Pacific Perspectives on Trump’s Second Term: Uncertainty and Adaptation

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled Navigating Disruption: Ally and Partner Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy.

Introduction

Before Donald Trump assumed office for the second time, there was rampant speculation about what exactly an “America First” foreign policy would amount to in this new administration. Governments, global leaders, and analysts across the world wanted to know what form Trump’s economic policy would take, and how much pressure he would apply to allies and partners perceived as not “pulling their weight” on defense spending. They also wondered whether Trump would be willing to muster coalitions of allies and partners to lean into competition with authoritarian actors in Tehran, Pyongyang, Moscow, and, above all others, Beijing.

Would a more assured and less constrained Trump overly privilege U.S. interests, potentially rendering the nation more isolated and alone? At their core, these questions revolve around whether Trump 2.0 will amount to “America First” or “America Alone” and if Trump will attempt to reform, abandon, or destroy the rules-based order. The answers to these questions carry enormous implications for the future of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands region and for how countries across the Pacific will calibrate their own strategy. That, in turn, has implications for the United States’ own interests.

To understand the impact of these policy changes, what regional responses have looked like, and what next steps might be, the CSIS Australia Chair reached out to security experts, policy analysts, journalists, academics, and current and former government officials from around the region. All discussions were conducted on background to encourage candid conversations.

Unsurprisingly, as the authors consulted a broad range of individuals, the results of these conversations were not uniform. Nevertheless, taken together, they form a broad picture of how the region is thinking about, and reacting to, the emerging agenda of the Trump administration.

The Impact of Trump’s Policies on the Region

The past six months have seen a wide range of America First policies that have cut across development, trade, and defense. Arguing that foreign assistance needed to better align with U.S. national security priorities, the Trump administration paused or halted most foreign assistance, and the State Department began a full-scale review of multilateral institutions. The imposition of historically high tariffs and the cutting or halting of development aid are having the greatest impact on the region; however the United States’ review of multilateral architecture, its withdrawal from global institutions, and pressure on defense spending are also causing concern.

Australia

For Australia, a long-standing U.S. ally that holds a trade deficit with the United States, the imposition of tariffs and U.S. expectations on defense spending have had the biggest impacts. In April, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated that the 10 percent tariff on Australia had “no basis in logic” and “was not the act of a friend.” This sentiment was echoed across most of the authors’ interviews. Despite Trump’s deep unpopularity in Australia, overall public support for the U.S.-Australia alliance remains high. However, actions such as tariffs have the potential to significantly erode trust in the U.S.-Australia alliance. One respondent noted that “there are growing voices among elites openly questioning the value of the alliance.” There is also a sense that tariffs on allies are incongruent with great power competition, as “anything that gets any part of the supply chain out of China should be a win.”

The U.S. expectation that allies increase defense spending has created domestic political friction, and, for some, is an example of U.S. bullying. This comes even as many acknowledge that an increase in defense spending is necessary to fund both the nuclear submarine program under AUKUS Pillar I, as well as to remedy conventional military shortfalls. But even as some welcome this external pressure, unease remains over the public manner of these requests—and how they might be tied to other critical components of the alliance.

Additionally, perceptions of a capricious and transactional Washington are creating pressure to reconsider long-standing assumptions about the alliance. Moreover, there is a growing sense within Australia that the United States is withdrawing from its role as a global leader. One respondent summarized this sentiment, describing Australia’s perception of MAGA as: “an indifference to allies, a power-above-rules mindset, . . . a gutting of development assistance, and associated ceding of ground to China in the battle for influence in our region.”

New Zealand

The top concern for New Zealand is tariffs, as the United States has become New Zealand’s second-largest trading partner. The Luxon government has put significant time and effort into reinvigorating the U.S.-New Zealand relationship and was disappointed by the increase of New Zealand’s tariff rate from 10 to 15 percent on July 31. But it is more than mere disappointment; public consternation over trade is ultimately shrinking the permission space for New Zealand leaders to align more closely with the United States on key policy issues, such as potentially joining AUKUS Pillar II.

In addition to trade, interviews also revealed concern over the United States’ about-face on climate change; the reduction of development assistance, especially in the Pacific; and the potential implications of the U.S. review of multilateral institutions. Any reduction in funding or withdrawal from international organizations would be particularly alarming for New Zealand, given the country’s reliance on the current global system.

Pacific

While none of the Trump administration’s policies have been specifically directed at Pacific Island nations, recent announcements have disrupted much of the goodwill that had been built up over the past half decade of reengagement. In many cases, the implications on the ground have been immediate, with job losses and local civil society organizations left vulnerable. 

Many respondents saw the administration’s combination of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, shuttering of USAID, pause of foreign assistance, and implementation of tariffs as a demonstration of U.S. inconsistency and self-interest, a perception that is allowing China to recast itself as a reliable partner in the region.

How the Region Is Responding to America First

Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific island region are reacting to these changes with a range of their own policies. Countries in the region are seeking to strengthen relationships and institutions outside of the United States, and some Pacific nations are considering leaning further into their relationship with China. 

Australia

In response to growing uncertainty over U.S. actions and intentions on trade and defense policy, Australia is attempting to balance alliance commitments with domestic resource constraints and increasingly negative public sentiment toward the United States. Navigating defense spending has been particularly complex. While some Australians welcome external pressures on defense budgets, thus far the Albanese administration has resisted calls to raise defense spending in any meaningful way, a situation that may become politically uncomfortable for the current government.

Amid what it views as an increasingly transactional United States, Australia is also strengthening its broader network of relationships, including with Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, and India. This move highlights a shift in Australian foreign policy to reduce dependence on a single nation, a shift which has been taking place over the last several years but has accelerated of late. Australia is also assessing where to fill gaps left by the United States, especially in the Pacific, even if it is already carrying the majority of developmental weight in the region. Yet, decreased confidence in the United States is also affecting Australia’s willingness to assert itself regionally. One respondent stated, “uncertainty around Trump also makes the government more hesitant to pick fights with China.”

Still, most respondents emphasized the continuing importance of the alliance in the Australian system even as Australia looks to bolster other relationships. Others pointed out that enhancing “spoke-to-spoke” ties is not necessarily a bad result, as it “breaks the hub and spoke system for good, making the spoke-to-spoke relationships much stronger.” However, this trend does reduce the United States’ ability to push its own agenda, and may put constraints on how far allies are willing to go to support U.S. interests.

New Zealand

With growing uncertainty over U.S. intentions, many New Zealanders are questioning whether the country can collaborate with the United States on global issues such as energy and trade. One respondent stated that some New Zealanders think that “the rules-based order has been obliterated . . . [which] is antithetical to [New Zealand’s] interests.” In response, New Zealand has been drawing even closer to its ally Australia, especially in navigating the current Trump administration, and is increasingly reaching out to other countries in the Indo-Pacific. Amid discomfort over U.S. trade policies, the government is looking at other ways to bolster economic resilience.

Pacific

Due to their small size and narrow economies, Pacific Island countries are limited in their ability to backfill development shortfalls or negotiate better trade deals. A common refrain among Pacific respondents was that recent U.S. actions will push Pacific countries to look to other nations—including China—for partnership. As Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape diplomatically stated after the April tariff announcement, “We will continue to strengthen our trade relations in Asia and the Pacific. . . . If the U.S. market becomes more difficult . . . we will simply redirect our goods to markets where there is mutual respect and no artificial barriers.”

For some Pacific partners, the primary response to a less certain United States has been to hedge by maintaining relations with the West even as they deepen ties with China. Overall, this shifting environment is creating opportunities for China to expand its influence in the Pacific. As one Pacific interviewee explained, “Gone are the days when China was widely feared in the Pacific. . . . now, it’s increasingly seen as a credible development partner.”

Implications for the United States

Taken in sum, U.S. policies are having the combined effect of undermining the United States’ moral authority and influence across the Pacific.

As the United States declines in popularity, its ability to prosecute U.S. national interests is also degraded. A recent Lowy Institute poll found that only 36 percent of Australians trusted America to “act responsibly,” a 20-point decrease since 2024. This reinforces what many interviewees alluded to: The perception of the United States as an unreliable and self-interested partner is negatively affecting public opinion and limiting policymakers’ ability to act in partnership with the United States. A former official noted that if AUKUS were being created now, the current Albanese government would not likely have the social capital to enter such a major agreement. What this means for the future of the U.S.-Australia alliance is less conclusive. While for many the alliance remains strong, there is the potential for a change in the trajectory of the partnership, with Australia becoming a “less dependable ally.”

Ultimately, this perception of U.S. retrenchment and unreliability creates opportunities for China to expand its influence. One official noted that “[China’s] message resonates, especially when the United States is seen to be retreating.” One respondent explained the direct implications for U.S. interests: “China will exploit this situation to deepen its campaign to persuade a wide range of Asian and Indo-Pacific nations to let it win without fighting, whether in the South China Sea or Taiwan.”

Recommendations from the Region

A topline message from almost all participants was the need for the United States to be more consistent in its resourcing and messaging, or as one interviewee stated: “Starting to meet deadlines, sticking to red lines. . . . There needs to be some sort of signal to the Indo-Pacific as to what’s important and what role they will play.”

Australia

In addition to greater consistency in policy, timelines, and messaging, the United States must communicate a coherent and credible Indo-Pacific strategy if it wants to shore up its influence and partnerships abroad.

While the architecture of the U.S.-Australia alliance remains strong, several respondents emphasized that U.S. engagement must respect the sovereignty, perspectives, and domestic politics of partners.

In a world where the Trump administration has shifted U.S. foreign policy to be more transactional, some respondents urged the United States to avoid zero-sum approaches and to treat partners differently from adversaries. One Australian former official stated that there is a logic to pursuing increased burden sharing but noted the importance of combining burden sharing with presence and collaboration.

New Zealand

Several New Zealand interviewees urged the United States to be more communicative and present with partners and allies, especially if the United States wants to have a voice in shaping the evolving multilateral architecture. To rebuild some of the lost momentum with the Pacific—a top concern voiced in interviews with Australians and New Zealanders—the United States could bring Pacific leaders to Washington for another U.S.-Pacific summit, and capitalize on U.S. strengths, such as providing education and scholarship opportunities to deepen ties with emerging Pacific Island leaders and to counteract Chinese efforts to build ties with senior officials in the region.

Pacific

In the Pacific, the United States could improve its visibility and messaging to counter narratives from adversaries like China. This messaging should be accompanied by action. “The United States needs to decide how important the Pacific really is to its strategic interests,” stated one journalist. “Don’t tell us the Pacific is vital, only to turn around and implement drastic aid cuts.”

Despite recent challenges, the United States remains an important player in the Pacific, and Pacific leaders are eager to see the United States demonstrate leadership and reinvigorate relationships across the region. In the Pacific, this is a relatively low-cost, high-gain endeavor. As one interviewee pointed out, “America doesn’t have to pay billions” to engage effectively.

The Way Forward

While the Trump administration’s strategic approach to the region has yet to be fully delineated, 2025 has already brought an astonishing number of U.S. foreign policy shifts.

In addition to tangible effects on the ground, recent U.S. government actions have also created an environment whereby it is politically more difficult for partners and allies to align themselves with U.S. objectives, and concurrently China is able to frame itself as a more favorable partner.

At the same time, support for the U.S.-Australia alliance remains high, for the time being, and many Pacific countries are eager to regain the momentum they have built with the United States in recent years. To this end, respondents provided several observations and recommendations.

First, because the full extent of policy changes remains unclear, governments across the region are struggling to assess Trump’s ultimate direction and objective. Consequently, governments have been hesitant to shift their own strategies and resource allocations in meaningful ways. Interviews often emphasized the need for the United States to be more consistent and transparent in messaging to help partners better align their own systems more effectively.

Second, virtually all respondents urged Washington to develop and communicate a clear Indo-Pacific strategy. Doing so would allow these countries to calibrate their own policies, align where warranted, and deconflict where necessary.

Third, many individuals acknowledged that having partners and allies contribute more increases broader regional security. However, pushing for burden sharing should be combined with presence and collaboration to be most effective.

Fourth, uncertainty around how deeply the Trump administration is leaning into competition with Beijing is tempering how countries in the region are framing their own China policies. U.S. economic policy seems to be at cross-purposes with defense policy, with the former aimed at extracting more concessions and the latter intended to build collective resilience. Clarifying policy objectives, as well as better sequencing policy actions, would ease friction between Washington and the region on efforts to build a larger collection of nations committed to taking on the more harmful aspects of China’s continuous outward push.

Finally, almost all respondents noted that there has been a profound perception shift of the United States in the region. To ensure the United States retains critical influence in the Pacific, nearly all discussants urged the Trump administration to determine the direction of its development policy and underscored that soft power is a necessary enabler of hard power.

Charles Edel is a senior adviser and the inaugural Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kathryn Paik is a deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at CSIS. John Augé is the program manager for the Australia Chair at CSIS.