Space Superiority and the Military Tools to Secure It

In early September, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink and Chief of Space Operations General Douglas Schiess disclosed the existence of “on-orbit space control weapons.” This acknowledgement, while long overdue, marks an evolution in the space domain’s place in modern warfare and a recognition that the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command need a broader tool kit to counter threats and defend U.S. interests in space. The disclosure will enable the Space Force to better integrate its own tools of warfare into joint planning and operations, deepen cooperation with allies and partners on space defense, and galvanize the U.S. industrial base to build the capabilities and infrastructure that underwrite continued U.S. space superiority.

The strategic implications of maintaining the ultimate high ground in space have been clear since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and the United States fielded its early reconnaissance satellites to monitor Soviet nuclear weapons. Since then, the domain has only grown in importance. The global space economy exceeded $600 billion in 2025 and the uses and applications of space have transformed the day-to-day lives of billions of people, enabling essential services such as navigation, weather forecasting, and land management. Space assets also underpin how the U.S. military fights and the weapon systems it invests in. Satellites help the force see farther, communicate across vast distances, and strike with precision. Satellite images and missile warning data help troops decide where to move, when to act, and when to take shelter. As more tracking and surveillance systems move from aircraft to orbit, that dependence will only deepen.

America’s adversaries know space is an Achilles heel. They also know a country that integrates space capabilities into its military forces gains a battlefield advantage. They are expanding their own use of space to support terrestrial military operations while building counterspace weapons to erode the U.S. military advantage. This is the contest for space superiority: As in other domains of warfare, opponents seek to utilize the space domain at the time and place of their choosing to maximize their military advantage while denying their adversaries the same.

Space is already a battleground for both Ukraine and the Middle East. Russia is using military and commercial space assets to develop battlefield targets, steer its drones, and communicate across the battlefield. Iran has struck U.S. military bases across the region, reportedly aided by targeting information from Chinese imagery satellites. But this is just a preview of what is to come: The Pentagon counts China’s reconnaissance and targeting fleet at more than 500 satellites. Paired with Starlink-like communications networks and navigation satellites, Beijing is building its own space-enabled “kill web” to find and strike U.S. forces across the Pacific—and doing so at massive scale.

Just as the Army would not cede the highest ridgeline or the Air Force allow enemy aircraft to track forces from overhead, so too should U.S. space forces be able to maintain their position and secure their operating area, giving forces on the ground and at sea the time and maneuvering room they need to accomplish their objectives. Having weapons—whether in space or elsewhere—that can hold an opponent’s satellites at risk and disrupt their ability to target U.S. forces is fundamental to joint warfighting doctrine. The joint force calls this “protection.”

At the same time, China and Russia possess their own arsenals of “space weapons,” based both in orbit and on Earth, that could disrupt or destroy their opponents’ space assets. These threats range from jamming signals to the physical destruction of satellites. Beijing’s 2007 anti-satellite missile test and Moscow’s 2021 test demonstrated their destructive potential, and left debris that continues to pose a hazard to spacecraft. Other developments are less dramatic but still consequential. In 2022, Beijing’s Shijian-21 (SJ-21) grappled an aging satellite in geosynchronous and towed it to a disposal orbit. In 2025, Shijian-25 docked with SJ-21, completing the first known satellite-to-satellite refueling at that distance and executing some of the largest synchronized maneuvers ever observed there. Russian spacecraft loiter near high-value satellites for months, some releasing small objects, unremarkable until the moment they are not. As in other domains, the United States needs the means to counter threats in space. Warfare evolves through adaptation: The capabilities and tactics the United States fields will be countered, and it should expect every counter to be countered in turn.

While addressing space threats requires a whole-of-government response, the military’s job is to develop military options for the president, including for when deterrence fails. The Space Force should possess capabilities and weapons that give it options for protection, movement and maneuver, and fires—the range of joint warfighting functions present in every domain. Those choices should work alongside the other services’ capabilities and support a broader campaign by combatant commanders. Crucially, their value is not measured only by their use in conflict; credible capabilities also strengthen deterrence by convincing adversaries that attacks on U.S. space systems will not deliver the advantage they seek and that their own space-enabled operations are not beyond the military’s reach.

To date, those options have been presented as part of the Space Force’s theory of success known as “competitive endurance.” Competitive endurance rests on three pillars: (1) avoiding operational surprise, (2) denying first-mover advantage, and (3) responsible counterspace campaigning. In other words: understanding the threat, building resilience to withstand attacks, and having credible ways to respond. The Space Force has thus far largely focused on the first two pillars: Enhanced space domain awareness helps the United States understand how adversaries operate in space and avoid operational surprise, and proliferated constellations, disaggregated orbits, and redundant ground architectures help preserve missions under attack. The third pillar—response—is what every military service provides through a range of capabilities (e.g., conventional strike weapons, cyber effects, and special operations units). The Space Force can now say that on-orbit space weapons are part of its tool kit to defend the Joint Force, and that it no longer just takes punches, but can punch back.

Yet “responsible counterspace campaigning”—a euphemism not used in any other domain—also demands restraint. It is not in the United States’ interest to employ weapons that create massive debris hazards, jeopardizing astronauts’ lives, other national assets and those of allies, and commercial systems that underpin global connectivity and Earth observation. Competitive endurance emphasizes that responsible employment may also help establish norms for military operations in space.

This announcement is an important step, but its value will depend on what comes next. Stating one has space weapons is one thing, but closing the distance between theory and operational effectiveness is another. The Space Force and Space Command will need to strengthen their intelligence picture, targeting processes, and battle management capabilities. They should develop operational concepts and tactics for employing such weapons and testing them through wargames and, where appropriate, on-orbit demonstrations. Encouragingly, they are making progress. The Space Force has established organizational units, or Deltas, dedicated to orbital warfare, intelligence, and targeting. Space Command published a framework for joint force operations and is wargaming and exercising concepts such as space maneuver. Policy guidance should clarify who can authorize use of these weapons, while robust modeling and simulation tools are needed to help planners understand their operational effects and debris-generating risks.

Acknowledging on-orbit space control capabilities should also be paired with classification guidance that allows them to be discussed at lower classification levels. The Joint Force plans and operates at a collateral level, and it campaigns and fights in coalitions. To integrate space weapons into broader operations, the Joint Force should understand their existence and basic parameters. U.S. allies, also cognizant of the threat, are committing greater resources to space defense. Diplomats and military planners need sufficient information about U.S. capabilities to help shape allied investments, coordinate operations, and reduce risks of fratricide.

Finally, the industrial base will be essential to making space control a reality. The United States needs maneuverable spacecraft in numbers, supported by on-orbit refueling, servicing, and transport across orbital regimes. Automation and AI can help monitor satellite activity, detect unusual behavior, and accelerate planning, freeing operators to focus on decisions rather than data processing. Systems should also evolve as threats do, through software upgrades, adaptable payloads, and tactics refined through experience. This requires a strong, competitive industrial base with multiple providers across ground, space, and user segments. Budgets are finite, and speed and efficiency matter, so industry will be indispensable to turning competitive endurance from doctrine into operational advantage.

The public acknowledgement of on-orbit space control weapons may be new, but the mission is not. The Space Force—and Air Force before it—has long been charged with protecting space assets and limiting an adversary’s ability to use the space domain against U.S. interests. What has changed is the nation’s willingness to acknowledge the capabilities needed to carry out that mission; they can now be discussed and integrated into joint and allied planning, and investment in infrastructure can make them credible. Ultimately, space superiority is not about seeking conflict in orbit, but about deterring it, convincing adversaries that they cannot deny the United States the advantages of space or exploit their own space capabilities against U.S. forces without consequence. A credible, responsible space control capability gives the president options, strengthens deterrence, and helps ensure that U.S. forces can fight—and prevail—if deterrence fails. The American way of life and war depend upon it.

Lieutenant General DeAnna M. Burt, U.S. Space Force (Retired), is a senior associate (non-resident) in the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kari A, Bingen is director of the Aerospace Security Project and senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.