Previewing Xi Jinping’s Visit to North Korea | State of Play

State of Play, a podcast and commentary series produced by the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, features timely analysis from CSIS’s leading regional experts on geopolitical developments and the future of the international order.

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As speculated over the past few weeks, Chinese President Xi Jinping is visiting Pyongyang for a state visit on June 8–9. President Xi’s visit to Pyongyang follows summits in Beijing with U.S. President Donald Trump on May 14–15 and Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 20. The visit reciprocates North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s visit to Beijing in September 2025, while also allowing Xi to give a readout of his visit with President Trump. This will be Xi’s third visit to North Korea—the first was as vice president in 2008; the most recent was in June 2019. The largely formulaic, opaque, and symbolism-focused coverage of both sides’ media has included, not surprisingly, little insight as to the substance of discussions or the state of relations between Beijing and Pyongyang.

With rumor upon rumor of a meeting between President Trump and Kim, there is speculation that mediating some type of U.S.-North Korea contacts could be on President Xi’s Pyongyang agenda. Though this seems unlikely, given Beijing’s unwillingness to date to confirm the May 17 White House Fact Sheet and its assertion that the two leaders “confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea.” President Xi is unlikely to expend much, if any, political leverage in an effort to bring Kim back to the denuclearization table—an effort Xi probably concludes is unlikely to bear fruit.

Why Does It Matter?

At a macro level, President Xi is likely hoping to demonstrate a dynamic leading role on the international stage—particularly within the China, Russia, Iran, North Korea (CRINK) grouping of revisionist autocracies—while portraying U.S. influence globally as in decline. Although themes of the importance of China to North Korea will be acknowledged, Xi may not be driven by any urgent need to counter Russia’s growing influence in North Korea, as some analysts might assert.

From Kim’s perspective, meeting with Xi supports Pyongyang’s broader diplomatic efforts to normalize the country’s nuclear power status, one country at a time. The meeting also demonstrates that North Korea and China can explore improving relations in spite of Kim’s growing closeness to Russia: It is not a zero-sum choice for Kim. Though observers hope that Xi might increase pressure on North Korean denuclearization or even draw a red line seeking to discourage Kim from moving even closer to Russia, these outcomes are unlikely.

What’s Next?

With North Korea’s continued close ties with Russia, indications that Russia has a sustained need for North Korean material and manpower support in Ukraine, and a restoration of trade between China and North Korea to pre-Covid-19 levels, Kim Jong-un is likely confident he is achieving success in his longer-term diplomatic strategy to lock in his nuclear status and achieve some level of normalcy on the international stage even without meeting Washington or Seoul. Kim has been cautious in his diplomacy since he failed in 2019 to gain forward momentum in his goal of locking in his nuclear status with the United States. He refused to engage President Trump for the remainder of the first Trump administration, ignored the Biden administration for four full years, and has been nonresponsive to U.S. overtures in the second Trump administration. Kim seems to be signaling he needs more assurance that a meeting with President Trump would not result in pressure to return to stalled denuclearization talks. The White House’s inclusion of wording in the fact sheet asserting that Presidents Trump and Xi agreed to work toward the denuclearization of North Korea was, of course, not likely to have been welcomed by Pyongyang, but Xi will likely explained the wording to Kim as diplomatically necessary to placate the United States.

What’s Under the Radar?

U.S.-North Korea diplomacy might not be perpetually dormant. There may still be a way for President Trump to frame talks that would appeal to Kim, mitigate the tension in the relationship built over the last several years, avoid the thorny denuclearization issue in the near term, and be trumpeted as creating a diplomatic atmosphere that would enable denuclearization talks down the road. This would provide the president with an opportunity to advance his relationship with Kim, claim forward progress in advancing U.S.-North Korea relations in a way his predecessors failed, and support South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s desire for resumed U.S.-North Korea dialogue necessary to jumpstart inter-Korean relations.

Motivation for Kim to come back to the table remains low, however. Near-term economic inputs that help him slowly but gradually restore both the civilian and military economies are obtainable through his relationship with Russia. Increases in North Korea-China trade suggest that this relationship can help bring North Korea out of its isolation and pressure in ways that would far exceed what Kim might hope to receive through South Korea or the United States.

The sustainability of improved North Korea-Russia and increasing North Korea-China relations may influence just how long Kim can continue to ignore Washington and Seoul. Claims of unacceptable tension on the Korean Peninsula aside, there remains little motivation for either Washington or Seoul to either rush back to the table or woo Kim with magnanimous preemptive concessions such as sanctions relief. Domestic political pressure in Seoul might motivate President Lee to seek a big win with Pyongyang through a concentrated engagement pursuit, but so far, President Lee has demonstrated a mix of pragmatism and skepticism as to the payoff of such a gambit. President Trump, meanwhile, faces many high-priority foreign and domestic policy challenges, and has signaled pessimism that he believes there is any deal to be had with Kim.

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

The views expressed in this submission are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.