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The answer is no. These Critical Questions use core findings from the academic literature on civil wars and political violence to situate recent tragic events and fundamentally challenge the notion that the United States is on the verge of an internal conflict. The risks of an actual U.S. civil war in 2025 are negligible, and rhetoric to the contrary is counterproductive and inflammatory when analyzed in relation to studies of political violence. The greatest risk on the horizon is not a civil war, but social media–induced tit-for-tat cycles of sporadic violence by lone gunmen.
Q1: What is a civil war?
A1: Not all political violence is organized or a harbinger of a civil war. Modern scholarship defines a civil war as a state-based armed conflict between a government and an internal opposition group that results in 1,000 battlefield-related deaths. This cumulative death toll separates civil war from other forms of political violence like terrorism. Furthermore, there needs to be at least some proportion of deaths from both sides of the conflict, or it isn’t a civil war. It is a one-sided violence that, in the extreme, becomes genocide.
Second, civil conflict involves incompatibility over the government or territory between a government and an organized opposition. Without a sufficient number of battlefield deaths and the presence of an organized opposition, a conflict does not meet the definition of a civil war. There will be political violence, which is sadly a constant across U.S. history, but even most tragic acts like those witnessed in the assassination of Charlie Kirk aren’t indicative of civil war without these above factors.
Q2: What causes a civil war?
A2: Most literature on civil wars tends not to find ideology or political polarization as a primary catalyst. Identity is rarely the cause of this kind of conflict. Rather, the causes of civil wars are often tied to low GDP per capita, a weak central government, safe havens (i.e., harsh terrain where rebels can hide), access to natural resources that rebels can take, and other structural concerns. Furthermore, many civil wars need a cycle of violence in which states repress citizens, leading to dissent and even armed opposition. Even this cycle often tends to lead to protest movements rather than rebellions.
Seen in this light, there are few structural incentives for a second U.S. civil war. The economy is strong, the U.S. government and military are capable, and no group is trying to secede or annex territory to secure natural resources. Instead, the United States has social media and other voices amplifying differences, leading to a sense of polarization. For this polarization to evolve into a civil war, based on literature and hundreds of years of history, it would likely require years of organized violent conflict between the government and a resistance group, a major split or defections at the upper levels in the military, and likely either an economic collapse or major authoritarian consolidation of power.
Q3: How does recent political violence in the United States compare to historical patterns?
A3: A people “numerous and armed” are bound to have a history defined by periodic waves of political violence and civil conflict. From the 1791 Whiskey Rebellion to Bleeding Kansas and the U.S. Civil War, there were numerous small and larger-scale violent episodes in the formation of the nation.
The United States did fight a bloody Civil War that was a secessionist variety that included large splits in the military, battle deaths on both sides that were well above 1,000 people, and lasted four years. The end of the Civil War led to a decisive victory by the North, a common outcome in civil wars. Reconstruction followed, but political violence—particularly in the South, targeting Republicans and newly enfranchised African Americans—remained widespread.
The 1960s and early 1970s, another volatile political time period, saw daily incidences of political violence on college campuses, the bombing of the U.S. Capitol by the Weather Underground, and the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy.
All of these periods likely had more heightened levels of polarization and violence within U.S. society than today. One period that may be more similar to ours is the early 1900s. On the left, anarchists perpetrated attacks like the Wall Street Bombing in 1920, which killed 38 people and injured hundreds more. President McKinley was killed by an anarchist in 1901. During this period, the United States also witnessed a series of mail bombings in 1919 that targeted wealthy industrialists, including John D. Rockefeller. While these high-profile events were tragic and deadly, other violence during this period was from the far-right, including a major resurgence by the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s. Additionally, the Palmer Raids and First Red Scare were organized repressions by the U.S. government against immigrants and suspected radicals. While these events were tragic and violent, this period was never close to what scholars or observers would characterize as a civil war.
Q4: Do Americans think a civil war is coming?
A4: Regardless of what academic studies find, fears can prevail across the population. Yet, there appears to be a disconnect between media coverage, what trends on social media, and the actual opinions of American citizens.
A 2023 national survey found that only 5.7 percent of Americans strongly or very strongly agree that “there will be a civil war here in the next few years.” Also, only 3.8 percent strongly or very strongly think “a civil war is needed to set things right.” In short, few members of the public concur that we are headed towards civil war or that we need to be. The survey was repeated in 2024 with similar results.
Q5: So, is the United States headed toward another civil war?
A5: Based on data, history, academic literature, and scholars who study political violence, the United States is not headed towards a second U.S. civil war. That does not mean the nation will be spared episodic political violence and other unnecessary loss of life. It does mean that the likelihood of a large-scale battle between the government and an organized rebel group that goes on for years, and claims thousands of lives on both sides, is highly unlikely.
Facts matter in these conversations. There is a distinct need at this juncture to lower the temperature of online rhetoric and calm people’s fears. Polarization and hostile rhetoric and actions at all levels of U.S. society are sadly part of modern politics, but they don’t need to be the defining features. After all, despite its turbulent history, dialogue, engagement, debate, and formal nonviolent disagreement are at the heart of the grand American experiment.
Benjamin Jensen is the director of the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Joseph K. Young is a professor and director of the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.
