Trump Takes on the Houthis

On March 15, the United States launched a wave of attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen. The Trump administration had pledged to step up efforts initiated by President Biden to combat what has been almost 18 months of Houthi assaults on international shipping lanes in the Red Sea, and it redesignated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization soon after returning to office. A conversation between senior U.S. government officials on the encrypted messaging app, Signal, preceded the strikes and has gotten extensive attention, but it is worth understanding more about why the United States was attacking the Houthis in the first place.

Q1: Who are the Houthis, and why do they matter?

A1: The Houthis are a traditionalist movement that has been waging war in northern Yemen for most of the last 25 years. They control most of Yemen’s population and are seeking to become the permanent rulers of a large swath of the country. They have been trying to get control of oil wells near Maarib to give them a source of revenue. They began attacks on shipping in the Red Sea shortly after the Gaza war broke out, which they said was in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Q2: What are the Houthis trying to do?

A2: One objective they’re trying to achieve is to distract Yemenis from the Houthis’ very poor governance record. The Yemeni people are poor, with limited access to food and water. If the Houthis are fighting a war, it gives them an excuse not to meet the population’s needs. They also claim that they’re defending innocent Palestinians, and they get some sympathy for acting in solidarity with what many Yemenis believe is an oppressed Palestinian population. Additionally, they are trying to present themselves as a worthy opponent of the world’s greatest superpower. And, in a way, their reputation is enhanced by fighting the United States and having Washington fail at decisively defeating them.

Q3: How much of a priority has the United States put on fighting the Houthis, and what tactics has it pursued?

A3: The United States has mostly been defending against Houthi attacks and trying to protect shipping in the Red Sea. About 15 percent of the world’s trade and about 30 percent of its container traffic trade passes through the Red Sea. It goes through the Suez Canal to Europe and countries in the Mediterranean. The United States has tried to defend Red Sea shipping lanes and protect ships from Houthi attacks. It has been partially successful. There’s also an ongoing European escort mission in the Red Sea.

The United States has periodically attacked Houthi assets along the Red Sea, but it hasn’t been able to decisively silence Houthi attacks. What you’ve seen in the Trump administration is, in some ways, giving in to the request of the U.S. Central Command to take the gloves off—to really go after the Houthis, not only by putting them on the list of foreign terrorist organizations but also by using much larger-scale attacks against a wider array of targets to try to put an end to Houthi aggression on global shipping.

Q4: What are the potential end games here?

A4: The desired endgame is that the Houthis give up. This outcome is certainly possible, though probably unlikely because the Houthis have been fighting for decades against a whole set of adversaries. They seem to dust themselves off and resume fighting. That’s been their history for a long time.

It’s possible that the United States feels it has to escalate attacks in Yemen, perhaps even incorporating a ground campaign to try to shift the direction of the situation.

The United States could also support Houthi adversaries in Yemen and become enmeshed in a long-term proxy war. In that case, Russia and Iran may end up giving more support to the Houthis than they already do.

Another possibility is that the United States isn’t able to resolve this on the Houthi end and decides to make good on the assertion that the Iranians are really behind it—using the battle against the Houthis as a pretext for a battle against Iran. Iran has carefully built up the Houthis with a lot of deniability. The Iranians have certainly supported the Houthis, but not nearly as much as one might think—maybe about $100 million a year. For a state supporting another group, that’s not a huge amount of money, and the results they’ve achieved from that investment have given them the ability to say, “We don’t control it, but we can influence it. Wouldn’t you like us to play a constructive role?”

The Iranians would like to have it both ways—they want to be able to both dial up and dial down Houthi attacks. It’s what Norman Roule, the former national intelligence manager for Iran at the Central Intelligence Agency, likes to call “implausible deniability.” But while the Iranians don’t control the Houthis, they influence them more than anyone else. And it’s certainly possible that the conflict with the Houthis could escalate into a conflict between the United States and Iran—either because the United States insists on it or because the Iranians can’t find a way to dance away from it.

Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.