NATO Public Forum: The Axis of Upheaval featuring CSIS's Jon B. Alterman

This transcript is from a NATO Public Forum panel discussion featuring CSIS's Jon B. Alterman on July 10, 2024. Watch the full event video here.

David Shullman: Welcome to our panel on “The Axis of Upheaval.” We've had a bit of a last minute change in moderation, so I will be acting both as moderator and panelist. And what we're here to discuss over the next 40 minutes or so is what NATO adversaries are doing. Obviously Russia, we've talked a lot about China, but also the role of Iran and North Korea and what that means for the NATO alliance, for the United States, and for Europe. Just as Russia's invasion of Ukraine has revitalized cooperation and cohesion among the NATO allies, it's also spurred a lot more cohesion among Russia and its backers. We've seen the consequences of that in cooperation that's on full display in Ukraine where the support Russia has received from China and Iran and North Korea has enabled it to sustain its warfighting machine.

We've talked a lot about that over the last couple of days, but that's really just the tip of the iceberg. We see their relations deepening in a whole range of different domains. They're increasing trade. Russia has become China's largest supplier of crude oil. Trade between China and Russia hit a high mark last year. Moscow is now Iran's largest source of foreign investment, and they're finding ways to work around the Western financial system in critical ways that undermine U.S. and NATO foreign policy tools, including de-dollarization, and of course they're also deepening military cooperation. And we see China and Iran and Russia having held naval exercises just recently in the Gulf of Oman and having done that now three years in a row. And they're also looking to expand their access to other countries. So this is a really critical domain that we need to dig into further, and we have some excellent panelists here today to discuss it from a variety of different angles.

I'm happy to be joined by Jon Alterman, who's a senior vice president and holds the Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS. And we have Benedetta Berti, who serves as head of policy planning in the office of the Secretary General at NATO. So why don't we get started and just jump in? Maybe start with you, Jon, and give us a sense of where you think Iran is when they think about this axis that we're talking about between North Korea, China, and Russia. How do they view it? How is it of utility to them and where are their concerns going forward?

Jon B. Alterman: Thanks very much David, and thanks to all of you for coming. Very important set of discussions this week in Washington. It seems to me that Iran feels very isolated in the world and looks and talks about how much it shares in common with Russia and China. And one of the principal things that it shares in common is it hates that countries aligned with the United States have non-kinetic means of coercion. What they would like to do is say, “If you want to stop us doing something, we'll fight you.” And that's a high threshold, and they have lots of asymmetrical tools to use and that's the space they want to be in.

When you start talking about sanctions, when you start talking about diplomatic action, from an Iranian perspective, that makes Iran more isolated, weaker. And they love the fact that they feel that both China and Russia share an interest in undermining the ability of the United States and its allies to use those non-kinetic tools.

So they try to build that sense of commonality. They try to use China and Russia to defend them in international forums. I think the rub is that oftentimes the Iranians understand just how weak they are vis-à-vis China and Russia. China represents about 30 percent of Iranian trade. Iran represents less than 1 percent of Chinese trade. And the Chinese have a much bigger game to play, and they use Iran. And Russia has had a long and often difficult relationship with Iran. It's changed with the Ukraine war and with sending drones and other materiel. There is a tactical sense of partnership.

But deep down, Iran aspires to be a Great Power. It knows it's not a Great Power. And the larger powers—Russia and China—find Iran disposable in a way the Iranians wish they can change, and they can't. So they try to build the common practice of undermining sanctions, undermining the kinds of collective action that the United States and its allies work on while they desperately try to build leverage against these Great Powers, who on the one hand they need and the other hand consistently disrespect Iran and use Iran to further their own goals vis-à-vis the United States, the West, and others.

Dr. Shullman: Great points, and I think the fact that you started, or at least centralized your comments around Iran's desire for this axis to fight U.S. centrality in the global system and to push back on the United States generally, that's very similar to China's view of this relationship specifically with Russia, but also with Iran and with North Korea.

Dr. Alterman: There is this concern about U.S. hegemony, and they feel that if you reduce international affairs to “How do we undermine U.S. hegemony?” not only do the Russians and the Chinese and the Iranians share a view, but then you start to bring in this whole sense of a Global South, a very diverse and disaggregated group of people. But if you can put it in terms of undermining U.S. hegemony, those are the sort of common terms that Iran finds very, very close alignment with Russia and China on.

Dr. Shullman: Yeah, I mean from the China side, there is definitely a value in terms of more of the security space, in terms of how to push back on the United States, in terms of its relationship with Russia that has bolstered China militarily, in terms of the trade that China's gotten from Russia for years for defense equipment. But in addition to that, the deepening of military exercises with Russia has been of great value to China, a PLA that has not had a lot of operational experience. More joint training with Russia, that has been of great value. And there's the potential for deepening collaboration on cyber, on military AI, and on potentially getting even more in the way of advanced technology for defense that China wants from Russia. So there's that aspect.

And then there's also the aspect of China hoping that the United States and NATO and other allies having to worry about a potential contingency where you have to worry about not just China, but also Russia, North Korea, and Iran undertaking actions at the same time that complicates planning for the Pentagon and for other defense planners. That I think is of great value to China in the security space. And then more broadly, this sense, and we've discussed it at the summit over the last couple of days, that you can't divide Asia from Europe. So I think in Beijing there is a sense that if Russia were to succeed in what it's been trying to do with its brutal invasion of Ukraine, if the NATO alliance and the United States were to fail in pushing back on that, that would have fundamental consequences for any kind of contingency in Asia over Taiwan, over the South China Sea, and China could be more confident that there would not be a robust response from the alliance.

Dr. Alterman: And there's a very important way in which Asian countries look at how the world deals with Iran and thinks that that's how the world will deal with the Asia contingency. Asian countries have profound energy security interests in the Middle East, and therefore the extent to which you can work through allies and partners and provide security, that gives you security not just for Europe, not just in the Middle East, but it extends to helping provide security in Asia.

Dr. Shullman: Benedetta, I want to come to you. So how does, from your perspective, NATO, the alliance, the members, view this emerging axis in terms of the interests and how it affects the NATO alliance itself?

Bendetta Berti: Well, I would probably agree with a lot of the points that have already been made. But to start framing the discussion, I think in the 2022 strategic concept, so a couple of years ago, NATO already recognized what it defined as the growing strategic alignment between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Now, that trend remains very much part and parcel of how we look at the security environment today. But I would say that as of 2024, the scale and scope and intensity of that relationship has grown in a way that wasn't forecasted in the 2022 strategic concept. And now really we're looking much more at what does concerted action and increasing strategic alignment by the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, and the DPRK look like, and what's the impact on your Atlantic security?

To make a long story short, I think you need to look no further than Ukraine to see how this all crystallizes and comes together, and that's one of the reasons why we talk about Ukraine as a test, both for the resilience of Ukraine itself, but also for the future of European security and global security at large. And in terms of what are their concerns, what are the trends that we pick up in Ukraine and what are we learning about it? Well, first of all, we see these actors amplifying each other’s hostile narratives in a very systematic way. And that's something that is part of knowing that the information space is really important. When we talk about deterrence and defense in the 21st century, that's an issue of concern.

Another issue of concern is that we see these four actors working together to try to minimize the impact of our foreign policy tools—for example, to hold Russia accountable and to try to constrain its war machine—including by circumventing sanctions. So that's of course a very significant issue of concern, especially today, where we know that the PRC is the greatest, the largest enabler of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine today and really key to the Russian Federation reconstituting its military instruments of power at a faster pace than anticipated. So that reciprocal enablement is of course a very strong issue of concern. That's not just an issue between the PRC and Russia itself. We also see, as was mentioned, the Iranians supporting the Russian Federation through drone technology.

But Iran gets something in return. And the same is true for the DPRK. Just as important, I think I would highlight the trend of authoritarian learning, mutual learning, and I have to look no further than the recent example from the Iranian strikes against Israel, in which they used a large, combined swarm of drones and missiles in a way that very much resembles what the Russians are doing in the Ukrainian theater. So these two theaters operationally are more and more linked. And that's a cause for concern. The more these actors learn from each other, the more we have to be concerned. And then at the macro level, there is what we defined already in 2022 as a pushback against the rules-based international order, and indeed attempts to promote an alternative authoritarian model of global governance.

So all of this together I think is just one of the many reasons why what's happening in Ukraine, and the stakes are so incredibly high. And the concern of course is the more that Putin's war of aggression is seen as succeeding in Ukraine, the more these actors will be emboldened. And that's why for Ukraine to prevail is, for us, one of the most important, if not the most important test for the future stability of all the Euro-Atlantic space.

In terms of what we're learning, I very much agree with you that this highlights the interconnectedness between the different theaters and the fact that we might wish to separate them, but our adversaries are not going to play that game and they're rather driven by opportunism or strategic logic. They're going to try to create strategic dilemmas simultaneously for us, and we need to prepare for that. Since you asked me to highlight the concerns, I also want to say that yes, these actors working together is a reason for concern, and yes, their strategic intent and actions are increasingly convergent, but they do not have anything that resembles the type of alliance that we have with NATO in terms of institutions, in terms of force structure, in terms of military might, economic heft. So we need to also remember that.

And when we work together with our Indo-Pacific partners, then we're talking about 60% of the world's GDP and military might. So yes, it's a cause for concern. No, it's not a cause for panic. Yes, it's a cause to double down on the rebuilding of our military instrument of power on that cross-theater solidarity that we see at play this week in Washington.

Dr. Shullman: That's such an important point.

Dr. Alterman: If I could just add to that point, one of the interesting things about the way that these countries engage with each other is they're constantly calibrating: “How close should we be? How far can we be?” There isn't the sense of common purpose. They have some shared strategic goals. They have a whole number of goals that don't overlap. And I think there's more agility within how these countries are really willing to sell each other out all the time, because they are in it for themselves. And one of the things that's different, listening to Benedetta talk about how the alliance works, we are in it together. And there's a way in which this isn't an alliance, this is a pickup game. They can help each other. They sometimes pass to each other, they sometimes don't pass to each other. They sometimes let him take the hit and it just operates in a different way.

And it is difficult for us, but I think we also need to recognize that for all that these countries are together on, you can also pick them apart on different issues. And certainly with the Iran nuclear program, there was a time when both Russia and China decided it's actually constructive to try to put the Iran nuclear program in a box. That time has changed, but there are times when you can bring these countries together and work with them.

Dr. Shullman: I agree with that. I want to make clear though, from at least my perspective, where China sees this axis and especially the Russia relationship. While it may be at some level a marriage of convenience and based upon alignment of interests that are potentially temporary, there is such a deep and abiding level of congruence on how they're looking at what they're trying to achieve, not only in light of undermining the United States and undermining NATO, but also, and this comes back to what Benedetta was saying, the fundamental drive to transform the current global order is really at the heart of what China wants to do in the next five, 10, 15 years. And for them, that is essential to China establishing itself really as the central economic and technological player globally. And these actors are really central to that because China, and we've discussed it a little bit already, is the benefactor for Russia and for Iran and for North Korea and the destabilizing actions that they're taking.

China's playing a neat trick now where they are supporting these different actors as basically agents of war and chaos and upheaval, and then a day later coming out and saying, "Okay, now we're going to play the role of being the peacemaker. We're going to play the role of being the stabilizer. We're going to propose a 12-point peace plan for this conflict that we have helped to create by continuing to support Putin's war machine." And then beyond that, also proposing now we have ideas for a common future of shared destiny for mankind, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, these grand ideas which are ideological at their root that are meant to transform the order and put China at the center of it. And it's not really possible without partnership from these other destabilizing actors that can make everyone stand back and say, "Oh, this order is unstable. It's not working anymore. And the United States can't do what it used to be able to do in terms of preserving the peace."

Dr. Alterman: And it seems to me that fundamental to the Chinese notion of world order is world order that is predicated on bilateral relationships between states where China is stronger than every bilateral partner except for the United States. And as they look at a map of the world, that's a nice way to be. I think it is important not to underestimate how much distrust is between the Chinese and the Russians, how much disdain the Chinese have for the Russians. I've had some really interesting conversations with some Chinese about how the Russians are drunk, and they don't work hard, and they're not serious, and the place is falling apart. The Chinese are happy to jump all over how inept the Russians are. The Russians are useful, but let the Russians take a hit from having a confrontation with the West. The Chinese will trade, the Chinese will build win-win solutions, they'll build these big international conferences. Let the Russians do the aggression part.

And ultimately, I think as there's a huge power disparity between the Chinese and the Iranians, there's a huge power disparity between the Chinese and the Russians. And I would bet that the Chinese don't lose a single opportunity to remind the Russians and the Russians don't go a single day wishing they didn't have more leverage against the Chinese, desperate for leverage against the Chinese, and knowing the Chinese would sell them down the river in a New York minute if it became convenient.

Dr. Berti: If I may, I would just point out that over the last year or so compared to, let's say the Vineyard Summit where we had a similar discussion about where we were in terms of the relationship between the PRC and the Russian Federation, things have changed and they've changed quite substantially. And there is now a path dependency. The level of PRC support for Russia's war machine to enable and energize and allow it to reconstitute its defense and technological industrial base is now the most critical enabler, and that is really important to underline. So we may have a very intellectual discussion about whether we want to call this a marriage of convenience or a strategic alignment, but the reality is today Russia is able to fight its war in Ukraine and reconstitute its military instrumental power at the speed and scale it can because of the provision of dual-use goods from China.

And I think that's an important point that we are discussing this week. And one of the issues that you will hear leaders discuss is: “Exactly what should be our response?” Is it reasonable to have a country that, on the one hand, wants to trade, wants to be treated like a normal and respectful member of the international order, and on the other hand, they are financing the largest full-scale war of aggression, illegal war of aggression, that we've seen in generations. And perhaps there has to be some type of signaling that it's difficult to have your cake and eat it and consequences must come too.

Dr. Shullman: You went exactly to where I wanted to go, which is this notion of forcing China to choose, as the Secretary General and others have said, because China is different in many ways, but in this particular way different from the other three countries that we're talking about in the sense that they do want to portray themselves as a force for stability and peace as a responsible player. And they do want to be able to continue to have productive relations with Europe and with developed countries for economic reasons and for other reasons, unlike arguably, but correct me if I'm wrong, Iran and Russia and North Korea, which are quite content to accept that there's not going to be any deep integration with the West or benefit from engagement with the Europeans. And the question I think is: Can China get away with that? Will there be costs to China trying to have it both ways?

Dr. Alterman: The last Iranian reformist President, Mohammad Khatami, had this big idea of “the dialogue of civilizations,” and there was a big Iranian idea that in many ways maybe planted some of the seeds of some of the Chinese global initiatives and all these things. You now have a new reformist president in Iran. I don't think the reformist president in Iran actually has any power to make the kinds of changes the rest of the world cares about, but might there be language coming out of Iran that would try to imitate that to move into some of that space of, let's just talk about this while acting in deeply maligned ways, but I think we might see Iran pick up some of the language as part of its recent political impact. Whether that matters either for China or for Iran, I don't know. I don't know if you think that any of these global Chinese initiatives are meaningful at all, either practically or even in terms of information, whether anybody takes them seriously.

Dr. Shullman: I think people do and should take them seriously, even if there is fluff language that you have to dig into if you want to try to get to what the meat of it means. Understanding how these kinds of phrases and these kinds of initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, have shaped China's grand strategy and foreign policy approach, especially in developing countries over the last 10 years. I think we make a mistake if we dismiss them as meaningless because I think China, in the way that it has for years referenced the Belt and Road Initiative in most of its engagements with countries across the developing world as well as in the developed world is now referencing the Global Security Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, etc., and it also underscores the fact that what China's trying to achieve here is ideological, right? I mean, it is a transformation of the order to one that is China at the center, not U.S.-led. But inherent in that is what China puts forward in these initiatives, which is no focus on individual rights, of course, or democracy, a focus on sovereignty, which, of course, we know that China itself violates by its support for Russia. But all these other principles that are baked into a notion that is: countries such as Europe and the United States should not be lecturing other countries on how they run their own systems, and one system, authoritarian, is just as legitimate as another. So in that sense, I think we should take them seriously.

Dr. Alterman: And certainly there's enthusiasm in the Middle East, not only Iran, but in the Gulf and Egypt and elsewhere about Belt and Road and what it means for them. It's important as we think about the alliance that there isn't a Western strategic vision that's attractive either to people in Iran or even throughout the region, and certainly the Gaza War has created even more fissures between the region and for countries like Iran that say, "We're part of the resistance to what's happening in Gaza." It gets them support throughout the developing world. And the Iranian strategy under President Raisi, which was, "Let's look more toward Asia, look toward regional partners. Let's stop chasing the West and let's support these agents of resistance." That strategy, from an Iranian strategic perspective, I think most Iranians think it's worked really well, and the Western alliance hasn't come up with a way to undermine it.

Dr. Shullman: Yeah. Well, we have a few minutes left and then we're going to come to questions, so I encourage people to start to come up to the mics if you have questions for our Q&A session. But before we get there, and you were starting to take us in this direction, Jon, I want to start talking about what should the NATO alliance be doing in terms of pushing back on this budding axis, if we want to call it that, among these adversaries? What is essential both in terms of our response to those adversaries and then what is essential in terms of trying to ensure that the key swing states that we're looking at in the international system, your Brazils, your Saudis, your Indonesias, all these kind of key countries that may determine where the future order goes feel invested in some version of a current order that maybe does need to transform but we don't want to necessarily buy into what China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are offering? Yeah, Benedetta.

Dr. Berti: Maybe we can start with what we are doing, because we are actually doing a lot. Let's start with Ukraine because, maybe I will repeat myself, but I think it's worth doing. So right now, Ukraine is the test case. It is the laboratory for authoritarian learning, authoritarian cooperation, and the stakes there are incredibly high. That is why I go back to Ukraine. There are very different paths for our future. One is where Ukraine prevails as a sovereign independent country and is vindicated in its fight for freedom, and that's a world in which there is a powerful lesson sent to Beijing, sent to North Korea, sent to Iran, sent to Russia itself, of course, and that's a message that, of course, supports the global rules-based order, supports the beginning of the rethinking of a European security architecture, which right now it's on life support because of Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.

So if you want a strong first policy proposal, and that's exactly what NATO is doing by supporting Ukraine, is first of all, Ukraine must prevail. The war of aggression must fail. These authoritarian actors need to see that using force does not pay off, and that's really important because the alternative, one in which Putin's war of aggression is successful, is where these actors become even more emboldened, even more brazen, and we already see it in the last year with Iran's destabilizing role in the Middle East, support for terrorism, non-proliferation concerns. We see this in the Korean peninsula, we see this, of course, with the PRC enabling Russia's war of aggression, we see this with the Russian Federation itself, which is now stepping up its hybrid activities in our allied countries, and you will hear statements from allied leaders this week expressing not just concern but also our response options to make sure that we build resiliency and counter this hybrid attack.

So first of all, Ukraine must prevail. These actors must understand that aggression will not pay off. In addition, we are, and you will have heard this throughout the day, in the midst of the largest reinforcement of our deterrence and defense posture in generations. This is part and parcel of how you communicate resolve and credibility to these adversaries, because I don't think we must be naïve. The main language that Putin understands is power, and that's why we have such a key task to rebuild and re-energize our defense industrial base and our military instruments of power.

So we're doing that. We're also working on the resiliency of our infrastructure, supply chains, of our societal and democratic institutions. All of this is so that we are better placed to respond to these coercive hybrid tactics by these authoritarian actors. And we're not doing that alone. We're doing that as an alliance of 32, but we're doing that more and more with our partners, and it's not a coincidence that tomorrow there will be a session with our partners from the Indo-Pacific, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. Again, this is what Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific solidarity looks like, not just in supporting Ukraine, but in pushing back against authoritarian aggression, and of course, we also have multiple partnerships in the rest of the world, working with countries that are interested in cooperating with us on issue like countering disinformation, countering hybrid threats.

So there is a lot that we are doing. I'm looking forward to hearing what more we can do, but I think we have to start with recognizing that we recognize the reality and we're responding and adapting to it. And possibly, again, I'm going to be boring, but the most important thing we can do today is ensure Ukraine prevails as a sovereign-dependent country. That is the lesson that we want to send to Beijing, to Moscow, to Pyongyang, and to Tehran.

Dr. Shullman: I couldn't agree more.

Dr. Berti: Thank you. Thanks.

Dr. Shullman: Absolutely agree. Jon, anything?

Dr. Alterman: I think there are any number of ways in which the actions of countries like Iran and North Korea threaten the interests of countries like Russia and China, and we can find ways to cooperate on what we can cooperate on to constrain the bad things that Iran is doing. For example, Red Sea security affects China in a pretty profound way because so much of Chinese trade passes through the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal. China cares a lot about Egypt, and China has a lot of investment in Egypt, and Suez Canal tolls, which are a huge source of revenue for the Egyptian government, are down 50 percent since the beginning of the year. I think there is a case that can be made that China should be playing a more constructive role, not to help some broader international alliance, not to bolster the United States, but to advance Chinese interests and call out China for not doing it, to call out China when it does the right thing. On the Iran nuclear issue, we had support from Russia and China for the JCPOA.

I think there are ways to make it about less than global hegemony and more about these country's interests and just be clear about, "You're hurting yourself, you're hurting everybody. You could play a role. Be responsible." And I think that there are ways that Europe can work with the United States to make clear to Russia and China that there are rewards for doing the right thing and costs for doing the wrong thing, and we should find ways to... Again, you don't have to agree on everything, but there are some things, they're not in anybody's interest, or they're certainly not in Russia's interest or certainly not in China's. When energy costs go up, that's good for Russia—it's really bad for China.

Dr. Shullman: Yeah, I would agree that. I think the fundamental way to approach this, at least when it relates to China, is not trying to create wedges between these countries, because I don't think that that's going to work, but to basically change China's calculus such that they start to understand that their interests are going to be better achieved not by aligning themselves with countries that start and lose wars, that they're not going to get to this position of centrality in the global system and be perceived as a responsible player by doing this.

The problem at this moment, as we have said already, is that China at this point is making these decisions in terms of its support for some of these countries and its position on things, such as Iran's support for the Houthis, based, I think, more around what might hurt the United States and hurt NATO, not so much what might be not convenient for Chinese interests, such as shipping through the Red Sea. We can talk about the extent to which China actually put pressure on Iran, but I'm betting it was pretty minimal.

So that, I think, is the challenge, is that we're not necessarily framing this, as the Chinese would say, in Cold War terms. It's China that is looking at the United States and is looking at NATO through that lens, and how do we deal with things given that reality?

We have a question. Great. Please share your name and your affiliation.

Q: Hi, I'm Nick Lokker from the Center for a New American Security. Dave, I wanted to ask you a little bit about how China is viewing the deepening relationship between North Korea and Russia that we've been observing since the onset of the February 2022 invasion with North Korea's military support for Russia's war against Ukraine, and then we did just see Vladimir Putin visit Pyongyang recently, so I assume that this has some implications for China's outlook on the region more broadly, but I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on that. Thank you.

Dr. Shullman: treaty ally going back to 1961, and I think when we look at how China views this burgeoning tightening between Russia and North Korea, as you mentioned we have this meeting between Putin and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, they had a new announcement of a defense pact. I think on the whole, China is uneasy about this development between Russia and North Korea. I think there is a positive in the sense that, obviously, we've seen or there's indications that North Korean missiles and other support are going to Russia and from China. That's probably all to the good. But in terms of China's ability to have sway over North Korea in the determination and the decisions that it makes, that potentially gets diminished by Russia and North Korea deepening their ties. And I think China, as we've discussed, views itself as a more responsible player with these other countries, ones with high-risk appetite doing things that might be dangerous. And when you look at the Korean Peninsula right on China's border, I think the notion of Russia and North Korea getting closer and potentially making decisions that are risky, that damage China's security is of great concern to China. Potentially Russia even giving North Korea advanced technology that helps North Korea to further its nuclear development in ways that could create even more security hassles for China in the region.

So on the whole, I think China is watching this warily, not terribly happy about it, but there's not much they can do about it to be honest. And I think the question that I've gotten about this is, "Well, is this an opportunity to create a wedge there between these countries?" I don't see that at all. I think it's just something to watch and wait. But it is an indication as we've discussed, that this is by no means a smooth relationship between these four countries that we've been talking about. Anything to add?

Dr. Berti: No, I would agree that smooth is possibly not the word that comes to mind, but I think the reality is that it is further along than what I think most analysts would've anticipated before 2022, in the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. And that also goes when we look at the DPRK-Russia relation. There are of course very serious concerns about what would in the future North Korea get in return for the significant military support that it is providing to Russia. And what would it do in terms of stability in the Korean Peninsula? What would it do in terms of concerns over non-proliferation and more broadly, what would it do for the stability of the Indo-Pacific theater? Which as we know is incredibly important to global stability, global prosperity, and of course also has direct implication for the security of the Atlantic area being such a central domain of growth, development and competition.

So it is a very concerning development, and I would agree that maybe not everyone in this "axis," which is a word I am a little hesitant to utilize, but whatever you want to call it, “strategic convergence.” Not everyone may be enthusiastic about it, yet none of these actors is taking active steps to slow down the cooperation or undermine it or call it out in an international forum or frankly support sanctions on North Korea. Again, we see that despite the fact that there may be baked-in frictions and disagreements for the time being. The broader strategic direction of trying to undermine the United States, NATO, and its allies remains the dominant consideration. That's something that we need to take on board and reflect upon and adjust our posture and actions accordingly. But of course, it's something that we need to keep a close watch on.

Dr. Shullman: Yeah. John, anything to add in terms of the Iran-North Korea relationship and how you think that is developing or not?

Dr. Alterman: Well, they talked to each other and a former Iranian foreign minister was gleefully telling me about the advice he got from the North Korean foreign minister about the Trump administration, which is only deal with the president, don't deal with his aides. So I think there's a lot of conversation. I think there's conversation probably on some of the nuclear issues. I don't think there's a lot of trust and mutual respect, but these countries don't have a lot of options. There aren't a lot of people who will talk to them. And I think that they do think there are things they can learn and they are in contact.

Q: My name is Julia Jamila Werner from Germany. I'm the co-founder of the Transatlantic Student Initiative. In Iran, there's just recently been an election and economic ties to Russia, for example. Also, China is flourishing. When it comes to European partners do you think that NATO and its allies have really understood the impact of the alliance we're talking about when it comes to the war in Ukraine, for example? Or are we still a bit too easy with that?

Dr. Berti: If I may repeat the question back to you so I can make sure I understood. Your question is whether we have fully grasped the dynamic, the scale and scope of the relationship between these four countries and how far it has gone?

Q: Exactly, that or are we too naïve?

Dr. Berti: That's always a good question because it's really good to check our assumptions, and we may in the past have been that way. But I would say that us today, and you'll see it this week in the discussions that the NATO leaders are having at this summit. I think we're clear-eyed about the fact that this relationship is incredibly worrisome, that there is a strategic alignment, that there are concerted actions. And again, this principle was already identified in 2022 when we had the strategic concept, but we're taking a hard look at how much faster than anticipated and closer our relationship has become, not least over the last year because of the Chinese decision to go all-in when it comes to the provisional dual use goods that enable Russia's war of aggression. So I don't think there is a naivete. I think we are clear eye about it as an alliance and I think we will hear leaders making statements to that effect.

Q: How do you describe then or how do you explain some actors, such as Germany for example, still having those good economic relationships?

Dr. Berti: Well, I think that each individual country is balancing between different considerations, and that's really how policy works. You're balancing between economic and trade considerations, domestic politics consideration, defense and security, foreign policy. That's how you square the circle of policymaking. And I think that applies to how many, and I'm not going to go into individual member states, but I would say that applies to how each and every member state is looking on the one hand at enhancing security and ensuring collective defense, and on the other hand, maintaining prosperity and having healthy economic relations.

And one of the conversation we're really having, and it's really important, is how do we better integrate national security consideration into our economic policies? And I think this is something that we are learning. We learned it the hard way to be honest, after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine because we learned what it meant to have a one-sided strategic dependency on Russian oil and gas. And I would very much say that it is in our absolute vital interest to make sure we do not repeat that mistake and have similar dependencies on other assertive authoritarian actors.

Dr. Shullman: I think that's a great place to wrap up because the very fact that we're having this conversation here at the public forum indicates that there's a growing understanding of the need to discuss not just China's support for Russia, but the role of these others actors as well, what that means for NATO, what that means for all of us in terms of the future and how we need to deal with it. But that there's a lot more that needs to be done in terms of more unity of vision on these issues and what we might be able to do about it in terms of joint efforts. So with that, thank you, Benedetta. Thank you, Jon. And please join me in thanking them for this great panel.

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