) are generally pronuclear. For example, the energy transition policies by former DPP President Tsai Ing-wen (2016–2024), such as phasing out nuclear energy and the 20-30-50 electricity generation mix, have become major targets for the opposition parties’ attacks. Also, when Taiwan experienced several major blackouts in 2017, 2021, and 2022, the media quickly blamed the blackouts on a power shortage, questioning whether the DPP’s energy policies are viable and can ensure sufficient supply.

Some of these narratives may stem from external sources, such as Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–owned media alleging causal relations between renewables expansion and power shortages. While it is difficult to ascertain, the CCP’s effort to undermine renewables expansion in Taiwan may be linked to the resource’s attribute as being indigenous and its role in advancing Taiwan’s energy self-sufficiency. Additionally, there is also evidence that China is behind disinformation efforts to encourage the Taiwan public to stockpile cash, food, water, and power banks, arguing that Taiwan will face energy and other shortages due to the current war in Iran.

The Challenges Facing Taiwan’s Energy Transition

Expanding non–fossil fuels has been challenging. As an isolated island, Taiwan’s development of renewable energy has been complicated by its limited landmass, high population density, and forest coverage. Taipei has been trying various ways to develop wind and solar energy, but wind and solar developments continue to clash with the original ocean and land users. Nuclear energy is another non-fossil energy source. However, it is the most contentious political topic in Taiwan. While DPP President Lai Ching-te (2024–present) has generally been supportive of nuclear power generation—so long as its safety is ensured, spent fuel is resolved, and societal consensus is achieved—his March 21, 2026, call to restart two idled nuclear power reactors (NPP2 and NPP3) to mitigate power shortage was swiftly met by some societal backlash as well as internal DPP opposition. Notably, Taiwan’s citizens have never been involved in the siting decision for Taiwan’s nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage site since Taiwan became a democracy in the 1990s. Of the three national referenda on nuclear energy in 2018, 2021, and 2025, there is no clear pattern of support or opposition. Some people seem to support nuclear energy in polls under the misguided belief that nuclear has been the main source of electricity generation. However, over 60 percent of those polled by Formosa Electronic News in late March 2026 think that the advantage of operating nuclear power plants outweighs the disadvantages for Taiwan.

The Energy Security Questions Taipei Has Yet to Answer

Taipei has introduced several measures to ease the short-term supply shock from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Given the uncertainties in the Gulf region, ongoing threats from China, and demand growth from chip production and data centers, Taiwan must address a few questions regarding energy security.

• After postponing and updating its 20-30-50 target, what concrete measures can Taipei take to ensure that the 2030 targets can be achieved? What is Taipei’s plan to restore public confidence in renewable energy, which is the only self-generated power source today? For example, Taiwanese chipmakers are committed to growing renewable energy use, but the ambition is outpacing actual deployment. Taipei has already suggested that growing overall electricity demand could undermine the island’s progress towards 30 percent reliance on renewable energy for its electricity.  
• What is the potential role of nuclear energy? Even if all nuclear power reactor restart procedures are completed on time, the earliest possible restart time will be 2028 for NPP3, and around 2030 or later for NPP2. According to historical data, the two units are expected to generate about 3 TWh, accounting for 10 percent or less of electricity demand in 2030. In all cases, nuclear energy is neither an immediate solution nor a substantial answer for Taiwan's energy security challenge. Additionally, building new reactors poses several questions, such as what types of “new nuclear” should be considered.
• Lastly, if Taiwan’s electricity mix remains dominated by fossil fuels, such as natural gas, how can Taipei further diversify LNG supply sources away from the Middle East? Will Taiwan have to further its reliance on the United States? For the current U.S. supply, the Lower-48 is the main production area, but a potential LNG project in Alaska has drawn Taipei’s interest. With many uncertainties abound, Alaskan LNG is still years away from coming online, according to CPC’s statement. Meanwhile, Australia is facing a production shortfall, and the Qatari ability as a stable supplier is unclear.
   

Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s mid- and long-term strategies to ensure energy security remain uncertain, and it will have to consider a range of options to reduce reliance on the Middle East and protect against ongoing threats from China.

Yu-Hsuan Yeh is a research intern with the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Bonny Lin is director of the China Power Project and senior adviser at CSIS. Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS.