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This National Security Strategy (NSS) marks an ideological and substantive shift in U.S. foreign policy. The administration is attempting to define a new “America First” foreign policy doctrine that is deeply pragmatic, and perhaps short-sighted. For example, the democracy agenda is clearly over. Foreign policy choices will be made based on what makes the United States more powerful and prosperous. That’s fair, and clearly what the American people voted for, but today’s self-interested choices may lead to a far lonelier, weaker, more fractured future. This is a truly pivotal moment in the way the world works.
This NSS is a real, painful, shocking wake-up call for Europe. It is a moment of cavernous divergence between Europe’s view of itself and Trump’s vision for Europe. If Europe had any doubt that the Trump administration is fully committed to a tough love strategy, it now knows for sure. The administration is asking—demanding, really—that Europe polices its own part of the world and, most importantly, pays for it itself. The most worrying parts of the strategy are the ones that chastise Europe for losing its European character. The sentiment behind the words seems to stoke fear of migrants and an adherence to an idealized, old-world Europe that is questionable at best. Modern Europe is vibrant, evolving, and—largely—pretty happy. The majority of Europe’s reaction to this NSS is likely to be the same aghast shock as met Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech.
China will love two parts of this strategy and hate the rest. Beijing will love the explicit declaration that the U.S. preference is noninterference in other nations’ affairs and the clear statement about respecting states’ sovereignty. That may assuage Chinese fears that the United States seeks to undermine regime stability. They will hate the calls for them to get out of Latin America and the robust approach to deterrence, both necessary and excellent policy positions. Overall, the Pacific section is strong.
An “America First” foreign policy has arrived. The key line: “President Trump’s foreign policy is pragmatic without being ‘pragmatist,’ realistic without being ‘realist,’ principled without being ‘idealistic,’ muscular without being ‘hawkish,’ and restrained without being ‘dovish.’ It is not grounded in traditional, political ideology. It is motivated above all by what works for America—or, in two words, ‘America First.’”
Two elements of the strategy highlight this approach most starkly—the language on economic growth and the clear end of the democracy strategy.
On economic growth, the clear logic is that the United States needs to succeed in trade to be strong at home, and strength at home will empower future wins abroad. That is right, but the question of how to build those more prosperous trade relationships is where ideas meet policy. The strategy points to reindustrialization, a strong defense industrial base, and securing critical minerals and resources. This is all right and good—the “how” is the hard part. U.S. businesses should be deeply encouraged by the explicit call for “closer collaboration between the U.S. Government and the American private sector.” Importantly, the president just tasked every ambassador to serve as a champion for American business: “All our embassies must be aware of major business opportunities in their country, especially major government contracts. Every U.S. Government official that interacts with these countries should understand that part of their job is to help American companies compete and succeed.”
The outlook is far darker for democracy, however. The administration has seemingly decided that pushing for democratic reforms is quite low on its list of priorities. It is a “nice to have,” rather than a vision for creating a more peaceful world with an empowered, independent citizenry. For example, in Latin America, the strategy says the United States will “reward and encourage the region’s governments, political parties, and movements broadly aligned with our principles and strategy,” then it follows with an enormous but: “But we must not overlook governments with different outlooks with whom we nonetheless share interests and who want to work with us.” The Africa section says, “For far too long, American policy in Africa has focused on providing, and later on spreading, liberal ideology.”
This is likely a “woke” reference but also has implications for democracy programming. Finally, in the section on the Middle East, regional monarchs will be very pleased to read the following: The United States will drop “America’s misguided experiment with hectoring these nations—especially the Gulf monarchies—into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government. We should encourage and applaud reform when and where it emerges organically, without trying to impose it from without.” If the very Millennial-generation idea of “you do you” were a foreign policy, it has fully emerged in this NSS. Despots will get no U.S. pressure, as long as we can work together. It is worth pointing out that the Reagan administration was also willing to work with unsavory regimes, but toward an ideological and deeply necessary end: defeating communism. The Trump administration’s end goal is prosperity.
This NSS will simultaneously reassure and disquiet China. The reassurance comes in the form of promises not to intervene in other nations’ affairs and to respect national sovereignty, both of which are perennial talking points for Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, and others who loathe U.S. lectures on democratic reform.
The strategy also rightfully calls out the failures of previous China policies. The critique is tough, but largely fair, with the benefit of hindsight: “President Trump single-handedly reversed more than three decades of mistaken American assumptions about China: namely, that by opening our markets to China, encouraging American business to invest in China, and outsourcing our manufacturing to China, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called ‘rulesbased international order.’ This did not happen.” However, this is far less fair, and is more of a cheap shot: “elites—over four successive administrations of both political parties—were either willing enablers of China’s strategy or in denial.” Policymakers had to at least try to work with China, view its rise with optimism, and try to embed it in a prosperous, rules-based world. These attempts were, in hindsight, naive, but the United States had to try. China, sadly, did not reciprocate U.S. goodwill, and the United States has learned its lesson.
Beijing will be far less sanguine about the clarion declaration of a new Monroe Doctrine, with the corresponding call for China to get out of Latin America: “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity.... The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence—from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.”
The NSS is blatantly derisive toward Europe. There is little in the strategy to give comfort to European allies, and the tone and substance bear much similarity to Vice President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year. Capitals across Europe will be deeply concerned by what they see here. In the category of expected and largely correct is this: “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over. We count among our many allies and partners dozens of wealthy, sophisticated nations that must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defense.” U.S. leaders have called on Europe to do more to burden share in NATO for decades. This NSS definitively ends the encouraging and cajoling and exercises tough love.
Far more concerning, however, is the NSS chastising Europe for cultural decline. This is particularly ironic, given the rest of the document’s profession that it will not criticize monarchs or interfere in other nations’ sovereign affairs. It also has a stark undertone of anti-migrant sentiment. For example, it complains about “the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure,” citing “activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence.” This should give even President Trump’s most fervent supporters pause. Not only does it misread Europe’s current state, but it leans hard into far-right wing political parties’ talking points. It further suggests that part of the reason for strife with Russia is Europe’s lack of self-confidence, which will come as music to Putin’s ears and nails on a chalkboard for Brussels. The NSS says, “as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, European relations with Russia are now deeply attenuated, and many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat.” That’s because it is an existential threat, Mr. President. Look no further than Russia’s increasingly aggressive strategy of hybrid warfare across the continent.
The rhetoric in the NSS is deeply troubling and over-the-top in places. For example, this paragraph vacillates between blithe and burning: “Stopping regional conflicts before they spiral into global wars that drag down whole continents is worthy of the Commander-in-Chief’s attention, and a priority for this administration. A world on fire, where wars come to our shores, is bad for American interests. President Trump uses unconventional diplomacy, America’s military might, and economic leverage to surgically extinguish embers of division between nuclear-capable nations and violent wars caused by centuries-long hatred.” It is unclear how one surgically extinguishes embers of division. But peace is far better than war. War is indeed hell. The world prospers when it is at peace and working together on global challenges. The last half-century has demonstrated that a strong U.S. presence furthers those goals of peace and prosperity, and President Trump himself has furthered the cause of peace with energy and determination. These efforts must not be one-and-done, however.
It is worthwhile to pay appropriate short-term costs for the long-term gain of Pax Americana. Those costs are investments—in security, open trade, democracy, and alliances. Losing sight of these underpinnings of global peace will not make America First; it will make America weak.
Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
