Reshaping Defense: Secretary Hegseth’s Latest Initiatives, Point by Point

In a September 30 speech, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced seven initiatives, promising to “govern the Department’s direction for years to come.” These initiatives will change drone acquisition, procurement of “legacy” systems, supply chains, officer commissioning, flag and general officer (GOFO) management, and how bases operate. This analysis examines each initiative to better understand what it means, what to watch for as it takes shape, and how to implement it more effectively. The order follows a rough estimate of significance, not the order in the speech. Although details on the initiatives are scarce, the speech, a press release, and a short directive memo for each initiative give enough information for an initial analysis. (Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in this analysis come from these sources.)
 

The Context

The audience for the speech was unusual: active-duty E-6s and O-3s at Marine Corps Base Quantico (i.e., service members at least four levels lower than attendees of the secretary’s address last year to generals, admirals, and their top enlisted advisers). They were specially screened, with military commands asked to send top-performing service members who maintain “impeccable” grooming and uniform standards. The Department of Defense (DOD) press release characterized this as “bypass[ing] [the] traditional Pentagon bureaucracy to brief the tactical-level officers and non-commissioned officers who will execute these reforms at the ground level.” However, it will be many years before most of these initiatives affect the troops.

The junior audience was enthusiastic. An alternative audience would have been the Pentagon staffs, who would have responsibility for the initiatives’ near-term development and implementation.

1. Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM)

This initiative would create a 12th combatant command focused on “unmanned and autonomous warfare” (i.e., a combatant command for drones). It is the most important of the new initiatives because it changes activity in a critical area and can be implemented rapidly. The new command would not have forces assigned, but would develop, test, and procure new systems. Until the combatant command stands up in October 2027, the “Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) [will] . . . establish the pathway to the Autonomous Warfare Command” and “prototyp[e] a new acquisition model for unmanned and autonomous systems.”

This initiative responds to a widespread concern that the United States is not moving fast enough with drone warfare. The experience in the Iran war, in which drones severely damaged U.S. bases, and observations of the Ukraine war, in which the Ukrainians have the Unmanned Systems Forces, have been powerful. As a result, many experts have proposed some kind of new structure.

Analysis:

• The president can create this new command under his own authority. He is only required to “notify Congress of the establishment of such command” and “provide to Congress a briefing on the establishment of such command” within 60 days of its creation.
• A first step will be defining what a drone is. “Drone” is a very broad term, encompassing systems from $500 handheld first-person-view quadcopters to $150 million strategic reconnaissance aircraft (MQ-4s) the size of a 757 jet. In the late 2000s, the DOD defined a drone as “aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight with or without human remote control” and categorized them into five groups. Drones operate in many domains in addition to air: sea, land, and, arguably, space. It is unclear which drones will fall under the AUTOWARCOM.
• This command will have “directed manpower, budget, [and] acquisition authorities.” Congress has been willing in the past to give the DOD new and streamlined acquisition authorities, but the administration will need to be specific about what it wants.
• Tensions with the military services are inevitable. To facilitate coordination, the new command is directed to work with them, and will have subordinate component commands for each military service. Nevertheless, the services have their own drone organizations, will operate these systems, and, by law, are responsible for developing their own equipment and doctrine. AUTOWARCOM will need to draw a line between what it does centrally and what the military services do. The operational demands and types of drones are so varied that a department-wide organization to operate them would be unworkable.
• The guidance implies a shakeup of existing programs: “DRPM-UxS will work collaboratively with the Services to recommend a rebalanced Joint Force investment allocation to the Deputy Secretary of War.” The administration’s fiscal year 2027 budget proposes funding for many “legacy” systems such as aircraft carriers, manned aircraft, and armored vehicles, so there may be some changes here.
• Secretary Hegseth is sending a message of warfighting by making this a combatant command and has said that a four-star general was needed to have the rank to drive change. Nevertheless, a combatant command seems like a poor organizational fit with the assigned mission. Combatant commands conduct military operations, whereas this organization will acquire things.
• The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is a better model. Like the proposed AUTOWARCOM, it was established because the founding administration worried that the military services would not support the new mission. MDA has its own acquisition authorities; it develops systems but does not operate them, instead transitioning them to the services.
• Reestablishing and restructuring the old Joint Forces Command (JFC) would be another option. JFC existed for joint concept development and experimentation, joint training, and joint interoperability and integration. It was disestablished in 2011, but many of its component elements remain in the Norfolk, Virginia, area. Reestablishing a combatant command there would be faster than starting anew because all the pieces are in place.
• Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is a partial model. Established because special operations forces were seen as not getting enough attention, SOCOM has acquisition authority for unique equipment and an associated assistant secretary of defense, with powers like those of a service secretary. SOCOM has operational control over special operations forces, something that would not be appropriate for AUTOWARCOM and the service drone forces.
• Foreign models might be helpful. Ukraine has Unmanned Systems Forces. South Korea experimented with a Drone Operations Command but abandoned it and now has a Drone Defense organization.
• If AUTOWARCOM looks like Joint Forces Command, which had an analogous mission, it will have about 4,000 total personnel, including about 1,500 active-duty military. It will also have 15–20 generals or admirals if it is like SOCOM, the closest current analogy.
• The Army’s attempt to do something like this—Futures Command—was unsuccessful in providing the Army-wide integration desired. It became one more bureaucratic player, adding dissonance rather than unity. Futures Command is now being redesignated as the Army’s Futures and Autonomous Systems Command, to incorporate drone development.

Recommendations for implementation:

• Consider a wide variety of organizational structures in addition to a combatant command before making the transition.
• Study why the Army’s Futures Command was unsuccessful, but MDA succeeded.

What to watch for:

• DRPM-UxS’s execution of its expanded mission. This will shape how AUTOWARCOM operates when it takes over. 

2. FORTRESS America and Defense of the Homeland

The FORTRESS America initiative (FORTRESS stands for Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy, Supply, and Survivability) is broad, with some extremely ambitious goals. The initiative has five pillars: (1) energy independence, (2) supply chain and defense industrial base resilience, (3) a strategic defense reserve, (4) installation hardening and cyber resilience, and (5) resilience in space and the electromagnetic spectrum. The initiative creates a new office for coordinating these activities.

Analysis:

• Despite the name, FORTRESS America does not appear to be an isolationist directive. The overall theme is resilience in the face of attacks on the homeland and supply chains. Indeed, it describes bases as power projection platforms, a long-standing view of their role as launch points for operations outside the United States.
• Some goals are long-standing but very ambitious:
  • “Bring critical supply chains home—rare earths, specialty metals, semiconductors, and propellants—mined, refined, and built in America by American workers.”
  • “Build deep strategic reserves of munitions, fuel, medicine, and blood sufficient to fight through disruption when global supply lines break.”
  • “Harden every installation on American soil against cyber intrusion, sabotage, and drones.”
  • “Secure the high ground and the airwaves—satellites, spectrum, and the ability to see, navigate, and communicate—so the force is never blinded or silenced.”

These policies have broad support, with several programs already implementing elements.

• Another requirement is to “ensure that every major U.S. military installation generates its own independent power.” Bases already have some backup generators as a hedge against power failures. That, however, requires periodic fuel delivery. Total independence from civilian infrastructure would require reliance on self-generating power such as wind and solar, which are not favorites of the current administration, or modular nuclear, which is not quite ready for production at scale. Another trade-off for full independence is that electricity from the grid is typically less expensive than base-generated electricity because of scale. The Biden administration’s efforts to create “net zero” bases had some similar goals, which might broaden support.

Recommendations for implementation:

• For resilience goals, be clear about timelines and minimum and maximum goals. For example, fuel is relatively easy to store, but blood has a short shelf life.
• Specify that backup electricity must run a certain number of days on its own but can then use outside fuel. This would greatly reduce the cost and expand the possibilities.
• Specify also that emergency power needs to cover only the most critical activities—warfighting, health, and safety activities—and can exclude noncritical quality-of-life activities like streetlights and recreation facilities.

What to watch for:

• The details are key—some efforts could be implemented in the near term, but others will take many years or decades and be extremely expensive.

3. Cutting 20 Percent of Flag and General Officers

The new target doubles the 10 percent overall reduction in general and flag officer (GOFO) positions that Secretary Hegseth ordered last year. That earlier directive also called for a 20 percent reduction in active-duty four-star positions and a 20 percent reduction in National Guard general officers. Such top-down cuts have happened before. Secretary Gates, under President Obama, cut 10 percent of the general and flag officers, though the eliminated billets were mostly wartime increases that were no longer needed as forces withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and shrank.

Today, there are about 850 general and flag officers from one to four stars. The announcement was silent about whether the cuts will include reserve officers.

Analysis:

• The initiative appears to cut positions, not individuals. One concern with the announcement was that this might be a purge of senior officers, but that does not appear to be the case. As presented, billets will go away, but the individuals could be reassigned.
• Some one-star positions will be downgraded rather than eliminated. In that case, colonels and Navy captains (O-6s) will fill those jobs. Other positions may be filled by senior civilians.
• Top-heaviness depends on perspective. If measured by troops per GOFO, the numbers are much lower today (1,400/GOFO) than in World War II (5,500/GOFO). Even so, the number of GOFOs increased by a factor of ten compared with the prewar level. Still, World War II was an anomaly, being a world war with total mobilization. The ratio today is about what it was in 1936 (1,300/GOFO), before wartime mobilization began. If measured by defense dollars per GOFO, the number is far higher today ($1.2 billion/GOFO versus $200 million in 1936, both in FY 2026 dollars), reflecting a more capital-intensive force.
• The specifics will matter. Across-the-board cuts sound great until the particulars are announced; then the trade-offs must be faced. Cuts are certainly possible—service component commands within combatant commands have long been a target—but each organization has a purpose that cuts in senior leadership will diminish.
• Early reports indicate congressional skepticism. However, the secretary has enough latitude between the current level and statutory minimums to make the reductions on his own authority.

Recommendations for implementation:

• Have the services submit to the secretary a 1-n ranked list of positions to be eliminated. That enlists service support while allowing the secretary to pass on cuts that seem not worthwhile, disrupt outside organizations, or face strong pushback. Better to hit a lower number than to backtrack later.

What to watch for:

• Congressional restrictions and pushback from groups whose advocate was eliminated or downgraded.

4. The “Next Great American Base”

This initiative will build a completely new military base. The base will:

• operate off the commercial grid by generating its own utilities;
• follow President Trump’s executive orders on classical architecture;
• be “highly hardened,” including being equipped with advanced air defenses;
• have “first class facilities;”
• cover “hundreds of thousands of acres;” and
• be situated “within the Homeland,” presumably meaning any U.S. territory, not just the continental United States.

Most unusually, a competition will decide the base location and many characteristics, with state and territorial governors proposing locations and support packages. This would include states and presumably territories, though only states are mentioned. Once built, this new base will provide benefits for decades, but it will cost billions of dollars and take many years to fully construct.

Analysis:

• The nature of the base is unclear. The implementing memo says that the installation “will serve as a foundational hub for integrated defense operations, distributed command and control, and resilient cyber and technological capabilities.” That sounds like a headquarters of some sort. However, the press announcement describes it as “a world class power projection platform” that will “host elite troops across hundreds of thousands of acres.” That sounds like a base with operational units.
• The services may be reluctant to support this initiative if the large funds required come out of their budgets.
• The implied size would put the base on par with the Army’s largest maneuver areas: Fort Hood (214,968acres), Fort Bliss (1.12 million acres), and Fort Stewart (288,000 acres). This would be larger than a headquarters and training base, such as Quantico (59,000 acres), but much smaller than the largest test and maneuver bases, such as White Sands Missile Range (2.2 million acres) or the Marine Corps base Twentynine Palms in the Mojave Desert (599,000 acres).
• The competition will need some specific base characteristics for governors to build their proposals around. Otherwise, one governor might propose a naval installation, another a space launch site, and a third an airfield. That approach might work but would require an additional round of evaluation in which the services compete for the base, each arguing that its needs are greatest.
• The large size and lack of a requirement to be near a coast imply an Army or Air Force facility in the Southwest, where space is less limited.
• The initiative assumes that the services need another base. On the one hand, the DOD’s 2017 facility inventory reported 22 percent excess capacity. Later assessments did not put a percentage on excess, noting both excesses and deficits. On the other hand, the need is tied to a new demand, a cited intention to “bring tens of thousands of servicemembers home.”
• States are expected to spend their own money. The base will be built in “the state that cuts the most red tape and offers the best package of land and support.” This sounds like competitions where states and municipalities compete for a sports stadium. The locality bears some of the cost in return for expected future economic gains.
• It is unclear why the money would not be spent on upgrading existing facilities, which the press release calls “decaying.” Many bases need more maneuver space because of civilian encroachment and the longer range of modern munitions. All bases need repair and restoration work because they have long contended poorly in the Pentagon’s budget process.

Recommendations for implementation:

• Include major enhancements to an existing base as an option for the competition. This would have two beneficial effects: broadening the competition and, if such a proposal were accepted, moving more quickly.
• Provide the funds centrally to incentivize the services to participate.
• Establish an independent board to judge submissions. Implications of bias would undermine legitimacy and support. Independence allowed the base closure process to operate successfully despite the highly sensitive effects.

What to watch for:

• Specifications for the competition. These will indicate what kind of base and, potentially, what regions might have an advantage.
• Reactions by states and municipalities. Some may show enthusiasm, driven by patriotism and the potential for economic development in a remote area while others show a lack of interest, because of cost, lack of space, or restrictive regulations. The lower the enthusiasm, the less support for the project.
• Political dynamics that favor red states.

5. Project Meridian

This initiative creates a study group “to secure America’s long-term military superiority by identifying the capabilities required to achieve absolute technological dominance on the next-generation battlefield.” It names three codirectors: Elon Musk, industry titan and former head of the Department of Government Efficiency, the Trump administration’s mechanism for cutting government; Palmer Luckey, entrepreneur and cofounder of the defense technology company Anduril Industries; and Newt Gingrich, former speaker of the House of Representatives and frequent critic of the Pentagon. The department’s chief technology officer will manage the project day-to-day. The scope is broad: “the full spectrum of future warfighting domains, from subterranean depths to the cislunar frontier.” The project has 120 days, until the end of January to report back.

Analysis:

• The project has little time to do its work. Many such groups have a year to recruit staff, identify issues, do analysis, agree on recommendations, and then write that up. The codirectors are three very busy individuals, so getting much of their time will be difficult, though all three were present at Quantico for the first meeting. The final report will likely discuss general trends rather than specific programs and funding.
• The focus will be on technology. The text refers to “technological and military demand” and specifically excludes strategy and policy. Given the United States’ capital-intensive approach to warfare, a technology effort is sensible. However, it is not the entirety of future warfare. As Andrew Marshall noted, “[B]eing ahead in concepts of operation and in organizational arrangements may be far more enduring than any advantages in technology.”
• The project will be conducted “through a partner organization.” This is routine because it lets the study group offload administrative and logistical tasks onto an organization with mechanisms in place to handle them and get support from staff who understand the substantive issues. The study group can then focus on its intellectual task. On October 2, the DOD announced MITRE Corporation, a DC-based technically oriented research center, as the partner organization.
• There will be a lot of input from outside the department. The guidance says that the project “will leverage critical perspectives from outside the Pentagon, drawing upon a group of top technologists, innovators, business leaders, policy makers, and national security experts.” That makes sense given the broad mandate and limited time.
• Given the backgrounds of the three individuals leading the effort, the likely themes are clear: more speed, more technology, more lethality, less bureaucracy. The MITRE announcement lists 17 individuals advising the project, most of whom, though not all, have a technology background.
• There are major conflicts of interest. Musk and Luckey head companies that sell extensively to the DOD. Some recommendations, if implemented, would inevitably help these companies. The administration has typically not been concerned about such conflicts, but court challenges are possible, depending on the recommendations’ specificity and whose interests are hurt.

Recommendations for implementation:

• Listen to many perspectives and recognize that technology is only one of several elements of a successful military.
• Engage some former military officers with operational experience to prevent the effort from being the technology community talking to itself.

What to watch for:

• Announcements about staff and advisers. They will have a large influence because the principals have so little time.

6. Elevating the Role of Religious Affairs

This initiative elevates the visibility of “spiritual readiness,” which Secretary Hegseth has identified as an important element of combat effectiveness. The Quantico speech contained many biblical references, reflecting the secretary’s personal faith. This new office will report directly to the secretary and oversee the existing cross-service coordination mechanism, the Armed Forces Chaplains Board. This new office will be a policy organization; the services will remain in charge of chaplains and religious facilities like chapels.

Analysis:

• Secretary Hegseth’s personal emphasis on Christianity has raised concerns about whether the department is elevating Christianity above other religions. However, the initiative description encompasses all religions. The guidance memo is emphatic that “the office will not compel religious participation, favor one faith, or diminish the rights of personnel of any faith or lack thereof.”
• The office will oversee classic staff functions: resource planning and advocacy, research, technology application, and the development of analytical tools.
• The text implies more money. It cites “unfunded and underfunded religious affairs requirements,” which will presumably be identified and addressed. These needs likely include repairs to existing chapels and more contract clergy—engaging local clergy when military clergy are unavailable. Cuts in contracted religious support recently energized the Catholic community until the cuts were reversed.

Recommendations for implementation:

• Allocate additional funding and new staff in proportion to service members’ stated religious preferences. Otherwise, the allocation will become the story, not the spiritual support.

What to watch for:

• Appointment of the head and staff of the new office, almost certainly clergy of some sort. This will indicate the office’s direction.

7. Creating Five New Corps of Cadets

This initiative upgrades five commissioning programs for military officers: Louisiana State University (LSU), Hillsdale College, Liberty University, Mississippi State University, and Tuskegee University. Hillsdale and Liberty are conservative Christian institutions, while Tuskegee is a historically Black university. LSU was founded prior to the Civil War by then-Major William T. Sherman as “Louisiana State Seminary of Learning & Military Academy,” and thus has a military heritage. The department has not explained how it chose the institutions.

In addition to requesting the corps, institutions have three requirements: (1) establish a four-year military or national security program, (2) host a distinct and self-governed student military organization—the cadet corps—led by an independent commandant who reports to the university president, and (3) require cadets to wear uniforms during all academic hours. All presumably have agreed to this.

A “corps of cadets” is like the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) in that both operate on the campus of a civilian college. An important difference is that students can sometimes join the corps of cadets without committing to military duty after graduation. Institutionally, a corps of cadets has statutory protections against termination and guarantees for military officers to go on active duty. Six corps of cadets already exist, at Texas A&M, Virginia Military Institute, the Citadel, Norwich University, Virginia Tech, and the University of North Georgia. Several are linked to states and act as their service academy. For all, the military element is central to the institution and, in some cases, encompasses the institution.

Analysis:

• The new corps of cadets will be established at institutions that already have ROTC programs. (Hillsdale’s is an off-campus partnership with other universities.) Presumably, the ROTC unit will be absorbed into the corps of cadets, which is being accorded greater prestige than ROTC.
• If these new programs increase the number of officers commissioned each year, rather than just changing the organizations in which they train, other ROTC programs may face reductions.
• This can be seen as part of Secretary Hegseth’s effort to move away from the Ivy League and universities he regards as “anti-American, DEI-worshipping, woke factories,” and toward institutions he regards as patriotic and focused on “Western Civilization and the pillars of our Republic.” Earlier, he banned military officers from attending several Ivy League institutions, cut professional military education at 22 institutions that “undermine the very values they are sworn to defend,” and added professional military education at 21 new institutions (including Hillsdale and Liberty, which are on this new list).

Recommendations for implementation:

• Make this an enhancement in commitment and quality—not an increase in numbers that requires offsets elsewhere. Offsets would turn a celebration of military character into a squabble for program participants.
• Develop objective criteria for determining favored and disfavored institutions. Otherwise, decisions look arbitrary.

What to watch for:

• Offsetting reductions to ROTC units elsewhere.
   

Congress Gets a Say

As noted, most initiatives can be accomplished with authorities the secretary or president already has. However, implementing recommendations proposed by Project Meridian, AUTOWARCOM, and FORTRESS America and acquiring construction funds for the new base will require congressional action. Congress will most likely give direction through the authorization process, the natural venue since the annual authorization act establishes policy. Congress could also use the appropriations process to squeeze or expand funding for any initiative, even those within the secretary’s or president’s authority. The relevant committees will certainly hold hearings to better understand the initiatives. A potential post-midterms Democratic Congress would likely be skeptical of, perhaps hostile to, many initiatives. This is the beginning of a long process.

Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

The author would like to thank Elyza Schoeberl and Chris Park for help with research.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.