Trilateral “Denuclearization”: False Promises or Way Forward?

In the 1987 classic film The Princess Bride, the diminutive kidnapper Vizzini repeatedly observes that unfolding events are “inconceivable.” Finally, the Spanish swordsman Inigo Montoya says, “You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.” Words matter. They can expand the realm of possibilities but can also close them off with overuse.

Since his first term, President Trump has been using the term “denuclearization.” I do not think it means what he thinks it means. Specifically, the Trump administration is calling for denuclearization to be on the agenda for potential upcoming talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, to be held in China from November 18 to 19. Denuclearization implies the reduction and dismantling of a nuclear weapons program, but this level of ambition in a trilateral agreement is inconceivable at present and should not be an expected outcome of any talks.

On the one hand, denuclearization talks imply a trilateral agreement on reductions or limitations that Trump, Putin, and Xi cannot deliver. Use of the term itself betrays how much the American president wants a deal, something Moscow and Beijing could use as negotiating leverage. On the other hand, the ambiguous meaning of denuclearization could be beneficial and allow for a breakthrough in trilateral nuclear dialogue. While an ambitious agreement seems unlikely because of China’s position on arms control, the Trump administration should use the talks for two purposes: to lay the groundwork for a longer-term trilateral arms control agenda, and to promote transparency and out-compete China and Russia in nuclear diplomacy.

Denuclearization Dreams

Donald Trump has wanted to secure an arms control deal since at least the mid-1980s. In a 1984 interview with the Washington Post, he expressed confidence about negotiating an arms control deal and said, “It would take an hour-and-a-half to learn everything there is to learn about missiles . . . I think I know most of it anyway.” As president, Trump has maintained nuclear issues and arms control as a consistent personal priority. In an October 2026 statement on potential talks with China and Russia, he said, “The whole thing is a shame, because I’d love to denuclearize if possible, but we’re actually talking to Russia about that, and we’re talking to China about that denuclearization.”

Trump’s personal rhetoric has not yet translated into policy, however, with the first Trump administration withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty. With only two years left in office, President Trump may be feeling pressure to achieve his nuclear deal. Prospects for a negotiated agreement on Iran’s nuclear program as part of an endgame for the war appear unlikely and time consuming. Similarly, North Korea has rejected the idea of talks and has continued to expand its nuclear and missile arsenal. The upcoming dialogue with Putin and Xi may be Trump’s best opportunity.

There is currently an arms control stalemate. Russia has violated at least nine major nuclear arms control agreements since Putin came to power. This includes the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), with Russia suspending participation in February 2023. Russia has maintained a consistent message that the United States’ allies, namely the United Kingdom and France, would also have to be part of any agreement for the sake of strategic stability and balance.

While Russia undermines arms control, China refuses to participate wholesale. In February 2026, a Chinese spokesman said, for example, “China’s nuclear capabilities are of a totally different scale as those of the United States and Russia (and) will not participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage.” Russia’s record of noncompliance and China’s intransigence suggest an agenda for verifiable arms control with nuclear reductions may be on hold.

The Trump administration has signaled a new era of arms control. In a Substack post in February 2026, upon the expiration of New START, Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlined three new principles for U.S. arms control policy. First, it would need to be multilateral to include China, given its nuclear expansion. Second, it would need to hold states accountable for noncompliance. Allegations of Chinese nuclear testing coincided with Rubio’s post, when Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno claimed China had conducted at least one yield-producing test and declared, “the end of U.S. unilateral restraint. The next era of arms control . . . will require the participation of more than just Russia at the negotiating table.” Although not mentioned by the administration, Russia also has a poor track record of compliance with arms control, including allegations of the deployment (or planned deployment) of nuclear weapons in space. Rubio’s final principle for the future of arms control was that it must work in conjunction with a modern and credible nuclear deterrent.

Despite these challenges, there are also signs of opportunity for arms control. Perhaps most importantly, there is political will on the part of the U.S. president. An arms control agreement could arguably contribute to Trump’s efforts to build a legacy as a peacemaker. Another sign is that President Putin has indicated a greater willingness to engage with Trump, such as by offering to continue to observe the New START limits after the treaty expired. Similarly, Trump and Xi have already made some progress on nuclear issues, such as discussions on strategic stability and agreeing to reciprocal nuclear site visits. Therefore, while Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to accept any meaningful limits or reductions on their nuclear programs, they may still be willing to discuss ways to reduce nuclear risks.

What to Expect from Trilateral “Denuclearization” Talks

Any Trump-Putin-Xi joint statement on nuclear issues is still a long shot, mainly because of China’s reluctance to engage in any trilateral format. If there is any outcome of the trilateral meeting relating to nuclear issues, it will likely be more of a political statement than a verifiable and restrictive arms control agreement, such as the INF Treaty or New START. But there are also several niche and nuanced issues to watch for:

• A joint statement on the risks of nuclear weapons and the need to reduce those risks. The most obvious language would be a repeat of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement, which was included in a January 2022 statement from the five nuclear weapons states (P5): “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
• A commitment to maintain human control in nuclear decisionmaking, or a broad statement about the potential risks at the intersection of nuclear weapons and superintelligence, or emerging technologies more broadly. Presidents Biden and Xi affirmed as much in a November 2024 meeting; however, Russia has been a holdout and not agreed to similar language, including in the P5 process. A less ambitious outcome could be recognition that rapid technological advances could impact the nuclear balance and should be part of an ongoing dialogue.
• Missile launch notifications, which already exist between Washington-Moscow and Moscow-Beijing, but the Washington-Beijing connection is the missing piece. There have been signs of improvement in this area: In 2024, Beijing notified some countries in advance of an intercontinental ballistic missile test, and again in 2026 for a submarine-launched ballistic missile test. These notifications were made less than 24 hours in advance, and there have been calls on Beijing to provide more notice.

There are also wild cards to watch. If the talks take place, each leader is likely to bring their own priority topic in the hopes of negotiating it into an agreement. Some of these can be readily discarded as unlikely to get agreement among all three, but others may gain traction.

• Space: Limiting competition in space is a top priority for China, and recent Russian counterspace activity should motivate the Trump administration to at least attempt to develop risk reduction mechanisms for competition in space.
• Iran: Although seemingly unlikely, the three countries came close to agreeing to language on Iran’s nuclear program as part of a draft document at the NPT Review Conference earlier in 2026. The language reiterated that “Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” The Trump administration may try to get this into any statement.
• Next Generation: As part of the ongoing P5 process within the NPT, all five recognized nuclear possessor states support a Young Professionals Network (YPN), a small group of experts under the age of 45. While the United States and Russia have a history of fostering dialogue among early career experts, China is relatively new to this practice. A joint statement could reaffirm their commitment to not only continuing to support the next generation of nuclear leaders through the YPN, but also to encouraging more forums for engagement at the Track 2 level to help build a community of practice and professional relationships that may facilitate deeper cooperation in the future.

Of course, it remains possible that plans for the dialogue will change or fall apart at the last minute, or Xi will refuse to discuss “denuclearization” at all. The talks, if they take place, are an important opportunity not only for multilateral nuclear diplomacy, but also for the United States to reinsert itself as a leader in the nuclear order and to out-compete China and Russia.

What Trump Should and Should Not Ask For

Arms control of the future will not necessarily look like arms control of the past. But first, the great powers need to get to arms control. This is where “denuclearization” as a fuzzy term and any upcoming trilateral meeting could present an important opportunity. Although the talks themselves are unlikely to yield any major breakthroughs, they could lay the groundwork for future cooperation. The Trump administration, therefore, should prioritize a meaningful first step, such as an agreement on missile launch notifications, along with a commitment to a continued dialogue and potentially setting the next date for a trilateral summit. One important outcome of the Trump-Xi meeting earlier this year was establishment of a U.S.-China Super Intelligence Dialogue, with a specific date scheduled for the next meeting. Trump, Putin, and Xi might agree to a similar dialogue specifically to address risks of nuclear misperception and/or emerging technologies. The nuclear community, particularly within the NPT, has been slow to address these risks out of concern that it might distract from progress toward nuclear disarmament. This is an important opportunity for great power leadership to address a real and growing threat.

What, then, might a future arms control agreement look like, if these talks eventually lead to deeper cooperation and progress? In essence, what are we working toward? In 2019, I published the idea of “asymmetric arms control,” whereby states make non-like-for-like exchanges in limits on strategic forces. This can include limits on capabilities; for example, the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty set ratio limits on capital naval ships of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively. A future trilateral arms control agreement might similarly put asymmetric limits on warheads or launchers, but also might expand to include non-nuclear capabilities. Behavioral arms control is another opportunity for the future of arms control, to focus on particularly dangerous doctrines or activities, such as no-notice exercises or launches, or attacks on NC3. A trilateral dialogue in Shenzhen could be an important first step in the new arms control reality. To be clear, now is not the time for deep strategic cuts, and even talking about arms control may make U.S. allies and partners nervous (more on that below). But asymmetric arms control and behavioral arms control as concepts show that there may yet be a future for arms control, albeit in a different format.

Another priority for the Trump administration should be to use any nuclear dialogues to out-compete Moscow and Beijing in nuclear diplomacy. Until recently, both China and Russia have not been sufficiently held accountable for undermining nuclear agreements. For example, Russia’s nuclear threats in the first year of the war in Ukraine went largely ignored in international forums. Similarly, the international nuclear community has not taken up U.S. allegations about Chinese nuclear testing activity. What this means is that Moscow and Beijing have largely been able to increase reliance on nuclear weapons and expand their arsenals with impunity. They have rejected numerous efforts to increase transparency and have instead tried to shift the narrative within multilateral nuclear diplomacy to focus on U.S. nuclear sharing arrangements with allies. A trilateral dialogue is an opportunity to put China and Russia on the spot with regard to transparency, but without undermining the prospect of agreement and future dialogue.

The Trump administration should craft unilateral statements before and after the dialogue focusing on transparency and highlighting the United States’ long history as leading on nuclear transparency. This leadership crosses Democrat and Republican administrations, including site visits to the Nevada National Security Site and National Labs by nongovernment experts and foreign policymakers, and publishing stockpile numbers and regular compliance reports. While some of these activities have fallen by the wayside, potentially due to personnel cuts, they nonetheless tell a broader story: The United States has historically been willing to be transparent, and not only have China and Russia refused to do the same, but they may have used that transparency in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage by quantitatively and qualitatively building up their arsenals. A focus on transparency will not only benefit U.S. diplomatic interests but also strengthen the nuclear order and put pressure on states to hold China and Russia accountable.

This path is fraught with challenges. Putin could diplomatically outmaneuver the Trump administration and make any progress on nuclear issues dependent on undermining Western support to Ukraine. Even the optics of Trump and Putin negotiating while the war continues and as Russia ramps up missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets could be interpreted as undermining U.S. values. Another challenge will be the implications for U.S. allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France. While a trilateral denuclearization statement can contribute to and build on the P5 process, the two need to be kept distinctly separate. If these talks do evolve into something more ambitious, London and Paris have significantly smaller arsenals that could put them at a disadvantage.

Maybe “denuclearization” does mean what the president seems to think it does. The term could oversell expectations for any upcoming Trump-Putin-Xi meeting; however, it also suggests a level of ambition and is ambiguous enough that it creates opportunities that should not be forgone.

Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).