Whilst Not a Strategic Alliance, the CRINK Axis Remains a Big Deal

The recent visit by North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui to Russia and Belarus from October 26 to October 30, 2025 was well-timed on the part of Pyongyang, occurring while President Trump was engaging in bilateral meetings with East Asian leaders ahead of the APEC summit. In so doing, Pyongyang signaled to its adversaries that it seeks to continue benefiting from its renewed cooperation with Russia even after any end to the war in Ukraine, and that its relations with other member states of the CRINK (China, Russia, and Iran), whilst not a formalized alliance, look to be sustained in the longer term. So long as Pyongyang, Moscow, Beijing, and, to a lesser extent, Iran, deem it strategically useful to present a united front against the United States and the West, the CRINK axis looks unlikely to break down completely, however and whenever the war in Ukraine ends. 

Choe’s meetings in Moscow with her counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, and Vladimir Putin, reaffirmed ongoing and expanded North Korea–Russia cooperation in security and economic domains. In Belarus, her remarks at the Minsk International Security Conference reinforced North Korea’s intention to collaborate with like-minded states to oppose what Pyongyang terms the “high-handedness” of the United States and “war machine” of NATO. Choe’s visit is the latest example of North Korea emphasizing its ongoing cooperation with Russia amidst the Ukraine War. At the same time, although North Korea’s supply of over 12 million rounds of artillery, up to 300 KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles, and at least 14,000 troops—with the likelihood of sending more—highlight Pyongyang’s diversification beyond its principal economic partner of Beijing, the Kim regime has not sidelined Beijing completely. China continues to assist North Korea in evading sanctions, as recently seen in the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s imposition of sanctions on eight individuals and two firms involved in cyber-related money laundering schemes on November 4. Kim Jong-un is thus pursuing a strategy reminiscent of that of Kim Il-sung during the Cold War, in seeking to maximize economic and political benefits, such as international legitimacy, from Russia, China, and other Western adversaries. 

The CRINK Axis: Bilateralism Within Multilateralism 
The CRINK axis has demonstrated remarkable resilience since Russia invaded Ukraine.  Nevertheless, the most meaningful flashpoints within this axis currently arise from bilateral relations amongst the four countries rather than any formalized multilateral ties. Leaders of the CRINK states have increasingly staged public displays of anti-Western solidarity, such as those between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un at China’s Victory Day parade in Beijing on September 3, or between Kim Jong-un and senior Russian and Chinese officials in Pyongyang on October 10, at a military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. These displays should not be discounted as merely optical. Yet, the gathering in Beijing on September 3 did not see any formal trilateral summit take place between Xi, Putin, and Kim. Instead, discussions occurred through separate bilateral meetings among the three leaders. 

Ties between North Korea and Russia have evolved into a consequential partnership that was arguably unexpected prior to Russia’s invasion. What began as a mere transaction of North Korea supplying Russia with 122 mm and 152 mm artillery shells in exchange for Russian food and financial assistance has grown into an increasingly strategic partnership. The relationship now encompasses deeper security cooperation, including the likely transfer of Russian missile and military technology to North Korea, together with Moscow’s support for Pyongyang’s attempts to undermine international security institutions (not least the UN Security Council), both of which embolden North Korea’s continued nuclearization. Moscow-Pyongyang ties, this year, have also expanded into cultural, educational, and even disaster management domains. 

Less surprising has been Beijing’s ties with Moscow. China continues to be one of the core enablers of Russia’s war, manifest most prominently in its supply of dual-use technologies but also participation in joint military exercises with Russia. China has supplied 90 percent of Russia’s microelectronics, used to make missiles, tanks, and aircraft. In the last quarter of 2023, nearly 70 percent of Russia’s machine tool imports were from China. Moscow and Beijing have affirmed that such cooperation is unlikely to subside. A meeting between Xi Jinping and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on November 4 saw the two sides pledge to continue creating “favorable conditions” to “deepen…bilateral cooperation” and ensure a “high level of strategic mutual trust”. Whilst China’s reluctance to comment on the Russia-North Korea relationship suggests its possible unease at this rapprochement, Beijing’s continued willingness to facilitate Moscow’s war and Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion disputes the claim that China is angered by the cooperation between Russia and North Korea. 

Despite these overlapping interests, the CRINK countries do not have identical foreign policy priorities, nor do they trust one another completely. At its most fundamental level, defeating Ukraine is a far more urgent priority for Russia than supporting North Korea in the longer term. China’s foremost foreign policy concern remains reunification with Taiwan, and Iran’s primary objective remains the survival of the ruling regime. Moreover, none of the four states has expressed an active interest in leading—or being seen to lead—a formalized anti-Western alliance. Whilst bilateral ties between Russia and Iran have been witnessed in Iran’s supply of over 3,000 Shahed drones (largely of the Shahed-136 model) and at least 400 surface-to-surface Fateh-110 missiles to Russia, Tehran remains the weakest member of the CRINK. Neither Pyongyang, nor Moscow, nor Beijing came to Tehran’s aid after the Israeli and U.S. bombings of Iranian nuclear facilities in June of this year. 

Continuity and Change in a Post-Ukraine World 
For all the differences in their individual foreign policies and levels of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, the CRINK’s increasingly public collective displays of solidarity in opposing the United States, its allies, and its leadership of the postwar international order should not be overlooked. During Choe Son-hui’s meeting with Putin on October 27, Putin equivocally stressed how “everything is proceeding according to plan” with respect to Moscow-Pyongyang ties. This plan of ongoing cooperation looks to extend beyond the war in Ukraine.

Although any end to the war will reduce Russia’s need for North Korean military assistance, the two sides’ affirmations of longer-term cooperation should not be dismissed as bluster, given the benefits to both parties. In June, Sergei Shoigu confirmed that the Korean People’s Army would send 1,000 mine clearance experts and 5,000 military engineers to support de-mining and post-reconstruction in the Kursk region. Doing so will simultaneously allow North Korean soldiers to gain experience in post-war reconstruction whilst providing the Kim regime with foreign currency. For Moscow, the recent deployment of 5,000 North Korean workers to Russian factories to produce Geran-2 drones provides a cheap and convenient means of replenishing Moscow’s chronic labor shortages. Kim Jong-un’s claims in September, assuring Russia of North Korean assistance as part of its “fraternal duty,” seem likely to continue, at least for the short term.

Relatedly, whilst any end to the war in Ukraine will lower Russia’s need for Chinese dual-use technologies to support Moscow’s weapons programs, the two states’ continued affirmation of their long-term “no limits” partnership will render it increasingly difficult for the United States and its allies to drive a wedge between them. Although Moscow and Beijing do not have identical domestic and foreign policy priorities, the decisions made by these two largest powers in the CRINK axis will continue to shape the nature and extent of cooperation amongst the axis’s members. 

Beyond bilateralism, trilateral ties between North Korea, China, and Russia look to retain importance in a post-Ukraine world, so long as such cooperation does not impede the individual interests of these states. Iran, however, looks to play an increasingly marginal, though not negligible, role in the axis. The possibility that members of the CRINK expand their cooperation to include other like-minded states, albeit to a lesser degree, cannot be dismissed. North Korea’s recent signing of cooperation agreements with Vietnam and Laos on October 10 underscores Pyongyang’s intention to continue diversifying partnerships, even as it becomes increasingly emboldened through its cooperation with Moscow. Such a strategy was echoed in Choe Son-hui’s exchange with her Belarusian counterpart, Maxim Ryzhenkov, in which both states agreed towards defending “common interests in the international arena” and “strengthen cooperation…to bring relations to a new level”. 

Of course, the CRINK axis should not be overestimated. It is anything but a formalized alliance akin to NATO or the United States’ hub-and-spokes model of relations with Northeast Asian states. Nevertheless, Washington and its allies would be wrong to dismiss it as a mere marriage of “mutual convenience” and, in turn, as no big deal. In fact, it is the enhanced cooperation between members of the CRINK (particularly China, Russia, and North Korea) together with their growing public affirmations of their relations, all in the absence of a formalized alliance structure, that underscores the need for greater, not lesser, attention to this emerging axis. 

Edward Howell is a lecturer in international relations at the University of Oxford and the Korea Foundation Fellow at Chatham House.