Photo: TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images
The rapprochement between Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which culminated in the DRC joining the East African Community (EAC) on March 29, 2022, promised several advantages and benefits for the two countries.i The DRC’s addition to the EAC more than doubled the area of the regional economic community, expanding it from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. Not only was it anticipated that the DRC, a market of more than 100 million people, would provide new opportunities for Kenyan businesses and investors, but the other EAC members also saw the DRC as a new frontier for their own businesses. The DRC’s political leadership touted EAC membership as a game changer, not only economically but also in terms of security, given the protracted conflict affecting the DRC’s eastern provinces, with devastating consequences for the economy and the welfare of its population.
The appointment of former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta as the EAC’s special envoy to the Great Lakes Region, coupled with the deployment of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), led by Kenya, to the eastern DRC in November 2022, raised expectations and hopes among the Congolese that these troops would defeat the rebel armed groups, end the conflict, and bring about peace. Kenyatta’s leadership during Kenya’s chairmanship of the EAC arguably played a pivotal role in bringing the DRC into the EAC. His commitment to the initiative was seen as a guarantee of Kenya’s sustained engagement.
It did not take long, however, for hope to dissipate. First, tensions between Kenyatta and his successor William Ruto, driven by domestic politics, reduced the level of support Kenya afforded Kenyatta and his mission. Second, various parties to the EACRF understood the force’s mandate differently, which became a source of tension between the DRC and Kenya. These tensions eventually erupted in public between Ruto and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi. For the Congolese, the EACRF’s mandate was offensive. In contrast, the Kenyans viewed their role more as mediators, providing a buffer zone between the Congolese military and the rebel groups as they figured out a peace process.
In this analysis, the authors examine the dynamics that have shaped the state of the security partnership between Kenya and the DRC and the drivers of the contentious relations between the two countries. This report is based on field research and interviews conducted in Nairobi, Kenya; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Kinshasa and Goma, the DRC, in the fall of 2024. At the request of the interviewees, their comments have been kept anonymous. In conducting this study, the researchers met with a broad cross section of informants: government officials, military officers, civil society leaders, diplomats, youth leaders, journalists, political analysts, and academics.
Since Kenya gained independence from the United Kingdom on December 12, 1963, the country has enjoyed a respectable standing on the world stage. Nairobi is home to the headquarters of the UN Environment Programme and the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). Kenya hosted the World Trade Organization’s 10th ministerial conference in 2015, which produced the landmark Nairobi Package—a series of six high-level decisions on agriculture, cotton, and issues related to least-developed countries—as well as the inaugural Africa Climate Summit in September 2023. In 2024, Kenya became the first sub-Saharan country to be designated a major non-NATO ally.1
The country, however, is in a region that has been affected by conflict for decades. Refugees from countries as close and far as Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan have settled in Kenya.
Due to the country’s proximity to conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda, Kenya’s leaders set out to design a foreign policy that promoted and ensured peaceful existence with neighbors.2 During the Daniel Arap Moi administration, Kenya’s foreign policy benefited from strategic focus and consistency because the unitary government was centralized. Due to the plurality of actors in government, subsequent administrations lost focus and a sense of direction.3 The current foreign policy structures evolved from the Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta administrations, which translated their visions into a clearly defined document titled Kenya Foreign Policy (November 2014).4 While market investment and economic partnership represent the largest pillar of foreign policy, new elements were added. These serve as the foundation for a multidimensional foreign affairs establishment, which includes the Foreign Policy Institute, the Peace Center, and the National Defense University.5 Thus, peace and security emerged as a new pillar of foreign policy as Kenyan leaders sought to ensure the country’s stability and prosperity through a combination of diplomatic, economic, and security engagements. A new class of peace and security professionals emerged, including special envoys, raising the visibility of foreign affairs.6
Kenya has adopted a “silent power” approach, keeping a low profile so as to effectively advance its interests while attracting minimal attention.7 Other analysts have characterized this approach as quiet diplomacy and reluctant foreign policy.8 For instance, Kenya became involved with the negotiations that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan, but it did not consolidate the gains, which weakened its influence with the new independent state. Uganda has since filled the void that Kenya left in South Sudan.9
Still, with the rise of Islamist extremist violence, Kenya deployed troops to Somalia and negotiated with the African Union to build a coalition of African forces, which stood up the African Union Mission in Somalia. As a senior Kenyan diplomat put it, “You don’t have to roar for people to know you’re a lion.”10
Peace in Kenya depends on how peaceful the neighbors are. As a vibrant economy with a political class that is often steeped in commercial interests, Kenya invested in the creation of regional organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC), as a founding member. These two organizations seek to accelerate economic and social development and the integration of member states, as well as to create prosperous, competitive, secure, stable, and politically united blocks.11 For Kenyan leaders, IGAD and the EAC serve as gateways to peace through which Kenya can project its economic and financial power by increasing trade with member states who need consumer products and banking and other financial services, as well as by facilitating access to Kenya’s market and ports and road infrastructure.12
The EAC became an entry point for peace through trade, and Kenya invested in bringing the DRC into the EAC, along with other efforts, to create dialogue and help find lasting solutions to conflict in the Great Lakes region.
With Djibouti, Sudan, and Uganda vying for influence and Ethiopia dominating the organization, IGAD was too politicized for Kenya to project its economic and financial power.13 So, the EAC became an entry point for peace through trade, and Kenya invested in bringing the DRC into the EAC, along with other efforts, to create dialogue and help find lasting solutions to conflict in the Great Lakes region.14 As a bonus, Kenya and the other members of the EAC would have access to the large market that the DRC represents. Still, some EAC members, such as Rwanda and Uganda, did not want the DRC to join the organization given their contentious relations with the country.15
While Kenya is relatively stable compared to some of its neighbors, its domestic politics are conflict driven.16 An Ethiopian diplomat observed that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic politics.17 The Kenyan political leadership is entrenched in business, which means that economic interests fuel the political discourse and competition.18 This dynamic prompted an Ethiopian newspaper editor to describe Kenya as a “business country” that is not disposed to be an anchor state.19 “Kenyan political elites have learned to negotiate,” an analyst said. “If the price is right, they make a deal.”20 Enmity between politicians is common and trickles up in policymaking. Political parties are fragile and short lived as they form and are motivated by the electoral cycle, and political alliances are fleeting. These domestic personal conflicts among politicians often spill into foreign affairs, with damaging consequences.21 Because foreign policy is also a matter of personalities and personal dynamics, tensions between politicians can make or break key developments, including peace processes.22 It is common for prominent politicians to engage in their own foreign policy efforts, which leads to confusion as to who speaks for Kenya.23 Furthermore, Kenya tends to appoint failed politicians as ambassadors.24 In the case of Kenya’s security engagement in the DRC, domestic political dynamics, whereby presidents actively seek to undo their predecessors’ legacy, as well as the conflict between William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, continue to negatively impact the relations between Kenya and the DRC.25
Kenya’s involvement in recent Congolese domestic politics dates back to the aftermath of Tshisekedi and his ally Vital Kamerhe withdrawing from an agreement reached in Geneva on November 11, 2018, which had seen leading figures in the Congolese political opposition nominate Martin Fayulu, a former ExxonMobil executive, as their joint candidate for the December presidential election.26 With the blessing and likely support of Kenyatta, the Kenyan president at the time, Tshisekedi and Kamerhe met in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, on November 23, 2018, to negotiate the creation of an electoral coalition, Cap pour le Changement (CACH).27 This coalition would pave the way for Tshisekedi to become the fifth president of the DRC a couple of months later. Tshisekedi’s swearing-in ceremony on January 24, 2019, was attended by only one foreign head of state—Kenyatta.28
Kenya was also the second stop on Tshisekedi’s first international tour, during which he discussed Kenya’s desire to participate in efforts to stabilize the DRC and maintain peace there with his counterpart. This climate of bonne entente quickly led to increased Kenyan investments in the DRC.
Although the economic benefits of Kenya’s involvement in the DRC have continued unabated despite challenges affecting its role in the Congolese peace process, it remains evident that the economy, security, and peace are intrinsically linked and must mutually reinforce one another.
In December 2020, Equity Bank Group acquired Banque Commerciale du Congo, one of the oldest banks in the DRC, in a transaction that propelled Equity to the second rank among Kenyan banks.29 From November 30 to December 13, 2021, Equity Bank Group, now known as Equity Group Holdings, facilitated the Kenya-DRC trade mission, an initiative stemming from a bilateral agreement between the two heads of state.30 The purchase of the DRC-based Trust Merchant Bank by the KCB Group in 2022 further consolidated this trend.31
While the context was marked by these improvements and hopes of stability that could bolster the surge in Kenyan investment in the DRC, the resurgence of the March 23 Movement, commonly known as M23, in the country’s eastern region was seen as a potential risk to businesses. In response, Kenya chose to support a peace process to protect its investment in the DRC.
Although the economic benefits of Kenya’s involvement in the DRC have continued unabated despite challenges affecting its role in the Congolese peace process, it remains evident that the economy, security, and peace are intrinsically linked and must mutually reinforce one another.
The Nairobi Process: A Good Idea, Poorly Implemented?
Launched in April 2022, the EAC-led Nairobi Process’s main objective is ensuring stability in the eastern DRC through a combination of political and diplomatic engagement, as well as military involvement.32 The Nairobi Process consists of facilitating direct dialogue between the Congolese government and armed groups while also supporting the deployment of a regional force from the EAC, which aims to contribute to peace efforts.
The costly proceedings are funded by Kenya and were supposed to be accompanied by a political dialogue that did not happen.33 From the outset, the process suffered from the contentious relations between President Ruto and his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, who also served as the EAC envoy for the Great Lakes. The two Kenyan parties hosting the Nairobi Process—the Ruto and Kenyatta camps—did not talk to each other.34 As emphasized earlier in this report, Kenyan domestic politics have impacted the country’s foreign policy.
Corneille Nangaa, the leader of the politico-military group Alliance Fleuve Congo (which is affiliated with M23 and other armed groups and seeks to overthrow the DRC government), launched his insurrection at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi on December 15, 2023.35 Former President Kenyatta condemned the action. When the DRC protested, President Ruto said it was acceptable and guaranteed by freedom of speech in Kenya. This soured relations between President Ruto and President Tshisekedi. The next day, the DRC recalled its ambassador.36
Tensions between Ruto and the Congolese date back to his days as deputy president. In February 2022, while at a presidential campaign rally in Nyeri, Central Kenya, he disparaged the Congolese describing them as high-waist trouser wearing singers in a nation of about 90 million people who own no single cow.37 His comments sparked a diplomatic incident, which was also the first time that most Congolese heard about him. Kenya’s ambassador to the DRC scrambled to quell the outrage.38 Ruto apologized but the damage was done, and his standing among the Congolese people has not recovered.39 The Congolese do not see him as a neutral broker on matters of security in the eastern DRC.
Many interlocutors consider the Nairobi Process a good idea, but one that has been poorly implemented. The main weakness of the process appears to be the non-inclusive and nonrepresentative nature of the attendees, as well as the agenda.40 According to several civil society actors from North Kivu, the Nairobi Process should involve all of the relevant armed groups and actors. They decried the lack of transparency and are concerned that the Nairobi Process does not focus on the “real” actors. There were self-proclaimed armed group leaders that were in Nairobi that no one knew in the communities they claimed to represent. By the same token, known rebel leaders were not included.41 This has led to doubts among civil society in North Kivu about the commitment of those leading the process to truly address the root causes of the problem. Since all rebel groups and their leaders should have already been identified and mapped, some questioned the reason behind the absence of key actors in Nairobi.42 While it is difficult to clearly explain what constitutes a “real actor,” some characteristics emerged from interlocutors in Kinshasa and Goma. These include the longevity of movements and their influence on the ground. Secondly, these groups are seen as protectors of their communities against the impact of both national and foreign armed groups. These groups hold a certain legitimacy due to the apparent security they provide to the population in areas where the state and its authority are almost non-existent.
This so-called legitimacy is, however, contradicted by the targets of the attacks by these groups, which are not limited to the protection of territories against foreign militias or to attacks on foreign economic actors (particularly the Chinese) who “invade” their lands. These militias also sometimes attack their own communities and the Congolese National Army (FARDC), and under the cover of noble objectives, they satisfy their economic interests and further political agendas.
Some observers believe that several armed groups active in the east of the DRC are auxiliaries of political actors in Kinshasa, whose political influence grows through their apparent ability to regulate stability and security in the east of the country. These local kingmakers are regularly consulted on the “situation in the east” without acknowledging their pernicious role.43 Some interlocutors thus suggested that the Congolese authorities may have been misguided, which led to the exclusion of certain armed groups or individuals from the Nairobi Process.44 Some civil society actors from North Kivu believed that some kingmakers manipulated the process to secure the participation of groups capable of protecting their interests.45 Other interlocutors believed that leaders of armed groups may have tried to undermine the process by not showing up personally and sending representatives that were not legitimate enough to engage their group.46 This tactic has been used by armed groups in the eastern Congo several times to justify not being bound by any agreement that would not be in their interest. The case of the group Nduma Defense of Congo-Renové, which controls a large part of the Walikale and Masisi territories and whose leader Guidon Shimiray Mwissa did not show up to Nairobi Process negotiations, as well as Janvier Karahire’s Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain, are examples that support that theory.47 Some of the attendees in Nairobi were, in fact, dissidents or appendices of the main groups not represented in Nairobi.48
Many interlocutors also highlighted the lack of understanding on the Congolese and Kenyan sides. On the Congolese side, a security expert pointed out the inconsistency in the choice of officials and members of the official Congolese delegation, notably the sidelining of individuals with expertise and knowledge of past commitments and actors.49 The inability to involve the same people who have historically followed the implementation of the peace process and who possess knowledge of the actors on the ground largely explains the failure of the process. A political analyst thought that this was because the leader of the Congolese delegation did not understand the situation and the regional dynamics that drive the crisis.50
As a political analyst pointed out, “Kenyan politicians do not understand the DRC.”51 For instance, the Kenyan facilitation of the Nairobi Process involved actors whose legitimacy and representativeness had not been vetted through proper verification mechanisms. There were no clear lines of communication with diverse voices and expertise from both the ground and external sources, which, when seen from the ground, was a cause of the process’s lack of credibility.52 A civil society actor noted that militias, harmed by their nonrepresentation in Nairobi, became more dangerous and amplified their actions against civilians in an effort to become noticed by Kinshasa and the process facilitators, leading to several human rights violations.53
The East African Community Regional Force and Contradictions over Its Mandate
On July 22, 2022, during the 22nd Ordinary Summit of Heads of State, the Community of West African States decided to deploy the EACRF to the DRC, with troops supplied by Kenya, Burundi, South Sudan, and Uganda. On December 3, 2023, one year after its deployment, the EACRF began withdrawing from Congolese territory, leaving behind mixed results and feelings.54
Regarding the arrival of Kenyan troops, it should be noted that their deployment was first announced by Tshisekedi during a joint press conference with Kenyatta in Kinshasa on April 21, 2021. Tshisekedi declared, “Kenyan troops will arrive in the DRC in the coming weeks to support our armed forces in order to attack in the most effective way possible this problem of terrorism and violence in the east of our country.”55 However, Kenyan troops ultimately arrived not within a bilateral framework but as part of a regional mission of the EAC more than a year after this declaration.56
The EACRF had the following mandate:
On the ground, there was significant confusion about the mission and its expected outcomes. The understanding of the EACRF’s mandate differed depending on whether one adopted the perspective of Kinshasa and the local population or that of its partners in the EAC. Kinshasa expected a force with an offensive approach—troops that would shift the balance of power on the ground in its fight against rebel movements, in particular M23.
From a regional perspective, however, the EACRF did not appear to have a mandate for armed engagement. Instead, it was envisioned as a buffer force tasked with maintaining a status quo by preventing the progression of both M23 and the regular forces in areas they controlled. This arrangement aimed to create conditions for negotiations, initiated under Kenyan facilitation with the blessing of the EAC through the Nairobi Process, to guarantee a ceasefire and facilitate the cantonment and disarmament of rebels.
Observers noted a clear lack of communication regarding the mission’s mandate, leaving room for widespread speculation. The Congolese government had informed the population in advance about the offensive nature of the regional force. However, the same population grew disillusioned when the regional force, under Kenyan leadership, declared upon its arrival that it did not have such a mandate.
Adding to the confusion, the population, unaware of the bilateral agreement that brought Burundian troops to Congolese soil, viewed with suspicion the apparent passivity of the regional force. Meanwhile, Burundian troops were conducting offensive operations on the ground and securing significant sections of Kalehe territory, notably Kinyezire and North and South Minga. This contrast in approach, far from satisfying Kinshasa, drew criticism when compared to the actions of the Burundian troops.57 In fact, it seems that the presence of Burundian troops in the DRC is more due to a sort of bilateral cooperation between the two countries, which justifies their resumption on Congolese soil, even after the departure of the EAC troops.
The local population closely followed the Congolese authorities’ assessment of the EACRF, particularly the criticism from Tshisekedi regarding the force’s lack of effectiveness.58 There was also significant anger among the local population over the EACRF’s agreement with M23’s demand that areas formerly occupied by the group be handed over exclusively to the regional forces—particularly the Kenyan troops—and not to the FARDC. Furthermore, the population resented that the EACRF’s withdrawal could allow M23 to reclaim these areas in the absence of progress in negotiations. This scenario unfolded in Masisi (Mweso and Kitshanga) and Rutshuru (Bwito).
This observation quickly gave rise to various theories about an alleged collusion between the EACRF and M23.59 Disenchantment and suspicions toward the regional force soon followed. As several observers in Kinshasa and Goma pointed out, confusion over the regional force’s mandate was one of the main reasons for its apparent lack of success. According to multiple interlocutors, expectations were poorly defined from the outset.60 This led to misunderstandings on both sides and, above all, significant frustration.
A Congolese security official noted that the issue with the regional force stemmed from its mandate (rather than Kenya’s leadership) and the differing perspectives of the involved parties.61 A mandate that lacked clarity—at least from the perspective of those on the ground—negatively influenced perceptions.
Misunderstanding Expectations
People in the eastern DRC are living witnesses to one of the bloodiest conflicts in recent decades. The need for, demand for, and search for peace are at the heart of the concerns of a population disillusioned by the unfulfilled promises of both national authorities and numerous international actors whose interventions have not produced effective results. After years of cyclical conflicts, the population’s judgment is harsh toward the many international forces that take turns on the ground, producing mediocre outcomes. In response to verbal declarations of solidarity, the population reacts with weariness and anger toward actors whose actions are limited to a form of “crisis management” rather than crisis resolution. In this context, radical discourses inevitably proliferate.
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) has regularly been the target of criticism and public demonstrations, primarily denouncing what the population perceives as passivity despite the mission’s mandate to protect civilians. A MONUSCO withdrawal plan signed between MONUSCO and the Congolese government in November 2023 provided for a total withdrawal of MONUSCO personnel in December 2024.62 In the eastern DRC, there is now a prevailing sense of suspicion that prioritizes doubt over trust. This mistrust is reinforced by the rhetoric of the ruling class, which often exploits the situation to consolidate political and electoral gains, as demonstrated during the 2023 general elections in the DRC. Consequently, any fighting force or operator that does not actively fight the DRC’s “enemies” is automatically perceived as complicit with these so-called enemies.63
The EACRF appears to have failed to understand this reality, and it has not recognized the importance of integrating the ethno-cultural dimension into its analysis. This oversight has led to a complete loss of confidence and a wave of hostility toward the regional force in general and Kenyan troops in particular—even in the context of their redeployment within the framework of the UN Intervention Brigade.
The Influence of Kenya’s Internal Politics in the Congolese Peace Process
There is no doubt that Kenya’s involvement in the peace process in the DRC relied heavily on the interpersonal relationship between the Congolese and Kenyan heads of state. Having positioned himself as an ally of Tshisekedi from the outset, Kenyatta already had the Congolese president’s trust and approval. This facilitated, on the one hand, the DRC’s accession to the EAC and, on the other, the opening of the Congolese market to Kenyan businesses. However, the departure of Kenyatta from the presidency and the arrival of his successor, Ruto, have clearly brought changes on the ground, particularly in the perception of Congolese actors, who consider Ruto to be an unconditional ally of Rwanda. This is significant because M23 is accused of being a Rwandan proxy force.64
As one observer noted, the political transition and internal challenges in Kenya have influenced the situation in the DRC, as well as the posture of the actors involved. While Kenya has attempted to address the problems in the DRC, tensions between Tshisekedi and Ruto and the fact that Kenya remains a hub for dissident groups—evidenced by the launch of the Congo River Alliance (AFC) in Nairobi in 2023—present a significant challenge.65 The group has since been a target of U.S. sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13413, as amended by E.O. 13671.66
The political transition and internal challenges in Kenya have influenced the situation in the DRC, as well as the posture of the actors involved. While Kenya has attempted to address the problems in the DRC, tensions between Tshisekedi and Ruto . . . present a significant challenge.
Despite the significant challenges surrounding Kenya’s intervention in the peace process in the DRC, as well as the suspicions it generates, Kenya remains an important ally for the DRC. This is evidenced by the maintenance and growth of Kenyan economic interests in the DRC, as well as the broader economic benefits the DRC continues to derive from the relationship. Bilateral military cooperation between the two countries remains in place, particularly through the presence of Kenyan Defence Force infantry instructors in Kisangani and Congolese military personnel attending training programs in Kenya.67
To make the most of these opportunities and contribute to peace, cooperation, and justice in the region, the authors recommend the following:
Please consult the PDF for references.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Nick Elebe is a lawyer, policy analyst, and writer based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The authors wish to thank the many government officials, military officers, civil society leaders, diplomats, youth leaders, journalists, political analysts, academics, and citizens who met with them and shared their insights in the conduct of this research. They also wish to thank Khasai Makhulo, who managed the data collection, as well as the research, editorial, and publication processes for this project. This report was made possible by the generous support of the Open Society Foundations.
