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Efforts to recalibrate the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) into a more selective and cohesive ‘Wassenaar minus one’ coalition—potentially excluding Russia—reflect the growing need for the United States, its allies, and technology firms to find common ground on export control measures. In 2024, individual Wassenaar member states began implementing their own controls on critical technologies outside the WA. This is the early step toward a new regime. However, translating this idea into an actual regime requires strategic alignment.
Q1: Why focus on Wassenaar minus one?
A1: On September 6, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) introduced a new framework for plurilateral export controls. Central to this framework is a license exception that allows exports to countries that have equivalent export controls on certain emerging technologies. Assistant Secretary Thea D. Rozman Kendler explained that the reason for a new rule is to “develop and coordinate [U.S.] controls alongside like-minded partners.”
Eleven like-minded countries—nine in Europe, plus Japan and Australia—have already implemented or announced similar export controls for certain emerging technologies, like quantum computing or semiconductors. These countries are eligible for licenses covering 24 controlled technologies, although not every country is eligible for each technology. This is BIS’s first step toward building and recognizing ad hoc agreements with like-minded nations on advanced technologies, potentially laying the foundation for a new approach to multilateral controls.
The need for a new multilateral approach emerged due to the ineffectiveness of the WA. While it remains the only multilateral regime for controlling dual-use technologies (both in civilian and military targets) and continues to set de facto international standards in arms and technology exports, it faces limitations. Its slow decision-making process (requiring unanimity from all 42 members), the lack of strategic measures (with only one plenary meeting per year), and the expulsion mechanism to remove Russia have resulted in protracted delays. Adding a new technology to the Wassenaar control list, for instance, can take up to three years.
Many members have addressed these weaknesses by adopting similar export control measures on advanced technologies. The United Kingdom aims to “address weaknesses in the multilateral system,” Japan seeks to “supplement the Wassenaar Arrangement,” and Norway stresses that effective control is “dependent on as many countries as possible to introduce the same controls to avoid circumvention.”
Q2: What progress has been made toward a “Wassenaar minus one” strategy since January 2024?
A2: The debate began in earnest at the January 2024 U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting, where the United States and the European Union discussed proceeding with a “Wassenaar minus one,” either by excluding Russia from the WA or continuing without Russian involvement. While no conclusions have been reached, it is clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as the fast-paced technology environment, will have important ramifications for the future of export controls.
By April 2024, during the sixth TTC ministerial meeting, U.S. and EU officials continued to focus on growing alignment on export licensing practices, noting progress in harmonizing regulations on advanced technologies. The TTC also renewed mechanisms to prevent global semiconductor supply chain issues. These are the principles that would align with the Wassenaar framework if it were “active.”
The concept of “Wassenaar minus one” became a central focus in May 2024. The EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting reviewed the European Commission white paper on improving export control implementation. A key proposal was to create a new legal framework that would allow EU member states to adopt controls agreed to under the WA, even if vetoed by Russia. The council, which meets once a month, proposed holding regular meetings to discuss “key export control policy issues” and called for “further analysis” about an act to allow the “temporary introduction of new items” to the EU’s dual-use export control list. This would allow member states to introduce export controls independently of the Wassenaar regime while still aligning with the “commitments accepted by member states in multilateral export control regimes.”
The European Commission’s vice president, Valdis Dombrovskis, stressed the urgency of moving closer toward “one set of uniform EU controls.” He argued that a single export control list, aligned with agreements made at Wassenaar, would minimize “loopholes” within the current systems. As an example, he explained that “in [the European] internal market where goods controlled in one Member State can freely be transferred to others where they may not be adequately controlled and subsequently exported.”
Japan has also expressed concerns about the future of export control regimes. On April 24, 2024, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) released an interim report calling for a major overview of Japan’s export control system. The report states, “The export control framework is at a turning point,” reflecting the dysfunction of the Wassenaar and growing risks of sensitive technologies spreading beyond its framework. In response, METI proposed strengthening “catch-all” controls for conventional weapons, narrowing the scope of regulated items, and setting clearer “Red Flags” for high-risk transactions. It also emphasized potential cooperation on export controls with non-member nations like Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
The urgency to find a solution to the WA was echoed by trade associations. The Confederation of Finnish Industries—the largest employers’ association in Finland—mentioned the difficulties in adding new items to the Wassenaar list in recent years, which has “led to an increase in unilateral, non-harmonized decisions also at the EU.” The VDMA, which presents more than 3,600 German and European mechanical and plant engineering companies, called for Wassenaar members to implement discussed export control proposals, regardless of potential vetoes by Russia. In contrast, some groups, such as the Technology Industries of Sweden and the Swedish Security and Defense Industry Association, have called on the European Union to establish its own export control regime, separate from Wassenaar. The American Chamber of Commerce in the European Union also noted the challenges faced by smaller companies to navigate conflicting national rules.
Meanwhile, the private sector has also supported the European Commission’s proposal for a new EU forum focused on the “political coordination” of export controls. Digital Europe, which represents the European tech industry, has called dedicated expert groups to facilitate discussions on individual critical technologies and suggested coordination with the United States to “avoid unilateral restrictions.”
As discussions progress, the broader question remains whether traditional export control mechanisms like the WA need updating or rethinking. For instance, one of the tools being developed is the effort to better integrate certain critical technologies, such as highly advanced artificial intelligence applications, into the WA framework. This would allow for more control over the diffusion of advanced technologies. The WA’s next plenary session, scheduled for December 2024 in Austria, will be a critical test of whether it can adapt to these dynamics or continue to be constrained by internal divisions.
Q3: What are the challenges for the “Wassenaar minus one” strategy?
A3: The “Wassenaar minus one” strategy presents three possible alternatives: expelling Russia, creating a new regime, or maintaining the status quo but also expanding licenses with like-minded nations that have similar controls. Each path, however, is complicated.
Expelling Russia. A report and commentary by CSIS (2023) outlined the reasons behind the challenges of expelling Russia from the regime. There is no mechanism for expulsion, and any such action, if proposed, would require a unanimous decision by all 42 member states. Russia itself would not vote for its own removal nor exit the WA. Russia continues to view the WA as a means to maintain its international status, “ensure that the WA is not directed against it,” and veto any proposals that could “harm its economic or security interests.” Attempts to exclude Russia could also alienate others, leading to a “minus several” framework. Historically, attempts to expel nations from multilateral frameworks have been rare. Venezuela’s indefinite suspension from Mercosur in 2016 over human rights violations is one of the few examples.
New regime. An alternative to reforming the WA would be to abandon it entirely and form a new regime. This may seem promising, but this option also faces political and practical challenges. Experts argue that creating a new international institution is impractical for most governments. Many countries rely on the Wassenaar dual-use lists. Dissolving the WA could undermine domestic legal frameworks. A new coalition may also face resistance. The European allies, for instance, are cautious of the risk that controls would explicitly target China. This, as seen by European experts, is viewed as a direct provocation to China’s leadership and could threaten Europe’s trade and investment ties with Beijing. At the same time, Europe seeks to deepen cooperation with the United States and potential partnerships with South Korea and Japan. Including additional countries or adopting a plurilateral format may raise interaction costs, but it could ensure export controls are balanced and do not disproportionately benefit U.S. firms.
Consensus in crisis. The WA benefits from broad participation, including India and Turkey. Its control list extends well beyond its 42 members, with countries like Taiwan, Singapore, and Israel adopting similar controls. However, achieving consensus remains a challenge. This is what the new regime must address. As regime theorist Arthur Stein explains, “regimes are maintained as long as the patterns of interest that gave rise to them remain. When these shift, the character of a regime may change; a regime may even dissolve entirely.” This rings true today, as multilateral frameworks struggle to achieve consensus on what to control, how to control, and who is invited, and this is not uncommon in the WA. Regulating dual-use technologies at both the national and international levels is increasingly difficult. There are many more suppliers of dual-use technologies beyond the regime members. Fewer than 40 countries, for instance, are willing to enforce stringent export controls, while nearly 150 nations exist in a “grey zone” with weak oversight. As a result, sensitive technologies are proliferating beyond WA control, with an increasing number of instances where these technologies are spread outside its framework.
Q4: What are potential alternatives to “WA minus one or more”?
A4: The United States and its allies have embraced a mix of plurilateral export control initiatives, including coalitions targeting Russia and Belarus, frameworks like AUKUS and TTC, and the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative. However, experts view the licensing system, which integrates exceptions for equivalent controls, as the future of export controls. This approach is considered a more flexible and diplomatic alternative to traditional multilateral frameworks, with the current system functioning as a de facto multilateral regime.
The new license exception is not without its limitations. Its effectiveness depends on how accurately the United States and its partners assess the landscape of companies engaged in critical technologies. As experts warned, without an up-to-date map, there is a risk of excluding key players or letting sensitive technologies advance outside control frameworks. If successful, this licensing tool could set a precedent for future rulemaking, as seen with the expanded use of the foreign direct product rule on Huawei. If partner countries don’t adopt equivalent controls, the United States may revert to unilateral “long-arm” measures.
In the longer term, experts suggest creating mini-regimes similar to the G7, including key technology players such as South Korea, Australia, and the Netherlands. Smaller coalitions are often seen as more effective for sharing information and timely decisions. Frameworks like AUKUS, the TTC, and the Quad are too narrow to address broader critical technologies.
In any effort, a new regime must focus on cooperation, information sharing, and centralized export controls. This would restore the political weight that Wassenaar had when it was initially proposed with strong backing from the U.S. Department of State. As such, a new approach may require the new Trump administration to acknowledge the limitations of the “America First” policy when addressing strategic export controls.
Altynay Junusova is a research intern with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. William Alan Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
