The Politics and Repercussions of Washington’s Permanent Joint Board on Defense Pause

Because Canada has a relatively large economy, spending 2.01 percent on defense produces one of the largest defense budgets in NATO. As the chart below shows, only 5 of the 32 NATO members spend more. In fact, Canada spends about as much as the 15 smallest NATO defense budgets put together. Canada has also pledged to meet the new NATO 5 percent goal.

In dollar terms, Canada spent Can$63 billion on defense in 2025 (approximately US$43.9 billion), the “single largest year-on-year increase in defence investment in generations,” according to Prime Minister Carney. A major priority is the Arctic and the defense of North America’s northern approaches. Investments are being directed toward Arctic forward-operating locations, support hubs consisting of improvements in roads and infrastructure at northern ports and airfields, surveillance systems, sea-floor monitoring sensors, NORAD modernization, and upgraded radar and early warning systems. These investments ease demands on U.S. forces.

At the same time, Ottawa is investing heavily in naval modernization, including the construction of 15 new destroyers through the River-class Destroyer Project and the purchase of 12 new conventionally powered, under-ice capable submarines under the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, along with expanded shipbuilding capacity and naval infrastructure. Air capabilities are also being modernized through the acquisition of F-35 fighter aircraft, drones, and long-range missiles, though because of recent trade tensions, the size of the F-35 purchase is under review. Armored vehicles, ground-launched drones, and precision fires will enhance Army capabilities.

Much of the spending is aimed at rebuilding military readiness after years of underinvestment. Canada is increasing pay for members of the Canadian Armed Forces and considering increasing trained reserves to 100,000 troops and adding a lightly trained citizen soldier force of 300,000. 

Q3: What about the administration’s other stated reason to pause the PJBD?

A3: As for the complaint about Canada’s “rhetoric,” one of the authors of this piece has argued that when it comes to Prime Minister Mark Carney, the pen is mightier than the sword, in the sense that his speeches have piqued the White House more than Canada’s former status as a defense laggard. Colby’s social media announcement may come from a feeling of shock at the gall of Canadian grandstanding on the world stage, while Canada is still largely relying on the United States for military defense. The prime minister’s remarks at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, which portrayed a harsher geopolitical environment and called on middle powers to band together to resist economic coercion from hegemons, upset the White House and contributed to a tougher stance toward Canada. Indeed, in President Trump’s own Davos speech, he said that “Canada gets a lot of freebies from us, by the way. They should be grateful also, but they’re not . . . Canada lives because of the United States. Remember that Mark, the next time you make your statements.”

President Trump subsequently revoked Canada’s invitation to participate in his Gaza “Board of Peace” initiative; threatened Canada with a 100 percent tariff if the country solidified a trade deal with China, after initially saying it was a good thing to sign a trade deal; and later threatened to block the planned opening of the Gordie Howe International Bridge connecting Windsor to Detroit, accusing Canada of treating the United States unfairly during construction of the bridge and in other trade matters.

The Davos speech represents the international dimension of what Prime Minister Carney is trying to do within Canada; diversify its economy away from the United States, in addition to reducing Canada’s military dependence on it. The prime minister recently declared that “the days of our military sending 70 cents of every dollar to the United States are over.” The review of the F-35 purchase is consistent with this goal, as is Canada’s new Defense Industrial Strategy. Canada’s international rhetoric and its intentional distancing from the United States on military purchases likely contributed to the decision to pause the PJBD as much as the continuing perception in Washington of Canada as a laggard on defense.

Q4: Why is the United States taking this action now?

A4: Canada has yet to demonstrate that its defense projects result in genuine deterrence or lethality as part of the spending, a point not lost on the Pentagon. Further, the pause is likely intended to remind Canada that catching up to the previous NATO standard is old news. The U.S. ambassador to Ottawa, Pete Hoekstra, speaking after the PJBD suspension was announced, said that he has heard of no plan from Canada’s finance minister to get to 5 percent. The timing is also likely intended to push Canada to make a final decision to purchase the F-35 fighter jet, as well as to move more quickly on other priorities the Americans are pushing Canada to procure to shore up the defense of North America.

Further, Canada has yet to make changes to its military procurement processes to allow for faster spending allocations. If the U.S. procurement system is considered antiquated, Canada’s procurement system is positively byzantine. Getting the large expenditures tied to procurement priorities actually spent will require Canada to modernize its procurement processes and get the timing down from years—in some cases, decades—to months. The prime minister, to his credit, has designated a minister responsible for modernizing military procurement. Unfortunately, no reported changes or progress have been reported thus far aside from the announcement of the newly created Defence Investment Agency overseen by Secretary of State Stephen Fuhr, though the legislation would give the new minister far more discretionary powers to invest and procure, speeding up timelines.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that the under secretary took the opportunity to give Ottawa a reminder of U.S. expectations for meaningful defense spending, not just spending planning.

One other reason for the timing is likely the forthcoming renewal of the USMCA, due on July 1. The United States has made it clear to Canada that renewal of the agreement is partially contingent on shouldering more of the burden for continental defense. This is nothing new, as President George W. Bush’s ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, famously said 20 years ago that for the United States, “security trumps trade.”

Q5: What impact will the pause have on U.S.-Canada cooperation?

A5: The United States has built an unmatched architecture for securing U.S. national interests globally. Its design includes myriad agreements and institutions. Many operate quietly and receive attention only when they fail. The value of such institutions lies less in crisis management than in creating habits of consultation before crises arise.

The PJBD was created to plan continental defense cooperation with Canada and as a means of encouraging Canada to align its defense planning with U.S. strategic priorities. The PJBD institutionalized that process at the civilian and political level. Suspending participation may therefore put at risk one of Washington’s own mechanisms for shaping Canadian defense choices over time.

The United States benefits from institutionalized Canadian cooperation because it helps ensure that Canada plans alongside U.S. priorities rather than drifting toward more autonomous or Europe-centered defense planning.

Washington also gains leverage and predictability through regular consultation. The PJBD is not charity toward Canada; it is a forum for shaping Canadian defense behavior early, quietly, and strategically. Recent reporting that Washington presented Ottawa with a classified list of U.S. continental defense priorities, and was dissatisfied with the Canadian response, illustrates the limits of unilateral demands absent the habits of consultation and consensus-building that institutions like the PJBD were designed to foster. Arguably, the PJBD has been more successful than other planning processes in securing Canadian defense investments to complement those the United States makes to secure itself.

Finally, the United States has a strong interest in maintaining bilateral—not merely multilateral—continental defense planning. NATO cannot fully substitute for a North American framework because the U.S. continental and Arctic approaches involve distinct operational and political considerations. In the same way the Five Eyes intelligence collaboration exists alongside U.S. bilateral intelligence sharing with allies like Israel, Japan, and Germany, U.S. national security benefits from a diverse array of partnerships structured for specific purposes and relationships that complement each other. Removing one element from this architecture does not mean other institutions automatically assume its functions. The more likely result is a lacuna in Washington’s threat awareness and response options.

These risks exist even if one accepts the administration’s frustrations with Canada—weakening the institutional architecture of bilateral defense consultation carries costs for the United States as well.

Because the United States has characterized its position on the PJBD as a pause, and not as a termination of the board, there is a time factor to weigh in assessing its potential impact. There will be a limited operational impact in the short term as the contributions of the PJBD are realized over a longer period. In the medium and long term, a prolonged pause would lead to an erosion of planning culture and political trust, with strategic consequences, including reduced alignment on Arctic and continental priorities. 

Q6: What effect will this action have on Canada and the United States?

A6: The PJBD was established because the United States and Canada recognized a reality that has not changed: The defense of North America requires close coordination and cooperation between the two largest countries on the continent. Prime Minister Carney played down the PJBD announcement, in part because it hasn’t met since 2024, but he clearly understands the significance of the move. But playing this down misrepresents the utility of the PJBD and the role that ongoing discussions play in even the closest alliances. Indeed, the importance of the PJBD is increasing as the Canada-U.S. relationship fractures under the second Trump administration.

Immediately after the suspension of the PJBD was announced, former members and observers of the board contacted one of the authors recounting the various topics and thorny issues that the board has helped address over the decades. Unlike NATO, which is an alliance with military and diplomatic components, NORAD is a squarely military command. NORAD does not offer “good offices” that are vital when countries are working through problems. The PJBD is one of those “good offices.” The PJBD has provided a forum to explore new avenues of cooperation. In so doing, it has complemented the work of Canadian and U.S. diplomats and political leaders. More importantly, the PJBD has been quite valuable when the Canada-U.S. relationship has been going through difficulties, such as when Ottawa declined to join the 2003 Iraq War and the U.S. missile defense system in 2005. Frank exchanges between PJBD members were relayed back to Ottawa and Washington, allowing both countries to better understand each other’s positions.

Canada-U.S. relations are currently in the worst state they have been in living memory. There is deep distrust and animosity between their respective governments. Geography, however, prevents the two countries from breaking up. They must live with each other, and as was the case when the PJBD was established in 1940, they have a vested interest in defending the continent together. Bodies like the PJBD will be essential as Canada and the United States look to reset their damaged relationship in the future. Ideally, the PJBD would also be meeting now to help keep the rift between the two allies from becoming larger.

The longer the PJBD is suspended, the longer the two countries will be missing a “good office” that could help them better understand each other, and that will be needed to repair their alliance when the time comes. That is bad for Canada, and bad for the United States.

Christopher Hernandez-Roy is a senior fellow and acting director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Mark F. Cancian is a senior adviser with the CSIS Defense and Security Department. Jamie Trones is the executive director of the Center for North American Prosperity and Security. Richard Shimooka is senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Christopher Sands is the director of the Center for U.S.-Canada Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Philippe Lagassé is associate professor and Barton Chair, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.