Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Philippines, ASEAN, and the South China Sea

With the conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Philippines is preparing to assume the chairmanship of the grouping in 2026. Its new role as ASEAN chair comes at a historic time, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the 2016 arbitral award ruling amid a period of heightened tensions with China in the South China Sea. Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has repeatedly identified finalizing the long-stalled Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea as his priority for the chairmanship. However, this emphasis appears to be largely rhetorical. Manila’s actions suggest that meaningful progress in addressing ongoing security challenges will depend less on ASEAN consensus and more on its expanding network of defense partnerships, particularly with the United States.

This year’s ASEAN Summit underscored the enduring limitations of ASEAN’s collective approach to the South China Sea. Most member states issued cautious statements and avoided directly addressing recent developments, including China’s declaration of a nature reserve at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal, its deployment of buoys, and its continued ramming and use of water cannons against Philippine vessels. As the 2025 chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reiterated that disputes should be resolved within ASEAN and warned that the involvement of “outside forces” would only heighten tensions. While President Marcos publicly agreed with this sentiment, his administration continues to pursue partnerships beyond the bloc to deter further Chinese escalation at sea.

In contrast to Prime Minister Anwar’s restrained tone, President Marcos delivered remarks described by Philippine media as “strong.” Without naming China directly, he criticized the “dangerous maneuvers and coercive use of tools and equipment to interfere with or obstruct legitimate and routine Philippine activities in [our own] maritime zones and airspace.” His comments at the 20th East Asia Summit were even more pointed. In the presence of Chinese Premier Li Qiang, he condemned Beijing’s declaration of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal, asserting that the feature “has long been part of Philippine territory.” At a subsequent press conference, President Marcos maintained that his statements were not provocative but a reflection of the reality that the Philippines is facing in the South China Sea and added that if ASEAN “fails [to resolve issues], at least we should keep finding a way to manage the tensions . . . with some level of modus vivendi for all involved.”

President Marcos’s remarks illustrate Manila’s evolving diplomatic policy of reaffirming ASEAN centrality in principle while simultaneously widening its strategic engagement with other partners. Although the Philippines remains supportive of the COC process, the slow pace of negotiations has reinforced a growing consensus in Manila that ASEAN alone cannot deliver meaningful security outcomes in the South China Sea, especially when tensions now can directly threaten the safety and livelihoods of Filipino citizens.

Developments at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus demonstrated where Manila’s tangible security progress is being made—nearly a week after the main ASEAN Summit. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro jointly announced the creation of Task Force Philippines and the completion of an Alliance Readiness Action Plan. Modeled after Task Force Ayungin, which was revealed last year as a U.S. military unit focused on allied response to potential crises in the South China Sea, it offers a step beyond current initiatives coordinated by the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group. Under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Task Force Philippines will reportedly have a wider mandate than its predecessor, covering other missions like disaster relief across the archipelago, but should still be expected to focus on the South China Sea. The task force will include around 60 permanent personnel and be led by a one-star general or flag officer, allowing for greater flexibility in responding to contingencies.

Secretary Teodoro emphasized that Manila and Washington must not only strengthen their alliance but “add more allies”—a goal the Philippines has already begun to actively pursue. The Philippines and Canada signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) over the weekend, Ottawa’s first such arrangement in the Indo-Pacific. And on the sidelines of the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung described the Philippines as a “special friend” and called for closer cooperation between the two countries, while South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean promised to support the Philippine Navy’s emerging submarine program.

These developments add to a growing list of Manila’s recent defense partnerships, including a reciprocal access agreement with Japan, a SOVFA with New Zealand, a defense cooperation agreement with Germany, and several defense agreements with India. Additionally, the Philippines and France are in the process of negotiating their own visiting forces agreement. These arrangements highlight Manila’s effort to build a network of security partners capable of supporting deterrence and capacity-building outside ASEAN.

Looking ahead, the Philippines faces a delicate balancing act. Its ASEAN chairmanship offers an opportunity to reaffirm the grouping’s role in maintaining regional stability, yet it also compels Manila to navigate the bloc’s internal divisions, particularly among members seeking to avoid direct confrontation with China. President Marcos’s emerging approach appears to be pragmatic. The Philippines will likely use its chairmanship to highlight ASEAN’s commitment to peaceful dispute resolution through its continued emphasis of the COC without expecting breakthroughs on the state of negotiations. At the same time, Manila will cultivate its network of “minilateral” defense partnerships capable of generating operational outcomes that ASEAN’s consensus-based mechanisms cannot.

The Philippines’ 2026 ASEAN chairmanship will likely be both symbolic and strategic. It marks a decade since Manila’s legal victory at The Hague, underscoring its enduring commitment to a rules-based maritime order. At the same time, it represents an opportunity to reconcile ASEAN diplomacy with security realities for the Philippine government in the South China Sea. President Marcos’s challenge now will be to uphold ASEAN principles while advancing Philippine national interests. If successful, the Philippines could position itself as both a defender of ASEAN centrality and a driver of multilateral security cooperation—the success of which will shape not only Manila’s chairmanship but also Southeast Asia’s trajectory in navigating great power competition at sea.

Monica Sato is a research associate with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.