Is It Time for Another Supplemental for Ukraine?

As the three-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fast approaches, it is time to consider the impact that a sixth U.S. supplemental aid package for Ukraine could have on forging a lasting and mutually acceptable peace agreement. President Trump has long pledged to find a path toward peace, although the contours of a ceasefire remain unclear.

Russian aggression has increased in the past month, strategically targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during some of the coldest months of the year and making battlefield gains in eastern Ukraine. As Russia continues to “run down the clock,” weakening Ukraine’s economic, military, and humanitarian resiliency, there is no reason for them to seek compromise.

Failing to maintain U.S. support for Ukraine risks Ukraine’s sovereignty and undermines U.S. interests. It is better to support Ukraine in defeating a major global competitor of the United States now than to face them in a future conflict. President Trump has made clear his intentions to keep Ukraine safe, but how that comes about remains up in the air, begging the question: Is it time for another supplemental to Ukraine?

Q1: Could an additional supplemental to Ukraine be used as leverage to bring Russia into peace talks?

A1: The last negotiations between Ukraine and Russia took place in 2022 but fell short of an agreement. Russia continues to make territorial gains, giving them little incentive to engage in negotiations. While the United States has begun conversations with the Kremlin, Ukraine lacks the leverage needed to engage in successful negotiations.

Russia has long sought to cut Ukraine out of peace talks, wanting instead to come to an agreement with the United States bilaterally. It has stepped up its efforts to delegitimize President Zelensky, claiming that his government is no longer legitimate since elections were delayed last year (under Ukrainian law elections cannot be held while the country is under martial law).

A new supplemental package signals that the West has no intention of abandoning Ukraine and would serve as a point of leverage for Ukraine—by raising the cost for Russia to continue its aggression. If Russia remains intransient, the United States could include escalatory weapons systems that have previously been off the table; if Russia engages in good faith negotiations, the supplemental could be restructured to emphasize economic and infrastructure reconstruction.

Any U.S. funding should be accompanied by additional pledges of funding from its European partners. Lawmakers have suggested a package that would provide military support to Ukraine with the stipulation that EU members would provide economic and humanitarian aid. Alternatively, they could leverage their own military stockpiles or purchase U.S. military equipment for Ukraine.

Q2: If not a supplemental, then what?

A2: While the United States has focused its funding through supplemental appropriations, it is not the end-all, be-all.

There are several additional financing mechanisms the United States could explore going forward:

1. Wield the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity Act (REPO Act): Instead of, or in accompaniment to, supplemental, economic pressures, the seizure of Russian sovereign assets under U.S. jurisdiction could provide further incentives. Through the REPO Act, passed in April 2024, the United States can use seized Russian Central Bank assets to pay for assistance to Ukraine. In addition, imposing secondary sanctions to block energy exports would increase the effectiveness of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, while targeting its military supply chains, including those involving China and Iran. Russia has pledged countermeasures to sustain its war efforts if the United States takes this action.
2. Utilize the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022: The United States could use a lend-lease arrangement to expedite the delivery of critical weaponry and resources to Ukraine while avoiding the bureaucratic hurdles associated with a true sale of arms. While the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) requires separate, distinct approvals for each set of aid and specific congressional notification for each use, the Lend-Lease Act could ensure continuous deliveries over a longer period. However, this arrangement may be perceived as an act of direct U.S. involvement in the war by Russia, who had warned that it could provoke more direct retaliation.
3. Prioritize loans over grants: Providing funds in the form of forgivable loans rather than direct grants could provide immediate financial support to Ukraine while keeping the option open for repayment later on. In addition, loans would allow for better monitoring of spending and could ensure that funds are used more effectively and align more closely with U.S. interests.
4. Facilitate a critical minerals-for-aid exchange: Earlier this month, President Trump suggested that, as a condition for continued support, the United States could secure access to Ukraine’s rare earth minerals, essential for high-tech industries. This aligns with Trump’s “America First” policy and responds to concerns about the affordability of continued aid. As this agreement would have to be predicated upon the end of hostilities and the assumption that Ukraine will control the land under which the minerals reside, the United States should consider an additional supplemental, in addition to points 1–3, to ensure that Ukraine is actually able to live up their “end of the bargain.”

Q3: How much money has the United States sent to Ukraine, and how has it been spent to date?

A3: Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the United States has been a steadfast supporter of Ukrainian sovereignty. The United States has appropriated approximately $183 billion (including forgivable loans) in military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.

It is important to note that not all of the money goes directly to Ukraine; a large portion is used to purchase weapons and equipment from U.S. defense manufacturers both to send to Ukraine and to backfill and modernize U.S. stocks of defense equipment, and salaries of U.S. officials and soldiers forward deployed to Europe. The primary recipients of this funding are the U.S. Department of Defense ($125 billion), the U.S. Department of State ($11 billion), and the U.S. Agency for International Development ($40 billion). With billions in contracts flowing into various states, this money is being reinvested into the United States, stimulating U.S. job growth and local economies.

Most of the weapons and equipment transfers to Ukraine have occurred under PDA. This allows the United States to transfer weapons and equipment from existing military stockpiles to rapidly deliver defense articles in times of crisis. The most recent supplemental included nearly $26 billion in PDA. However, the United States cannot continue to draw down on defense stocks and maintain its own military readiness, absent supplemental funds to backfill its own stockpiles.

As of September 2024, approximately $106 billion has gone or is committed directly to the Ukrainian government. Although there are persistent accusations of corruption, regular audits by the U.S. inspectors general have found no credible evidence of the misappropriation of U.S. funds. While problems remain, Ukraine is actively addressing corruption concerns and the government has taken concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment to transparency and anti-corruption.

Q4: What is the process to pass a supplemental?

A4: Supplemental appropriations are typically used to respond to urgent needs outside of the regular appropriations process. Traditionally, the White House initiates the process by submitting a request through the Office of Management and Budget, which the House and Senate appropriations committees use as a baseline draft to approve or deny. However, it is unclear whether the administration will offer a request as they focus on closing out FY 2025 and authoring a budget proposal for FY 2026 in the next two months. A more realistic estimate pushes a supplemental request well into 2025. This means Ukraine will be forced to hold the line with dwindling resources and no guarantee of replenishment.

As time is of the essence, a new supplemental may need to be initiated by Congress. However, the prospect of Congress initiating the supplemental process could be bleak as the political climate on the Hill is overcast, if not outright stormy. The relative failure of the Ukrainian forces despite the billions of dollars of aid already appropriated has led many members of Congress to view continued support as a waste of taxpayer dollars and contributed to the unpopularity of the war overall.

As the Trump administration looks forward, it is important to prioritize a lasting peace over a quick one. And this cannot happen without buy-in from both sides. Russia invaded Ukraine’s sovereign territory in 2022. Since then, the United States has stood by Ukraine with economic, humanitarian, and military support. If the United States turns its back now, Ukraine risks leaving the war in the same position as it started: the victim.

Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Elizabeth Hoffman is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Human Security and Development Department at CSIS.