Photo: Mandel NGAN/AFP/Getty Images
U.S. foreign policymakers would do well to refocus attention on the Caribbean, especially Haiti, even as they struggle to end the costly on-and-off conflict with Iran. The Trump administration began the year with the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, in a swift, tactically flawless operation. President Trump has boasted that he will soon have the “honor” of taking Cuba, where the Communist regime struggles to provide even basic services.
The United States is also backing a multinational force in Haiti, where heavily armed gangs control much of the capital city and surrounding areas, terrorizing the people and destroying livelihoods. Violence over the past five years has devastated a country that was already the hemisphere’s poorest, with some of the highest levels of hunger and illiteracy in the world.
Could an administration that promised to prioritize the Western Hemisphere—under a rebranded Monroe (or “Donroe”) Doctrine—achieve a Caribbean trifecta by addressing the three greatest U.S. policy challenges in the neighborhood? Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela have long been major sources of migration to the United States, an exodus that accelerated in recent years amid economic collapse, political repression, and state failure.
Asserting U.S. preeminence in this hemisphere is not unfolding quite as smoothly as hoped, however. Venezuela’s recovery has been tragically undermined by twin earthquakes that left thousands dead and tens of thousands displaced. Cuba’s leadership resists relinquishing power even as the Cuban people sink further into economic destitution.
Haiti might offer the best opportunity for positive change. The United States rarely pays much attention to the hemisphere’s poorest nation, focusing only when it plunges into chaos amid political turmoil, criminal violence, or natural disaster. But the Trump administration has been quietly leading multinational efforts to finally provide Haiti with an international force capable of opening transportation hubs and, in collaboration with Haitian security forces, restoring order to gang-controlled neighborhoods.
The question is if the United States will lead a sustained, comprehensive effort in Haiti or continue committing mistakes of the past. Haiti’s recent history is one of repeated international interventions, which may improve security over short periods, but end in new cycles of political unrest and gang violence. The lesson is not that Haiti is unfixable, but that short-term security wins are not enough.
So far, U.S. signals on Haiti are mixed: The Trump administration is assisting deployment of a new UN-supported Gang Suppression Force (GSF). It has also named several Haitian gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. But it is ignoring the social, political, and economic deficits that keep allowing violent, corrupt actors to reemerge.
The U.S. government itself inflicted another blow on Haiti by removing the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that allowed some 300,000 Haitian migrants to live and work in the United States. Mass deportations will weaken the already shaky interim government and heighten the country’s severe humanitarian crisis amid ongoing conflict that has displaced approximately 1.4 million people.
U.S. policy is anchored to one core concept: security first and foremost. Success in Haiti hinges on the GSF, which began deploying in April 2026 with the arrival of about 400 Chadian troops. Another 300 Sri Lankan soldiers arrived in early July. By October, the force should include 5,500 personnel from about 18 countries. It replaces the Multinational Security Mission, created during the Biden administration, whose role was limited to supporting and training the Haitian National Police. In contrast, the GSF consists largely of military personnel with a mandate not only to support Haitian security forces but also proactively use lethal force to combat gangs.
Meanwhile police forces backed by private security firms—including Vectus Global, a company founded by former Blackwater CEO Erik Prince—continue to attack gang strongholds in Port-au-Prince, often using explosive drones. These attacks may have halted gang advances in the capital, but they exacted an enormous toll. Authorities have yet to announce the killing of any major gang leaders in the strikes, despite operations targeting residences linked to the country’s most notorious gangster: Jimmy Chérizier, a former police officer better known as “Barbecue.”
A May report by the UN found that in the first quarter of 2026, of the 1,600 people who died during security force operations, about a quarter were bystanders with no known gang connection. Human rights groups have called for investigating civilian deaths and clarifying the command structure that authorizes drone attacks.
Pressure in Port-au-Prince may have another unintended consequence: scattering gangs into suburban and rural areas with little or no police presence. In early July, armed men raided Kenscoff, a rural area on the outskirts of the capital, killing residents, stealing livestock, and displacing some 5,800 people. The gangs have also launched attacks in Artibonite, a department that produces more than 80 percent of the country’s rice, according to an April 2026 report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The report noted that insecurity in Artibonite had forced farmers to abandon thousands of hectares of cultivated land. Another attack on several villages in late March killed at least 70 people, including some who burned to death when gangs set their homes ablaze.
Haiti and its international partners need more than firepower to restore security. They need to bring the gangs and their supporters to trial and then incarcerate those convicted. They also need to develop a broader strategy that will prevent new gangs from emerging in the future.
Haiti’s armed groups have proven remarkably resilient over time. They have graduated from exploiting the poor in certain urban enclaves to working in criminal alliances that have cut Port-au-Prince off from much of the rest of the country. They have also taken advantage of the country’s leaky customs controls to allow contraband, including weapons and drugs, to enter Haiti through official ports and over the porous land border with the Dominican Republic.
But the gangs could not have grown so powerful without enablers: the politicians and businesspeople who enrich themselves by engaging in arms, drugs, and human smuggling. Haiti established specialized investigative units to combat corruption more than 20 years ago, but only a handful of the cases referred to the justice system have made it to trial. Many simply disappear in the system, according to Haitian human rights groups. The justice system struggles to manage even common crimes. The courts face an enormous backlog: More than 80 percent of the prison population is held in pretrial detention, sometimes for years.
Conditions in the country’s stifling, overcrowded prisons are “subhuman,” according to UN human rights expert William O’Neill, with insufficient access to food or medical care. The situation is especially dire for juvenile offenders, who are often housed with adults. Many grow up in detention without ever facing trial.
The interim government has taken steps to overhaul the justice system. It launched two specialized judicial chambers in May 2026 to handle complex criminal cases: One will specialize in financial crimes, such as money laundering, and the other will concentrate on mass-casualty crimes, such as arms trafficking and widespread sexual violence. These efforts are in addition to the government announcement of new prison construction and the appointment of additional prosecutors in July 2025.
Reintegration programs are still in the planning stage. Haitian gangs have held entire neighborhoods hostage for years, generating income and forcing compliance through extortion and kidnapping. Children and teenagers are especially vulnerable to recruitment and coercion. Of the estimated 10,000–15,000 gang members, about half are minors.
The interim government relaunched the National Commission for Dismantlement, Disarmament and Reintegration in February, but funding remains uncertain. A UN report published in late May 2026 mentioned the need to mobilize resources for a dismantlement, disarmament, and reintegration strategy, suggesting options that ranged from a “rapid, quick win” program at an annual cost of $13.5 million to a more comprehensive, multiyear approach, including broader peacebuilding and development efforts, which would cost $100–$150 million.
Haiti has never fully recovered from the massive earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince in 2010, which killed tens of thousands of people, hitting the capital’s poorest residents hardest. Many of those who lost their homes in the quake later succumbed to disease due to lack of clean water and sanitation in the aftermath.
The earthquake accelerated the deinstitutionalization of the already fragile Haitian state. Most of the billions in humanitarian relief was disbursed through international relief organizations, further undermining the capacity of state institutions and local organizations and helping turn the country into a “Republic of NGOs.”
Political turmoil has deepened government dysfunction. The country has not held an election since 2016, and that vote was a do-over after electoral authorities annulled first round results because of fraud. Following the 2021 assassination of Jovenel Moïse, the country has cycled through a series of weak, ad hoc temporary governments.
The U.S. strongly supported the February transition to Haiti’s latest interim government under Prime Minister Didier Fils-Aimé, a business leader who once headed the country’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Fils-Aimé is now Haiti’s sole de facto executive, backed by a fractious pact among dozens of political parties. He’s tasked with holding a shaky governing structure together until security allows for credible elections. Previously scheduled for August 2026, electoral authorities have now scheduled the first round of presidential, legislative and municipal elections for December 13. The Provisional Electoral Council launched voter registration in nine of Haiti’s 10 departments in July, but it excluded the West Department—which includes Port au Prince and about one-third of the country’s entire population—because of gang violence.
Organizing credible elections in the midst of a security crisis is not the Prime Minister’s only challenge. Fils-Aimé recognizes that to sustain any security gains in Haiti, the country must also revive an economy that has now contracted for nearly eight years in a row. “When the guns fall silent,’’ he said in a recent interview, “the jobs must follow.”
But his government lacks the financial wherewithal to meet Haiti’s humanitarian crisis, much less rebuild the infrastructure needed to stimulate economic growth. Government revenues represent less than 5 percent of Haiti’s GDP, compared to about 20 percent in the Latin American region and 30 percent in the United States.
To address the state’s failure to collect revenue, the interim government has reportedly signed a 10-year deal for customs collections with Evergreen Trading System Limited, a firm based in the United Arab Emirates that is linked to Erik Prince’s Vectus Global. Separate agreements with other foreign firms would outsource prison construction and operations, potentially costing the government billions over the contract’s 50-year term, according to a Haitian watchdog group. Yet, the exact terms of these contractual agreements remain unknown to the wider public.
Corruption has been a perennial source of political turmoil in Haiti, sparking mass protests during the Moïse government. The most recent deals, negotiated without competitive bidding, are likely to heighten widespread perceptions of corruption, further eroding trust in the interim government as it prepares for elections.
The State Department acted to keep Fils-Aimé in office, slapping visa restrictions on members of the previous Transitional Presidential Council who had attempted to oust the prime minister. But the Trump administration seems unwilling to spend the political capital needed to bolster a business-friendly leader whose legitimacy rests largely on U.S. support.
U.S. trade preferences are crucial to reviving Haiti’s textile sector, an important driver of an economic group that accounts for 80–90 percent of the country’s total exports. Employment in that sector has collapsed in recent years, down from 60,000 workers in 2021 to 21,575 in 2025. The U.S. Congress, however, allowed legislation providing duty-free entry for most Haitian textiles, the HOPE/HELP trade program, to expire in September 2025, forcing some factories to cut production and halt U.S. shipments.
Yearly extensions do not provide the predictability that international and Haitian businesses need for investment. Congress renewed the preferences retroactively in February but only through 2026, offering at best short-term relief to factories that are struggling to maintain production, much less expand it to generate jobs. (A bill extending the preferences until the end of 2028 has passed the House and is awaiting action by the Senate.)
Withdrawing TPS is another economic blow, not only to the Haitians now subject to deportation, but also to their relatives in Haiti who depend on U.S. remittances for income. “We understand [TPS] is temporary,” Prime Minster Fils-Aimé said, in a rare rebuke of U.S. policies. “But T also stands for timing. This is not the time to send those people back.”
And in another sign of U.S. ambivalence, Haiti has been without a Senate-confirmed U.S. ambassador for more than a year. Ambassador Henry Wooster, who served effectively as chargé d’affaires, will soon leave the country, having been nominated to serve as U.S. ambassador to Kenya.
Nonetheless, Haiti is not a policy dead end. U.S.-led initiatives over the past 18 months point to potential successes, if not-yet-altered perceptions of long-term policy frustrations dating back to the late 1980s. Saving Haiti does not require U.S. boots on the ground. Instead, the opportunity is framed by the UN-backed security commitment being deployed through the GSF and the February 7, 2026, remodeled, if fragile, Haitian national transitional governance structure led by Prime Minister Didier Fils-Aimé.
Yet the United States seems reluctant to spend the policy capital needed to ensure success. The United States can still put Haiti policy back on track by focusing on the following measures:
Haiti policy success is achievable. The right policies are already in train; what they require is focus, energy, and follow-through.
Georges A. Fauriol is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Mary Speck is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at CSIS.
Critical Questions by Georges A. Fauriol and Mary Speck — February 9, 2026
Critical Questions by Georges A. Fauriol and Mary Speck — October 8, 2025
