What Should Korea’s Take on “The Asian NATO” Be?

Mr. Shigeru Ishiba has been a longtime proponent of the Asian NATO. His inauguration as Prime Minister of Japan in October 2024 brought about renewed interest in the idea, especially in Northeast Asia. Questions were raised in national parliaments, government leaders were called upon to respond to the idea, newspapers chimed in with editorials, and academic articles were written. 

Even after his resignation as prime minister, Mr. Ishiba continues to work to propagate his belief in the Asian NATO. This spring, he visited Seoul to make a keynote speech at the Asan Plenum under the theme “Modernizing Alliances,” where he again made a strong case for why we need an Asian NATO. 

Meeting of Minds on the Asian NATO

At the Asan panel exploring this issue, it was interesting to observe an emerging meeting of minds on the Asian NATO. All the panelists expressed understanding of why the idea continues to attract attention in Northeast Asia: the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific; the return of the Russia-North Korea alliance; a more assertive China and shrinking U.S. commitment to the region; and the retreat of liberal multilateralism.

Irrespective of these reasons for renewed interest in the Asian NATO, the panelists also had realistic views on why these reasons are insufficient to lead to the institutionalization of the Asian NATO. They pointed to the lack of a common threat perception among key U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region; lingering historical issues between Korea and Japan; and the absence of a clear and proximate threat. 

Between the widely felt need for the Asian NATO and the bottlenecks to its realization, the panelists proposed not rushing the idea, but steadily building upon the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and further deepening security cooperation among like-minded countries in the region. These efforts will send a potent message to China, Russia and North Korea, and thus have the effect of complementing the set of bilateral security alliances that regional countries have developed with the U.S. Furthermore, if and when the need arises for the formal institutionalization of an Asian NATO, the experience of cooperation among like-minded countries in the region will facilitate that institutionalization.

What Should Korea’s Take on “the Asian NATO” Be?

Sitting through Mr. Ishiba’s keynote speech and the panel discussions, my thoughts constantly came back to the question: what should Korea’s take on “the Asian NATO” be? In fact, I could agree with most of the views expressed by the panelists on the necessity of an Asian NATO, the barriers inhibiting its institutionalization for now, and the way forward. On that basis, I thought about what efforts Korea has made so far and what additional efforts we should make down the road.

Korea has, in fact, been an important actor in developing the multi-layered security architecture. Korea has consistently strengthened its security alliance with the U.S. On that basis, Korea has gradually strengthened security partnerships with the other “spokes” of the U.S. security network in the Indo-Pacific, especially Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. With Japan, President Lee Jae Myung resumed shuttle diplomacy and met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi no fewer than three times in about six months. With Australia, Korea has started regular 2+2 ministerial meetings between foreign and defense ministers. With the Philippines, the two countries enhanced their relations to a “strategic partnership,” and are now strengthening cooperation in the defense industry, maritime security, and military training. The leaders of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, and Japan  opened a new era in trilateral cooperation among the three allies with the historic Camp David summit in August 2023. In the face of the deteriorating security reality in the Indo-Pacific, Korea now has to build upon these efforts and further strengthen each layer of Korea’s multi-layered security architecture.

With respect to Korea’s security alliance with the U.S., this is not a time to question the value of the alliance. Korea is faced with North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, the renewed alliance between North Korea and Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine War, China’s changing strategy on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea’s professed hostility toward South Korea. The Lee government is intensely focused on the return of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. to Korea, with the self-imposed timeframe of completing the transfer during the Lee presidency. The issue was previously carefully reviewed by Korea and the U.S., and a decision was made in 2014 to make the transfer based not on a fixed timeframe but on the fulfillment of three conditions. One of the conditions is that the ROK military must acquire the critical capabilities required to command and lead the future Combined Forces Command (CFC). That condition has not been met. In particular, Korea’s C5ISR capabilities are assessed as needing major improvements. The second condition is that the alliance must have comprehensive, verified capabilities in place to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was formed for that purpose in April 2023. The Group had auspicious start. However, after the leadership changes both in Washington, D.C., and Seoul, the NCG process has effectively stalled. Further progress must be made on these conditions before we move wartime OPCON back to Korea.

With respect to strengthening security partnerships with other “spokes” of the U.S. alliance network in the region, Korea’s efforts lag far behind those of Japan. Japan strengthens partner capacity via its Official Security Assistance program, defense equipment transfers, joint training, and strategic dialogues. With the Philippines, Japan entered into a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) to streamline joint military training and mutual troop deployments in August 2025. These efforts add to Japan’s integrated defense capability and also help to further strengthen bilateral security ties with the U.S. Japan’s efforts should inspire Korea’s approach to strengthening security partnerships with the other “spokes” of the U.S. alliance network in the region.

With respect to lattice-type security partnerships, again Korea is far behind Japan’s efforts. Japan is forging plurilateral security partnerships not only among Korea, Japan, and the U.S., but also among Japan, Australia, and the U.S. and among Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. The Iran War and the closing of the Strait of Hormuz have once again awakened Korea to the importance of securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for trade, logistics, and naval operations. Seoul has a vested interest in the preservation of unimpeded maritime routes. More than 90 percent of Korea’s maritime trade volume passes through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Korea should keep in mind that Japan’s efforts to forge lattice-type partnerships were inspired by similar trade, logistics, and security concerns. 

For the reasons discussed above, the Asian NATO is unlikely to be institutionalized in the near future. However, keeping the issue alive can serve as an aspirational goal. That aspiration will push Korea to further strengthen all the layers of its multi-layered security architecture. Eventually, the aspiration could become more than just an aspiration if the need grows stronger amid a more serious deterioration in the security situation in the Indo-Pacific.