Photo: John Lund/Getty Images
Since mid-November 2024, U.S. residents in several East Coast states have reported hovering and low-flying bright lights at night that many observers assess to be uncrewed aerial systems (UASs), commonly called drones. To date, federal and state authorities have been unable to explain or corroborate the sightings, suggesting that some may be attributed to crewed airplanes or helicopters. Despite the inconclusive results of their investigative efforts, government officials have stressed that the sightings do not appear to pose a public safety or national security threat. In the meantime, local residents and lawmakers have expressed mounting concerns, calling on the government to do more to stop the drones and understand their purpose. These are only the latest in a series of drone sightings over the last several years—including over sensitive sites in the United States and allied countries—to confound authorities, raising questions about the ability of the U.S. government to identify and track drones operating in U.S. airspace, as well as assess and respond to UAS threats.
Q1: What have people on the East Coast seen in the night sky over the last month?
A1: On November 19, 2024, the prosecutor’s office in Morris County, New Jersey, issued a press release stating that county agencies were investigating reports of drone activity, which had been observed by local law enforcement officers the previous evening. Since then, residents in other parts of New Jersey and across several nearby states, including Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, have reported dozens of similarly unexplained UAS sightings. The Maryland governor reported seeing dozens of large drones over his residence on December 12, 2024. On December 13, 2024, a Navy public affairs official confirmed that unidentified drones have repeatedly entered the restricted airspace over Naval Weapons Station Earle in New Jersey. Drones have also been reported near other critical infrastructure and the U.S. Army’s Picatinny Arsenal.
The FBI is leading the investigation into the UAS sightings, with support from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and state and local law enforcement organizations. So far, White House, FBI, and DHS officials have all stated that they have no reason to believe the sightings pose any safety or security threat. Additionally, a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the U.S. military is not operating these drones, noting as well that defense officials do not think the drones were sent by a “foreign entity or adversary.” However, lawmakers continue to press federal officials for answers, with senators from New Jersey and New York sending a letter to the FBI, DHS, FAA, and other congressional leaders questioning the federal response during a recent hearing. In addition to expressing frustration about the government’s inability to explain these sightings, many have called on the U.S. military to shoot down the drones.
Q2: Why can’t authorities identify the drones responsible for these sightings?
A2: The FAA is responsible for integrating UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS), which is the air traffic control service managing over 45,000 flights per day across the almost 30 million square miles of U.S. airspace. Drones are difficult to track using traditional radar systems, which best track objects with large radar cross sections and at higher altitudes than ones at which UAS typically operate. Though radar systems sometimes can detect drones, they may mistake those objects for birds since radar alone cannot classify detected objects. That drones can fly erratically and quickly change speeds, as well as operate in large groups or swarms, like many birds, also makes them more difficult to track using traditional radar. Historically, efforts by the U.S. military to identify and track airborne threats to the homeland focus on ballistic missiles and bombers, meaning that sensors and algorithms processing radar data are not tuned to UAS threats. Additionally, not all data from sensors operated by civil agencies, such as the FAA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has been integrated into homeland defense military tracking architectures, meaning that neither military nor civilian officials have the full picture of potential airborne threats in U.S. airspace. In addition to the impacts on drone tracking, the focus on ballistic missiles and bombers and the lack of full military-civil sensor integration partly explains how some Chinese high-altitude balloons flying over the United States during the past several years went undetected, demonstrating what a senior military official called a “domain awareness gap.”
To overcome the shortcomings of traditional radar, officials in New Jersey announced they will be using an advanced radar system that works in combination with a heat sensor and camera to track and identify the unknown drones. Additionally, a network of acoustic sensors can be used, as proven in Ukraine, to successfully identify and track drones. Though it would take time to deploy such a system along the East Coast, the deployment of a similar network of acoustic sensors in the United States, particularly around sensitive sites like critical infrastructure, airports, and military facilities, could help identify and track drones in the future.
Drones weighing more than 250 grams are required to broadcast identifying information, including location and altitude, velocity, and location of the human controller, as part of an FAA initiative called Remote ID. Certain drones, however, such as ones operated by the U.S. government, are not required to broadcast Remote ID signals. Though local law enforcement organizations may have difficulties accessing Remote ID data, federal officials should have access to this “digital license plate” and information about the drones’ operators and operations. That federal officials do not appear to have gleaned much information about the drones and their operators from Remote ID suggests that many UAS are not complying with the Remote ID rule, which went into effect in April 2024 as part of FAA regulations covering drone operations in U.S. airspace.
Q3: How does the United States regulate UAS operations?
A3: The FAA, part of the Department of Transportation, is responsible for regulating U.S. civil aviation and ensuring the safe, efficient use of the nation’s airspace, including by both civilian and military operators. Some states and localities place additional rules beyond FAA requirements on drone operators. The FAA requires the registration of any drone that weighs more than 250 grams (about half of a pound). As of October 1, 2024, there are almost 800,000 drones registered with the FAA in the United States. Two sets of FAA rules cover most drones: one for drones that weigh less than 55 pounds, which the FAA classified as a small UAS, and another for drones larger than 55 pounds.
According to these rules, small UAS operators cannot fly above 400 feet, require authorization to fly in controlled airspaces, such as near airports, and must see their drones at all times while flying, among other rules. Drone operators can qualify for waivers to many of these individual rules, though operators must comply with more rigorous standards to obtain them. While many quad-copter drones weigh, at most, only a few pounds and can fit in the palm of the hand, other fixed-wing drones classified as small UAS have wingspans approaching eight feet. Some drones used for commercial purposes, such as package delivery, chemical and agricultural product dispensing, and air taxis, weigh more than 55 pounds and are covered under specific FAA rules. Additionally, UAS performing a governmental function, no matter the weight, can operate under special rules. Specifically, the U.S. military operates a variety of drones of different sizes, with the largest having maximum takeoff weights of close to 35,000 pounds and 130-foot wingspans—a longer wingspan than a Boeing 737 passenger jet.
Q4: What can the authorities do to stop these drones?
A4: There are a number of technologies, such as signal jamming, cyber operations, kinetic weapons, like bullets, and high-energy weapons, that can be used to disable or destroy drones. No private individual or entity in the United States can legally shoot at a drone, as it is prohibited under federal law to shoot at any crewed or uncrewed aircraft. However, there are certain agencies that can lawfully take counter UAS measures. In 2018, DHS was granted authority to counter UAS threats, but that authority is limited to protecting facilities or assets that support the DHS mission, certain events, and other specified special operations. The ability of the U.S. military to respond to drone threats over U.S. soil is also limited. Interpreting their statutory authorities, defense officials have proposed the use of signal jammers, cyberattacks, nets, and “strong, stringy streamers” to stop drones threatening national security facilities in the United States. Typically, local law enforcement agencies also do not have the authority to disable drones, though the New York Police Department has petitioned federal officials to provide it with such authority, citing the prevalence of drone threats to New York City.
Ultimately, federal authorities assert that these drone sightings do not signal any threat, so regardless of which agency has the authority to disable drones, the absence of a threat negates any need for action. It remains to be seen why Remote ID cannot be used to glean more information about the drone operators. Unless the drones were being operated by the U.S. government, they should be broadcasting Remote ID signals. If none of the drones involved in the sightings had Remote ID installed or broadcasting, federal authorities might as well state as much so as to clarify that discrepancy. If confirmed, the lack of Remote ID broadcasts would suggest that the success of FAA efforts to integrate UASs into the NAS has been limited.
Q5: What other unidentified drone sightings have occurred recently?
A5: No matter the resolution to these recent sightings, these recent reports of unidentified drones are only the tip of the iceberg in both the United States and allied nations. Unidentified drones were sighted operating near a U.S. air base in Germany in early December 2024. In November 2024, unexplained drone operations were reported over four U.S. military bases in the United Kingdom, and a Chinese citizen was arrested for flying a drone over Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. Numerous drones were reportedly observed near Langley Air Force Base in Virginia over the past year. In fact, the joint U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command officially reported in October 2024 that there had been around 600 unauthorized drone incursions over U.S. military sites since 2022. Though the sightings over defense installations during the past year and ongoing events over the East Coast may not pose threats to public safety and security, future ones might.
What the string of unexplained sightings demonstrates is that the United States has an incomplete picture of drone activity in U.S. airspace, primarily due to the unsuitability of traditional radar to track small, low-flying drones. Significant investments in radar infrastructure and federal efforts, including the creation of the FAA, on aircraft traffic control that began in the 1950s laid the foundation for the nation’s air traffic control system that today provides officials a comprehensive real-time ability to monitor conventional crewed aircraft operating across the entire nation. Investments in UAS surveillance technologies on a national scale will be needed to provide the same capabilities to track drones—Remote ID is not enough because an uncooperative or hostile drone operator can simply disable the broadcast. What these sightings also show is that officials are hesitant to take action to disable drones whose operators and purposes remain opaque. In wartime or a crisis, such hesitation could result in casualties and damage to critical infrastructure, possibly under attack by hostile drones. Civilian and military officials should heed this urgent clarion call to improve and accelerate their capabilities to identify, track, and respond to drone threats over U.S. soil.
Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
