What’s in Canada’s New National Security Plan?

On October 29, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney unveiled the Plan for a Stronger Canada, the country’s first national security strategy in over 20 years. The plan, to paraphrase the prime minister, outlines a strategy to help Canada confront a series of new threats, including the erosion of the rules-based international order as well as new and evolving threats to the country’s sovereignty, such as cyberattacks and the weaponization of trade deals. What’s in the new plan, why is it being issued now, and how is the United States likely to view the Canadian government’s strategy?

Q1: What are the priorities of the new strategy?

A1: The government’s stated aim is to enhance Canada’s strategic autonomy and national resilience in a turbulent and unpredictable world, and to do so under a national security umbrella. For a country that has rarely taken national security seriously, this is a dramatic shift. The five key priorities set out in the document—economic security, foreign policy, defense, intelligence, and public safety—will now be seen primarily through the lens of national security, the definition of which has been well and truly expanded. These priorities will be supported by eight strategic capabilities—critical minerals, defense, emerging technology, food security, energy, transportation, pharmaceuticals and biotech, and payments, settlements, and investments. All of this calls for a whole-of-Canada approach involving the provinces and territories and the private sector, as well as close collaboration with allies.

The framework, at first glance, makes sense. Both the priorities and the strategic capabilities are well chosen and mutually reinforcing. But as you scratch at the surface, it is difficult to see what lies beneath. The strategic capabilities are never defined beyond their title, and their connection to the five priorities is unclear. Most of the document is a bulleted list of things to do under each priority area (some old, some new—it is not always apparent which is which), many of them pitched at a high level and vague. The devil will be in the details, and these will only be revealed with the publication of promised substrategies for the five priorities. These will come out in dribs and drabs over the coming months, but why not publish the whole package at the same time so that Canadians can see how truly integrated and comprehensive the strategy is? Instead, one is left waiting for the proverbial meat on the bones.

The priority areas each follow a similar vein, with broad goals but limited detail. Economic security is listed first, giving it a prominence never seen before in a national security context. Foreign policy will build on Canada’s quest for diversification and strategic autonomy. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) will focus on the “defence of Canada and Canadian interests.” Sovereign intelligence capability will be strengthened, but there is no commitment to create a foreign intelligence service anytime soon. The section on public safety touches on the threats from hostile state actors and criminal groups but says remarkably little about emergency management.

The prime minister prides himself on being a man of action. His new national security framework contains a long list of things to do, but the details, including the cost, will remain a mystery until the substrategies appear. But this is a new conception of national security with a bold vision. It will take time, resources, and a fundamental rethinking of how government operates in the national security space, but it is an important step in the right direction.

Q2: Why is Canada publishing the new strategy now?

A2: The first, and obvious, answer is that it has been two decades since Canada issued a national security strategy, and an update was clearly overdue. One had to go all the way back to April 27, 2004, for the last strategy, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, released by Prime Minister Paul Martin’s Liberal government. That document was drafted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the concerns of international terrorism and how to prevent it were first and foremost, with an emphasis on intelligence, transportation, and border security, among other areas.

The second and deeper answer is that the threat environment as seen from Ottawa has changed significantly in the past two years, and the previous strategy was obsolete with the global war on terrorism having formally ended with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. It can be hard for Americans to understand the degree to which Canadians have been offended and, more importantly, felt threatened by annexation rhetoric and U.S. trade policy under the second Trump administration. These feelings were compounded by U.S. threats to annex Greenland, which have for now subsided with the recent agreement between the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Greenland. This is not to say that Canadians think the United States represents a military threat to Canada, but rather that they understand, perhaps belatedly, that (1) the world they thought they were operating in is rapidly disappearing and that (2) Canada can no longer rely solely on its neighbor to the south and must diversify its diplomatic, economic, and defense relationships, most clearly articulated by Prime Minister Carney in his now-famous Davos speech. Canada has been shaken out of its complacency and is determined to build new economic and military capacity to stand on its own two feet.

The timing of the plan’s release also coincided precisely with an EU-Canada summit held in Montreal, and that is likely not by chance. Carney and Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, have been working toward a much greater partnership, short of accession to the bloc, with talk of Canada becoming the European Union’s first “associate member.” This partnership would be important for delivering on the economic security dimension of the Plan for a Stronger Canada. At their summit, the two partners agreed on a Canada-EU Alliance for the Future consisting of building a common prosperity and economic security space by deepening trade, investment, regulatory alignment, and strategic supply chains, in addition to strengthening collaboration on defense, critical minerals, energy, AI, digital technologies, cybersecurity, and foreign policy. While Canada remains firmly committed to continental defense in partnership with the United States, it will pursue other partners to ensure its economic security.

Q3: What does the new plan mean for the future of continental defense?

A3: The United States is given scant mention in the new framework. This is not surprising given the current state of the relationship. That said, the document does declare that Canada’s approach to the United States will be “cooperative” and “clear-eyed,” and based on “mutual respect, national sovereignty and shared responsibility for the security of North America.” This seems to suggest that Canada understands the ongoing importance of the relationship, especially in the North American space, but that it will continue to defend its sovereign interests in its engagement with the United States. This is the driving force behind the quest for strategic autonomy and national resilience. In short, Canada needs to control its own destiny.

Defense is identified as both a priority and strategic capability in the framework. Reflecting this importance is the government’s commitment to achieve defense spending of 5 percent of GDP by 2035, which is confirmed in the document. Canada already hit the previous NATO target of 2 percent earlier this year.

The document gives the CAF “one clear, central mission: the defence of Canada and Canadian interests.” Traditionally, the CAF’s roles have also included defending North America and contributing to international peace and stability. We can safely assume that protecting Canadian “interests” covers both these missions as well.

While the framework does not discuss continental defense in depth, it does state the government’s intention to make Canada a “defence partner of choice,” including by meeting its commitments to NORAD and strengthening partnerships in the Arctic. Canadian sovereignty will be exercised and protected through a “robust, permanent presence in our Arctic,” working in collaboration with like-minded Arctic countries. These activities, including the partnership with the United States in NORAD, will “anchor [Canada’s] wider role in the hemisphere.”

As part of continental defense and its other roles outside North America, the CAF will become a leader in the concept of “defence in depth” by absorbing the lessons from Ukraine and other theaters of conflict and developing the capabilities and training required to respond to emerging threats on land, at sea, and in the air. Canada will also further grow military capabilities to deter and defend against hybrid warfare and threats in space and cyberspace. Finally, the government, as part of its previously released Defence Industrial Strategy, will build a “robust” domestic industrial base to support the CAF and advance strategic autonomy and resilience. This is part of the government’s ongoing effort to rely less on the United States for its military equipment needs.

In short, the Plan for a Stronger Canada confirms the United States as a critical defense partner, particularly in North America, while at the same time supporting the Canadian government’s aims to pursue strategic autonomy and national resilience through security diversification and the continued growth of the country’s defense industrial base.

Q4: How is the United States likely to view the strategy?

A4: The first question is whether the United States will react at all. Canada is barely mentioned in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, which is not surprising considering the disparity in economic size and military capability.

That said, the Trump administration will like several things in the strategy:

1. First is the commitment to reach NATO’s 5 percent spending target. As mentioned above, Canada currently spends 2 percent of GDP on defense—a remarkable achievement for a country that, only three years ago, spent just 1.3 percent of GDP on defense. The NATO 5 percent target consists of 3.5 percent military spending and 1.5 percent “security-related” spending. Getting to the 3.5 percent will be a great stretch. Achieving the 1.5 percent will not be a major challenge because other NATO countries are interpreting “security-related” broadly.
2. The commitment to NORAD is important because it is vital for both countries. Canada has too much airspace to defend itself, and the United States needs to operate in Canadian airspace to meet threats at a distance.
3. Finally, stopping “illegal guns, drugs, and human smuggling” will resonate. The Trump administration believes that some threats come to the United States from Canada and generally favors border security.

The document wisely avoids discussion of China, particularly as an economic counterweight to the United States. When Canada appeared to be flirting with that notion, the Trump administration reacted strongly. Any hostile presence on the border, north or south, is a U.S. red line.

There are also several things that the Trump administration may not like:

1. The repeated reference to “strategic autonomy” implies gaining some distance from the United States in economics and security. Indeed, there may be a veiled threat in the statement, “We are prepared to protect Canada’s sovereignty, and when it is threatened, we will act.” The emphasis on strategic autonomy is hardly surprising—it may have been the document’s purpose in the first place—but the Trump administration prefers accommodation to resistance.
2. Canada’s strengthened border security apparently includes targeting criminal flows from the United States. This is a sharp contrast to a longstanding U.S.-Canadian tradition of celebrating “the world’s longest unguarded border.” One security uncertainty is what the document means by “defence in depth.” Usually, that means trading space for time; here, it may mean all-domain defense. The definition will affect the United States.

Other implementation details will similarly be critical, as noted earlier, and will inevitably produce more likes and dislikes. This is not the end of the story, but the beginning.

Christopher Hernandez-Roy is acting director and senior fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department Program at CSIS. Vincent Rigby is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Americas Program at CSIS.