Why Open-Source Intelligence Is a Powerful Weapon Against Fentanyl

Fentanyl overdose is a leading cause of death for Americans aged 18–45. In 2024 alone, synthetic opioids killed more than 48,400 Americans. But there may be an untapped path to better understanding and disrupting this deadly trade: open-source intelligence, or OSINT. A quick, action-oriented partnership between industry, intelligence, and law enforcement could disrupt these networks and help save tens of thousands of lives.

Success hinges on better, quicker analysis of OSINT. Both government agencies and private sector companies already collect this data, and industry is inventing new and better tools to draw insights from it. Because OSINT draws from unclassified, publicly available data, it can, in theory, be shared more freely with companies and countries that touch the complex supply chain. In other words, OSINT allows for an all-hands-on-deck approach to a terrible problem: Both government agencies and private sector actors can contribute to this fight, helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals involved in the trade, follow financial flows, and monitor shipping data.

Mapping the Supply Chain: An Increasingly Complex Web

Combating the flow of fentanyl into the United States is a complex, shifting challenge as new source and transit countries emerge regularly, creating a diverse, agile, and resilient global supply chain. China has a complicated role in the flow of fentanyl. Despite broader tensions and strategic competition, counternarcotics cooperation has historically been a relatively strong component of the U.S.-China relationship, and China has strengthened controls on fentanyl and fentanyl-cursors. For instance, in 2019, Beijing placed the entire class of fentanyl-type drugs and two fentanyl precursors under a controlled regulatory regime. Similarly, in June 2025, China added two new chemicals to the list of fentanyl precursor chemicals, and in November 2025, Beijing added 13 precursors to its export control list, which necessitates a license to ship these chemicals to the United States, Mexico, or Canada.

Yet, Chinese companies are still known to produce precursors and pre-precursors. It appears China has taken only limited action against the companies known to produce these substances, citing the legitimate use of certain precursors as a constraint on further action. India has also recently emerged as a main source of these chemicals, and illicit drug actors are notably sourcing precursor chemicals from an increasing number of countries, including the United States and Germany.

Following the production of these chemicals, traffickers based in China, India, or elsewhere then ship them via mail services or smuggle them across the Southwest border to Mexico, where drug actors such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) process them into fentanyl. The finished product is then smuggled into the United States, largely through legal ports of entry and using U.S. citizens. Finally, U.S.-based affiliates distribute the illicit fentanyl throughout the country.

Further, in the age of synthetic biology, low costs for entering the marketplace, and potentially high profits, there is a constant proliferation of new fentanyl analogs. In 2024, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that it received reports of more than 80 different analogs, with new compounds appearing each year. This trend complicates response options for law enforcement officers as traffickers modify products to “avoid classification as illegal, get around policy restrictions on manufacturing, and evade detection in standard drug tests.”

Technology alone cannot solve a problem this complex, but better tools are essential if intel and law enforcement are going to keep up with the rapidly growing web. Technology will help officials find the signal in the noise, process that signal, and recognize the patterns to enable faster and more efficient disruption, before new nodes and strands emerge.

The Power of OSINT

OSINT plus AI-enabled processing tools will provide flexibility and speed for law enforcement and intel officers. For example, publicly accessible maritime traffic data, border crossing cameras, and data from online platforms can all contribute to a clearer picture of illicit fentanyl networks. Some specific examples of OSINT include the following:

• Gathering data from social media platforms: Cartels, their members, and affiliated drug trafficking organizations in the United States “use social media platforms and messaging applications to advertise their deadly products and recruit couriers and dealers,” according to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 2024 National Drug Threat Assessment. Law enforcement officers can search for clues on a suspect’s social media profile and may be able to link illicit drug actors to specific locations by analyzing geotagged posts or key geographic clues on platforms like Instagram or TikTok.

  In 2023, for example, Operation Last Mile relied heavily on intelligence collected on social media platforms. The operation tracked fentanyl and methamphetamine distribution networks across the United States that were affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG. 220 cases were linked to Facebook, 168 to Facebook Messenger, and 99 to Instagram, clearly demonstrating that “social media platforms play [a] significant role in cartels’ ability to get fentanyl and methamphetamine into American communities.”

  But this is often slow, painstaking work, if done by a human. Further, there are restrictions for intelligence agencies collecting anything involving U.S. persons, and there is little to no indication on social media platforms of a person’s citizenship or location. An AI-based system could dramatically improve these efforts in speed, privacy protection, and accuracy.

• Examining financial transactions: OSINT can help investigators follow the flow of money between various illicit drug actors and their assets worldwide. Drug actors, including CJNG, the Sinaloa Cartel, and chemical companies based in China, have “developed sophisticated money laundering techniques that exploit cryptocurrency,” but cryptocurrency transactions can be publicly traced using OSINT techniques and blockchain analysis. Every transaction is recorded on the public ledger, which skilled officials can follow and map, providing important information about the connections between various drug actors, such as Mexican cartels’ reliance on certain companies based in China for precursors, providing valuable insight into which companies are not, in fact, producing precursors for legitimate medical purposes.

• Monitoring darknet and other marketplaces: Although criminals use the darknet to remain anonymous, many make small mistakes that help law enforcement uncover their true identities. For example, investigators may look for related accounts on the surface web. They can search usernames found on the dark web on other platforms—such as gaming sites and social media platforms—to reveal dark web personas.

  Additionally, analysis of writing style and word choice can support claims that two posts were authored by the same individual. This approach unlocked the case of the Unabomber in the late 1990s and, in this case, could reveal a connection between a darknet user who wrote a post selling fentanyl precursor chemicals and a post by an individual on Instagram, helping officials uncover darknet identities.

• Tracking shipping and customs: Authorities can employ various OSINT techniques to identify emerging smuggling routes and methods. For instance, OSINT can help authorities track precursor chemical shipments across the global supply chain, allowing law enforcement authorities to discover new smuggling chokepoints and proactively intercept deliveries. This data can also be used in conjunction with predictive modeling tools to model potential alternative future pathways.

  Further, analyzing advertising (AD) data can reveal insights into an individual’s location. If a new restaurant opens in Washington, D.C., for example, the owner can run a geo-targeted campaign to promote the new business only to users in nearby zip codes. An intelligence professional can analyze which ads are served and when to monitor suspect device activity over time, detecting patterns such as frequent travel to known fentanyl production zones.

OSINT can be generated and gathered in real-time, allowing officials to stay up to date on current events and monitor situations as they evolve. People tend to frequently update their social media accounts, for instance, and financial transactions can be tracked immediately after they occur.

Information as a Lever to Demand Action

Because OSINT relies on publicly available data, it offers advantages over traditional intelligence for information sharing. In principle, U.S. officials can more quickly and easily share OSINT with key foreign partners, such as Mexican, Indian, and Chinese government officials, because there is no need to evaluate the risk of declassification. OSINT can also be shared with state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities, who often lack security clearances but are essential to tracking suspects and making arrests. Similarly, U.S. officials can quickly share OSINT data with key industries—like the shipping industry—that play a critical role in disrupting the transportation of illicit drugs. The ability to swiftly share information is critical because delays allow key enablers time to disappear, as well as to evolve their operations.

Sharing OSINT can also help the United States gauge other countries’ willingness to collaborate. Some U.S. officials, for instance, argue that the Chinese Communist Party maintains significant influence over illicit drug trafficking originating in mainland China but has taken selective action to combat the problem. Using publicly available data, the United States can identify cases that fall within China’s legal framework. A particularly powerful use of OSINT would be distinguishing which Chinese companies are producing precursors for legitimate purposes and which are supplying drug cartels. Washington can then share that information with Beijing, and if it fails to act with these insights, the United States can use this example to highlight gaps in China’s enforcement.

Industry Plays a Role

Private sector intelligence organizations are emerging as a powerhouse of OSINT capabilities. Valued at $12.1 billion today, the OSINT industry is projected to grow to $127.6 billion by 2034, according to Custom Market Insights. These private sector companies have already proven to be crucial partners for government agencies in the fight against fentanyl trafficking.

Companies are enhancing their OSINT capabilities by incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) to automate data collection and analysis. One company is developing “AI models to translate information, detect threats, and analyze political sentiment, with results delivered through a chatbot interface that’s not unlike ChatGPT.” This can be used to track critical issues like fentanyl supply chains. Another OSINT-focused organization analyzed websites, social media accounts, and contact information tied to European advertisements for nitazenes (a synthetic opioid more potent than fentanyl). The firm also referenced business registries to gather information on companies associated with drug sales, and its investigation established a link between nitazenes in Europe and Chinese suppliers. These are only two examples of the many companies taking advantage of new data sources and an explosion of AI tools to provide real, actionable insights in real-time, helping law enforcement and allies disrupt networks.

The fentanyl crisis is one of the most urgent public health and national security concerns facing the United States. As former Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator Anne Milgram highlighted, “Fentanyl is the single deadliest drug threat our nation has ever encountered. Fentanyl is everywhere. From large metropolitan areas to rural America, no community is safe from this poison.” Ending this tragic pattern will require both the know-how and access of industry partners working in conjunction with the authorities and resources of the U.S. government and its allies, both domestically and abroad. OSINT could become one of the key tools that turns the tide in this fight.

CSIS thanks Vannevar Labs for their generous support of this effort.

Julia Dickson is an associate fellow for the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Christina Nordby is a program coordinator with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS. Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.